United States v. LovatoUnited States v. Lovato
Pending before the Court is Defendant Danny Charles Lovato‘s (“Mr. Lovato“) Motion to Dismiss Count Two of the Superseding Indictment for Failure to State an Offense, or in the Alternative, as Multiplicitous (“Motion to Dismiss“). (Docket No. 84). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Lovato was indicted on November 29, 2023 for the sole count of failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of
On July 12, 2024, the Federal Bureau of Prisons reported the results of a mental evaluation conducted on Mr. Lovato by forensic psychologists while in federal custody. (Docket No. 32). The results concluded that Mr. Lovato was sane at the time that the first-degree murder was allegedly committed, and that Mr. Lovato is competent to stand trial. (Id.). On November 24, 2025, notwithstanding the federal system‘s conclusion, the Commonwealth court dismissed Mr. Lovato‘s criminal prosecution for first-degree murder during his preliminary hearing,2 on grounds that he “meets the minimum criteria for legal insanity.”3 (Docket No. 91-1 at 3).
Consequently, Mr. Lovato filed the instant Motion to Dismiss claiming that this Court lacks jurisdiction to address Count Two, because the Commonwealth‘s determination of legal insanity annuls the commission of a crime of violence, which is a requisite element
The United States opposes the dismissal of Count Two. It claims that the Commonwealth court‘s determination of legal insanity as to the Puerto Rico offenses does not bind this Court in regard to the federal offense, and that Mr. Lovato‘s double jeopardy сontention is misplaced because the Commonwealth and federal charges are distinct, separate offenses that require proof of different elements. (Docket Nos. 93, 102).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts take the facts alleged in the indictment as true, mindful that the question is not whether the [G]overnment has presented enough evidence to support the charge, but solely whether the allegations in the indictment are sufficient to apprise the defendant of the charged offense,” United States v. Ngige, 780 F.3d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted), and allow him to contest the charges “without fear of double jeopardy.” United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012). Accordingly, motions to dismiss are not meant to be a litmus test of “the sufficiency of the evidence behind an indictment‘s allegations.” United States v. Guerrier, 669 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2011).
“Dismissing an indictment is an extraordinary step.” United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2000). “When a federal court uses its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment it directly encroaches upon the fundamental role of the grand jury. That power is appropriately reserved, therefore, for extremely limited circumstances.” Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1360 (1st Cir. 1995).
III. DISCUSSION
Having reviewed the record and the law extensively on this matter, the Court must deny Mr. Lovato‘s Motion to Dismiss on multiple grounds. First, double jeopardy did not attach to the pretrial dismissal of the state offense. Second, under Puerto Rico law, a determination of insanity at a preliminary hearing is not final and therefore is not tantamount to an acquittal. Third, independent of Puerto Rico law, the Commonwealth court‘s determination did not resolve the sufficiency of the evidence or the factual elements of thе offense, as required under federal law for a ruling to constitute an acquittal. Fourth, in any event, Puerto Rico‘s insanity standard employs a lower burden of proof than federal law requires. Fifth, the state and federal charges constitute distinct offenses. Sixth, the charging of Count One and Count Two does not involve multiple punishments for the same conduct. Seventh, and lastly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar federal prosecutors from relitigating the issue of insanity.
Before the Court proceeds, it must first revisit the statutory and constitutional factors that guide its analysis.
A. Puerto Rico‘s Insanity Statute
Articles 38 and 40 of Puerto Rico‘s Penal Code - when read in conjunction – define an “insanity” defense by establishing that
In Hernández Ortega v. Tribunal Superior, 102 D.P.R. 765 (P.R. 1974), the Puerto Rico Supreme Court extended the availability of the insanity defense to preliminаry hearings. Rules 240 and 241 of Puerto Rico Criminal Procedure codify this precedent.
B. Double Jeopardy
Mr. Lovato argues that “Count Two must be dismissed because the Commonweаlth court has already determined that [he] was not
This logic, however, fails at numerous levels. The Court will address each of these concerns in turn.
