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United States v. Feemster
572 F.3d 455
8th Cir.
2009
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*1 455 yеars than two after his from fed- intended to release that the district court only sentence, custody, the heinous nature of his an alternative but also eral provide crimes, relatively on and his lenient previous alternative sentence based that the identifiable, sentences, given must correctly prior calculated that we an “under a United range.” review sentences deferential guidelines standard,” (8th Cir.2007). Icaza, 967, 128 971 abuse-of-discretion conclude the district S.Ct. we that Johnston, v. 533 F.3d impos- court did not abuse discretion Cir.2008) (alterations (8th omitted). ing imprison- sentence 48 months’ assuming court Even Therefore, we ment. conclude procedurally granting erred in this case district court’s sentence was not unreason- an upward motion for the Government’s able. such error departure, we conclude harmless, and we affirm John- would be III. CONCLUSION sentence based on the district court’s son’s we affirm convic- Accordingly, Johnson’s an impose upward decision to alternative tion and sentence. 3553(a) on factors.4 variance based had court it not explained The district

granted upward departure started undisputedly-correct with the advi-

instead to

sory guidelines range of 18 months’ it still would have

imprisonment, America, UNITED of 48 months based on the STATES Appellant, clearly factors. The court discussed the factors and con- thoroughly v. imprisonment that 48 months’ was cluded FEEMSTER, Appellee. Kendrix D. on sentence based John- appropriate No. 06-2059. history and and the characteristics son’s protect public for a sentence to need Appeals, United States Court of crimes, promote from Johnson’s future Eighth Circuit. law, deter future crimi- respect for Submitted: Jan. 2009. conduct, just punishment nal July Filed: offense, reflect the serious- for the and to in- Given Johnson’s ness of offense. and firearms less drugs

volvement analysis, capital By adopting a defendant convicted of three counts of harmless-error murder). suggest proce- argues do not that the district Johnson also that the dis- upward durally granting depar- erred improperly trict court "double counted” his argues example, For Johnson that the ture. history granting upward de- criminal departure improper upward because his parture, previously we have stated that but lenient, they juvenile sentences were not commentary guidelines "[n]either the nor the at the time. were the maximum allowable considering prohibit also used to convictions however, note, only that he served four We criminal-history points,” award United States capital years for five counts of murder Cir.2005). Yahnke, v. battery, first-degree which is ten counts Finally, the fact that Johnson was arrested compared unquestionably to the sen- lenient charges years after the current less than two comparable an adult tence convicted being his custody based on released would have received. Rankin crime Cf. high juvenile convictions demonstrates State, S.W.3d 365 Ark. 4Al.l(e). risk of See recidivism. U.S.S.G. (2006) (upholding adult death sentence for *3 Goodman, AUSA, argued,

Daniel Steven DC, Washington, appellant. for AFPD, Liggett, argued, Lucille Gardner MO, Louis, appellee. St. for LOKEN, Judge, Before Chief WOLLMAN, BEAM, BYE, MURPHY, RILEY, MELLOY, SMITH, COLLOTON, BENTON, SHEPHERD, and Circuit Judges.

SMITH, Judge. Circuit D. of Kendrix Feemster convicted intentionally and knowingly counts two cocaine, in distributing crack violation 841(a)(1) (b)(l)(B)(iii). §§ and 21 U.S.C. sentencing, court1 At statutory mandatory minimum sen- imprisonment of 120 months’ and tence dоwn- eight years supervised release —a ward variance from the Guidelines The government of 360 months’ to life. sentence, remanded appealed resentencing because the record did permit meaningfully analyze us to sentence. reasonableness Feemster, States 435 F.3d United (“Feemster ”). (8th Cir.2006) I On re- mand, again the district court sentenced imprisonment months’ Shaw, Charles A. United of Missouri. 1. The Honorable Judge District District Eastern but ing, second-degree burglary. buttressed rationale for sen- Addi- appealed, tionally, tence. government again following Feemster had the adult (1) and we found that district court abused convictions and at age sentences: United, Feemster, (crack its discretion. possession of a controlled substance (8th Cir.2007) cocaine) 588-90 marijuana, possession re- ”). (“Feemster Supreme II Court va- sulting in a suspended proba- sentence and judgment cated the (2) remanded us tion, which successfully completed; he light for further consideration in of Gall v. first-degree burglary, resulting U.S. in a sentence of years’ imprisonment six *4 (2007). 169 L.Ed.2d 445 nowWe affirm. (including conduct citations for violations occasions), separate

