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United States v. Fumo
655 F.3d 288
3rd Cir.
2011
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*1 individuаlly, respect with Udren practices Court she had learned of based on what the ef- imposi- considered court reversing bankruptcy’s there. Insofar she the future conduct of on fect the sanctions of sanctions. tion her, attorneys appearing before of other Af- permissible. were

such considerations 11 sanc- all, Rule prime goal [of

ter “the of repetition of be deterrence

tions] should County v. conduct.” Waltz improper (3d Cir.1992). 387, 390

Lycoming, 974 F.2d

G. Conclusion use America, that the of technolo- appreciate We UNITED STATES attorneys gy litigants can save both Appellant/Cross-Appellee course, not, money, do time and and we v. that the use of databases suggest mean to FUMO, Appellee/Cross- communications Vincent J. or even certain automated presump- Appellant. counsel and client are between However, re- tively Rule 11 unreasonable. America, Appellant United States rubber-stamping than quires more process by per- of an automated results lawyer. happens son who to be Where Ruth Arnao. lawyer any re- systematically fails take seeking adequate informa- sponsibility 09-3389, 09-3388, Nos. 09-3390. client, representations tion her makes Appeals, Court of United States they are any without factual because basis Third Circuit. pleading” in a “form she has been included out, ignores fill trained to obvious May 25, Argued 2011. may be indications her information incorrect, Opinion Aug. Filed: 2011. said to made she cannot be have Therefore, inquiry. find reasonable we As Amended Sept. court did abuse its bankruptcy Doyle imposing discretion sanctions However, it

or the Firm itself. did Udren in imposing

abuse its discretion sanctions individually.

on Udren

III. reasons, foregoing

For the we will re-

verse District with respect Firm,

Doyle affirming and the Udren

bankruptcy imposition court’s of sanctions. HSBC, respect previ-

With as discussed

ously, jurisdic- the District Court lacked sanctions, we;

tion reverse the as do

therefore, we vacate the District Court’s party, leaving

order respect imposed by bankruptcy

the sanctions

court in affirm District place. We will *6 Memeger, Esq.,

Zane David Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq. [Argued], Pease, John J. Esq., Office of United Attorney, States Philadelphia, PA, Appellant/Cross-Ap- for pellee. Buffone, J. Esq. [Argued],

Samuel Buek- LLP, D.C., leySandler Washington, Peter Ardmore, PA, Goldberger, Esq., for Appel- lee/Cross-Appellant Fumo. Egan, [Argued],

Patrick J. Esq. Eric E. Reed, LLP, Esq., Fox Rothschild Philadel- PA, phia, Appellee for Arnao. FUENTES, GARTH, Before: NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. Democratic came Chairman of Senate THE COURT OPINION OF Committee, put him Appropriations FUENTES, Judge: Circuit of that could of millions dollars control 14, 2010, Dis- July the United States On legisla- his discretion for dispensed be of for the Eastern District trict Court Fumo in the Penn- purposes. tive served Pennsylva- former Pennsylvania sentenced thirty years, for sylvania Senate State to 55 J. Fumo Senator Vincent nia State became widely agreed that he where $411,000fine, and imprisonment, months’ powerful figures of political one the most restitution, arising his $2,340,839 in from in the state. fraud, of tax on 137 counts jury conviction sen- three decades as a state During his justice. A evasion, and obstruction ator, publicly frequently Fumo directed his later, the District Court sentenced week his to attend to paid employees Senate impris- Arnao to Fumo aide Ruth former dur- political and interests personal neеds $45,000 year day, one of one and onment hours, night as at ing working their well fine, joint restitution with and and several Philadelphia weekends. Fumo’s $792,802, arising her upof em- fraud, was staffed ten such tax district office jury conviction on 45 counts evasion, justice. ployees, providing duties included On whose obstruction argues residents of appeal, Government constituent services procedural However, Court made numerous of- District Fumo’s the staffers district. sentences. arriving errors at both campaign also Fumo with provided ten particular, Government asserts personal organizing political assistance: the District Court failed announce mailings, processing bills fundraisers and guidelines sentencing range for final accounts, handling vari- business contending cross-appeals, Fumo. Fumo finances. aspects personal ous Fumo’s the District erred when it de- housekeep- also acted as his Various aides motion a new trial based on nied his er, man- place place, him from drove jury partiality and the District alleged his 33-room aged the refurbishment of admission of evidence related Court’s *7 house, errands, and even personal ran Pennsylvania’s employee ethics law. public During daughter drove to school. his reasons, we will affirm following For Vineyard, trip Fumo’s annual to Martha’s conviction, Fumo’s vacate sentences Massachusetts, would his Senate aides Arnao, Fumo and and remand both for Philadelphia drive from and two vehicles resentencing District Court. before the back, Fumo and luggage filled with guests. also their time his Staffers used I. Philadelphia City to assist a Councilman Background A. and, months, ally who for two was Fumo’s ultimately campaign to advance the of an high-profile Fumo was a Penn- Vincent Pennsylvania gu- unsuccessful Democratic sylvania state at the center of one senator Moreover, Fumo bernatorial candidate. largest in recent political scandals Harrisburg— misused staff in his Senate history. first state Fumo was elected to developed a several renovated and a in of them Senate in 1978 from district State a resi- purchased farm he had 2003 as eventually He be- Philadelphia.1 South at taking part proof tween and the offered In was convicted of the indictment Fumo party place appeal. a local Democratic scheme that we on trial —a decision affirmed Camiel, legislative payroll as workers on the state F.2d 31 See United States “ghost employees.” was Fumo’s conviction Cir.1982). overturned because of variance be- later trash, streets, removing In ex- enterprise. sweeping dential and business trim- trees, snow, for change, arranged Fumo salaries his ming clearing and cleaning greater employees substantially that were alleys and abandoned lots. Citizens Alli- than Senate designated those State funding аnce received much of its comparable employees. for Senate grants obtained from the Fumo state and other entities. In after Fumo non-staffers, such provided Fumo also litigation brought challenging utility contractors, members, family girl- and rates, Philadelphia Electric Company resources, friends with access to Senate (“PECO”) privately agreed donate $17 and including laptops computer assistance. part million Citizens Alliance as of a Further, he used Senate funds hire agreement. settlement The existence of non-legislative contractors for tasks. For million only contribution became $17 instance, $40,000 obtained a Fumo state public knowledge in November when who, in investigator contract for a private reported by it was Philadelphia In- activities, legitimate addition to his con- quirer. million, After the influx wife, $17 ducted surveillance Fumo’s former expanded Citizens Alliance the scope of its girlfriends, ex-girlfriends’ boyfriends, and work, acquiring times, properties renovation, for political rivals. He obtained an $80,000 opening school, charter and attempting for a state contract consultant who develop spent building high-tech much his time office for assisting Fumo $45,000salary companies. with and a political races spent an individual his who most of time However, expanded concurrent with its assisting with Fumo’s farm. Mitchell efforts, began Fumo and Arnao to use Rubin, the and boyfriend later husband of Citizens Alliance their personal funds for Arnao, paid $30,000 Ruth per year for benefit, $90,000 including for tools and much, if years, doing any, five without $6,528 vacuum and cleaners floor ma- work at all. chines used Fumo’s homes. Citizens In order to facilitate his use of provided Alliance also Fumo and his staff purposes, falsely vehicles, funds for his own $38,000 minivan, including a represented employees contrac- and $52,000 luxury SUV, $25,000 jeep. and receiving payment by tors were Senate total, $387,325 more than went towards performing legitimate legisla- proper acquiring vehicles for maintaining they tive only partially functions that Fumo, Arnao, aides, legislative use of completed, never fact failed dis- Further, family members. Citizens Alli- *8 private political close the and services ance the of became landlord Fumo’s office they actually performing. were Fumo also on Street in Philadelphia. Tasker While provided job descriptions false elevat- and $90,000 spent the Senate in rent during a ed position classifications that conflicted period, five-year spent Citizens Alliance with that employees actually the duties $600,000 maintain, furnish, over to and carried out. rent Fumo’s office at a to him discount. The office also campaign served as his

In and Fumo his staff founded a Further, headquarters. office and ward non-profit organization became known paid phones Citizens Alliance for cell for as the Neigh- Citizens Alliance for Better many staffers, (“Citizens Alliance”). of Fumo’s as well as his Arnao, a borhoods $39,000 paid It also for daughter. Fumo’s staff, Senate on became employee Fumo’s $50,000 trip to with five and its director. stated Cuba friends Citizens Alliance’s dog” purpose improve Philadelphia was to for a “war memorial Bucks Coun- neighborhoods through projects ty- such as um, help to the museum expected but were Alliance violation

Fumo used Citizens 501(c)(3)rules charitable or- Fumo develop federal for and solicit donors. While $250,000 for having pay ganizations by way much in the did not donate solicit $20,000 a polling, for lawsuit political ISM, he his of donations for the did use rival, $68,000 sup- to a and against Senate grants to obtain for the museum influence to Government’s con- opposition port Howev- from the state and other entities. shore, along Jersey dunes struction er, ISM, he also expense at the his have blocked seaside which would repeatedly yachts pleasure used its for the ocean and its view of reduced house’s for ship and its models decorations cruises oppose the value. In order to property and personal his home office. These dunes, had his Senate counsel create Fumo resources, were uses of the ISM’s nonprofit entity “Riparian called Defense Carter, approved by president John ISM’s Fund, from Inc.” to funnel funds Citizens policies were in violation the museum’s Alliance, then the IRS and and misled and later claimed that he bylaws. Fumo Secretary as Pennsylvania of State to the yachts help money used raise for organization. and purpose nature paid and that he museum sometimes Further, political misrepresented Fumo for use. their expenses “community de- campaign and as In investi- began Government velopment consulting” expenses on Citi- December, Fumo. the Philadel- gating filings, deceiving zens Alliance’s tax phia published a of articles Inquirer series yet again. IRS and about Alliance’s use of funds Citizens had his Just he done with relationship Shortly Fumo. there- Alli- employees, Fumo directed Citizens after, computer Fumo directed a techni- mat- personal ance staff to assist with his cian on his staff ensure all emails ters, Jersey his traveling to house on and Fumo others were deleted. and paint and dock and repair shore his Inquirer ran an entitled When article trash, deck, undertaking picking up and January “FBI Probes Fumo Deal” They other errands and tasks. also fre- 2004, Fumo involved additional Senate and his quently cleaned served Philadel- at- expanded scope aides and of his home, and phia equipment and delivered tempts Throughout to delete emails. Additionally, his personal items to farm. Arnao, aides, his email including deleted $27,000 paid Alliance Citizens bull- from numerous computers communica- traсtor, truck, dozer, dump an all- lawn devices, comput- tion “wiped” then vehicle, pickup and a F-150 terrain Ford using sophisticated programs ers in order Harrisburg-area truck for farm. Fumo his prevent analysis. forensic These efforts Arnao funds never disclosed the used wiping computers at Arnao’s included Fumo’s personal benefit Citizens Despite home and Citizens Alliance. accountants, Alliance’s and when asked efforts, Fumo’s two of aides involved accountant, those Arnao about funds kept oth- deletion emails between each purpose. misstated their Arnao *9 er, in- including regarding emails Fumo’s repeated misrepresentations also made computer structions to eliminate evidence journalists about Alliance how .Citizens and of the fraud. spent it its funds. the Fumo served on of directors board B. Trial The Independence Seaport Museum

(“ISM”). Ar- charged Fumo and Board The Government members did receive the nao what to later become a compensation or benefits from muse- under was 1 Executive Director of the superseding indictment. Counts State Ethics count (the “Commission”), on Penn- through 64 related fraud the Commission the body Senate, through sylvania charged State Counts enforcing the Ethics Act. Alliance, 1103(a) on Counts 99 98 to fraud Citizens of prohibits Section The Ethics Act tax 103 to evasion Citizens through or public employee official from engaging Alliance, fraud through 108 to Counts in conduct that constitutes a “conflict of ISM, through 141 to on and Counts 109 interest,” § defined 1102 as the justice conspiracy to obstruction of and by public official or employ- “[u]se justice. of was commit obstruction Fumo authority of ee of his office employ- counts, including all but charged ... the private pecuniary ment benefit trial, 100 and 102. At Counts Govern- himself, of of a member his immediate voluntarily ment moved to dismiss Counts family or a business with which he or a Fumo. Arnao was against 36 and 38 of his family member immediate is associ- counts, charged including Counts 65 ated.” 98, related to the fraud on Citi- through trial, Prior Judge to the Yohn had found 100, 102, Alliance, 99, zens Counts and “well qualified” expert Contino be as an evasion, 109, related to tax and Counts ruled it “appropriate and that was for him 121, 124, 126, 127, 129, 132, 134, and relat- (J.A. 431). talk about the Ethics Act.” justice. of ed to obstruction trial, During Contino testified toas how originally assigned The case was and to whom the applied, Ethics Act Yohn, Jr., H. Honorable William and after nature, mandatory whether was and delay satisfactory some while Fumo found legislature to how apprised was counsel, jury began defense selection on Ethics Act inter- Commission’s 8, September 2008. After case was it. pretation of Contino also referenced reassigned to the Honorable Ronald L. abridged versions of the Commission’s Buckwalter, jury selection resumed on Oc- opinions, summarizing violations that were tober 2008. The trial lasted an addi- сonsidered and ruled upon the Commis- months, five proceedings tional with the not, however, sion. He did express an By on Fridays. halted the time it rested opinion as to whether Fumo’s own actions January 26, on its case the Govern- violated the Ethics orAct whether Fumo ment had called 80 witnesses its case-in- guilty of the charges against federal chief. The then called an defendants addi- him. witnesses, including tional 25 Fumo him- extensively Government also cross- self, February and rested their case on subject examined Fumo on the of the Eth- 16, 2009, days 2009. On March after four knowledge Act his specifically ics deliberation, jury convicted Fumo of of it. At the understanding time him, all presented 137 counts against cross-examination, pro- the District Court presented Arnao of all 45 counts against limiting jury, vided instruction to the her. reminding required them that no law A during number of events occurred to study reports the decisions or trial that Fumo now asserts as the bases the Commission. First, tri- cross-appeal. during his trial, At the conclusion of the al, the Dis- the Government called J. John Contino jury trict Court further instructed the expert testify as an witness to about Act, them telling they the Ethics Pennsylvania Employee Public Official and Act, could ... [such] Ethics 65 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. “consider evidence *10 (the Act”). et seq. [they] light “Ethics the it Contino is extent that find sheds on — defraud, (Sunday evening before Mar. 8: willfulness, intent to of questions deliberations): day “[Juror 1] of the second of that faith” but “violation good ...”3 tomorrow by is not sure about not be considered ethics laws should of federal a violation implying [them] — (end day 9: of second of delib- Mar. they “may not con- law” and that criminal erations): says today was 1] “[Juror alleging any of of the counts vict tomor- expected than much better attempted to execute conspired or that he promising too!” row looks money the Senate of defraud a scheme — (Friday completion after Mar. 13: the on property simply basis or deliberations): “Stay first week of of may violated conclusion that he have Mon- big for the announcement on tuned 4363). (J.A. ethics law.” state everyone!” day jury delibera- March while On 587-88). (J.A. a local television sta- ongoing, tions were jurors, one of the here- reported tion that appeared comments l’s Facebook Juror 1,” had made to as “Juror inafter referred trial, many the months of the over Twitter on Facebook and postings both his he midst of dozens of other comments night, the trial. That related to pages trial. It to the was made unrelated jury re- night was the before the subject final, that post March 13 was verdict, watching turned its Juror was to Twit- regard of media attention. With the media when he learned that television ter, single or made a comment Juror made following comments he had it stating on March “This is “tweet” pan- He subsequently on the internet. 587). (J.A. now!” looking ... no back his icked and deleted comments of l’s Face- Fumo learned Juror When page. Facebook comments, he moved book Twitter them, deleting Prior to Juror 1 made disqualify jury. Juror 1 from the Facebook following comments on his Court held an in camera review District during the trial: jury “wall” selection and issue, and his questioned Juror about — contin- Sept. (apparently upon a 18: two and his activities these websites illness): to judge’s uance of the trial due 1 told consumption. media Juror general re- got he a week glad 1] is “[Juror report judge he saw the news money but could use the prieve, still watching anoth- night because he had been began. local He er show when the news — referring to (apparently Jan. 11: avoided explained nevertheless he had case): government’s “[Ju- the end of the trial. He during news the entire television if wondering this could be 1] ror affirmed he had not discussed also week to end Part 1?” anyone. case with Juror substance — today 21: wonders if “[Juror 1] Jan. 1 further stated that he had made really will be the end of Part 1???” my just get “for benefit to out comments — head, (conclusion argu- my blog posting similar to closing Mar. 4: (J.A. ments): somebody something.” journaling can’t tomor- believe “[Juror 1] 589). may actually row be end!!!”2 responded to the 8 Face- 4 Face- 3. A friend March responded