1. Jeopardy does not attach where criminal charges are dismissed during pretrial proceedings.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment affords “three basic protections” to criminal defendants: “It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.
“[J]eopardy attaches when a trial commences; that is, when a jury is sworn or empaneled or, in a bench trial, when the judge begins to hear evidence.” United States v. Santiago-Colón, 917 F.3d 43, 55 (1st Cir. 2019) (citation modified); Willhauck v. Flanagan, 448 U.S. 1323, 1325-26 (1980).
As to the case at bar, jeopardy did not attach because the Commonwealth charges were dismissed at the preliminary hearing, and no jury was sworn nor trial evidence reviewed. See Santiago-Colón, 917 F.3d at 55. As such, Defendant‘s double jeopardy concerns are misplaced.
2. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has ruled that a determination of insanity at the Commonwealth court‘s preliminary hearing does not constitute an acquittal.
Mr. Lovato‘s assertion that his insanity determination at the Commonwealth level is equivalent to an acquittal also fails.
“It has long been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant‘s jeopardy.” McElrath v. Georgia, 601 U.S. 87, 94 (2024) (citation modified). In this vein, in Pueblo v. Lebrón-Lebrón, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court explicitly rejected the proposition that a determination of
Hence, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court concludes in Lebrón-Lebrón that a determination of insanity at the preliminary hearing is “not final“; is not “tantamount to an acquittal“; and “renders inapplicable the rule on collateral estoppel.” 116 D.P.R. at 859-60.8 Therefore, Defendant‘s request for this Court to treat the Commonwealth‘s preliminary insanity determination as an acquittal for purposes of Double Jeopardy cannot stand.
Mr. Lovato‘s posture is further diminished by the lack of substantive findings at the preliminary hearing regarding the elements of the charged Commonwealth offenses.
This Court has already identified that Defendant‘s insanity finding at the Commonwealth level does not constitute an acquittal. Yet the United States Supreme Court has clarified time and time аgain that to decide whether a determination of insanity constitutes an acquittal, “labels do not control our analysis in this context; rather, the substance of the ruling does.” McElrath, 601 U.S. at 94 (citation modified).
To that end, “what constitutes an ‘acquittal’ is not to be controlled by the form of the judge‘s action.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). Instead, it turns on “whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution . . . of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.”
In particular, this Court must look into whether the determination of insanity “relates to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence,” United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 n.11 (1978) (citation modified), and whether the trial court has “acted on its view that the prosecution had failed to prove its case.” Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833, 842 (2014) (citations omitted); McElrath, 601 U.S. at 94 (An acquittal “encompass[es] any ruling that the prosecution‘s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense.“). As such, this Court turns its attention not just to the label of the Commonwealth‘s insanity determination at the preliminary hearing, but also to the Commonwealth court‘s substantive findings or lack thereof.
As relevant here, a determination of insanity at either the Commonwealth or federal level “establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness.” Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983). “And to this day, the overwhelming majority of U.S. jurisdictions recognize insanity as an affirmative defense that excuses a defendant from criminal liability even where he was capable of forming the mens rea required for the offense.” Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. 271, 300 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 284 (majority opinion) (similarly tracing the historical understanding of insanity as excusing criminal responsibility).
Puerto Rico‘s insanity status follows this logic, by stating that an insane defendant “shall not be criminally responsible for
Indeed, for insanity to apply, “[t]here is no question that [the defendant] committed the criminal acts charged.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 91 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The application of the insanity defense merely means the defendant “should not be held morally responsible for the[] [criminal] acts” that he committed.9 Kahler, 589 U.S. at 315 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Hence, under Commonwealth law, “[a] verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is neither equivalent nor comparable to a verdict of not guilty standing alone,” id. at 94, because it necessarily accepts that the defendant committed the criminal act in order to hold that the Commonwealth will not hold him responsible for said act.