on 65 he which Background I. conditionally was twice released and both times conditional release was revoked 16, 2004, On March Feemster sold 11.2 (submitting positive a urine test for mari- grams of crack cocaine to an undercover (3) juana); 23, age first-degree robbery at (DEA) Drug Enforcement Administration (involving handgun carried his co- Then, 25, 2004, agent. on March he sold defendant), resulting ten-year in a sus- grams 6.8 crack cocaine to the same pended sentence probation, and which he Thereafter, officer. grand jury charged violated; (4) 24, possession and at age knowingly Feemster with two counts of marijuana, 60-day in a resulting suspend- and intentionally crack distributing co- one-year ed sentence and unsupervised caine, 841(a)(1) in violation of 21 §§ U.S.C. (b)(l)(B)(iii).2 trial, and gov- Prior to the an ernment pursuant filed information to enhancements, Without Feemster’s base that, giving U.S.C. notice if offense level was see U.S.S.G. convicted, Feemster faced a man- ten-year 2D1.1(c)(7), history and his criminal cat- datory minimum sentence because of his IV, egory resulting in аn advisory prior for a felony drug conviction offense. Guidelines to of 92 im- months’ trial, jury Feemster went to and the con- prisonment. prior conviction victed him on both counts. felony drug for a triggered offense a statu- Prior sentencing, the United States tory minimum of 120 sentence months’ im- Probation prepared Office presentence prisonment. See U.S.C. (PSR) investigation report set 841(b)(1)(B), Also, §§ forth Feemster’s criminal history. According to adult status at he the time the committed undisputed PSR,3 the sections of the prior instant offense and his convictions the following juvenile had con- for two crimes of first-degree violence— (1) age victions: at attempted stealing; burglary first-degree and robbery— (2) age making a report; false bomb prompted office to recom- (3) and at age stealing, attempted application steal- mend of the career offender Although originally charged Feemster was object 3. Because Feemster did to the counts, specific allegations, accept with three PSR’s factual district court dismissed count, as true facts set in the forth PSR. Seе one on a based March 2004 sale of Jenners, United States v. grams 5.7 of crack cocaine to an undercover (8th Cir.2007) (stating although PSR ''[a] agent, government’s DEA motion to evidence,” permitted is not protect confidentiality of one its infor- accept PSR facts in the as true unless mants. objection specific the defendant files an allegations). factual brought Feemster was before the PSR. See U.S.S.G. in the enhancement 4Bl.l(a) (“A term supervised of- court to correct is a career defendant (1) statutory that it mini- release so met was at least if the defendant fender years. eight hearing, mum of At the the time the defen- years old at eighteen deviating court reiterated its reasons for of con- the instant offense dant committed range, explaining: from the Guidelines (2) viction; convic- the instant offense of felony inquiry that is either a crime And I know that there was some tion is a offense; a controlled substance to Mr. Feemster’s sentence of violence or relative (3) months, has at least two I him there the defendant and sentenced considering of еither a crime of prior felony convictions because defendant’s age of- current he age, controlled substance at which violence fense.”). including enhance- prior career offender committed the offenses years at 37 when 17-16 Feemster’s offense level offense he was and 17 ment set VI, old, history why gave I him that category his criminal that’s range of yielding advisory he received. *5 imprisonment. to life 360 months government appealed, The and we re- 10, 2005, to the district court for resentenc- Feem- manded sentencing At on March concluding that “the at this ing, court con- record requested that the district ster under- permit time does our court to than his Guidelines sider a sentence lower that, meaningful analysis a of whether the court absent his take range, reminding the violence, is unreasonable.” of he would sentence qualifying crimes two 1, 435 115 Feemster F.3d at 884. sentencing range a of 92 to facing be The court imprisonment. months’ fur- resentencing, At the district court Feemster committed acknowledged that developed reasoning sentencing for ther 17 at аnd the other of these crimes one imprisonment, to 120 months’ Feemster Additionally, the court noted age 23. at stating: had al- Now, at the that Mr. was time Feemster 92 to months to ready increased from 115 sentenced!,] he was 27. At the time man- by 120 virtue of the at least months offense, Now, it’s ... he was 26.... government argued datory minimum. a unquestioned that Mr. Feemster was was 30-year sentence youth. they “Youth is say, troubled As criminal his- given reasonable They just on need young.” wasted disagreed, stating: But tory. getting he started little wisdom. When too is I think this much. 360 years ... these ... he points!,] was you’re much too because offense old. ten- counting application on [for event, In has looked [t]he [c]ourt mandatory minimum] is this 16- year 3553(a) factors and the time he drug offense one when year-old was committed the de- instant offense years only He’s was old. age, was it involved years fendant one at alleged violence were crimes grams of 18 of cocaine the distribution 23, the the other at burglary, ‍‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‍and weapon No was agent. to federal base robbery. does present. And while defendant signifi- and much of it is have record The comí then sentenced Feemster being troubled because of his sentences on each cant concurrent 120-month it violent conviction, youth, it would seem includes to be followed three count of convictions, made felony and that’s what release. On March supervised years offender, II, him a and many career ranted punishment. further Feemster —most of those ... 483 F.3d at prior Supreme convictions occurred 588-90. The Court judgment vacated the juvenile. when he was a and remanded for further in light consideration of Gall. Now, conviction[,] his adult [sic] he’s placed probation. He successfully II. Discussion Now, completed that. his second adult According government, to the Feem- conviction the burglary involved of a ster’s procedurally 120-month sentence is home. And his third adult conviction unreasonable because district court for robbery degree was first which in- failed to adequate explanation However, a weapon. volved his codefen- for the chosen sentence. the alterna- dant, Goddard, Dean who had the weap- tive, arguеs that Feem- on and defendant did not. And his substantively ster’s sentence is unreason- fourth and final conviction was a misde- able for a who lengthy defendant has a meanor possession marijuana. He history serious criminal and who has not placed on probation. He successful- prior shown that sentences have deterred ly completed him from activity. criminal So to me I think this 360 months to life In response, argues that the is excessive. I it pretty think much Supreme Court’s decisions in Gall and life, away takes Mr. Feemster’s so ... Kimbrough v. United U.S. light factors, of these so I (2007), S.Ct. 169 L.Ed.2d 481 think an aggregate term of 120 months *6 establish a deferential standard of review concurrently to be served with his state for district criminal court deci- sentence of 1 eight years CR-2495A and Feemster, sions. to According an while supervised of release would seem to ad- appellate may court still consider the ex- sentencing objectives dress the pun- of tent of the district court’s deviation from ishment and deterrence and incapaci- range, the it Guidelines give must due tation. I years think ... ten and then deference to district the court’s determina- eight yeаrs supervised release, of I think 3553(a) factors, whole, § tion that the on a ... years right that’s 18 there that he justify the extent the variance. Feem- will be under kind of supervision some ster the asserts that district court by commit- the system. court procedural ted no error in formulating his appealed, and this sentence, correctly as it ad- calculated the remanded, again court finding that the visory range, Guidelines treated the Guide- (1) district court its by: abused discretion lines as advisory, considered all of the giving too weight much to Feemster’s 3553(a) § factors, did not any utilize clear- young age at prior offenses; the of his time ly facts, erroneous ex- adequately (2) substantially basing the variance on plained reasoning for im- the sentence at the time of the instant posed. He also asserts that his sentence (3) offense sentencing; considering is substantively that, reasonable and even Feemster’s lack of involvement with fire- if this court would have a differ- arms, when such lack of involvement had sentence, ent give it must still due defer- already been accounted for in calculating ence to the district court’s individualized (4) range; Guidelines con- decision. sidering Feemster’s successful completion of two terms of probation, when failure to begin district court “[A] should complete would all sentencing have war- proceedings by cal- correctly 3553(a) § failing the fac- range.” ry, to consider applicable Guidelines culating the tors, Then, clearly selecting after sentence based on the facts, failing or erroneous opportunity an parties affords both court explain including the chosen they deem “for whatever sentence argue sentence— explanation deviation from the it then consider all “should appropriate,” 3553(a) range.” Guidelines Id. to determine factors the they the sentence re- support whether A court its discre district abuses making In party.” Id. quested (1) when it “fails to consider a rele tion determination, prohib- court is district sig have vant factor that should received presuming from Guidelines ited (2) “gives significant weight”; nificant Instead, it must is reasonable. Id. or weight improper to an irrelevant fac assessment based an individualized “make (3) tor”; only appropri “considers Id. If the court presented.” facts on the weighing factors ate factors but those outside concludes judgment.” commits a error of clear Unit warranted, it range is then (8th Kane, ed States v. deviation must “consider the extent Cir.2009) (internal quotations and citation justification suffi- and ensure omitted). determining whether dis degree support the ciently compelling to error, procedural trict court committed major departure the variance.” Id. “[A] require do not a district court to “[w]e significant a more supported by be should provide a mechanical recitation of the Id. than a minor one.” After justification 3553(a) determining factors when a sen “appro- the district court determines Rather, simply tence. it must be clear sentence,” “adequately then it must priate record the chosen sentence allow explain actually factors in considered and to meaningful appellate pro- review determining the sentence.” United States perception sentencing.” of fair mote the Walking Eagle, that, Id.; (stating also id. at 594 see Cir.2009) (internal quotations and citation *7 sentence, fashioning a defendant’s the dis- omitted). give “must serious consideration trict court of er procedural In the absence from the any departure the extent to below, then the ror we “should consider his explain and must conclusion Guidelines substantive reasonableness of the sentence unusually unusually an an lenient or an abuse-of-discretion stan under particu- in a appropriate sentence is harsh Gall, at In conduct dard.” justifications”). case with sufficient lar review, are to into ac ing we “take circumstances, imposition totality count the of the