2. A to the March friend "Why?” respond- post asking Juror 1 post asking Juror 1 book “of what?” book (J.A. 5 months dear.” say LOL.” ed: "think of the last responded: “Can’t till tomorrow! 592). (J.A. 30). n.

299 opinion, In a written the District Court Fumo permission to take free yacht no determined there was evidence trips, doing time for fraud. The that Juror received outside influence due judge want didn’t jury know or postings to his Facebook Twitter Carter, about either. that, although concluded in violation of his (J.A. 703-04) (emphasis original). instruction to discuss the case outside There any was no evidence that ju- other room, jury they “nothing of the were more ror had of prior learned Fumo’s conviction having than harmless no ramblings preju- Carter, of conviction and the other They vague dicial effect. were so as to be jurors five by interviewed Cipriano did not 592). (J.A.

virtually meaningless.” mention either fact. three after More than months the ver- The motion, District Court denied the dict, sentencing, but before Fumo filed a concluding that the information was an trial, for a attaching second motion new insufficient basis hold a hearing and Cogan. affidavit counsel Dennis that, everything by even if asserted Juror journalist affidavit asserted true, 2 were it would not constitute the Ralph writing Cipriano, Philadelphia showing of prejudice substantial required Magazine, Cogan had contacted regarding grant trial. new during post-ver- information he obtained jurors. dict interviews several Ac- Sentencing C. by an article cording Cipriano, written July On the District Court held a morning day on of March of the sentencing hearing at parties which the verdict, jurors all of the had heard media arguments made reports Juror directed at the about l’s use Facebook sentenc- Further, juror ing guidelines and Twitter. another here- calculations for both Fumo 2,” inafter referred to as “Juror indicated and Arnao. The adopted Government at her workplace Friday, that while position of Report Pre-sentence several her of co-workers informed Fumo’s (“PSR”), which divided Fumo’s crimes into prior conviction, overturned as well as the two groups pursuant §to 3D1.2 of the imprisonment of conviction and John Car- Sentencing Guidelines—the made up first ter, president former of the ISM. Both of of the 134 fraud and justice obstruction of these had previously facts been excluded counts, consisting second by trial Spe- the District Court. (Counts 99, three tax evasion counts cifically, the article that Juror stated had 103). Cipriano told that: As to first group, began the PSR stopped Co-workers and talked with a base offense level of under media, things about in the such as 2Bl.l(a)(l). § U.S.S.G. It added then conviction, prior Fumo’s subse- 2Bl.l(b)(l)(J) § levels under because it quently judge, overturned for hir- calculated the loss from the fraud to be employees. ing ghost Judgé Buckwalter greater $2,500,000, specifically than repeatedly prosecution turned down re- $4,339,041. The PSR then added levels quests tell the jury prior about that 2Bl.l(b)(8)(A) § under because conclud- conviction. But any- [Juror found out 2] misrepresented ed Fumo he was act- way, though up even she her held hands ing organization, on behalf aof charitable

and told co-workers: don’t Please talk to Citizens Alliance. Similarly, it added 2 me, I can’t discuss the case. Co-work- 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C) levels under Carter, because the ers ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‍also told her that John for- mer fraud the use president Independence sophisticated involved Sea- Museum, port guy means, gave and the who corpora- used a shell *12 300 2- apply also to the

tion, purchase to District Court declined Leasing Corp., Eastern and conduct sophisticated use enhancement for means personal vehicles for his level firm consulting used a polling, Additionally, and political group. the evasion tax role a lawsuit a to conceal his conduit departures requested downward two The political his rivals. against one of physical on his health under based under an 4 levels PSR added additional extraordinary public § 5H1.4 and for ser- 3Bl.l(a) organiz- as the § for Fumo’s role § The vice under 5H1.11. District Court fraud, and 2 levels the er or leader of judgment reserved the former and denied in a position § 3B1.3 he was under because until the final the latter on 3C1.1, § it Finally, under public of trust. adjusted hearing. reduced offense With of 2 levels obstruction added for Fumo’s the and tax of and 24 for fraud levels 31 during of the of- justice investigation combined groups, respectively, evasion fense, 2 of and for his obstruction levels 3D1.4(b), § 32 offense level became under at trial. justice perjuring himself guideline range into a of 121 to translating total, adjusted the PSR calculated Fumo’s imprisonment. 151 months’ group as 39. level for the fraud offense July the District held an- On group, As the tax evasion the PSR hearing. the Govern- lengthy other When of 24 under began with a base offense level ment learned that the Court had calculated 2Tl.l(a)(l) 2T4.1(J) §§ because months, range 121 to it guideline a of 151 $2,500,000, and tax was more than loss variance, sought upward arguing an $4,624,300. It then added specifically adjusted range adequately rep- did 2Tl.l(b)(2) § the of- under because levels the full resent or take into account loss means, a sophisticated for fense involved fraud, damage from the insti- adjusted total level of 26. offense tutions, trial, at alleged perjury Fumo’s group’s the tax evasion offense Because conduct, al- other obstructive and Fumo’s level of 26 more than 8 levels below The leged lack of remorse. District Court 39, pur- group’s the fraud offense level vary upwards. It also denied declined 3D1.4(c), no levels suant additional departure on request Fumo’s for a Ac- larger were added to the of the two. Then, of medical condition. after basis his calculated, and the cordingly, PSR hearing spoke six on witnesses who argued, Government District behalf, reviewing Fumo’s hundreds of adjusted find total Court should Fumo’s public, that Fumo letters from found level 39 and his criminal offense to be public and ... had “worked hard for the I, category to be history would extraordinarily hard” that it worked such guideline range mean a of 262 to 327 guide- “grant a from the departure would imprisonment. months’ (J.A. 1622-23). lines.” Without enunciat- day July hearing, The after the guideline ing any range modification to the ruling District Court issued order months, the District Court apply it would not the 2-level enhancement impris- then sentenced Fumo to term of 2- misrepresentation, for charitable months, years super- three onment of 55 sophisticated level enhancement for release, $411,000 fine, $13,700 vised means, or the obstruction of second 2-level assessment, $2,084,979 in restitu- special justice trial. perjury enhancement tion, $255,860 prejudgment interest It loss from the also calculated total restitution. $2,000,000 $2,379,914 fraud to be —about Fumo filed Motion Correction less than the Government’s calculation under Federal Rule of Criminal a reduction of additional levels. Sentence 35(a), asking Procedure the Court to re- the defendant. I did not announce what solve various issues related to the sen- *13 specific guideline level the offense fell Among tence. raised issues was the into; say, that is to precise number had, fact that the District Court during the by of levels I which intended to depart July sentencing hearing, three times because until I considered all other sen- referred to the sentence a “departure” as factors, tencing I could not determine in guidelines range. from the The motion precise months the extent that I would papers noted that a sentencing “[w]hen vary guidelines. from the court grants ‘departure,’ a true op- [as Having advised counsel of the offense variance,] posed to a it must ‘state how the level I that found my intent to de- departure affects the Guidelines calcula- part downward, I proceeded then tion.’ This Court[ ] fail[ed] make such a hear from counsel respective their anal- (J.A. 1629) statement....” (quoting Unit- yses of what an appropriate sentence Tomko, ed States should be. Cir.2009) (en banc)). They suggested also procedure The I followed was perhaps context, appears “[i]n it more akin to that associated with a vari- Court intended the sentence as a statute- ance than a downward ‘variance,’ departure based be- designed to achieve a cause I punishment never greater sufficient but not announced nor I than have ever necessary objectives to fulfill the set forth determined to what guideline level I had 3553(a)(2), § at 18 U.S.C. rather than as a departed. Ultimately, the argument ” ‘departure.’ Guidelines Manual-based over which it was elevates form over (J.A. 1629). Fumo asked that the Court substance. (J.A. 1629). “correct this technical error.” (Sealed 185-86). App. The Statement of response, Government filed a contest- Reasons further indicated that the Court ing Fumo’s characterization of the Court’s granted had departure Fumo a under below-guideline sentence as a variance and § 5H1.11 of Sentencing Guidelines for noting repeatedly that “the Court stated Record, “Military Service, Charitable Good that it grant departure decided to mo- Works.” (J.A. 1635). tion based on service.” sentencing Fumo, After the District The following day, the District Court a sentencing held hearing for Arnao. issued a Order, Memorandum and originally recommended, The PSR and the among things, explained other that “[t]he Government argued, the loss from government correctly states that the court Arnao’s fraud was between $1 $2.5 it granting announced a departure. million, leading to an offense level of 23 Thereafter, the court never enunciated the 2Bl.l(b)(l)(I) § under of the Sentencing guideline and, level to which it departed, Guidelines. The PSR also recommended fact, never reached the it by sentence did 2-level enhancements for the use of so- consulting any specific level on guide- means, phisticated misrepresentation on (J.A. 1653). line chart.” The District behalf of a organization, charitable Court also filed a Judgment and a formal justice, obstructions of generating a total Statement of Reasons. The Statement read, adjusted offense pertinent level of 29. part: Just as for Fumo, the PSR’s offense level calculation

