UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Joseph Mario MCGREW, Defendant-Appellant
No. 16-1095
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Submitted: September 23, 2016. Filed: January 17, 2017.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied February 22, 2017*
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* Judge Colloton and Judge Kelly did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
Counsel who represented the appellant was Todd M. Lantz of Des Moines, IA.
Counsel who represented the appellee was Mikaela Jo Shotwell, AUSA, of Des Moines, IA.
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, MURPHY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Joseph McGrew pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of
On appeal, McGrew argues that his sentence should be vacated and that this case should be remanded for resentencing because the district court improperly calculated his Guidelines range. We need not
I. Background
On December 4, 2013, Des Moines police officers stopped a vehicle driven by McGrew for a minor traffic infraction. During the stop, the officers noticed a strong odor of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. The officers ordered McGrew and his companion to exit. While searching the vehicle, the officers discovered a stolen 9mm handgun and ammunition in a secret compartment. At first McGrew denied knowledge of the handgun, but later, as part of his plea agreement, he acknowledged possessing it.
Within two months of the December 4th incident, McGrew had two additional encounters with the police involving vehicle stops and firearms. Before the grand jury returned its first indictment against McGrew, investigators lawfully searched McGrew‘s Facebook account. This search uncovered numerous photographs of McGrew possessing a firearm, smoking marijuana, and making gang-related gestures. The search also uncovered multiple conversations between McGrew and other Facebook users regarding the purchase and sale of various firearms. The court issued an arrest warrant on October 29, 2014, and McGrew received pretrial release on November 7, 2014. During this release period, McGrew served a ten-day jail sentence for harassing the mother of his children, tested positive for marijuana use, and stashed an AK-47 assault rifle in an attic. On April 28, 2015, after several superseding indictments involving these additional charges, the grand jury indicted McGrew for having committed four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and one count of contempt of court for possession of a firearm in violation of pretrial release. The government entered into a plea agreement with McGrew that dropped all the charges except the single count relating to the December 4th stop. The United States Probation Office used the Facebook evidence and McGrew‘s further encounters with law enforcement in making its PSR Guidelines determination. The report scored McGrew‘s total offense level at 32 and his criminal history as category II. The PSR calculated McGrew‘s sentencing range to be 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment.
At his sentencing hearing, McGrew objected to the offense level calculation applied to him, specifically contesting: (1) the base offense level; (2) a four-point enhancement for possessing more than eight firearms; (3) an enhancement based on the offense‘s connection to other offenses; and (4) the denial of a single-point reduction for McGrew‘s acceptance of responsibility. The district court addressed all these objections in turn, finding the recommended total offense level appropriate. After discussing the sentencing factors found in
II. Discussion
McGrew asserts that the court misapplied several of the enhancements
Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines in order to overcome the serious disparities in imprisonment lengths that could occur between different defendants prosecuted for similar crimes. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-70 (1989). “The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). The Guidelines are a “starting point” for a potential sentence, followed by the application of the factors found in
McGrew contends that the district court committed a significant procedural error by improperly determining his Guidelines sentencing range. We review a district court‘s application of the Guidelines de novo. Beckman, 787 F.3d at 494. It is well established in the Eighth Circuit, however, that a Guidelines calculation error is harmless if it “did not substantially influence the outcome of the sentencing proceeding.” United States v. Henson, 550 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 492 (8th Cir. 2005) (“An error is harmless if it is clear from the record that the district court would have given the defendant the same sentence regardless of which guidelines range applied.“). As with all Guidelines deviations, we look to whether the district court “adequately explain[ed] the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
At the outset, we recognize that an improperly determined Guidelines range can create a significant procedural defect in a defendant‘s sentence. See Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541 (2013) (“[W]hen a Guidelines range moves up or down, offenders’ sentences move with it.“). In the majority of cases, the Guidelines act as both the starting point and the lodestar for determining the appropriate sentence. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 198-200 (2016). The Supreme Court
In Waller, the defendant pleaded guilty to knowingly transmitting a threat to injure another person, an offense with a maximum penalty of 60 months’ imprisonment. Id. at 950, 957. The defendant‘s PSR calculated a sentencing range of 6 to 12 months. Id. at 950. At sentencing, the court granted a two-level enhancement under
Waller‘s reasoning applies here. Although McGrew pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm, the district court found that the evidence surrounding this single charge compelled a more serious penalty. McGrew‘s Facebook page had multiple photos of him smoking marijuana and brandishing firearms. His message history included numerous references to gang membership, selling weapons, and other illegal activity. The government introduced an AK-47 assault rifle connected to McGrew during pretrial release. As the district court stated, “This is not the offense in its most basic form. It‘s the offense in a very aggravated form,... because of the multiple weapons, the gang-related nature of it and his status as an arms dealer....” The district court stated that it would have given McGrew the maximum penalty “regardless of how any of the guideline issues were resolved in this case.”
McGrew relies on United States v. Bah, 439 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2006), for the proposition that the district court cannot immunize a Guidelines range miscalculation with a blanket statement that it would have chosen a certain sentence regardless of the calculated range. McGrew‘s proposition is true but inapplicable. In Bah, the district court improperly applied a sentencing enhancement pursuant to
A sentencing court that grounds its sentence upon a statutory maximum penalty based on the unique facts of the defendant‘s case provides this court with an objective basis for the chosen sentence apart from the applicable Guidelines range. Accord United States v. Goodyke, 639 F.3d 869, 876 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t appears from the record that regardless of the Guidelines range and the recommendations of the parties, seventy-five months was the sentence that the district court was going to impose.“). This does not eliminate the requirement of the sentencing court to make proper Guidelines determinations and to follow proper procedures. United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he court should be careful to identify potential applicable ranges, the reason why a specific range is not being selected, and other
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