“When we review the sentences, including from whether inside or outside the the extent variance range.” ‘a the Id. If the defen range, apply deferential Guidelines Guidelines ” United dant’s sentence is within the Guidelines abuse-of-discretion standard.’ “may, but not re Hayes, range, [are] then we 591). Cir.2008) to, Gall, (quoting quired apply presumption at a of reason S.Ct. permitted But we are first the district ableness.” Id. not We “must ensure apply of unreasonable significant procedural presumption to a court committed no if is at 597. ness the sentence outside the Guide S.Ct. “Procedur error.” (or Instead, we range. “may lines Id. consid “failing includes to calculate al error” deviation, must the er the extent of the but improperly calculating) Guidelines the give as due to district court’s treating mandato- deference range, the Guidelines 3553(a) factors, a appropriate particular decision that the on a fence is case whole, justify justifications.” the extent of the variance.” sufficient Id. at 594. “ require ‘extraordinary’ may parameters Id. We of these unusual devia- justify certainly surveyed to outside circumstances sentence tions have not been prohibited mapped.4 the Guidelines” are rigid “the mathematical formula use of Here, the government argues that departure that uses of a percentage court procedural district committed error determining strength for standard be government and should reversed. The justifications required specific for solely on allegation relies that the court sentence.” Id. at 595. Just because we “adequate explanation” failed an “might reasonably have concluded that a sentence, imposing a 120-month but it in- appropriate different sentence was is specifically any argument disclaims justify sufficient to reversal of the district court considered irrelevant fac- court.” at 597. Id. in fashioning Appel- tors the sentence. Post-GaZZ,appellate begun Supplemental courts have lant’s Brief 12. Ac- way legal cording to make their new government, across the factors such as landscape of abuse-of-discretion “Feemster’s at the time of the instant circuits, offense, review. Like our sister we are a weapon absence of in the endeavoring offense, to determine what constitutes instant allegedly and Feemster’s abuse of discretion court in completion’ district ‘successful ... of the terms of sentencing a defendant prior outside some of offenses” range. The Court in Gall ex- “appear are factors that to fall within the pressly prohibited appellate extremely 3553(a), courts from broad ambit of Section employing “rigid mathematical formulas” which includes ‘the nature and circum- circumstances” “extraordinary and an test stances of the history offense and the ” reviewing when the reasonableness of a characteristics the defendant.’ Id. at 12 3553(a)(1)). sentence. Id. 595. But the Court also (quoting 18 U.S.C. Further- expressly permitted appellate more, courts concedes that “be- extent “consider the of the deviation” from cause the various consider- Id. at Additionally, Guidelines. set forth in ations Section overlap required the Court that a to a degree, considerable fact that “give already serious consideration to the extent of taken into computa- account *8 from departure the Guidelines and advisory tion of Sentencing defendant’s must explain may [its] conclusion that an un- range ... also be relevant usually 3553(a).” lenient or an unusually harsh sen- to other subsections of Section hand, recently expressed 4. The Circuit Third propor- On one told we are that tionality frustration with the current between the extent of a re- variance justification extent of the gime, for the stating: pretend "We do not that the required, variance is not 128 S.Ct. at much, foregoing any, if observations (rejecting approach per- an "that uses Indeed, guidance. we give find it difficult to centage departure of a as the standard for endeavoring direction when we are ourselves determining strength justifica- reviewing to our understand role in sentences required specific sentence”), tions while, for a Rita, Booker, Kimbrough.” after hand, on the other are advised Levinson, major supported that a variance “should be (3d Cir.2008). gave The court then an exam- significant justification a more than a ple messages of the "mixed that can be drawn one,” minor id. at 597. Gall,” explaining: Id. at 197 n. 6. adequate of an ex- for want result, reasonable government As at 12-13. Id. planation. could court that the district acknowledges weap- of a 17-18.5 the absence Id. at “consider