I next determined whether there for the tax evasion group began with a should be a departure from the guide- base offense lines and level of and then announced аdded hearing that there levels should be because the sophis- based offense involved my finding extraordinary good means, works adjusted ticated for a total offense responds that evidence The Government grouping rules level of 26. Under Act was of substan- regarding Ethics 3D1.4, levels added two additional were necessary to tial relevance because it was making higher level of to the offense approve did not show that Senate offense level 31. combined With using expenditures the kind of Fumo made I, category history criminal entailed well that Fumo money, state as show 135 months. sentencing range of 108 to intended to deceive the Senate mislead- re- hearing, the District Court At the how ing spending about he was *14 jected the means enhance- sophisticated money. The Government notes that this the ment and determined that loss particularly given true Fumo’s initial was than the Alliance fraud was less Citizens theory of case at trial —that no rules or the $958,080, $1,000,000, specifically thus and employing Senate laws barred resources group the and tax evasion reducing fraud use, personal his or that if there were 24, respectively. levels to 25 and offense rules, entirely vague, they such that were level created a combined total offense This unclear, Fumo also ini- and unenforced. §of 3D1.4 grouping of 27 under the rules regard- tially planned experts to call three sentencing range 70 to guidelines and a of ing their with the “customs experiences im- 87 The District Court then months. Senate,” practices focusing spe- and of the posed year a of one and one sentence “accepted cific attention on uses of staff day substantial downward variance —to —a they comport other and resources counts, concurrently years’ run on all three Act.” (Gov.Supp.App.64). the Ethics release, fine, $4,500 $45,000 supervised assessment, theory of special light and of Fumo’s restitution to Citi- case, $792,802, of the content and enforcement Alliance in the amount of zens clearly Ethics Act was relevant to the Gov jointly severally and with Fumo. ernment’s claim that there were rules that II.4 repeatedly, Fumo broke those rules understand, enough him were clear to Appeal of Fumo’s conviction deceiving and to show that he was relating Pennsylva- A. Evidence to the misrepresented he or omitted Senate when nia Ethics Act aspects expenditures of his actions and to conviction, In his appeal of he perception avoid had violated argues presented that the Fumo evidence evidence, it those rules. Without regard Government with to the very would have been difficult for the Gov state Ethics Act to the fed was irrelevant prove intent. ernment fraudulent See him, charges against eral criminal and was 24 Copple, States v. F.3d 545 United highly prejudicial likely it was (3d Cir.1994) because intent (“Proving specific jury suggest and, confuse difficult, mail cases as a fraud was in violation of state law. The District result, policy developed has liberal rulings admissibility regarding Court’s government allow the introduce evi testimony expert of evidence are re even bears on the peripherally dence that intent.”). Further, viewed for abuse of United the District question discretion. Mathis, jointly drafted in jury States F.3d Court read Cir.2001); struction, Serafini, and after during States v. both the trial United (3d Cir.2000). emphasized that Fumo closings, F.3d 768 n. 14 3742(b) § jurisdiction jurisdiction pursuant 4. The District Court had over this U.S.C. § matter under 18 U.S.C. and we have U.S.C. violating mandatory was not on trial for the Ethics nature of the rules was a de- Act, violation of scription and that even a the Ethics some of Commission’s dis- imply Act that he defraud- itself did not ciplinary opinions, penalties and the ed or defraud the conspired to Senate. imposed were for violations of the rules. finding The District Court’s that evidence properly The Government posed ques- also Act was relevant related to the Ethics tions to Contino about whether certain unfairly prejudicial not abuse hypothetical facts would constitute viola- discretion. tions of the question- Ethics Act—a line of it ing suggested pretrial had disclo- Similarly, was not an abuse pursued light sures and later of Fumo’s permit discretion for the District Court to theory of the case. Contino, John Director of the State Commission, testify Ethics about the Finally, the Government’s cross-ex previously explained Ethics Act. We have subject amination of Fumo on *15 “[wjhile permissible it not for a is Ethics Act appropriate. was also During to testify governing witness to as the law examination, direct Fumo testified that it duty since is the district court’s to ex rules[,]” “there are no as to his exercise of plain jury, the law to the our Court has discretion regarding spending and that expert testimony concerning allowed busi “there are no guidelines” as to whether practices.” ness customs and United personal staffers can do errands for law (3d Leo, 181, States v. 941 F.2d 196 Cir. (J.A. 3967). makers. He then claimed 1991). practices These customs and will that “none of is written any down applicable legal regula sometimes include where, up and I think left it’s to the discre tions, requirements such registration as tion of you the senator do that to as see fit for registration securities under the Secu (J.A. and appropriate you as need and it.” Acts, Berckeley Grp., rities Inv. Ltd. v. 3967). Accordingly, order to impeach Colkitt, (3d Cir.2006), 218-19 F.3d this testimony, the Government under Davis, rules, or Medicaid States v. United standably questioned Fumo about his fa (7th Cir.2006). 471 F.3d Similar miliarity reports with the annual ly, expert may also testimony concern eth Commission that were sent to him person public ics rules and laws to related officials ally. having Fumo denied ever read the government and contractors. reports Commission, annual the of al Appropriately, never Contino testified as though being he admitted aware them. himself to whether had Fumo violated the merely Yet because this line of questioning Act, Ethics guilty or whether he was did not turn directly out to fruitful be any of the with crimes which he was although very it well Government— charged. properly explained Contino also may credibility- have undermined Fumo’s disciplinary proceedings, Commission’s it does not mean that was irrelevant or advisory opinions, its and the annual re- unfairly prejudicial. precaution, As a how port publishes, is distributed to ever, the District instructed jury Court every legislator. state This was evidence was, among things, Fumo other question relevant to the of whether Fumo required reports. to have read the annual rules, was aware of the Senate ethics and sum, the District was well thus had an intent defraud when he within the bounds of discretion in ad- represented in way and omitted facts a testimony mitting expert of Confino falsely appear that made him be cross-examination compliance permitting rules. Part of those Con- explanation tino’s Fumo on the Act. seriousness and issue of Ethics jury’s party seeking assume that Challenges fairness it must B. jury impartiality hearing prove is able id., information, with extraneous presented rulings of challenges two Fumo “the defendant determine whether denying his motions the District Court likely prejudice’ suffered ‘substantial jurors’ exposure account of a new trial on Lloyd, jury’s exposure.” result of the information, pur and the extraneous omitted). (internal at 238 citation F.3d may partiality ported prejudice order have We review court’s resulted. on Facebook 1. Juror l’s comments alleged trial based on “which denies new and Twitter discre information for abuse of prejudicial Urban, 404 F.3d tion.” States v. United that Juror l’s comments argues Cir.2005) (internal quotation brought wide- on Facebook and Twitter omitted). “A new trial war and citation jury’s public attention to the delib- spread likely if suffered ranted the defendant erations, creating “cloud of intense and prejudice’ as a result of ‘substantial ... and widespread coverage [the] media informa jury’s exposure the extraneous im- expectation that a verdict [wa]s Lloyd, (quoting tion.” Id. United States minent[,]” his thereby violating Sixth (3d Cir.2001)). “In ex to a right impartial Amendment fair and prejudice, we must conduct amining for 131). Br. (Cross-App’t trial. Fumo also objective analysis by considering prob *16 1 that the fact that Juror watched argues in allegedly prejudicial effect of the able news, evening in which his own inter- ju a hypothetical average on formation discussed, implies or net comments were at 238 (quoting Lloyd, ror.” Id. F.3d may suggests compro- that he have been (internal omitted)). Yet, quotation partiality. mised bias or into may inquire only “court the existence Com- the Judicial Conference of information” and not “into extraneous and mitteе on Administration Case subjective effect of such information Management published proposed model jurors.” particular Wilson v. Vermont jury regarding instructions “The Use of (3d Inc., Cir. Castings F.3d Technology Electronic to Conduct Re- 1999). a on or about search Communicate Case.” “If there is reason to believe the impor- the instructions focus on While jurors exposed prejudi that have been jurors consulting of websites or tance information, judge obliged cial trial is or information blogs research obtain exposure of investigate effect case, they caution in- about also the trial.” on the outcome of United jurors on the use of social media: struct Console, States v. 13 F.3d Before Trial: omitted). Cir.1993) (internal quotation However, required con the court is not deliberate, you you retire to Until investigation duct an where insufficient anyone, may not case with discuss Further, factual basis it exists. Id. you your jurors. After re- even fellow even if foundation a has been established deliberate, you begin may tire to dis- claim, court need not hold jurors, fellow cussing your the case with party “at the of a whose hearing behest you the case with cannot discuss but allegations if established would not entitle you Gilsenan, until have returned anyone else it to relief.” United States I (3d Cir.1991). an end. the case is at According verdict and is hearing, you if for all of this case ly, hope to hold a Court declines noteworthy. enthusiastically I know We endorse in- interesting and these many you phones, cell Black- of use strongly structions encourage district berries, and other the internet tools routinely incorporate courts to or them must not talk to technology. You also language similar into their own instruc- or use anyone about this case these tools juror tions. Not who with speaks unlike electronically any- communicate friends or family members about a trial your about the case. This includes one returned, juror before the verdict is who family may You not com- friends. comments a case on about the internet or anyone about the municate with case on engender social may responses media e-mail, phone, through cell your Black- include extraneous information about iPhone, berry, messaging, or text on case, attempts or exercise persuasion Twitter, website, blog or through any anything, and influence. If the risk room, through any chat or by internet prejudicial such may communication be way any networking other social web- greater juror when a blog comments on a sites, Facebook, including My Space, or social media than website when she has Linkedln, and YouTube. a discussion about the case in person, giv- At the Close of the Case: en that the universe individuals who are deliberations, During your you must respond able to see and to a comment on provide or аny not communicate with blog Facebook or a significantly larger. anyone by any information to means may about this case. You not use any Yet prohibiting while and admon media, electronic device or such as a ishing jurors from commenting—even telephone, cell smart phone, phone, obliquely a trial on social network —about iPhone, Blackberry computer; or the in- ing websites and other internet mediums is ternet, service, any or any internet text preferred highly recommended service; messaging any instant or practice, it every does not follow that fail room, blog, *17 chat or internet website such juror ure of a prohibition to abide that Facebook, Linkedln, My Space, as You- Rather, will result in a trial. with new as Twitter, any- Tube or to communicate partiality expo other claims of juror any one information about ease or to information, sure to extraneous courts any about conduct research this case must if look to determine the defendant I accept your until verdict. substantially was prejudiced. Model Proposed Jury Instructions: The Here, regard with to Juror l’s Technology Electronic Use Conduct posts, none of Fumo’s or theories of bias Research on or Communicate about a partiality plausible, is let alone sufficient Case, Judicial Conference Committee on for us to find that the District Court Manage- Court Administration and Case in denying abused its discretion his motion ment, December available http:// for a The ques new trial.5 District Court www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2010/ (last tioned Juror 1 camera at docs/DIR10-018-Attachment.pdf length in about vis- 2011). August both ited his comments online and his efforts highlights gave 5. Fumo also the extensive concedes District Court such media that the coverage that on six was focused Fumo's trial in instructions on different occasions tried, Philadelphia suggests throughout including begin- market. He at the media ning September adequately did not The that District Court voir dire on 2008. attention, recognize or address this media District Court was well within its discretion infrequently jury jury too instructed the how it chose to about media instruct exposure. coverage avoid media the case. Yet evi- exposure to excluded 2’s of the case. Juror coverage avoid media dence 1 had no evidence Juror found or that posts, regarding been contacted conviction, after his months Three accessing media sources 1 had been Juror 2 had alleged that Juror Fumo’s counsel he acci- single incident when beyond the trial, co-workers, during the learned attention that dently learned of the con- prior Fumo’s overturned about both com- paying to his were employees, media as well hiring ghost for viction that the presi- also concluded ments. The Court of the former ISM as the conviction dent, Carter, of fraud. opaque charges were “so on Facebook John posts had been pieces of evidence way that members Both of these possible was no there trial the District from the could excluded Philadelphia network [Facebook’s] allegations of bias In contrast to Court. under- any obvious them and have read trial, always reluc- we “are during made (J.A. 591). It standing of his discussion.” they in after have jurors haul tant “nothing more posts as then described probe for a verdict order reached preju- no ramblings having than harmless bias, instances of misconduct potential to be vague so They effect. were dicial As we have said extraneous influences. raised no virtually meaningless. [Juror 1] before, may lead to post-verdict inquiries trial, dealing facts with specific juries to consequences: subjecting evil any comments indicated nothing these harassment, juryroom delibera- inhibiting in the anyone toward involved disposition tion, appli- burdening courts meritless with (J.A. 592). largely agree suit.” We cations, temptation jury increasing of the comments. these characterizations uncertainty jury creating tampering and that de- Finally, the District Court found Gilsenan, (quot- at 97 949 F.2d verdicts.” against dis- violating prohibition spite Ianniello, ing United States trial, cussing “[Juror 1] the details of (2d Cir.1989)). qualitatively “It juror very was trustworthy who dire thing a different to conduct voir no his duties. There was conscientious of at which the during ongoing proceeding presented by party either show- evidence adjudicative part process jury is had a extra-jury misconduct ing his years jury to recall a months or later than the Defendants.” prejudicial impact on Id. at 98. purpose.” 597-98). (J.A. Here, rejected the District Court *18 were light findings, of these which allegations of the the foundational basis large part in-person l’s based Juror of evi that Juror had learned excluded demeanor, testimony simply there is It characterized dence from co-workers. plausible theory no for how Fumo suffered affidavit, double-hearsay counsel’s defense any prejudice, preju- let alone substantial reporter’s the interviews which recounted dice, from Juror l’s Facebook and Twitter “clear, lacking the jurors, with the provide comments. Nor does Fumo substantial, and incontrovertible strong, that other plausible theory for how the fact im specific, nonspeculative that a evidence jurors of l’s may have learned Juror (J.A. 692). We need propriety occurred.” “virtually meaningless” com- “vague” and there question of whether not address led to sub- ments on Facebook could have for a foundational basis was sufficient According- however, him. prejudice against agree stantial we hearing, because everything did not if ly, the District Court abuse the District Court even what Juror reported by Cipriano it denied Fumo’s motion about discretion when true, it from her co-workers were learned a new trial on this basis. would not be sufficient for a showing against of eration finding prejudice. of See Urban, prejudice.” “substantial We also need not (finding F.3d at 778 that the party determine which has the burden of extent of the jury’s exposure to a news issue, persuasion deciding non-existent, article “was as even if limited to thus supporting the burden were on the Government to the absence of prejudice” only juror where prejudice, show the lack of substantial one had read prejudi- we article, cial pointed find that it and four others sufficient evidence in had “looked at picture on the first ... page record for the District Court to con- or contents”). glanced Moreover, at showing. [its] clude that it made such a District gave careful repeated The factors we have looked to in deter- jurors, instructions to the including imme- mining whether there prej- was substantial diately deliberation, before they (1) udice include whether “the extraneous rumors, should “not let suspicions, any- information ... to one of the relatefs] thing [they] may else that have seen or elements of the case that was decided heard outside of the court influence [their] against party trial,” for a moving new (J.A. 4631). in any way.” decision Cura- (2) 239; Lloyd, 269 F.3d at “the extent of tive every mistake, instructions cannot fix jury’s exposure to the extraneous in- but we do generally presume juries [(3)] formation; the time at which the follow their instructions. United States v. jury information; receives the extraneous Liburd, Cir.2010). 607 F.3d (4) length jury’s of the [ ] deliberations Finally, the sixth heavy factor—the volume (5) verdict; and the structure of the [ the] incriminating weighs evidence—also existence of instructions from the court heavily against finding prejudice. jury only that the should consider evidence presented Government’s case was over the case[,]” Urban, developed in the course of three months and included an (quoting Lloyd, 240-41); at 778 F.3d astonishing Further, 80 witnesses. as the (6) heavy whether there is “a volume Government accurately explains in foot- of incriminating Lloyd, 269 evidenee[.]” brief, note 16 of its opening “Fumo testi- (internal omitted). F.3d at 241 quotation fied at trial many admitted [and] Here, alleged indictment, while the fourth acts and to but asserted they some extent were not weigh (Appellant the first factor criminal----” Br. 16). favor, 44 n. many While they easily physical Fumo’s are overwhelmed facts second, fifth, related to the fraud factors, were therefore and sixth largely undisputed, the active destruction weigh heavily against finding of computer records related to the First, fraud prejudice. substantial while knowl provided particularly potent evidence of edge of Fumo’s earlier conviction had motive, Fumo’s knowledge and intent. potential prejudice, some fact nearly thirty years conviction occurred factors, In light of these and even as- prior, in as well as the fact that it suming that the Government had the bur- *19 overturned, was mitigating are factors. den persuasion, the District Court did Perhaps importantly, most the fact that not abuse its discretion when it found that juror only one exposed to brief Juror exposure 2’s to extraneous informa- summary verbal of the excluded evidence unlikely tion was to have led to substantial from her a compelling prejudice.6 coworkers is consid- argument any expo- entirely unsupported Fumo’s alternative unpersuasive. potentially prejudicial sure to extraneous in- proposition cases Fumo cites for this concern formation constitutes a "structural error” in presented a court that an erroneous definition requires the trial automatic reversal is imposed sentencing would have court