This Court, therefore, understands that, at some level, Mr. Lovato concedes having committed acts that may fall within the sphere of a criminal offense.10 Yet, to properly understand the scope of the Commonwealth‘s findings at the preliminary hearing, this Court must also consider whether the Commonwealth prosecutors met their burden of proof as to Mr. Lovato‘s charged offense of first-degree murder. To conduct this inquiry, this Court looks into federal jurisprudence for guidance.
As to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth prosecutors’ evidence for first-degree murder during the preliminary hearing, “an affirmative plea of legal insanity” does not “implicate the State‘s initial burden” of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In fact, “the existence or nonexistеnce of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the required [] elements of the crime.” Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Considering that “[t]he State‘s burden [of proof] is unaffected by an adjudication [of insanity] without trial,” then a determination of insanity does not constitute a determination of
In this vein, the Commonwealth‘s determination of insanity is not a ruling that the prosecution‘s proof was insufficient to establish whether Mr. Lovato committed the charged offense. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977).11 In rendering its one-sentence determination of legal insanity, the Commonwealth trial court did not take into account the prosecution‘s sufficiency of the evidence, nor did it rule that Mr. Lovato enjoys actual innocence. Quite the opposite. The Commonwealth court reached a separate legal conclusion: notwithstanding the sufficiency of the evidence, Mr. Lovato cannot be punished.
Without evaluating the merits of the charged offense, the Commonwealth court narrowly ruled that – irrespective of whether Mr. Lovato committed the prohibited act – his mental infirmity at the commission of the offense exempts him from punishment. (Docket No. 91-1 at 3). Hence, the Commonwealth‘s determination of legal insanity falls short of being “unquestionably a ruling that the prosecution‘s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense,” nor does it relate to the factual
4. Even if considered, the Commonwealth court‘s insanity determination was reached under a lower burden of proof than federal law requires.
Even if the Commonwealth had made some finding as to the suffiсiency of the evidence, this Court would not be bound by it because Puerto Rico law requires a lower burden of proof to establish an insanity defense than what federal law allows. Under federal law, “[t]he defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.”
Without a doubt, clear and convincing evidence is “more than preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 509 (D.P.R. 1984) (citations omitted). Given that the Commonwealth‘s determination of insanity is premised upon a lower standard than clear and convincing evidence, it does not meet the legal criteria that is required by federal law and, consequently, does not bind this Court.12
5. The state and federal charges are distinct offenses and require proof of different elements.
Mr. Lovato‘s double jeopardy argument similarly misses the mark, because the Commonwealth and federal charges do not pertain to the same offense. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); Santiago-Colón, 917 F.3d at 57.
“Successive prosecutions even by the same sovereign do not violate the double jeopardy principles if the second prosecution involved substantively different offenses.” United States v. Pérez-Pérez, 72 F.3d 224, 226 (1st Cir. 1995). Under the applicable legal test, offenses are “different” for the purpose of double jeopardy where “each [offense] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
Defendant‘s claim fails under Blockburger, because the Commonwealth offense – first-degree murder - and the federal offense – committing a crime of violence while failing to register as a sex offender - have materially different elements.
The Puerto Rico charge requires proof that Mr. Lovato “kill[ed] [] a human being with malice aforethought” in a manner
The state and federal charges “are not even arguably the same charge as each other.” Pérez-Pérez, 72 F.3d at 226. “In sum, Blockburger disposes of the double jeopardy claim.”
6. The application of Count Two‘s sentencing enhancement is not an impermissible “multiple punishment” for the same conduct.
Mr. Lovato argues in the alternative that Count One and Count Two of the Superseding Indictment punish him twice for the same offense. (Docket No. 84 at 16-18). The Court finds this argument equally unpersuasive.