properly under of the offense circumstance on as a disagree. The record reflects We. 3553(a)(1), of a if the absеnce even Section our provided, as that the district the defendant’s Guide- “insight also affects weapon requires, substantial precedent reasons for its determination.” at 13. into the range.” Id. lines that, Kane, (finding apart 552 F.3d at 756 concessions, we will restrict these Given comment, pro court failed to from one the district court to whether review our into the for insight reasons vide additional chosen sentence. explained its variance). a 90-month downward imposing the district According government, to the 3553(a) factors, the district Applying unreason- “procedurally is court’s sentence justifications for the court offered three explanation” adequate of an able for want First, the court noted Feem variance. it that Feem youth, because observed ster’s began 17. criminal career ster’s prior convictions despite Second, apparently that the court observed multitude of violence and his crimes of at the time Feem weapon present no citations, arrests, violations, lesser Third, offense. ster committed instant sentenced Feemster the district court successful com the court cited Feemster’s statutory mandatory same 2006 to the government has pletion would have that the court minimum justifications already conceded that these Feemster impose had required been combination, are “relevant factors.” during the interval citizen been a model adequate explanation why they form felony first cocaine between that court determined “360 the district in the Furthermore, and his conviction conviction base to life is excessive.” months acknowledged that it had circum- the district court Under those present case. im before factors considered stances, abrupt an- the district court’s imprison of 120 months’ posing a sentence sentence, a 120-month nouncement ment. its unadorned statement along with of “360 months turn a blind court did not

the Guidelines The district but ac- the defendant’s conduct eye un- procedurally ... life is excessive” (crack cocaine) that, pos- al- controlled substance Additionally, *9 argu- explanation, this district court’s of the "[¡Information adjust- regarding prоbation court's challenge the district seems to ment because the ment is unavailable Nevertheless, findings. we find that factual ¶ unsupervised.” Although 62 does not was findings that Feemster suc- court’s the district successfully definitively state that Feemster completed probation on his first cessfully completed probation, the this and final and his “fourth adult conviction Thus, presented evidence that he did not. no possession "misdemeanor for conviction” for permitted the was to draw the district court supported the PSR. marijuana” are successfully complet- that Feemster inference that Feemster Paragraph 46 of the PSR states ed his possession of a placed probation for on 464 and “vio- III. Conclusion Feemster’s “record”

knowledged United States felony lent convictions.” Cf. the Accordingly, judgment we affirm (8th Cir.2008) 933, 937 Shy, v. 538 F.3d the district court. that, in who sentencing defendant (holding RILEY, concurring. pseu- Judge, to Circuit pleaded guilty possession knowledge that it would doephedrine reaching of substantive Before the issue methamphetamine, be used to manufacture reasonableness, first wе “must ensure the ex- court failed to the district significant pro- court district committed no sentence because it plain the defendant’s error.” Gall v. cedural that not the “critical fact” did discuss 169 L.Ed.2d U.S. possessed methamphetamine ‍‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‍defendant (2007). government’s If not for arrested, when which undermined she was position abandonment of its the dis- defendant the court’s conclusion gave significant weight trict to im- court who com- longer person was “no same and irrelevant in proper fashioning factors years two and was mitted the crime earlier sentence, I would conclude the cleaning up avoiding capable of her act significant proce- district court committed future”). Instead, criminal conduct dural error. court, acting its discre- within majority’s opinion leaves intact 3553(a) factors, tion and applying precedent court’s that an abuse of discre- concluding