III. particular defen- sentence on same Appeal sentence of Fumo’s pro- the district court dant for the reasons defendant, dis sentencing a “In Tomko, 562 F.3d at (quoting Id. vided.” At process: three-step follow a trict courts omitted). (internal Here, 568) quotation applica one, calculates the the court step challenge not the Government does range, includes which ble Guidelines either reasonableness substantive any sentencing enhance application only alleg- Fumo’s or Arnao’s sentence —it Wright, 642 F.3d States v. ments.” United procedural es error. Cir.2011) Tomko, (3d (citing 148, 152 standard “The abuse-of-discretion Shedrick, v. 567; States F.3d at United and sub procedural to both our applies Cir.2007)). (3d “At 292, n. 5 493 F.3d inquiries.” Tom stantive reasonableness two, any motions the court considers step ko, (citing at 567 Gall v. United 562 F.3d and, how granted, if states departure for 586, States, 128 S.Ct. 552 U.S. calcu affects the Guidelines departure Wise, (2007); L.Ed.2d 445 United States Tomko, at (citing 562 F.3d lation.” Id. Cir.2008)). “For 515 F.3d 217-18 567). three, considers the court step “At an of discretion has oc example, abuse togeth range the recommended Guidelines curred if a district court based its decision in 18 statutory factors listed er with the conclusion clearly on a erroneous factual 3553(a) ap § determines the U.S.C. legal conclusion.” Id. at or erroneous sentence, vary up may propriate 217). Wise, at (citing 567-68 range sug or downward from ward (citing by the Guidelines.” Id. gested dissenting colleague argues Our 567). Tomko, 562 F.3d at of review for the proper that the standard arrive at a final District Court’s failure to review of a criminal sentence “Our First, error because the guideline range plain we stages. ... in two proceeds object to this failure any error at sen Government did procedural review for or at the failing in its memoranda tencing step, including, example, (Dissenting at sentencing hearing. Op. computation to make correct 324-26). However, one, July 8 sentenc rely at range step failing at Guidelines argued the step ing hearing at the Government appropriаte departure bases for objected proposed Fumo’s two, merits of and failing give meaningful or consider 3553(a) position clear step departures. It also made its ation to the factors (internal must first “deter quota that the District Court three.” Id. citations and omitted). grounds depar there are procedural “If there is no mine whether tions and, so, many up ture if how levels error, of our review is for stage the second unreasonableness, reaching guideline ... will down thus substantive and we final ” applying] ... all of range before “then affirm the no reasonable sentence unless preju- aspects right, jury, different of that where "beyond a reasonable doubt” to the Louisiana, 275, 113 S.Ct. presumed Sullivan v. 508 U.S. and cannot be rebutted. dice is (1993), judge and a 124 L.Ed.2d 182 Similarly, argument that the extra- Fumo's hearing presided grand jury who both over a right violated his to coun- neous information subsequently presided over and and then right against to confront witnesses sel and his contempt guilty of criminal a witness found fails, challenges, like his also as both him hearing. grand jury who had testified at the *20 impartiality jury, challenge to the of the re- 623, Murchison, 133, 349 U.S. 75 S.Ct. In re prejudice. United States v. (1955). quire that there be L.Ed. While both concerned 942 963, Cir.1985). Peri, (3d trial, they very 778 F.2d right addressed De to a fair 3553(a) factors, which, course, (3d Cir.2009) (internal one of of quotation omit- guideline range ted); that [the is Court cal- id. at 446-47 (finding plain error (J.A. 1558) added). (emphasis culated].” where the District Court “did not accu- rately follow second and steps third of light arguments, In of these and the procedure set out [United States v. par- District Court’s failure to advise the Gunter, (3d Cir.2006)],” 462 F.3d separately ties that it would not calculate a and thus we could not “know the District guideline range completion final after the Court’s in sentencing intention defen- [the two, step of the Government could not dant]”). have foreseen that the District Court fail

would to determine the extent of the A. Loss calculation departure it pronounced when its sentence. notes, colleague parties dispute As our “the Government number of objected could not calculations that went have because the deci- into the District Court’s determination of appeal sion claims on to be error had not the loss attribut 326). able to Fumo’s fraud. (Dissenting Op. Ultimately, even been made.” the Dis trict Court’s decisions resulted in a loss circumstances, Under these including calculation for Fumo which just fell short opportunity object the lack of an to the million, of the threshold increasing $2.5 procedures prior District Court’s to its the offense level. “The appropriate stan sentence, pronouncement of we conclude dard of review of a district court’s decision objec- the Government’s substantive regarding interpretation of the Sen departure requests tions to Fumo’s as well Guidelines, tencing including what consti recitation, Court, as its to the of the three- ‘loss,’ tutes plenary. is Factual findings, step sentencing process preserve its claim however, simply are reviewed for clear appellate review. See United States v. Napier, error.” United States v. 273 F.3d Sevilla, (3d Cir.2008) 541 F.3d 230-31 Cir.2001) (internal citation (defendant’s object failure to “at close of omitted). sentencing” neglect to the district court’s sentencing procedures related to the Pennsylvania 1. The State Senate 3553(a) require plain factors did not er- Overpayment a. employees ror review because defendant raised the Senate sentencing relevance those factors arranged Fumo to have a number of memorandum and at the hear- Senate employees under his control classi- ing, so that require[d] he was “not ... to fied at higher salary grades than they them”). re-raise were entitled to be based on their duties Further, even if agreed we with our qualifications. order to calculate colleague that plain error fraud, standard of the losses attributable to this applied, review we would nevertheless find Government reviewed the human re- that the District Court’s failure to calcu- sources manual to determine the proper guidelines late a final range leaving us employee classification for each based on — unable to procedural review the testimony and sub- about the work they actually stantive bases of the performed sentence —is an error and then calculated the loss to plain, that affects the substantial the Senate as the difference between the rights parties, and that could highest salary “seri- each possibly could have fairness, ously integrity affect the been salary entitled to and the each actual- judicial reputation received, proceedings.” ly United for a approximately total of $1 Vazquez-Lebron, States v. million. At sentencing hearing, *21 310 Although possible that the Govern- of work the em- is dispute type not

did actually performed or the salaries ment errors course of its ployees made Instead, actually calculations, he they received. to think there no reason were spec- that the calculations too argued that its was not a “reasonable esti- figure Clerk loss, ulative the Chief of because aby prepon- mate” of the established not them Senate could confirm and be- Accordingly, af- derance of the evidence. failed to fire or the Senate had cause grounds reviewing the District Court’s ter fact, after the reclassify employees these prima rejecting the Government’s facie original classifications implying amount, showing are of the loss we left justified. Agreeing with were somehow with “the definite and firm conviction that Fumo, excluded the the District Court a mistake has been committed.” United altogether. proposed loss Government’s (3d Grier, States v. F.3d (internal (en banc) Cir.2007) quotation course, Of the Government bears omitted). Further, because the difference establishing, by of a prepon the burden place higher in the loss would Fumo into evidence, of the the amount of derance level, offense error was not harmless. Jimenez, F.3d loss. United States v. Cir.2008). (3d However, although b. Rubin’s “no-work” contract persuasion of “the burden remains with objects The Government next Government, Government once Court’s District decision exclude prima out a facie case of the loss makes $150,000, amount, the loss calculation a five- production the burden of shifts provide year contract awarded the defendant to evidence that the to Arnao’s husband Rubin, incomplete in per Government’s evidence is or for which he purportedly In making accurate.” Id. a loss calcula July formed sen no services. At the tion, only court make reason “[t]he need tencing Fumo hearing, informed the court estimate of able the loss.” United States that he gathered had additional evidence Ali, Cir.2007) had, fact, demonstrating Rubin 2B1.1, (quoting Application U.S.S.G. completed work under contract. He 3(C)). Note July submitted the evidence on 13. The largely additional material consisted of Here, made the Government entries, credit card bills and calendar doc amount, facie prima out a case of the loss umenting people, that Rubin met with had response only and in Fumo made the most but not those had meetings what been showing “inaccuracy” minimal of in the about. argued The Government fact, Government’s calculations. evidence submitted Fumo was weak or really challenges never the substance of irrelevant, noted that Fumo’s current calculations, the Government’s instead re theory directly that Rubin had worked lying surrounding on circumstances to cast with Fumo and met with people his speculative doubt Yet it on them. is not testimony behalf contradicted Rubin’s that the surprising Chief Clerk the Sen trial, that the contract Rubin’s ate, who had not reviewed detail the Services, B R court ser company, & concerning employee’s evidence each vices. The District Court declined to rule duties, position declined take a on the contract, on the loss from issue of Rubin’s accuracy as to the stand Govern stating complexity that “because of the ment’s calculations. And Senate’s de argument light loss de reclassify not to Rubin cision certain the em submissions, prop I I ployees involved fense felt could prompted could have been by any reasoning erly sentencing. manner of it before Rather purposes. resolve *22 sentencing, arriving I declined to whole and then at an overall postpone than sen- (Sealed 184-85). tence, App. Cunningham California, This rule on it.” 549 U.S. 270, 300, 856, was an abuse of discretion. 127 S.Ct. 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007) (noting “pre-Guidelines federal a require Federal Rules Court sentencing system, under which well-es- any disputed rule on matters tablished doctrine barred review of the unnecessary ... ruling “a is be- unless discretion....”) (in- of sentencing exercise mat- the court will not consider the cause omitted). quotation ternal The District sentencing.” in Fed.R.Crim.P. ter Court therefore stated that not nec- “[fit’s 32(i)(3)(B). that, argues because essary for me to make decision this $150,000 from its the court excluded the morning as to whether it was three and a calculation, it did not “consider the loss 400,000.” half million or whether it was sentencing,” proce- in and thus its matter Cannistraro, 871 F.2d at In Yet, if acceptable. “not consid- dure was case, contrast, in order to determine 32(i)(3)(B) Rule ering matter” under [a] appropriate offense level under the refusing to resolve a matter that can mean Guidelines, and to comply with the three- part non-discretionary of the calculation is step sentencing process under United level, of the Guideline base offense then Booker, 220, States v. 543 U.S. 125 S.Ct. could, instance, exclude district court 738, (2005), 160 L.Ed.2d 621 proge- and its losses, any simply they all because are it ny, necessary definitively resolve and, 32(i)(3)(B), disputed, consistent with of the issue loss amount from Rubin’s fact, calculate a loss amount of $0. contract. effectively District Court here did resolve dispute over the loss from Rubin’s Because the Government concedes that it contract favor of Fumo when treated this issue must be reviewed under the simply the loss as It characterized its $0. standard, plain error it ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‍must show “declin[ing] decision as to rule on” the plain, error was that it affected substantial requiring reasoning issue and thus no and, rectified, rights, if not it that would A not refuse part. district court should fairness, “seriously integrity affect the or to find or calculate a loss because of the judicial proceedings.” reputation or because complexity dispute Ward, United States v. 626 F.3d dispute spending the time resolve (3d Cir.2010) (internal omitted). citation

might delay sentencing. disputed The failure to resolve the loss here meets all three criteria. Under

Fumo cites to United States v. Cannis- (3d three-step jurisprudence, Booker and our traro, Cir.1989), F.2d Further, the error is clear. if the District may proposition for the the court had found that Rubin’s contract was simply to determine a loss refuse whether $150,000,it a loss of would have raised the proposed occurred and therefore exclude a defendant, affecting level of the offense However, calculation. loss from the public’s rights. substantial Cannistraro, See United although dispute there was a Dickerson, States v. ($400,000 over the amount of the loss Cir.2004) (district le- impermissibly court’s million), the district court was not $3.5 “plain nient sentence could constitute er- engaged non-discretionary process “Congress’s impri- ror” because interest offense level calculating Guidelines Rather, soning ‘right’ certain ... offenders is a on the loss. because was based entitled”). Finally, if case, citizenry which the n. pre-Guidelines id. at 1215 may simply disregard disputed loss- exercising court was its broad discretion in courts grounds they are “not con- considering gravity of the offense as a es on the say record that the District Court’s them, pro- on this sidering” the fairness of *23 seriously finding clearly called into was erroneous. We ceedings may be factual on remand the question. Accordingly, affirm the District Court’s re- therefore carefully consider Court should District to duction the loss amount attributable make a determination the evidence and equipment.8 the tools and extent, whether, Rubin’s to and to what property b. The Tasker Street in a loss to the Senate.