As stated above, one of the Double Jeopardy Clause‘s functions is to prоtect against “multiple punishments” for the same conduct. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 498. “A prosecution is multiplicitous when the government charges a defendant twice for what is
Here, the application of Count Two‘s sentence enhancement does not pose an issue of multiple punishments because, “[a]ssuming a defendant has been convicted under § 2250(a) [Count One], the only requirement for thе § 2250(d) [Count Two] enhancement is that he also committed a crime of violence. That additional requirement is unrelated to the prior conviction that requires him to register.”
C. Collateral Estoppel
As a fall-back position, Mr. Lovato argues that “[i]n Sánchez Valle, the Supreme Court held that [] Puerto Rico and the federal
Collateral estoрpel “means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). “[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in criminal cases.” Pérez-Pérez, 72 F.3d at 226. Importantly, in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, the United States Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico and the United States draw from the same sovereign source of prosecutorial authority, meaning that both are barred from successively prosecuting someone for the same conduct under analogous criminal stаtutes. 579 U.S. 59 (2016).
Higher courts have already put this argument to bed. As previously discussed, in Lebrón-Lebrón the Puerto Rico Supreme Court stated: “The fact that the findings made at the preliminary
The First Circuit has also addressed – and settled - the Sánchez Valle argument raised by Mr. Lovato: ”Sánchez Valle, which had nothing to do with collateral estoppel, and where the Supreme Court emphasized the narrowness of its holding, held that Puerto Rico and the United States are a single sovereign for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause because the source of authority оf both prosecutorial powers derive from the same source.” Santiago-Colón, 917 F.3d at 58. Thus, “what determines whether collateral estoppel is applicable is whether the party to be precluded from relitigating an issue decided in a previous litigation was either a party or in privity with a party to that prior litigation.”
For the United States to be in privity with Puerto Rico prosecutors in a Commonwealth criminal proceeding, “the non-party [United States] must substantially control or be represented by the party [Commonwealth prosecutors] so that the doctrine of collateral estoppel apply.” Olson v. Fajardo-Vélez, 419 F. Supp. 2d 32, 44 (D.P.R. 2006); see Santiago-Colón, 917 F.3d at 47. “Where prosecutors from a state [here, Commonwealth] or federal jurisdiction are neither a party nor in privity with their
The question, here, is whether the Commonwealth prosecutors that previously litigated the matter of insanity in the local trial court constitute the “same parties” as the federal prosecutors that are currently litigating the same issue in front of this Court. Mr. Lovato, however, “makes no effort to аdduce facts showing privity in this case between federal and Puerto Rico prosecutors, possibly because he thinks that his ‘single sovereign’ argument establishes an identity between the two governments, an argument [that the First Circuit] has previously rejected in Bonilla Romero itself.” Pérez-Pérez, 72 F.3d at 226.
In Bonilla Romero, the First Circuit noted that the defendant “present[ed] no evidence whatsoever that federal prosecutors were, or should have been, involved in any way in the local prosecution. There is no indication they provided assistance or advice to the local authorities or at any time еven discussed the matter.” 836 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1987). Likewise, here, “there is no evidence of record to the effect that Commonwealth authorities procured, initiated, assisted or oversaw the federal criminal prosecution. Nor is there evidence that the federal prosecutor was de facto representing the Commonwealth during the federal proceeding.”
In fact, if the Commonwealth and the federal government were indeed in privity, then Mr. Lovato should have never been able to litigate the matter of insanity in the Puerto Rico forum on November 2025, (Dоcket No. 91-1), because this matter had already been adjudicated by federal authorities on July 2024 when the Court accepted the Bureau of Prisons’ finding “that Mr. Lovato was sane at the time of the alleged offense.” (Docket No. 32). Mr. Lovato‘s own actions, therefore, directly contradict – and undermine – his own legal contention.
Accordingly, without facts suggesting otherwise, the Court finds that the United States was not in privity to the Commonwealth court‘s insanity proceedings, and the collateral estoppel doctrine cannot be raised to preclude relitigating the matter of insanity in federal court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Mr. Lovato‘s Motion to Dismiss at Docket No. 84.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, on August 5, 2026.