was not unreasonable “gives tion occurs when a district court justifications supported three enunciated significant weight improper to an or irrele- imprisonment. sentence of 120 mоnths’ Majority Opinion vant factor.” See Kane, (quoting United States v. 552 F.3d regard With to substantive rea (8th Cir.2009)). 748, 752 See also United 3553(a), under agree sonableness Haack, 403 F.3d with the D.C. Circuit that because the Cir.2005). “[[logi- “Relevant” as is defined advisory only, are now “sub Guidelines cally tending prove connected and or appellate sentencing stantive review in issue; disprove having appreci- matter cases is narrow and deferential. As the is, probative rationally able value—that case law in the courts of since appeals Gall tending persuade probabil- people demonstrates, it will be the unusual case ity possibility alleged of some fact.” when we sen reverse district court (8th ed.2004). Law Dictionary Black’s within, above, tence—whether or below the Rules of relevancy Evidence define as applicable substan “tendency to make the existence of —as tively unreasonable.” United ... fact that is of consequence prob- more (D.C.Cir. Gardellini, probable.” less able or Fed.R.Evid. 401. 2008). Here, justifica the district court’s explaining its reasons the dramatic imposing tions for 120-month sentence ease, downward variance in Feemster’s precisely on the kind of “rest[ ] defendant- gave significant weight specific (1) determinations that are within the three factors: at the courts, special competence of the instant and sentencing, time offense (2) the Supreme repeatedly empha Court has fact carry Feemster did not a weap- result, (3) sized.” at 1095. we can crimes, Id. As he when committed his say district court abused its completion Feemster’s successful of two *10 sentencing discretion in Feemster to 120 terms These three factors imprisonment. months’ appreciable probative had no value and Feemster, any particular consequence to States v. 531 F.3d were not of United (8th Cir.2008), reh’g granted, 619-20 vacat- sentencing specifically to Feemster’s (8th 1, 2008) (Feemster III). ed Cir. Oct. variance, court’s substantial district is, they were not relevant. concedes Feem- now age part “history is and char- ster’s panel opinion, In reasoned the we 3553(a)(1), under 18 acteristics” U.S.C. basing district court’s the downward vari- therefore, аnd, properly the district court substantially at age ance on Feemster’s twenty-something considered Feemster’s (26) the time of the instant offense fashioning in sentence. age Feemster’s (27)6 was an of discre- abuse However, part the fact age is tion because: “history and of his characteristics” does (includ- provide, “[a]ge The Guidelines necessarily mean age not is a in ing youth) ordinarily is relevant “characteristic” is relevant for sen- determining departure tencing purposes potentially sup- whether a is port 5H1.1, significant variance. Feemster’s warranted.” U.S.S.G. As p.s. distinguish in age does not him mean- Feemster, noted States v. [United fact, way from other ingful defendants. (8th Cir.2007) (Feemster F.3d 583 34.1 % of all males arrested in the United II) ], “[although the are no Guidelines ages in 2007 of 20 were between mandatory, policy longer narrowly, 29.7 In more even ac- still must taken into statements be ages males between of 25 and 29 made fashioning sen- count reasonable up largest demographic group es-—an II, at 590 tence.” Feemster 483 F.3d all timated 17.24%—of state and federal 3553(a)(5)). A vari- (citing 18 U.S.C. prisoners in the Feem- United States.8 resulting “unusually in an lenient” ance age ster’s “characteristic[ ] largely should not be based provides no more a basis for a defendant” twenty-something age of the defen- variance than other irrelevant downward dant, a factor youth because relative is sentencing characteristics such as Feem- many it applies defendants and (5' 9"), (175 lbs), height eye weight ster’s uniformly unlikely is district courts will (black). (brown), or hair color As color the view that in their adopt defendants panel explained opinion, dra- “[a] deserve mid-twenties more lenient sen- for Feemster matic downward variance middle-aged tences than or older defen- (26 27) youth relative based on his (citing dants. See id. manifestly because would inappropriate it Cir.2006) Plaza, (8th sentencing dispari- in unwarranted result Maloney, 466 (quoting United States v. similarly among ties situated defendants.” (8th Cir.2006))). III, F.3d 531 F.3d at 620. Feemster’s Justice, majority Department 6. The notes the court consid- 7. United States Feder- Investigation, al Bureau of Criminal Justice career be- ered the fact Feemster’s criminal Division, Information Services Table 39— 463-64, gan age Majority Opinion see at 2007, http://www. Crime in the United States mention sub- but does not the district court fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_3 9.html. stantially based variance on Feemster’s the time of the offense and instant Albany, University Sourcebook of Crimi- Feemster, sentencing. See United States v. 6.33.2007, Online, Statistics Table nal Justice (8th Cir.2008), reh'g granted, http://www.albany.edU/sourcebook/pdf/t 2008). 6332007.pdf. Cir. Oct. vacated *11 significant “appreciable has no or pro- majority opinion Neither Gall nor the

bative value” and is precedent our circuit ... “overrule^] irrelevant, government’s absent con- grounds justify absence of ‘[t]he fur- cession. punishment ground ther is not a ”9 III, downward variance.’ Feemster rehearing government On acknowl- II, at 620 (citing F.3d edges the district court did not commit 589). procedural by error considering the ab- offense, weapon sence of a in the instant or Finally, government’s but for the con- fact Feemster’s co-defendant carried a cession, I would conclude Feemster’s

weapon during prior robbery while completion probation, of two terms of on Feemster did not. Thе now balance, was not a significantly relevant concedes the district court properly con- consideration or a proper ground for a sidered the of a weapon part absence of downward variance in this case when the “nature and circumstances of the of- compared to history of re- 3553(a)(1). fense” under 18 U.S.C. peated probation and conditional release However, carry the fact Feemster did not revocations, and numerous citations for a weapon during the instant offense is not prison conduct violations.10 See Feemster “circumstance[ ] offense” that is II, 483 F.3d at 589 (“Successfully com- relevant to whether a downward variance pleting probation a term of is similar to is warranted. all Otherwise other non- obeying the law or complying with a existent crimes and facts should be consid- court order in that expect- defendants are too; ered as “circumstances of the offense” law, obey ed to comply with court example, Feemster did not also possess orders, complete and to proba- terms of or methamphetamine distribute ecstasy, or successfully. tion The reward for doing murder, fraud, or commit rape, mail tax so is the punish- avoidance of further evasion, kidnaping, burglary, or a host of ment.”) (citations omitted). during other crimes the commission of the view, my the district court committed instant offense. Feemster could have significant procedural by error substantial- committed the instant offense in countless ly basing unusually more lenient egregious ways. To the extent the sentence on these various three irrelevant and in- crimes Feemster did not commit significant However, were factors. “[ljogically tending accepting connected and prove disprove government’s a matter in concession that all of issue” relat- sentence, justifications ed to Feemster’s given by the absence of the district court for these crimes were all taken into account in Feemster’s sentence were relevant and calculating Feemster’s range. considerations, proper sentencing I am left 9. clearly district court made рrocedural also erro- error to a sentence ] based "select! determination, thereby facts”). neous committing pro- clearly on erroneous error, cedural when it determined Feemster deserved a Further, downward variance because the record is not clear Feemster possessed weap- Feemster's co-defendant successfully completed one-year term of during prior robbery conviction, rather than Feem- probation for his fourth which II, sler. See Feemster at 589 n. 5 was counted the district court as a success- (“Co-conspirators responsible are for all rea- completion. ful began term sonably 9, 2004, foreseeable acts and omissions February of oth- and Feemster was later ers in jointly furtherance of the charged undertaken distributing crack cocaine in omitted); activity.”) criminal (quotation guilty see March 2004 and was found of that

also (explaining 128 S.Ct. at 597 it is March offense in December 2004.