contract resulted sought to assess Government 2. Alliance Citizens $574,000 worth of losses for rental income unnecessary to the equipment improvements and a. and Tools Street, property on Tasker which Fumo objects to the The Government purchase induced Alliance to and Citizens calculation of the losses District Court’s furnish, lavishly and then used as his Sen- equipment pur resulting from tools and from the payment ate office with little actually but by chased Citizens Alliance Senate for rent or maintenance. The Dis- others, by including Fumo.7 The Gov used Court, however, against that trict credited -hundreds, perhaps thou ernment reviewed sands, figure proper- state the fair market value of the receipts and credit card a list of tools ty, ultimately signifi- ments order assemble in a resulted aegis the equipment bought and under cant to Fumo. The ap- credit Government compared Citizens Alliance. It then this that peals reasoning, decision and its Alli against inventory list the of Citizens argues in the that if Fumo is alternative employees ance and discussed with its given credit for the fair market value of any whether it would ever have made use building, the District should set particular Finally, items. it assembled maintain- against acquiring, the costs of identifying equipment two charts tools and ing, improving building. purchased by Alliance that it be Citizens 3(E)(i) to Application Note Section lieved were used for the benefit of Fumo provides 2B1.1 of the Guidelines that aides, though it conceded that the and his ... by money shall be reduced “[l]oss [t]he Fumo, approximate. charts were in testi returned, and the fair market value of the fying, reviewed the charts and denied hav property returned and the services ren $50,000 ing roughly of the received worth dered, by persons the defendant or other $130,000 approximately equipment defendant, acting jointly with the to the appears the charts. The District Court victim before the offense was detected.” have and reduced credited assertion added). (emphasis In The use of the word by roughly light the loss that amount. determination, credibility signifies of this we cannot “returned” that for a credit put by 7. Fumo concedes that there were "mi- that were in evidence some exhibits Government, calculating detailing nor” arithmetical errors the cost of tools that Alliance, pin purchased by loss to Citizens which would were and were used Fumo for $1,077,943, $958,080 ($93,409.52) purposes personal loss at rather than should have by calculated the District He con- been added to the loss calculation in full. Court. tends, however, ruling regard that these errors were insuffi- The District Court’s in this elim- are, They to affect his offense findings jury beyond cient level. inated the made however, significantly sufficient affect Arnao's offense the court reasonable doubt IV.A., See Section findings level. did not issue its own factual until infra. sentencing hearings after the were over. doing, able Judge disagrees so the Government was not Garth the District clearly argue findings were Court did not err. He the Court’s would hold Government, evidence introduced erroneous. any must have either re- eral to value received the defendant because of the apply, money very property, purchase building. They same or turned would ap- that were provided have services have been if or costs even Citizens Alliance value, money, very to the same or plied building beforehand, had owned the during lost or taken property even if it had been lessee rather than Radtke, States v. fraud. See also United owner, space who subleased to Fumo. (8th Cir.2005) (noting essentially seeks set the value *24 fringe paid benefits to defrauded em- that an independent “good” he purportedly se- by the defendant were “not ... ployees cured for Alliance against Citizens the against contemplated sort of credit loss the costs his frauds inflicted on it.9 He offers guidelines” they the because were “oth- by support no cases in of this theory of loss provided employee-victims benefits to er calculation, which it unsurprising, as directly do not correlate with the allow, instance, would for an officer of a third-party amounts withheld from the ad- corporation who embezzled from his em- the fraud.” part (empha- ministrator as ployer to against claim credits the loss original)). insis caused the embezzlement for overall company’s increases in the assets Here, under argues the Government that the Accordingly, his watch. we conclude that money or the value taken was maintenance the District Court’s decision to credit the improvement as well as costs the rent value of the property Tasker Street charged by Fumo was not Citizens against the resulting losses from property. Alliance as owner Citizen rent, any improvements, Alliance’s lost pay not of the did refund mainte- nance, himself, improvements, or lost maintenance costs was abuse of rent discre- tion. “money would have been returned” 3(E). Application under Note Nor did he painting c. The Gazela loses, to render services related these such assisting with maintenance or im- Fumo induced Citizens Alliance to com- The provements himself. Government did Gazela, mission a painting of a historic argue not that the loss the fraud $150,000. ship, from a local for painter As spent included funds Citizens Alli- investigation the Government’s and media Thus, property. on purchasing ance reports surfaced, Fumo directed Citizens neither that itself property because nor its ISM, painting Alliance to donate the to the monetary alleged value were ever to have rather it in than retain his office. The part been taken as of the fraud the first Government argues entire they place, could not be “returned” to Citi- loss, amount should count as because the 3(E) Application Alliance under Note zens painting was otherwise unwanted against and credited the losses. prints and its in storage. are now District testimony Court credited the of an explain To in the the error District appraiser as to the value of the painting technical ruling way, Court’s a less maintenance, prints and the Government improvements, and rental in- does appear to offered a competing come Government identified as losses have independent conceptually appraisal. were and collat- formal Accordingly, the Dis- Further, appropriate grant experienced by even if it were Alliance Citizens due to the credit value building for the fair market of the build- only value of the can be calculated ing, necessary it would to set off the be costs subtracting paid acquire after what it purchase associated with the and mainte- building place. in the first building. Obviously, any gain nance (e.g., for the defendant’s of that benefit is entitled to finding factual trict Court’s (b)(8)(A) ap- deference, personal gain). and we will not dis- Subsection significant following: example, it.10 plies, turb Sentencing enhancements B. (iii) defendant, chief of a local fire A objects The Government department, who conducted impose a 2-level District Court’s refusal representing pur- fundraiser acting on on Fumo for behalf enhancement procure pose of the fundraiser was organization and 2-level charitable engine for a fire funds new sufficient sophisticated use enhancement fact, when, intended to defendant ap review a district court’s means. “We of the funds for the defen- divert some sentencing enhancements for plication of benefit. personal dant’s States v. of discretion.” United abuse 7(B). 2B1.1, Application Note U.S.S.G. *25 (3d Cir.2010). Robinson, that Fumo’s be- The Government contends into be- squarely guideline havior this fits Acting 1. on behalf of a charitable or- from acquired cause Fumo funds PECO ganization while intending Alliance for Citizens that the argues The Government use. divert funds his own Fumo those a 2- failing apply erred in District Court argued agreed the District and Court misrepre for Fumo’s level enhancement had not shown Fumo’s Government acting that he on behalf of sentation was time intent to divert the funds he Alliance, organization. Citizens charitable However, obtained them PECO. Sentencing state: “If the The Guidelines out that Fumo ac- points Government (A) misrepresentation involved offense portion million— quired a substantial $10 acting on behalf of that the defendant was — in of the funds well after PECO he charitable, educational, religious, polit or began using Citizens Alliance’s funds for government agency or a organization, ical political his own benefits. In- personal by 2 levels.” ... increase U.S.S.G. deed, 2B1.1(b)(8)(A). credulity strains all to believe that § application *26 create these sham corporations, with wer, (7th Cir.2011) (in- 640 F.3d false corporate addresses and purely tit- omitted); quotation ternal see also United ular officers. Frank, (8th v. States 354 F.3d Cir.2004) (enhancement (J.A. 507). appropriate entities, where The use of these sham defendants other “use[d] individuals and which were created to conceal the flow of businesses to conduct business on defen- [a associates, funds to Fumo and his strongly behalf,” as well as a entity”); dant’s] “shell resembles the conduct in Appli- described Cianci, United States v. 8(B) cation Note as well as conduct that (3d Cir.1998) (finding “sophisticated this Court and others have found to fall means” appropriate enhancement where within sophisticated the guideline. means defendant’s crime “involved the use of a too, Here we conclude that the District corporation shell falsified docu- [and] Court abused its discretion in refusing to ments”). apply the enhancement. Here, rejected the District Court the guidelines C. Calculation of the final request Government’s a sophisticated range means enhancement for the “reasons sub- argues Government next stantially upon based arguments.” defense that the District Court made a fundamen (Sealed 184). App. argued Fumo had that procedural tal error in the second step of the conduct here was not “especially com- sentencing process when, the after grant intricate, plex or relative to other federal ing departure Fumo a upon based his ex criminal fraud cases” under U.S.S.G. traordinary works, public it did not calcu 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C). (J.A. 715) § (emphasis in new, late a guidelines final range. As we original). Yet Fumo Alli- induced Citizens repeatedly have made clear “[c]ourts must ance to form for-profit in subsidiaries or- continue to calculate a defendant’s permit der to Guide purchases on his behalf lines sentence precisely they without the required disclosures for such would have [;] evidence, so, entities. According to the before Booker doing they [i]n these must own, subsidiaries did no business of their formally rule on the motions of both par- an- ever they tion on whether court had on the whether and state record ties guideline how that a final offense level. departure a nounced granting are calcula- affects Guidelines departure 35(a) motion, on the ruling Rule Gunter, (emphasis 462 F.3d at tion.” correctly government “The held: added) (internal quotations and citations it was the court announced states Lofink, omitted); see also United States Thereafter, departure. a granting (3d Cir.2009). 232, 238 F.3d level never announced guideline court initially sought departure based Fumo fact, and, departed, it never to which (i.e., his “good and his works” his health on consulting the sentence it did reached service). ulti- The District Court chart.” any specific guideline level him a reduction mately significant awarded 1653). (J.A. Then, an amendment to range of guidelines sentencing ruling, judgment accompanying months that it had calculated 121 to 151 stated, “I never nor have court announced ulti- step one. Whether this reduction level I guideline I determined what ever the Guidelines mately departure under (Sealed 185-86). departed.” App. had 3553(a) is itself a a variance under in more detail contested issue discussed attempts argue that the Court Fumo However, at the time sentence below. adequately completed step simply two courtroom, ap- was announced it did— sentencing Fumo the sentence At the it was a peared departure. i.e., by a reducing Fumo’s sentence hearing, the Court July 14 final what the implies certain number months guide- stated: “I have considered what However, departure was. degree make a here and I did lines have said only case that cites to for the are, but finding guidelines as to what the departure proposition announcing going that I’m finding I’ve also added months than in terms of terms of rather *27 (J.A. 1623). Never- depart from them.” ranges and guidelines offense levels theless, actually the District never Torres, States v. 251 F.3d 138 United departure what that was terms stated Cir.2001), ap- a pre-Booker case. Such range; parties a fact the guidelines would make little sense under the proach noticed. de- post sentencing procedure -Booker levels, cross-refer- scribed Gall. Offense 35(a) mo- post-sentencing

In his Rule history of the de- enced with criminal tion, to have deem its seeking the Court fendant, result now in a recommended departure, a a variance instead of sentence incarceration, range of months and the sentencing Fumo noted that a “[w]hen un- court must then exercise its discretion opposed a true grants ‘departure’ [as court 3553(a) § der determine where —wheth- variance,] depar- it must to a state how range or outside that er inside calculation. ture affects Guidelines —the fall. one the step sentence should If after such a state- Court[] This to make fail[ed] added) simply decides a final sentence (J.A. 1629) court on (emphasis ment....” the second (internal omitted). separately completing without oppos- quotation While (i.e., departures change the Guidelines motion, the noted ing that Government (i.e., range) steps and third variances initially had established that the court sentence), final (i.e., it becomes determine “baseline” before the resolution appellate for an court to recon- departure good impossible motion for based works) there- logic reasoning, and although offense level later struct of 33— note no review the As we changed carefully posi- to 32—but took fore to sentence. (internal below, omitted). worry precisely quotation this is no idle Under such what occurred here. circumstances, “we will remand for resen- tencing unless we conclude on the record result,

As a to the extent the District as a whole ... that the error did not affect sentencing reduction a depar- Court’s the district court’s selection of the sen- ture rather than a variance under (internal imposed.” tence quotation Id. 3553(a), § it by failing erred to calculate a omitted). Therefore, the Government guideline final guidelines offense level and first, must establish impossible that it is sentencing range. determine with confidence from the record D. Articulation of the basis for the be- granted whether the District Court a de- low-guidelines sentence related to parture or a variance based on Fumo’s public service works; second, good the error argues

The Government affected the District Court’s selection of its District Court further erred failing to sentence. clearly articulate granting whether was July hearing, Before the Fumo moved variance, departure Fumo a or a and that a departure based good on both works requires this error remand. There are ill July health. In its ruling, types diverge “two of sentence that from request District Court denied the for a original range.... Guidelines A tradi departure health, based on ill but stated sentencing ‘departure’ diverges tional ... that “a decision on a departure based upon originally range from the calculated ‘for good works will July be reserved until ... contemplated by reasons the Guidelines (J.A. 1566). 2009.” At the July 14 contrast, themselves.’ a ‘variance’ di hearing, initially the Court noted that “I Guidelines,

verges ... including from the deny regards did not good to the any departures, based on an exercise of (J.A. 1568). works.” Later on 3553(a).” the court’s discretion under announced, hearing, court “You Floyd, United States v. worked hard for the ... and I’m (3d Cir.2007) (internal omitted). citations going therefore grant departure This distinction is more than mere formali (J.A. 1622). guidelines.” Finally, the ty. “Although departure aor variance stated, court “I finding did make a as to could, end, in the lead to the same outcome guidelines are, what the but I’ve also add- ... important it is courts to *28 finding ed a that I’m going depart to from distinguish two, departures between the as (J.A. 1623). them.” subject are to requirements different than variances.” Id. “[District courts should Shortly after the hearing, response in to be careful to articulate whether a sentence 35(a) Fumo’s Rule motion to “correct” the departure is a or a variance from an advi sentence to sentencing establish that the sory Guidelines range.” United States v. reduction was a variance rather than a Nation, (3d Vampire 451 F.3d departure, the District Court an issued Cir.2006). order stating government that “[t]he cor- rectly states that the court announced it a district sentencing

When court’s deci- Thereafter, granting departure. was sion “leaves us unable to determine wheth- court never guideline enunciated the level er the court grant intended to ... [a] and, variance,” departed, fact, to which it departure or a never the court has not, must, as it reached the sentence it “adequately explained] by consulting did any specific chosen sentence.” level on guideline United States v. chart.” Brown, (3d Cir.2009) (J.A. 1653). 578 F.3d The District at- Court then months the precise could not judgment, to the determine amendment tached an guide- from the vary extent that I would following passage: which included the (Sealed 186). language This App. lines.” I whether there next determined “vary” interchangeably “depart” uses departure guide- from the should be a conflated and admits that the Court sentencing announced at lines steps and third combined the second that there should be based hearing The District sentencing process. Court extraordinary good my works finding ... all other did not need to “consider I not what did announce defendant. 3553(a) sentencing under before factors” level the fell specific guideline offense level, guideline nor departing a different into; say, precise number that is to to do so. appropriate I was depart which intended to levels until I considered all other sen- because responded have previously We factors, I could determine tencing that the District Court’s criticism distinc- precise the extent that I would months departures and variances tion between vary guidelines. from the by noting “elevates form over substance” counsel of Having advised the offense context, it is sentencing firmly that “in the my I found and intent to de- level that procedure established that form —i.e. —and downward, part proceeded I then high importance.” substance are both of respective hear from counsel their anal- Wright, 642 at 154. have a F.3d “We yses appropriate sentence of what responsibility that a substantive- ‘to ensure should be. imposed ly has been reasоnable sentence ” perhaps I procedure was Id. procedurally way.’ (empha- followed in a fair more akin to that associated with added) v. (quoting sis United States Levin- departure a downward variance than (3d Cir.2008)). son, F.3d I announced nor have I because never Moreover, may difference here be guideline ever to what level determined formality, given than more a mere Ultimately, I departed. argu- had scrutiny different and standards review it was ment over which elevates form apply departures opposed we vari- over substance. places particular, precedent our ances. (Sealed 185-86) added). (emphasis App. courts’ certain limitations on abilities judgment, the amendment to the Without in the depart good based on works case of we might have been satisfied that Serafini, public officials. United States departing varying. rather Cir.2000) than (holding However, the statement that document public performs “if a servant civic and procedure per- I followed was “[t]he daily of his part charitable work as func- haps more akin to associated with tions, these not be considered in his should departure” indi- variance than a downward expect such we work because cates that the District Court was not itself our but that “assis- servants” *29 departing vary- certain it or whether was tance, money, time and individuals ing. organizations” and local would not ordinarily a defendant’s work as part be of by is reinforced the Dis-