467 review, in which we re- majority’s proportionality conclusion with the agree justifica- explained judge’s that the district quired the district that defer- light guideline In the the chosen sentеnce. tions for a sentence outside Gall, in com- announced standard range “proportional ential be to the extent of the concessions government’s with the bined advisory range the and difference between view, agree I also with majority’s imposed.” the sentence United States v. Feemster’s sen- majority’s conclusion (in- (8th Cir.2006) Gall, 884, 889 substantively unreasonable. tence was omitted), rev’d, quotations ternal 552 U.S. (2007). 586, L.Ed.2d 445 128 S.Ct. COLLOTON, concurring. Judge, Circuit Gall, however, Supreme In Court Congress what portends Our decision review of sen- proportionality held that in disparity once considered unwarranted 3553(a) § tences under was con- criminal defen- sentencing of federal trary interpretation to Booker and its of dants, the result follows agree but I Gall, 128 at the Sixth Amendment. S.Ct. Supreme Court’s decisions from Presumably 594. to avoid Sixth Amend- Booker, 220, 125 543 U.S. United States ment violations that would result (2005), L.Ed.2d 621 Gall S.Ct. review, appellate see id. at rigorous more 552 U.S. v. United (Scalia, J., concurring), the Court em- (2007). Therefore, 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 appeals reviewing that a court of phasized observations, I con- with these additional of application a district court’s the court.11 opinion cur in the pro- factors must refrain from Booker, held that Supreme Court a portionality proceed review and under mandatory fed- applications certain of discretion standard. deferential abuse violated the sentencing guidelines eral say appeals did that a court of Court Amendment, adopted remedy Sixth “the extent of vari- may still consider essentially guidelines rendered range,” ance from the Guidelines ap- all The courts of advisory in cases. authority but without to con- S.Ct. charged conducting appel- peals were disputed whether the extent of the sider to determine whether sen- late review to the reasons disproportional variance is substantively “unreasonable.” was tence it, justify one searches vain for given to in Booker that Responding to statements to conduct a principled basis on which designed “to reasonableness review review appellate consistent and coherent Congress’ preferred move At least when it reasonableness. direction, excessive sen- helping to avoid comes ‍‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‍to variances based on circumstances tencing disparities,” 543 U.S. defendant, specific that are to an individual applied this court a version of S.Ct. completed one-year correctly acknowledges successfully term of government 11. The February given probation imposed in youth, of a Feemster's relative nonuse was convicted in this federal that Feemster performance during prior terms weapon, and distributing in March case for crack cocaine probation are within the wide Nonetheless, ante, n. at 463 Cf. may be considered a sentenc- matters that object government did not to the court's reli- 3553(a), ing court under 18 U.S.C. finding, plain and under a error ance on this computing when facts taken into account review, prob- I see no reasonable standard advisory guideline range may relevant also be ability a whole that the on the record as 3553(a). As the other subsections of longer court would have selected however, notes, also imprisonmеnt without its observation term of finding this term of that Feemster about court made a dubious another, I court that it agree authority with the will be the and no for a court of *13 in unusual case which we reverse a district appeals preference. to enforce such a The substantively court’s sentence as unreason- in judge thought this case able.12 youth” largely “troubled mitigating, was impose statutory and elected to mini

Substantive reasonableness review en- dures, so there must be at least a “shocks mum sentence. Other reasonable federal sort of conscience” constraint on dis- judges will that Sentencing believe judges, trict but this case is not in that Commission policy was correct to declare a States, category. Rita v. United 551 age, youth, Cf. including ordinarily is 338, 365, 2456, U.S. 168 L.Ed.2d 5H1.1, sentencing, § relevant to USSG and (2007) (Stevens, J., (reject- 203 concurring) a relatively youthful drug trafficking ing “purely procedural contrary review” as history offender with a serious criminal “[ajfter Booker, all, because a district should be sentenced at or near the statuto judge gives who harsh Yan- sentences to ry in maximum aсcordance with the career kees fans and lenient sentences to Red Sox guideline. offender See United States v. fans acting reasonably would not be even if Jackson, (7th 428, Fed.Appx. 300 429-31 procedural rulings her impeccable”). were Cir.2008) (affirming sentence within advi We now must range defer the wide sory range for career offender who com personal sentencing philosophies that are mitted offense of conviction at age twenty- reflected the ranks judges, of district two); States, Marion v. United No. 04-94- and past, even Feemster’s checkered P-H, (D.Me. 2008 WL at *5-8 a years’ imprisonment term of ten for his 2008) Oct.15, (recounting district court’s drug most recent trafficking is not so le- vary refusal to downward in career offend nient that it beyond must be declared er case based on argument counsel’s realm of what a judge reasonable federal worth, young “this is a man that has he 3553(a). might select under I therefore potential rehabilitation; has he is ex agree that judgment court’s tremely young” product is a “[h]e must be affirmed. large degree adolescence”); of troubled see consequence One of these recent devel- 994(h). also 28 U.S.C. Reasonable opments likely is to be substantial sentenc- can minds differ. The punish offender’s ing disparity in federal criminal cases. inment these career rang offender judges District are supposed to “take ac- cases— ing from statutory minimum term to a count sentencing practices in other courts,” sentence at or statutory near the maxi Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. but depend there is now no mum—will substantially basis law to declare that on the one practice preferred judicial over luck of the draw. See United States, Kimbrough (internal v. United experience.” 552 U.S. quotation Id. at 575 (2007), 128 S.Ct 169 L.Ed.2d omitted). Supreme Court has reserved - -, Spears v. United U.S. decision on whether "closer review” is war- (2009) S.Ct. (per L.Ed.2d 596 cu- sentencing judge ranted when varies from riam), judges also settled that district need guidelines guide- other than the crack cocaine give weight guide- no to the crack cocaine solely judge’s lines "based on the view that lines, they embody policy because neither properly fails to reflect by Congress, dеcision directed Kimbrough, considerations even in a mine-run 570-73, exemplify 128 S.Ct. at nor the Sen- case,” (internal omitted), quotation id. tencing Commission's "exercise of its charac- question directly presented is not in this guide- teristic institutional role” to formulate case. light "empirical lines in data and national (1983) (internal 98-225, at 41 Maloney, S.Rep. 669-70 No. omitted), reprinted footnotes Cir.2006).1 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1980s, majority in bipartisan In the found that much Committee state of affairs Congress viewed similar in sentencing “directly variation at- unacceptable, opted to remove a judges tributable to the fact that some degree of discretion from sen- substantial give generally tough generally tend to *14 judges in the interest of uniformi- tencing sentences,” 44, lenient at id. and that Judiciary ex- ty. The Senate Committee “variation offense and offender charac- way: plained problem the teristics does not account for most 45; disparity.” at Id. Because the Com- comprehensive The absence of a Federal mittee believed that “[sjentencing dispari- statutory sentencing guidance law and of justified by ties that are not differences appropriate on how to select the sen- among offenses or offenders are unfair option dispari- creates inevitable tencing id., public,” both offenders and to the it ty impose in the sentences which courts “[fjederal recommended statutes This similarly situated defendants. guidance should clear to Federal by handed down occurs sentences judges among on how to select from by same and judges appropriate available alternatives an sen- judges from different districts and cir- to impose upon particular tence defen- system. judge in the Federal One cuits dants before them.” Id. at 49. These relatively long prison may impose a observations led to the Sentencing Reform incapacitate or term to rehabilitate the mandatory guidelines. Act of 1984 and judge, Another under similar offender. Thoughtful critics of Sentencing Re- circumstances, may the defen- sentence mandatory form Act have referred to the simply prison dant to a shorter term to guidelines experiment,” e.cj., as a “failed him, mаy punish judge opt or the for the Canania, 764, v. United States 532 F.3d (8th Cir.2008) in or- imposition of a term of J., (Bright, concurring), 778 fact der to rehabilitate him. but remains the elected (N.D.Iowa 2009). Kimbrough Gully, F.Supp.2d Early after and 619 633 results Gall aggravated disparities are show judges apply Some district decline the full by policy disagreements among further sen penalties by measure of recommended tencing judges best re about what sentence congressionally advisory guideline directed in mine-run flects the factors cases. possession pornography, of child see Unit example, judges agree For some district now Stern, 945, F.Supp.2d ed States v. 590 960-61 advisory guidelines with the crack cocaine Baird, (N.D.Ohio 2008); United States v. 580 (which apply crack-powder ranging ratio 889, (D.Neb.2008); F.Supp.2d 894-95 United 80-to-l), apply 25-to-l and and between 739, Shipley, F.Supp.2d 744 States v. 560 3553(a). them under See United States v. 2008), (S.D.Iowa judges while other believe 08-3165, 1228264, Haigler, WL No. 2009 rejection guideline’s policy under 6, 2009); May *2 Cir. United States v. pornography child states seriousness of Gibbons, 40, (1st Cir.2009). 44 Oth 553 promote respect offenses and fails to for law judges vary advisory guidelines er frоm the provide just punishment. and to See United policy disagreement, apply on a based Fiorella, 1057, F.Supp.2d States v. 1074- 20-to-l, crack-powder ratio of see (N.D.Iowa 2009). Sentencing Com Dozier, 108CR08-02, v. No. S 2009 WL presumably catalog mission will these 1286486, 8, 2009), (S.D.N.Y. May at *6 or 10- by the Edwards, other variations for consideration 1, No. 04- see United to— Booker, CR-1090-5, (N.D.Ill. Congress. courts and See 543 U.S. at *3 2009 WL 1-to-1, 2009), v. 125 S.Ct. 738. Feb. see United States branches have never renounced determi most of the unconstrained discretion that Booker, nate or restrictions on the dis Congress eliminated in 1984. Cf. sentencing judges. cretion of federal (Stevens, J., 543 U.S. at 125 S.Ct. 738 Congress recent action of in this most (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. dissent- area, controversial, designed albeit to ing). Attorney The United States is un- further limiting cabin discretion derstandably frustrated that sentences like grounds departure available the one in this case undermine strengthening appellate review. PRO See uniformity, but “it not our role to fight Act, 108-21, TECT Pub.L. No. 117 rear-guard preserve quasi-man- action to (2003). Mandatory 667-76 mini Stat. datory Guidelines.” United States Gar- mum in full sentences remain effect with dellini, (D.C.Cir.2008). offenses, respеct they to numerous are point, any At this such action must be constitutional. Harris v. United See, Congress. taken by e.g., *15 545, 568-69, 2406, 536 U.S. 122 S.Ct. (“After (Souter, J., S.Ct. at 603 concurring) (2002). Court, Supreme L.Ed.2d 524 Bookers, holding, remedial I continue to recognizing policy goals legislatures of think that the best resolution of the ten- proportional to make sentences to the sion consistency between substantial gravity parity of offenses and to achieve throughout system right and the of defendants, among specified nothing that jury trial Congress: would be a new Act of in its Sixth Amendment decisions “im reestablishing a statutory system of man- pugns salutary objectives.” those Blakely datory sentencing guidelines (though not v. Washington, 542 U.S. 124 S.Ct. identical to the in original points all of (2004). 159 L.Ed.2d 403 We have detail), but providing jury findings for of system returned to a of wide discretion for necessary all facts upper range to set the therefore, sentencing judges, not because discretion.”). sentencing people through politi demanded it process, cal constitutionally because it is BEAM, Judge, Circuit dissenting. required, but Supreme because the Court agree Because I with the аdvisory system decreed the a remedy as that the district court failed to for in particular constitutional flaws deviation, explain the 240-month and be- manner in Congress which established cause the resulting 120-month sentence is determinate under the Sentenc unreasonable, substantively respectfully I ing Reform Act. dissent. irony is that the Court chose its First, agree I with the court that wheth- remedy in Booker on the view that reviewing er we are sentences within or advisory guidelines would “deviate less without the Guidelines range, apply radically Congress’ system” intended standard, deferential abuse-of-discretion than would mandatory retention of the ensuring procedural first that no guidelines error oc- judicial without factfinding. Booker, none, considering curred and if the sub- U.S. 125 S.Ct. 738. however, stantive acknowledged, The Court also reasonableness sentence. 461; appellate Ante Gall v. review “will not uniformity 591, 597, Congress originally U.S. sought secure,” (2007). 766-67, id. at L.Ed.2d 445 I light therefore concur in Kimbrough, appears portion And, Gall and it opinion. the court’s I respect statutory fully acknowledge sentences above the thаt under the “deferen- minimum, judges have regained standard, tial appel- abuse-of-discretion” greatly sentences is tact. 128 S.Ct. at 597. the Su- late review of federal When curtailed, harkening pre-Guidelines back to preme appellate instructed Court courts sentencing.14 I also be- days of federal procedural review for and substantive rea- lieve, have, always good I that there is sonableness, I believe it meant what it judges great giving sentencing reason only said. Not did the district court fail to Yet, notwithstanding pru- latitude.15 support any sig- Feemster’s sentence with giving district courts dence exhibited justification, nificant but also this court’s deference, there remains such deserved opinion any meaningful lacks discussion of seemingly review nonetheless —an element the circumstances under which a court of analysis. The lost in ‍‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‍the court’s instant appeals may actually reverse a district court’s affirmance of practical result court’s sentence. What would constitute establishes, effective- an abuse of discretion if this case does not? at all. ly, apрellate a standard of no review affirmance, today that is so defer- If Feemster is a adopt posture We case that, long ential so as the district court surely then there is no reversal on the of discussion to gives lip service and bit appellate horizon this circuit. Feem- 3553(a) factors, the relevant 18 U.S.C. juvenile litany ster’s and adult convic- reversed, sentence will almost never be tions, Feemster, see United States v. approach or otherwise. This procedurally Cir.2007), 585-86 include *16 supported by Supreme prece- not is Court qualifying flatly two crimes of violence ov- dent. ershadowing age his factor that was —the clearly primary justifi- the district court’s agree Judge Riley