This conclusion public may properly be consid- servant trict earlier statement in the same Court’s ered). While we need not decide whether filing specif- “I not announce did what good works could be into; departure based on guideline ic level the offense fell here, that a undeniable district by applied precise is ... number of levels imposing court has more discretion depart which I until I intended because factors, variance, the substance sen- I where sentencing considered all other subject In only setting tence is to substantive reason- forth how a court respond party’s review. should to a request ableness for a variance, Supreme Court has held that uncertainty of the substantial Because sentencing judge should set “[t]he forth the District re- regarding whether Court’s enough satisfy appellate court that variance, departure duction was a he has parties’ arguments considered the very because that distinction could well exercising and has reasoned basis for his practical have effects on Fumo’s ultimate legal decisionmaking authority.” own Rita sentence, conclusively say we based cannot United, States, 338, 356, v. U.S. on the as a whole that “the error record (2007). S.Ct. 168 L.Ed.2d 203 “[T]he not affect district selection did court’s acknowledge respond court must Broim, imposed.” of sentence any properly presented sentencing argu Accordingly, at 226. F.3d on remand the ment which has colorable legal merit and a District Court should take care to first Ausburn, factual basis.” United States v. any if departures, departures address (3d Cir.2007). 502 F.3d Never granted, guide- are to then calculate a final theless, we need not argu address this range. Taking guidelines lines this final now, light ment fact that some or range advisory, only it should then con- many of the arguments may Government’s sider the factors included in 18 become moot after the District Court re 3553(a), vary U.S.C. decide whether to guideline calculates the range and rules on guidelines, from the and determine the parties’ departures. motions for On appropriate sentence. remand, the District Court should consider any arguments colorable for a variance E. Consideration of the Government’s fact, that have a basis in made whether arguments upward for an variance Fumo or the Government. learning proposed After that the Court downwards, depart the Government Prejudgment F. interest on the order variance, upward moved for an arguing of restitution the proposed sentence did not ade- Finally, challenges Fumo also one quately represent or take into account the sentence, aspect of raising argu his two fraud, damage full loss from the why prejudgment ments for interest on institutions, trial, perjury Fumo’s the restitution awarded was an abuse conduct, other obstructive and Fumo’s al- discretion. leged lack of remorse. The District Court First, vary upwards any did not although previously these we affirmed hearing, bases. At the prejudgment Government an award of interest on a disparity also raised the between the sen- Virgin restitution award Gov’t Is- Davis, imposed tence on Fumo and other sen- lands 43 F.3d Cir. 1994), imposed tences for fraud involving public argues that Davis has been funds, and charitable disparity as well the overturned sub our silentio decision in between Fumo’s sentence and im- Leahy, those United States v. 333— (3d Cir.2006) (en banc). posed Davis, on his in the accomplices scheme.11 35 In we Carter, case, particular, John the former received a sentence of 30 months’ im- *30 ISM, prisonment. Computer President of the was sentenced to a term technician Mark Eis- ter, Government, years’ imprisonment. Computer cooperated of 15 techni- who with the Luchko, only departure cian Leonard who was involved received a 5K1.1 and was sen- justice portion probation. with the obstruction of of the tenced to (1947), has suffered matter, or that a victim who it is “well general a noted that as do not of a penalties money damages that criminal at the hands established actual (internal 43 F.3d at bear interest.” fairly compensated should be defendant omitted). However, we also held citations 373, 5, loss, in at 68 S.Ct. for the id. interest of prejudgment that the inclusion are principles appli- both situations where and Wit- under the Victim on restitution cable. (“VWPA”), as amend- Act ness Protection produced Rodgers, In a cotton farmer Mandatory Restitution by the Victims ed quota per- more cotton than his and sold 3663(b)(1), (“MVRA”), Act 18 U.S.C. Adjustment Agricultural mitted under the the “restitution ordered proper because 1938, and the States ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‍sued Act of United punitive” ... rather than compensatory is ” “money that the Act ‘penalties’ recover [ajwards designed are and the “[VWPA] subject at the farmer to. Id. made losses, rather compensate victims their inter- 5. The District Court awarded S.Ct. pur- retributive or deterrent than to serve $7,000 from the approximately est on the (internal citation poses.” 43 F.3d at to the date penalties became due dates omitted). or- the restitution Given affirmed, The Sixth Circuit judgment. VWPA, awarded under the dered here was reversed. The Supreme and the prejudgment interest is it would seem that general first affirmed the Supreme Court under Davis. appropriate interest in rule that “the failure mention Leahy, that in which de- argues Fumo obligations has not statutes which create States v. Booker termined whether United by as mani- interpreted been this Court restitution, orders of we con- applied to pur- festing unequivocal congressional an part ordered as cluded “that restitution obligation shall not bear pose a is criminal rather than criminal sentence Id. at 68 S.Ct. 5. interest.” expressly agreed in civil nature” case, however, we characterized the Court analo- particular three other circuits who restitution, ordered holding penalties, “that when gized penalties to criminal conviction, a criminal is connection with and noted: at penalty.” a criminal 334-35. hardly supportable contention is [t]he Thus, argues, restitution is because the Federal Government suffers own penalty,” a “criminal under Davis’s money damages or loss the common be un- prejudgment terms interest should sense, compensated law to be underlying tension is that available. The interest, a when one convicted of crime restitution, unlike a criminal fíne on pay money fíne as- promptly fails hand, compensatory damages, on one underlying him. The against sessed other, punitive purposes serves both theory penalty of that is that Indeed, Leahy ones. compensatory deterrent and not a reve- punishment or “that analysis by noting we framed our device; tax, unlike a it does nue-raising restitution combines features of both crim- necessity on the basic not rest is, penalties, inal and civil as it on the one carefully to collect a esti- Government hand, to the victim defen- restoration money by particular mated sum of is, ill-gotten gains, dant while it at the anticipated date order meet time, aspect of a criminal sen- same expenditures. questiоn tence.” 438 F.3d According Rodg- Id. at 68 S.Ct. 5. arises, courts then which dictate should “money then, dam- it is the absence ers penalty follow: that a criminal should not compensated ... for” States, ages or loss to be interest, Rodgers bear v. United authority for “revenue- 371, 374, the lack of 68 S.Ct. 92 L.Ed. 3 and 332 U.S.

321 a punitive component VWPA has that prejudgment interest that makes raising” penalty eyes it a criminal in the penalties. criminal makes inapplicable to Amendment, that does not modi- Sixth in context of restitution Yet in fy ruling our Davis that such restitution VWPA, money there áre dam under important compensatory serves an also Fur compensated. to be ages and losses VWPA, purpose permits under the ther, widely agreed, there is have as courts in prejudgment courts to award interest “carefully estimated to seek authority of the vic- recoup order to the time-value id., for victims under money”, sum[s] we reaffirm our Accordingly, tim’s loss. VWPA, ... is to en “purpose as its prejudgment in Davis that interest holding degree possi wrongdoers, sure of restitution is available orders under ble, make their victims whole.” United (5th the VWPA and MVRA. Rochester, 971, 898 F.2d 983 States v. Cir.1990) States v. Hu (quoting United argues Fumo also the Gov (5th Cir.1989) 1256, 1261 877 F.2d

ghey, ernment, prejudgment when obtained cases), grounds, rev’d on other (collecting on the after the date of interest restitution 1979, 411, 109 L.Ed.2d 495 110 S.Ct. U.S. sentencing, give proper did not 10 (1990)). And in order to make victim 408 days’ notice it would need more time whole, may interest be neces prejudgment the amount of loss to ascertain under 18 recoup injured party sary to “allow 3664(d)(5). 3664(d)(5) Section U.S.C. A. of his loss.” William the time-value reads: 138, 145 646 F.3d Haughey, v. Graham Co. If the victim’s losses are not ascertain- (3d Cir.2011). circuits have reached Other days prior the date that is 10 able reached in conclusion that we the same sentencing, attorney for the Govern- Davis, interest is finding prejudgment probation ment or the officer shall so under the orders of restitution available on court, and the court shall set inform States v. and MVRA. See United VWPA a date for the final determination of the 699, Cir.2011); Qurashi, F.3d 704 634 losses, days not to exceed 90 victim’s 1240, Huff, v. 609 F.3d United States sentencing. after (11th Cir.2010); United States v. n. 4 (4th language face this does seem to Cir.1994); On its 415, 420 Hoyle, 33 F.3d pro- that the Government should suggest Patty, 992 F.2d States v. United (10th Cir.1993); interest calculations be- prejudgment v. vide United States 1049-50 (7th Cir.1993); give days’ notice that fore Simpson, 8 F.3d Smith, present make and v. it will need more time to United States Rochester, (9th Cir.1991); However, 898 F.2d at 982- the Fourth such calculations. Johnson, Circuit, States v. United (4th Cir.2005), noted that F.3d Moreover, characteriza- Leahy, our concluded, based on the other circuits have penalty as a criminal tion of restitution victims, purpose protecting statute’s it was the came in the context of whether determining 90-day that the “deadline” for award to which the Sixth Amend- type of not bar a court the victim’s losses does For jury applied. to a trial right ment after 90 ordering restitution even analysis Amendment purposes of our Sixth long as there is no substantial days as constitutionally Leahy, it was irrelevant holding This prejudice to the defendant. the VWPA also whether restitution under Supreme affirmed has since been primary pur- indeed important, has an — States, U.S. Dolan United Le- Court. compensating victims. While pose of 2533, 2539,177 -, L.Ed.2d 108 under 130 S.Ct. ahy shows that restitution *32 (2010) (a its crediting court’s failure to meet the stat- abused discretion in the value restitution, 90-day property against for “even of the Tasker Street ute’s deadline maintenance, through improvements, its own fault or that of the Gov- losses ernment, rent. deprive foregone approximately does not the court of the restitution”). $574,000 portion also loss from that of the power to order Johnson Citi- held, light in of the treatment of the 90- zens Alliance fraud is also attributable to deadline, day 10-day that the deadline for Arnao. Because these revised calculations provide greater the Government to notice of the create a loss that is than mil- $1 lion, need to further ascertain the victim’s loss Arnao will 2- receive additional levels) similarly postpon- (thereby totaling no bar to the Court level increase at ing modifying restitution. 400 F.3d her base offense level under 2Bl.l(b)(l)(I). agree § 199. Accordingly, We with Johnson and see no these er- 10-day distinguish reason to between the rors were not harmless as to Arnao and at 90-day deadline issue here and the her sentence must be vacated and remand- provision deadline the same ed.12 Supreme Court in Dolan held creates B. Procedural reasonableness

non-enforceable deadline for district downward variance courts. We will therefore affirm the order restitution, including prejudgment inter- Although we vacate and remand est. Arnao’s sentence for consideration of the fraud, proper loss amount from the we also

IV. argument address Government’s we should vacate Arnao’s sentence because Appeal of Arnao’s sentence the District Court failed adequately ex A. Loss calculation plain its granting reasons for Arnao a sub that, argues The Government did stantial downward variance from the advi Fumo, the District Court erred in cal- sory guideline range. regard With culating the loss that Arnao’s fraud caused explanation whether a court’s aof sentence to Citizens Alliance. demonstrates that it’ meaningfully consid 3553(a) factors, ered the joins we have Arnao in Fumo’s stated arguments with respect fraud, “[b]ecause the fact-bound nature of the Citizens Alliance decision, which is each only portion there is no uni Fumo’s fraud- ulent form determining conduct which she is threshold for whether implicated. The District court supplied explanation Court’s calculations of those has sufficient losses and our review of them affect her sentence.” United States v. Mercеd, Cir.2010) sentence as agrees well. Arnao (internal analysis omitted). Fumo’s of the Citizens Alliance quotation For some loss, cases, sufficient, calculated the loss a brief statement bewill $1,077,943, $958,080 rather than the calcu- while for others a explana more extensive addition, lated the District Court. reasoning may tion of the court’s be need above, as explained However, the District Court ed. greater magni- Id. joins arguments Arnao op- also Fumo's sophisti- ance fraud did not involve the use of posing means, the Government’s contention finding cated the same of abuse of failing apply District Court erred in a 2- applies discretion in Arnao’s sentence. Ac- sophisticated level means enhancement with (b)(9)(C) cordingly, the 2B 1.1 en- additional regard to the Citizens Alliance fraud. Be- applies of 2 hancement levels in the Guideline cause we find that the District Court abused calculation for Arnao as well as Fumo. ruling its discretion in that the Citizens Alli- *33 variance, dressing statutory sentencing arguments, greater a court's tude of that “is emphasized to describe its and have review nec the district court burden essarily at 215 (quoting flexible.” Id. Aus reasoning. Id. at 216. 328). bum, 502 F.3d at The Government Here, the Government’s claims despite examples cites three of sentences that we the District Court did contrary, to the grounds procedural have overturned on statutory factors and the relevant consider 217-20, unreasonableness: Id. at United to it at sentenc- presented arguments (3d Lychock, 578 F.3d States part, the most the Government’s ing. For Levinson, Cir.2009), and 543 F.3d at 199- to appears with the sentence true concern However, 200. each of these involved a agree District Court did not be that the sentencing court that varied from the initial substance. In its with it on the policy disagree Guidelines because of brief, instance, argues the Government States, Kimbrough ment under v. United it was erroneous because that the variance 558, 169 128 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 481 U.S. child- on Arnao’s difficult primarily relied (2007), sufficiently without explaining but criticism, not a This is a substantive hood. disagree that reasoning policy behind Later, brief, reply one. its procedural ment. that the District admits the Government Arnao’s charitable also considered Court case, In this it is true that works, good but contends that these good there was some hint of the District Court’s support large variance. deeds cannot way disagreement with the the Guidelines criticism, This, not a is a substantive again, Nevertheless, corruption treat cases. (re- See, e.g., id. at 217 one. procedural suggest District Court did not that this argument, which jecting Government’s variance. was an actual basis Rath that the district procedural, framed as er, vary appears its decision to to have adequately consider defen- court did upon been based the considerations of the criminal history or the seriousness dant’s 3553(a) sum, § statutory factors. we it the offense because “is substantive explanation find the District Court’s one”). procedural complaint, not sufficiently thorough of the variance is to fully considered the argument extent its is based on demonstrate To the deficiencies, arguments and the various alleged procedural Gov- Government’s statutory specific that the District factors. It was also appears argue ernment enough permit us to exercise duty every single had a to address reasoned Accordingly, arguments, meaningful appellate of its counter-ar- review. permutation we find no abuse of discretion in the guments replies. But we have never pinpoint precision such in ad- Court’s downward variance.13 required help disagrees help people, other chari- Judge with this conclusion time other Garth ties,” provided expla- the District Court little that the District Court abused and would hold nation for the sizeable downward variance it granting large downward its discretion granted. granted "major variance it to Arnao. A vari- requires the Guidelines a more ance from additionally The District Court failed to significant justification address, than a minor one.” give meaningful much less consider- Grober, to, United States v. argu- ation several of the Government’s case, Cir.2010). example regarding egre- In this the District Court im- ments —for Arnao’s posed only reputational and one gious a sentence 12 months obstruction efforts and the day, guideline range Finally, on a calculated based harm to Alliance. the Dis- Citizens conclusory explana- provided inadequate Other than its 70-87 months. trict Court an challenges regards considering were "un- unwarranted that Arnao’s tion in statement 3553(a)(6). § challenge” disparities "[A] usual from the usual and its nod to under district 3553(a)(6) analyze may something failure to "did life- court's [her] the fact she Judge

Y. reveals the District did indeed advisory recalculate the range Guidelines reasons, affirm foregoing For we granting after the downward departure.1 conviction, Fumo’s vacate the sentences of Second, majority employs I believe the Arnao, Fumo and and remand for both incorrect standard review this issue. proceedings further not inconsistent with opinion.