I that the dis- significant procedur- trict cation and concern at Fur- sentencing. court committed ther, by substantially basing al error the district court’s articulation that unusually sentence on three irrele- lenient “successfully completed ... youth, ab- insignificant vant and probation” justification huge as for this factors — weapon, completion sence of and successful disingenuous deviation is both and coun- repeated and redundant accepts ter-factual. That this court such a use of these factors does not justification difficult to is understand. We explain great nor variance in support sixty-five ignore separate con- And, willingly I credit this case. do so during prior duct violations received (which government’s “concessions” is a imprisonment, two conditional release rev- misnomer, it, I government’s as see for the ocations, probation and at least one argument) mere articulation of its as a And, add, certainly might was violated. I barrier in this case. to reversal considering the existence of an unsu- probation pervised comple- directives leave no doubt as “successful

Gall’s in- tion” “meaningful appellate review” remains when there is no clear indication change govern- sentencing, pre-Guidelines, 14. Without substantive in the and the of at least Guidelines, ing felons, statutes and the our current "disparity princi- 500 federal that the 180-degree review is a turnaround from our ple," by advanced advocates as the founda- days micro-management. of near United underlying guideline tion and bedrock federal Robinson, 454 F.3d 839 Cir. illusion, sentencing, by at is an least half. Saenz, 2006); v. United States Virtually every presents a individual different And, (8th Cir.2005). I we have now believe picture a careful and conscientious sen- gone far. too result, tencing judge. alleged uniformity As a believe, disparity, through is often viewed a different firmly upon 15. I based almost five years experience judge prism. trial as federal (11th Cir.2008). Notwithstanding Pugh, a stretch. way, either is clarify supports the A failure to more serious level of review government’s I regarding completion, reversal this case. dissent. confusion not, unsupervised proba- term of

tion, obligated existing under this court the record on its own.

precedent to review it, almost I

As see “successfully completed” certainly not America, UNITED STATES of support such deviation. such as to Appellee, however, court, justifi- framed its way to receive a free cation such

pass appeal. Ray GAMBLE, Appellant. Michael though the district bolstered Even No. 08-2800. justification departure for the men- Appeals, States Court of tioning Feemstеr’s “record” and “violent convictions,” Eighth felony repeated use of Feem- Circuit. driving remained the obvious ster’s April 2009. Submitted: fashioning

force behind the of this sen- July Filed: tence. should not allow such circumlo- We By guide appellate cution to our review. Rehearing Rehearing En Banc giving this sort of action free rein without Aug. Denied review, sentencing meaningful courts upon mention a few words based

requirements have obtained license for

capriciousness. Merely acknowledging a

consideration of factors is not

enough. Ante 463-64. The court ‍‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‍does seriously attempt analyze

not the dis- end,

trict reasoning court’s does how address justifications “sufficiently”

court’s three

support resulting 240-month deviation. vaguely at 594. S.Ct. While justifications

plausible, barely, but these

do not convincing explanation support

needed to the deviation made

here. Review for abuse of discretion must

be more than a review of thin recitations

already meaningfully considered in Guide-

line calculations. bottom,

At I am left with a “definite and

firm conviction” that this sentence is out-

side the realm of reasonableness dictated the case. United States v.

by the facts (9th Cir.2009)

Autery,

(Tashima, J., dissenting); United States v. notes marijuana. Paragraph states though court "found that Feem- session of successfully completed two terms any proba- had ster not reflect records do "[c]ourt does not reveal probation, the record to Feemster’s fourth con- violations.” As tion successfully completed term.” either ¶ marijuana, 59 of possession of viction for government has con- While the Id. “placed proba- he was the PSR states that adequacy only challenging the it is ceded that Paragraph year.” 62 states tion for one

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Feemster
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date Published: Jul 13, 2009
Citation: 572 F.3d 455
Docket Number: 06-2059
Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.
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