I. *34 NYGAARD, Judge, concurring Circuit A. part dissenting part. in in and United States v. Quoting opinion our in

I agree majority join with the and them Tomko, majority in states affirming “[t]he Fumo and Arnao’s convictions. do, however, I abuse-of-discretion specific points applies have two standard disagreement procedural both our cause me to dissent. and substantive rea- First, majority today 558, inquiries.” vacates the sen- sonableness 562 F.3d 567 (3d Cir.2009) banc) (en tencing experienced decision of an District (citing Gall v. Unit- alia, States, inter claim, ed judge they 38, 51, 586, Court because 552 U.S. 128 S.Ct. (2007)). advisory he failed to recalculate the Guide- 169 L.Ed.2d 445 That ais correct statement, range granting lines after Fumo a goes. down- as far as it What departure. misses, however, majority ward Without such a recalcu- is that “[o]ur lation, majority contends that it cannot standard of review differs based wheth- logic reconstruct the District Court’s and alleged sentencing er the error was raised and, therefore, reasoning so, impossi- finds it below. If we review for abuse of dis- cretion; not, ble to review the Although sentence. I if plain we review for error.” Russell, question recalculation is United States v. 200, whether such 564 F.3d 203 (3d necessary, my Cir.2009); even see also United States v. reading of the record error, procedural My constitute reversible dissenting opinion even 1. will be confined to my disagreement engages thorough finding proce- where ... the court in with their depar- dural error as to the District thoughtful Court's analysis of several other sentenc- ruling ture and Guidelines Merced, calculation. I also ing factors.” 603 F.3d at 224. portions majority dissent from those may procedurally improper A sentence be opinion that find the District Court’s classifi- "imposed considering where it is without cation of loss to be an abuse of discretion. I creating disparities risk of unwarranted disagree majority further with the and cannot risk,” the sentence in fact creates such apply find the District Court’s refusal to sen- where, here, especially "the sentence falls tencing acting enhancements for on behalf of Guidelines, outside of the or where ... a (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(8)(A)) charity and for party specifically raises a concern about dis- (U.S.S.G. sophisticated the use of means parities argu- with the district court (b)(9)(C)) § 2B1.1 anbe abuse of discretion. ignored.” ment is Id. The District majority’s Because I dissent from the resolu- largely ignored this case the Government's issues, tion of the loss calculation I dissent concluded, disparity arguments, and instead portion majority from that opinion of the explanation, guideline without that the sen- join vacates Arnao's sentence as well. I dispari- tence would "result in a tremendous Fuentes, however, Judge finding no abuse ty-" of discretion in the District Court’s loss calcu- circumstances, Judge Under these Garth concerning lations equipment the tools and would hold that the District Court failed to purchased by (Maj. Op. Citizen’s Alliance at providing meet its burden of a sufficient ex- 311) vessel, painting sailing and the id., planation for Arnao’s variance. See 603 312-13). (Maj. Op. Finally, join I Gazela Therefore, F.3d at Fuentes, the variance ordered Judge and find no abuse of discre- by the District Court was an abuse of discre- grant tion with the District Court’s of vari- tion. ances to Arnao.

325 (3d error, plain appealing party lish must 582 F.3d Vazquez-Lebron, (1) (2) made, Cir.2009) pro- show that an error (holding that failure to raise (3) (i.e., obvious), plain re- clear or affects the district court before cedural error review); rights. United States v. Less- United substantial plain error sulted (3d Cir.2007). ner, Watson, F.3d Even States Cir.2007) (“[b]еeause three-part if show- appellant did an makes defendant] [the may court ing, appellate exercise its ground on this object to this sentence only to correct the error if it hearing, we review discretion during fairness, “seriously integrity affects the plain judgment the District Court’s error.”). judicial proceedings.” Indeed, question public reputation there was no Olano, (quoting Id. United States v. preserved its appellant Tomko that 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 123 L.Ed.2d review: U.S. challenge “[a]t to the issue under (1993)). sentencing proceeding, the Govern- *35 asserted, directly in exhaustively ment Supreme specifically The Court has held Court, proba- that a front of the District unpre courts can review appellate that adversely affect tionary would sentence only. plain served claims for error United 562 F.3d at 568. general deterrence.” Olano, 731, v. at States U.S. S.Ct. Supreme recently The has majority acknowledges 1770. Court though Even the that, an error is not “carefully again took no instructed “[i]f the Government au properly preserved, appellate-court whether the court had even position on level,” thority remedy to the error ... is strictly offense guideline announced a final plain-error of circumscribed” to review. incorrectly defaults to the “abuse it States, Maj. Op. Puckett v. United 556 U.S. of review. discretion” standard 1423, 1428, 173 is, -, 129 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 266 “plain Review for error” at 315-16. (2009). instead, Applying plain-error of review the appropriate standard review worthy pur because, sentencing to context “serves despite ample opportunity do timely so, object poses,” including “inducting] the did not to the the Government objections” give claims and to post- raising perform failure to District Court’s opportunity an to cor the District Court sentencing recalculation. departure error, at if error there be. See Id. rect authority remedy improperly to an Our Indeed, in States v. 1433. United strictly error is circumscribed.2 preserved Booker, Supreme Court instructed 52(b), Procedure Federal Rule of Criminal ordinary prudential doc “apply we are to Supreme prece- Court as well as recent trines, example, whether determining, dent, standard of proper sets forth the raised and whether it the issue was below unpreserved proce- to applicable review reviewing test” when ‘plain-error’ fails sentencing party errors: when dural 220, 268, 543 U.S. 125 S.Ct. sentences. argument an in the dis- preserve does not (2005). 738,160 L.Ed.2d 621 court, only plain we review error. trict 52(b) that, provide expressly The Federal Rules in the absence of provides Rule may preserve a claim of ap- party preservation, plain-error “[a] review proper 52(b). informing the court—when the error To estab- plies. See Fed.R.Crim.P. noted, unpreserved er- to reverse because of Supreme Court has there is courts 2. As the States, v. be fatal.” Puckett United circumscribed: ror could good reason our review is 129,-, 1423, 1428, 173 129 S.Ct. “anyone the work of courts un- 556 U.S. familiar with (2009) (quoting v. United States in the L.Ed.2d 266 that errors are a constant derstands Cir.2005) (en Padilla, (1st matter, F.3d process, that most do not much trial C.J., banc) (Boudin, concurring)). by appellate a reflexive inclination and that 35(a) sought— or motion does the Government ruling or order is made Rule court court party the action the wishes the to object post- to the failure to recalculate take, objection or party’s court’s departure. portion transcript of the objection.” grounds and the for that (J.A. action points the Government its brief 51(b) added). ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‍(emphasis 1558) objection. Fed.R.Crim.P. is not Aside from Furthermore, “objection spe- be must opinion Government’s criticism of our enough only judge not put cific Gunter, infra., transcript portion objection, notice there is in fact an but merely a with the District discussion underlying notice as to basis serve regarding application departures or objection.” for the United States Rus- I generally. variances cannot find an ob- (3d Cir.1998). sell, jection District departure to the Court’s Here, request Government’s sole perceived failure to recalculate a Guide- sentencing was for a hearing end And, course, noted range lines there. prejudgment formal determination on in- objected the Government could not have as it J.A. terest affects restitution. the decision it claims on appeal because did the Government avail itself of the Nor be error had not even been It is made. opportunity challenge the District why to me obvious Government did by filing a Court’s calculations then, now, object: thought as I think 35(a) motion It post-sentencing. Rule did that the District Court did not err.3 *36 35(a) response a to file Fumo’s Rule mo- I tion, issue, further note that the Government has despite but failed to raise the acknowledging argued can for error plain such motions be review time after might to attack technical used errors time in situations where a fails defendant require See, otherwise remand. object procedural J.A. 1635-36. to a e.g., to error. Miller, 172, See States v. F.3d United 594 110, v. 112 Reevey, United States 631 F.3d Cir.2010). (3d (3d Neither of these actions Cir.2010); n. 3 United States v. Bradi- preserved objections nor (Government’s Government’s ca, Brief); No. 09-2420 put the District Court on that the notice (Gov- v. Bagdy, United States No. 08-4680 perceived problem Government a with its Brief); Swift, ernment’s United States v. sentencing post-departure. calculations (Government’s Brief). No. The 09-1985 government knows the rules and cannot

The Government that it chal- contends ways, arguing have it both for plain error lenged the District to un- Court’s failure object review when defendant fails to a post-departure dertake recalculation in slips up. and abuse of discretion when it sentencing its at the memoranda and sen- Although employ I would tencing plain error re- hearing. Opening Government’s view, my majority at 4. I will meet challenge colleagues Brief There is no such they the record. Neither in where for sentencing its own stand review this issue response memoranda nor its to Fumo’s an abuse of discretion. (3d (en banc)). majority's Cir.2007)

3. The reliance on our decision in F.3d n. 11 Sevilla, readily distinguishable United States 541 F.3d 226 But is Sevilla on Cir.2008) Sevilla, Sevilla, provides In defendant-appellant them no had cover. facts. In " objection legally recognized grounds we stated that the reason- for '[a]n raised his pre- sentencing ableness of the final sentence will be downward variance in a written if, during sentencing proceedings, prior sentencing served to the memorandum hear- properly ing. defendant raised a factu- at 231. The meritorious Government here legal relating post- al or issue more of to one or never raised issue of the lack of a ” 3553(a).’ § enumerated departure factors in 18 U.S.C. recalculation before Grier, (quoting Id. at United States v. afterward. objections report, ing presentence B. 23, 2009, counsel, dated June Fumo’s majority faults the District Court’s noting the possibility while of both a anal- step two of the Gunter application variance, a departure and stated the fol- my fault the colleagues ysis. Specifically, lowing in a section entitled “Grounds for a announce failing District Court departure “A Departure”: downward after sentencing range final Guidelines appropriate for Mr. Fumo is because of failing departure a and for granting public Mr. Fumo’s health and his issues granting it was clearly articulate whether service, either or in com- standing alone Maj. Op. departure a or a variance. Fumo Letter at 15. See also id. at bination.” disagree I them on both at 316-17. (“Mr. merely Fumo’s record is not points. ordinary, extraordinary. rather it is As me with My reading of record leaves such, § 5H1.11 is a valid basis for [sic] decision no doubt as to District Court’s Next, departure.”). a downward at a reasoning: grant- Buckwalter Judge or its 8, 2009, hearing July on regarding the departure 5H1.11 for ed Fumo under calculation, guideline Fumo’s counsel specifically works. moved good his strenuously position. advanced this his ill departure on two fronts: response, July the Court good The District health and his works. part, issued an order which stated in “As request specifically denied his stands, it now the offense level 33. health, him a granted for ill depart but already The court has indicated that no “You for his works: departure good departure upon will granted be based I’m for the ... and worked hard health, departure but decision on a going grant departure therefore upon good based works will be reserved Buck- Judge J.A. 1622. the Guidelines.” July until time of sentencing on by comment- ruling reaffirmed this waiter *37 Then, at the on sentencing hearing July a the finding “I did make as to what ing 14, 2009, repeatеdly the Court stated are, a find- but also added Guidelines I’ve departure it decided grant to I’m from them.” ing going depart to on public motion based service. As the 1623. J.A. sentencing Arnao hearing for Ruth on ruling District Court clarified its The 21, 2009, July the Court reiterated that Fumo filed sentencing. further after even given a departure it had to while sentence, clarify given that a motion to his similarly depart it stating that would not departure Buckwalter Judge ruled on guideline range, from Arnao’s but rather a during request discussion grant would variance.” 3553(a) motion, Fumo factors. In his Although J.A. the Government had specifically asked the District finding no trouble the District Court’s in- it had a vari- grant whether intended to grant departure tention downward a departure. ance rather than Interest- crystal sentencing, appeal clear at argued ingly, reply, the Government disingenuously waffles on the issue and that it repeatedly that “the Court stated points Judge to a statement that Buckwal- grant departure motion decided added to his ter official “Statement Rea- at 1635. public based on service.” Id. sentencing: sons” for argued: The Government I next there determined whether should But, requested it was Fumo himself who departure guidelines be a from the grant depar- that the Court a downward sentencing hearing announced at basis service. ture on the of his my to the Office stat- that there should be based on find- his letter Probation (“I ing extraordinary good by works did not announce specific guide- what I into; defendant. did not announce what line level the offense fell that is to specific guideline level offense fell say, precise number of levels which into; say, precise that is to number I depart intended to until I because consid- I intended to depart levels which factors, ered all other I sentencing could because until I considered all other sen- not in precise determine months the extent factors, I tencing could not determine in vary that I would guidelines.”) precise months the that I extent would contains a concrete statement that the Dis- vary guidelines. from the trict Court was granting departure. I Having advised counsel of the offense “vary” read the use of the word in this my level that I found and intent to de- particular phrase hyper-technically or downward, part I proceeded then art, as a term everyday but rather in its hear from counsel respective their anal- sense, meaning adjust. alter I am yses of what an appropriate sentence neither nor confused unable to ascertain should be. departure whether a or a variance was I procedure The followed was perhaps granted here. It was a departure, clearly. more akin to that associated with a vari- And, even were I in need of further ance than a departure downward be- clarification, I need turn no than further causе I never nor I announced have ever Ruth sentencing hearing. Arnao’s guideline determined what level I had firmly record there establishes that departed. Ultimately, argument District Court knew it was granting Fumo over which it was elevated form over departure. At Arnao’s hear- substance. ing, Judge specifically Buckwalter differ- App. My at 185-86. colleagues upon seize entiated between the departure gave he statement, finding the District Court’s Fumo and the variance he awarded Arnao: use of the “vary” “depart” words con- you, Arnao, “So the fact that Ms. at least Indeed, fusing. Majority admits that did something your help lifetime to oth- choice, they but for this word would have people, charities, er to help other it’s not found Judge Buckwalter’s intentions clear. enough depart for me to guide- from the Reviewing discretion, for abuse of I find lines, certainly enough but it’s for me to none. sufficiently The record is clear for vary consider to in some way from what *38 me to bend toward the District Court guidelines suggest the here.” J.A. defer to reasoning. Let us not split Judge hairs. Buckwal- I agree with Fumo here and think this granted § ter Fumo a 5H1.11 departure up any statement clears possible ambiguity and I see no reason to vacate and remand creating instead of Judge one. Buckwal- Fumo’s sentence because the District ter identifies the granting standard for a Court’s intentions were unclear. departure good based on works—extraor- My colleagues also fault Judge Buckwal- dinary behavior actions. See Unit- and/or ter for failing to conduct a post-departure Kulick, (3d ed States v. 629 F.3d 176 Cir.2010). recalculation advisory of the Furthermore, sentencing judge’s state- range. I points have two disagreement ment granted indicates that he a down- First, mind, with them works, my ward here. departure good not a vari- requirement a post-departure ance: “I next recalcula- determined that there departure advisory should be a tion of guidelines sentencing range, from the Indeed, ...” majority post-departure, injects layer the sentence the a superfluous points to as generating all the computation already confusion of into an unnecessar-

329 Second, advisory to recalculate process. failure Fumo’s ily hyper-technical range announcing the sen- it would Buckwalter did recalculate Guidelines after Judge tencing range post-departure. senator grant depar- the former state a no Buck- Judge ture. I find such error. Gunter, v. 462 F.3d States United advisory range, waiter did recalculate the (3d Cir.2006), established a 247 we albeit in terms of months than lev- rather procedure for relatively straightforward advisory range els. The Guidelines sentencing to follow in a Courts District to be 121 to 151 He recalculated months. First, post -Booker. criminal defendant range, thereby step adopted satisfying a are to calculate defen- courts district two, range analysis. step one of the At pre- Guidelines Gunter dant’s motions, announcing cisely they pr departure as would have e-Booker. Id. he ruled Second, courts instructed to departure district were a to Fumo for his downward any on the rec- rule on motions state good denying § under 5H1.11 and works a they depar- were granting ord whether de- requested upward Government’s and, so, departure if how such a af- ture Judge parture. Buckwalter then reviewed A Guidelines calculation. fects initial 3553(a) § against factors and decided also into court should take account district variances, any step satisfying three. He law, case continues pr our e-Booker fifty-five then announced a sentence of Third advisory force. Id. to have months, revealing sixty-six depar- month finally, required courts are exer- district ture. considering cise their discretion majority recalculation the misses is 3553(a) factors in set- relevant U.S.C. easily sixty-six departure found—a sentences, regardless of ting their whether months from 121 month bottom of original calculation. Id. it varies from left advisory range Guidelines Although requires district Gunter fifty-five month sentence. It was range, court to calculate Guidelines procedurally unreasonable for the District range only starting point “a is depar Court to determine the extent of its sentencing analy- initial benchmark” ture in of months of levels. terms instead Grober, v. 624 F.3d sis. United States Torres, F.3d 138 See States v. United Cir.2010) (citing United Gall (3d Cir.2001). My colleagues try to brush (“As States, at U.S. 128 S.Ct. Maj. as a case.” “pre-Booker Torres aside and to secure na- matter of administration Op. they This cannot do. Torres at 316. consistency, Guidelines should tionwide -Booker, vitality, post an adviso retains initial starting point and the bench- be require district ry decision which we mark.”)). I no that a requirement see Gunter, at to consult. courts See court, concluding after a de- district that, (noting first and sec Gunter's warranted, and spec- recalculate parture step, pr ond our e-Booker case law is still adjusted sentencing range. a new ify *39 considered, force.); given advisory its be only judge a district requires that Gunter 308, 312, v. Floyd, 499 F.3d United States departure how the “affects the indicate (3d Cir.2007) (citing n. 6 Torres for the Gunter, 462 F.3d calculation.” Guidelines §a 5K1.1 de factors to be considered indicating 247. A whether the at statement parture post-Booker); Vazquez- see also go or below the departure would above Lebron, 582 F.3d at 445. sentencing range previously determined suffice. would Further, requiring the District Court sentencing range a on its in recalculate based majority finds error additional sixty-six month is unfair be- they perceive departure District Court’s what c. the sentencing ranges overlap. cause would pointed out, sixty-six a As month Finally, agree I to even were him departure put would have into levels majority prоcedural and in the find error the District Court with leaving District Court’s failure recalculate the quandary: level’s sentencing advisory range post-departure, Guidelines range should refer under I would still from vacating dissent 3553(a)(4)? § Asking sentencing I sentence. see no evidence that the Dis- judge to choose a comes close to level trict Court would have arrived at another depar- him requiring conceptualize engaged in sentence had it the additional course, levels, which, in terms of he ture post-departure required calculation now Torres, not have to 251 F.3d does do. See before, I majority. Judge As stated at presided Buckwalter over this trial for five Looking easily I can way, at this another months and knows more about Fumo than sentencing range find recalculated on any granted of us. He departure Fumo a record. During sentencing pro- and, good based on his works in the con- ceedings, granted District 3553(a) § text of full consideration of the departure Fumo’s motion for a downward factors, chose a that adequately sentence good chose, on his based works and then accounted his findings fifty-five — context considering the required imprisonment, months a fine and restitu- statutory factors, a sentence that ade- tion. This sentence would have been no quately this finding fifty- accounted for — different had District Court announced five months. fifty- Fumo to (8) departure terms levels months, Judge implicitly five Buckwalter then selected a sentence from the corre- levels, departure eight announced a (51 months) sponding range to 63 at (51 then selected a corresponding range 3553(a) § stage. This is exactly what months) 3553(a) (“a stage. § at the Id. Judge may Buckwalter do on re-sentenc- departure easily measured in months is ing to correct the majority what per- has levels.”). translated into offense I would procedural ceived to be error.4 require not more. I if recognize that we procedural find Judge complied Buckwalter with the re- error any at we will step, generally “re- quirements we have articulated for sen- mand the case re-sentencing, without tencing. began He by calculating an initial going any v. further.” United States range, range Guidelines which neither Merced, (3d Cir.2010). 603 F.3d argued party he at incorrectly. arrived however, This approach, opens up us announced, two, then step He that he serial appeals on procedural error issues grant would Fumo’s motion for a depar- before we reach our substantive reason- ture, thereby indicating his ultimate Ly- ableness review. United States v. sentence would advisory be below the chock, (3d Cir.2009) 578 F.3d 219-20 three, range. step Guidelines At he re- (finding procedural yet error 3553(a) proceeding to factors, viewed determined reasonableness). analyze substantive See variance, would grant he and an- Stewart, also fifty-five nounced a United sentence of States months. Cir.2010) (Cabranes, J., The District Court all proce- touched dis- dural bases consequently, Here, did senting not err. sur of rehearing). denial *40 Indeed, why sentence, put through vacating simply the District Court judgment of the of complete re-sentencing? a majority If the remand for clarification? not, confusing, why the finds record instead program. The the article or television per that clearly record demonstrates the why departed, instructing jury a to avoid days simply court of departed, district departed. reading newspaper watching extent to the or televi- and the which .it ag- must more are over. Courts be sion II. their, admonitions. enforcing gressive however, in affirm- join my colleagues, I Internet, network- especially The social convictions. As Fumo’s and Arnao’s ing Twitter, like and have ing sites Facebook relates, argues majority opinion the at all society that is “connected” created its discre- the District Court abused Facebook, 2004, argu- created is times. dismissing juror Eric Wuest tion in not networking ably popular the most social post- Internet consequence of Wuest’s allows to com- people Facebook platform. jury and during the trial delibera- ings family, co- municate with their friends and charges District also tions.5 Fumo through and information workers to share by refus- abusing its discretion with digital people’s of real-world mapping their jurors about ing question the other Facebook, Faetsh- social connections. See I postings. to juror Wuest’s exposure eet, http://www.facebook.com/ available at no colleagues and find agree my (last 2011). 18, July visited press/info.php I separately, of write abuse discretion. million Currently, Facebook has over 500 however, challenges briefly highlight users, spend these registered and users pres- media proliferation of social per using over 700 billion minutes month system justice. to our of ents average Id. connect- the site. The user is system,” wrote Jus- theory “The of our community pages, or groups ed to 80 Holmes, to be the conclusions tice “is that in 2006 events. Id. was created Twitter only by in a will be case induced reached and is a real-time information network court, and argument open and evidence hap- people lets share and discuss what influence, any whether by not outside at a in time. pening particular moment print.” talk Patterson private Twitter, http://twitter.com/ available See Colorado, 205 U.S. S.Ct. (last 2011). July Twitter about visited (1907). Holmes, of L.Ed. 879 Justice and approximately has million users course, juror who never encountered a by allowing its from Facebook differs no trial. can during “tweets” Courts message text from to send out a users media on longer ignore impact social characters) to their phones (up their to 140 judicial system, cornerstone Id. estimated followers real time. It is always by jury. is trial We have out that Twitter users send over million that, although operate we understood Tweets) (or, day. messages per of these jury’s verdict will presumption words, affects In other the effects and Id. fair, jurors and can be just themselves be pervasive. electronic media are of external influences influenced a host supposed are Jurors to discuss impartiality ques- call into that can their they jury cases hear outside delibera- availability of the Internet tion. However, jurors room. we know that tion presence networking abiding of social to discuss have used Twitter Facebook held concern previously now dwarf the example: juror newspa- their service. For may exposed that a be http:// inquirer/specia]/4133127.html ex- recording audio of the in-chambers 5. An. District www.philly. com/inquirer/special/41331457. amination of Wuest Juror online available for Court and counsel is html. listening. http://www.philly.com/ See *41 * court, In an Goldstein, Arkansas state a defen- Appearance The Impropriety attempted dant to overturn a $12.6 and Networking Jurors on Social Sites:

million juror verdict because a used Rebooting Way Courts Deal with Ju- Twitter to updates send during the Legal Misconduct, ror 24 Geo. J. Ethics “Oh, trial. post One stated and no- (2011). body buy mojo Stoam. It’s bad course, jurors Of doing independent re- they’ll probably cease to exist now search improperly commenting on a and/or that their wallet is 12m lighter.”6 phenomena. case are not new The Inter- * In Maryland, Mayor Baltimore Sheila sites, net and social networking however, sought Dixon a mistrial in her embez- simply have quicker made it and easier to because, zlement trial while the trial engage privately juror misconduct, more on, going jurors five of the be- compromise the secrecy of their delibera- came “Facebook friends” and chatted tions, and abase sanctity of the deci- site, on the social networking despite sion-making process. As we have seen in Judge’s instructions not to com- case, jurors can use services like Face- municate with each other outside of book and Twitter to broadcast a virtual jury room. attorneys Dixon’s ar- play-by-play jury’s of a deliberations. gued that these “Facebook friends” course, Technology, of will continue to clique became a jury altered the evolve and courts creatively develop must dynamic.7 * ways to deal with these issues. In addi- In the United Kingdom, a case was tion to the endorsement majority opin- juror

thrown out because a sitting on gives ion recently proposed jury model a criminal matter wrote on her Face- instructions, I encourage would district page book that she was uncertain of go courts to further. We must first edu- guilt defendant’s or innocence and jurors cate that their extra-curial use of poll created a for her friends to vote.8 and, social media generally, more In- examples type of this of behavior are ternet, damages trial process and that legion. only jurors Not are tweeting, but their postings on social media sites could they have been conducting factual research mistrial, result in a inflicting additional online, looking up legal definitions, investi- costs and parties burdens on the specifical- gating likely prison sentences for a crimi- ly, judicial and the system generally. defendant, nal I visiting scenes of crimes via suggest images, satellite district courts blogging specifically about their own experiences jurors caution against accessing sometimes even reaching the Inter- parties out to and witnesses net to through issues, “Fa- do research any concepts cebook friend” requests. See David P. presented trial, evidence in the or to Loth, 6. See Renee by Google, Mistrial Boston http://mddailyrecord.com/2009/12/02/ able at Globe, 6, 2009, A15, Nov. available at despite-judgeS%ors-warning-dixon-jurors- http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editoriaL (last August visited went-on-facebook/ opinion/oped/articles/2009/ll/06/mistrial_by_ 2011). google/ (moving for a mistrial and reversal of judgment $12 million juror's based aon Khan, 8.Urmee Juror Dismissed From Trial "oh, posting stating: Twitter nobody buy Using Help After Facebook to a Make Deci- mojo Stoam. Its they'll proba- [sic] bad sion, 24, 2008, Telegraph.co.uk, http:// Nov. [sic], bly cease to Exist now that their wallet www.telegraph.co.ulc/news/newstopics/ (last lighter.”) 2011). is 12m August visited lawreporls/3510926/Juror-dismissed-from-a- trial-after-using-Facebook-to-help-make-a- Kearny, Despite Brendan Warning, Jurors (last 1, 2011). August decision.html visited (2009), Dixon Jurors Went on Facebook avail- *42 imposed by firm or on the case under the sentences District post seek comments Court. review.

Indeed, a I can envision situation where upon be judge might district called

a inappropriate Internet jurors

sanction networking postings or on social

research integrity

sites that threaten trial. sanctions are not unheard of: Such HIGGS, Carien Uriel AKA Cardel recently juror a fined $250.00 Higgs, Dayes, AKA Cordell five-page essay write a on the ordered to Petitioner judge by Michigan Amendment Sixth on posting biased comments about case Cook, Dis- Facebook. Jameson VIDEO: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE Essay missed Ordered Write Juror STATES, UNITED Amendment, Daily Tribune About Sixth Respondent. 2, 2010, Review, available at September No. 09-3128. http://www.dailytribune.com/articles/2010/ 09/02/news/doc4e806a7b7e451383425678.txt Appeals, United States Court of 2011). (last July The threat of visited Third Circuit. jurors fining holding them either Pursuant to Third to Internet miscon- Submitted Circuit contempt of court due 34.1(a) May 24, LAR necessary 2011. may become to deter duct judicial convey message that Aug. Filed 2011. system such Fi- cannot tolerate behavior. Sept. As Amended nally, responsibili- Bar some also bears dire, ty. During attorneys voir should

routinely question jurors their Internet

usage ju-A networking and social habits. potential

ror’s Internet activities have the defendant, prejudice against result expаnd must the voir dire counsel inquiries into

questioning include online

activity.

Facebook, Twitter, and other Internet

communication sites are boon to law used, Improperly

and the courts. howev-

er, they could do real harm. Problems jurors’ use continued of these sites during

and others their service must be

anticipated and deterred.

III. conclusion, I would affirm Fumo’s I

and Arnao’s convictions. would also af- The notes used guideline applies repeatedly clear that Citizens Alliance make it raising purposes, individual to be purports personal political where an funds for charity intending for a while to di funds his intent do so at then withdrew all or the funds for another vert some time million from he obtained $10 purpose. PECO, regained shortly intent then (b)(8)(A) applies any Subsection thereafter as he continued to use Citizens represented in which case the defendant his Alliance funds for own benefit. This acting to that the defendant was obtain Fumo’s to divert evidence of intent of a edu- a benefit behalf charitable overwhelming, the District funds was cational, religious, political organiza- or apply enhance- Court’s refusal a 2-level tion, government agency (regard- or ment was an abuse discretion. actually whether less of the defendant sophisticated 2. means Use of organization associated with the or argues The next when, fact, Government government agency) apply- Court erred in not part divert all or the District defendant intended to prints be included in the loss cal- Judge disagrees Garth the District should did not err. He would hold that culation. ($150,000), painting cost of the Gazela ing a 2-level enhancement for the use of and at least some of their directors were sophisticated Sentencing means. “recruited” being asked ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‍sign docu- (C) “If ... Guidelines state: the offense significance ments the of which they did means, sophisticated otherwise involved in- not understand. These subsidiaries leased crease levels.” U.S.S.G. cars for Fumo paid at least politi- one 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C). § the explanatory As note cal consultant for work on a campaign “ 8(B) amplifies, ‘[sophisticated means’ Fumo political had a interest in. In its especially complex especially means or in- memorandum and order denying Fumo’s tricate pertaining offense conduct to the post-trial motion acquittal, the District execution or concealment of an offense.... Court itself characterized the entities as: hiding Conduct such as assets or transac- nothing more than sham corporations tions, both, through the use offictitious designed to hide the activities of Citi- entities, shells, corporate or offshore finan- zens Alliance that were not conformi- ordinarily cial accounts also indicates so- ty 501(c)(3) with its status as a corpora- 2B1.1, phisticated Ap- means.” U.S.S.G. tion, such purchase as the of the cars for 8(B) added). plication (emphasis Note personal use of Fumo and his staff “Application adjustment is proper In a March 2000 memorandum from when the conduct shows a greater level of Fumo, Arnao to Arnao revealed that the planning typical or concealment than a two working were conjunction close fraud of its kind.” United States Land-

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Fumo
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Aug 23, 2011
Citation: 655 F.3d 288
Docket Number: 09-3388, 09-3389, 09-3390
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
Read the detailed case summary
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