United States v. JohnsonUnited States v. Johnson
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant Kevin Johnson is a 61-year-old man who has served over 20 years of a nearly 27-year sentence for non-violent offenses. See Sentence Monitoring Computation Data [ECF No. 88-2] at 1-3; Presentence Investigation Report [ECF No. 89] (“PSR“) at 3 (sealed).1 He has filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing, among other things, that if he were sentenced today, he would likely receive a sentence of around only 13 to 15 years. See Def.‘s Emergency Mot. for Compassionate Release [ECF No. 80] (“Mot.“) at 14. After considering all the facts of Johnson‘s case—including the disparity between the sentence he has already served and the sentence he would likely receive if sentenced today—the Court agrees that Johnson has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting his release. Hence, for the reasons explained below, the Court will grant Johnson‘s motion.
Background
I. Facts
In June 2002, Johnson was standing outside a building in southeast D.C., saw police
Johnson was indicted for violating
The Probation Office determined that the base offense level for count one (heroin possession with intent to distribute) was 12 since Johnson possessed 2.4 net grams of heroin. PSR ¶ 14; U.S. Sent‘g Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(a)(3), (c)(14) (U.S. Sent‘g Comm‘n 2002) (“2002 USSG“). Putting count two (using, carrying, and possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking offense) to the side for a moment, the base offense level for count three (felon-in-possession offense) was 24 because Johnson had two prior felony convictions for drug offenses. Mot. at 3; PSR ¶ 20; see 2002 USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2). These felony convictions were for (1) unlawful distribution of phencyclidine (“PCP“) and marijuana and (2) attempted distribution of PCP. Mot. at 3; PSR ¶ 20 & n.1. The combined adjusted offense level for counts one and three was 24. See PSR ¶¶ 25-32; see also 2002 USSG § 3D1.4 (outlining rules for determining combined offense level for multiple offenses).
The Probation Office next determined that Johnson‘s two prior felony convictions meant that he was a career offender and that the offense level for count one should be enhanced to 34. Mot. at 4; PSR ¶ 33; see also 2002 USSG § 4B1.1(a) (“A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is . . . a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of . . . a controlled substance offense.“). Johnson also had several prior misdemeanor convictions, and the Probation Office concluded that his record merited 13 criminal history points, placing him in category VI. Mot. at 3; PSR ¶ 47.2 A total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI resulted in a guideline range for imprisonment of 262 to 327 months for count one. PSR ¶¶ 81; see also 2002 USSG § 5A (sentencing table). A total offense level of 24 and a criminal history category of VI resulted in a guideline range for imprisonment of 100 to 125 months for count three. See 2002 USSG § 5A.3
Johnson was sentenced in February 2003. Sentencing Tr. [ECF No. 49] at 1. At that time, the sentencing guidelines were mandatory. See id. at 18:16-19:2. The Court noted this constraint at sentencing, commenting that “the sentencing guidelines do limit the flexibility and judgment of the court in circumstances such as this . . . [but] whether one agrees or disagrees with particulars of the sentencing guidelines, it is the law, and it is binding on all of us . . . .” Id. at 18:16-24. After summarizing the appropriate guideline calculations for each offense, id. at 3:15-6:20, the Court sentenced Johnson to 262 months of imprisonment on count one (the minimum permissible sentence), 120 months of imprisonment on count three, and 60 months of imprisonment on count two, id. at 14:2-5; J. in Criminal Case at 2. The sentences for counts one and three were to run concurrently. Sentencing Tr. at 14:2-5; J. in Criminal Case at 2. Johnson‘s total sentence of incarceration was therefore 322 months (or 26 years and 10 months). See Sentencing Tr. at 14:2-5; J. in Criminal Case at 2. The Court also sentenced Johnson to six years of supervised release following his incarceration. Sentencing Tr. at 15:15-20; J. in Criminal Case at 3 (six years of supervised release for count one to be served concurrently with three years of supervised release for each of counts two and three).
There have been two important and relevant changes in sentencing law since 2003. First, the D.C. Circuit has held that attempted distribution of a controlled substance does not qualify as a controlled substance offense for the purpose of determining whether a defendant is a career offender. United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The government does not dispute that under Winstead, Johnson would not be sentenced as a career offender today because one of his two felony drug convictions was for an inchoate offense, and the Court considers the issue conceded. Second, while the guidelines must be considered at sentencing, they are no longer binding. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). Hence, if Johnson were sentenced under the law as it exists today, his guideline range of incarceration would be substantially lower and the Court would also have the freedom to deviate below (or above) the guidelines if it concluded that such a variance was warranted.
II. Procedural History
The D.C. Circuit affirmed Johnson‘s convictions in 2004. United States v. Johnson (Johnson I), 98 F. App‘x 5, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Johnson filed his first motion for compassionate release in August 2020, arguing that his advanced age and excellent record while incarcerated, in combination with the COVID-19 outbreak, warranted his release. Mot. Pursuant to
The Court again denied Johnson‘s motion on remand. United States v. Johnson (Johnson IV), Crim. A. No. 02-310 (JDB), 2021 WL 3737681, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2021). In this opinion, the Court briefly discussed Johnson‘s argument that he received a much stricter sentence than he would likely receive today. See id. at *1, *3-4. The Court concluded, however, that the argument was not properly presented because Johnson had failed to raise the claim with the warden of his prison (FCI Cumberland) before filing his compassionate release motion and had failed to fully develop the argument in the motion itself. Id. at *3-4. The Court explicitly noted that “nothing in
In October 2021, Johnson, through counsel, sent a letter to the warden at his prison requesting compassionate release. Compassionate Release Request [ECF No. 80-2] at 1. The letter cites as reasons for his release Johnson‘s “age, race, gender, health conditions, and complete medical record; the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and all of the attendant circumstances . . . ; and changes in the law that prove his sentence was unfair and is far greater than necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing.” Id. Johnson‘s request also argues that he should not have been sentenced as a career offender and that he is not a danger to the community. Id. at 1-2.4 The warden never responded to Johnson‘s letter. Mot. at 14.
Johnson filed this second compassionate release motion in January 2022. See generally Mot. The government filed its opposition in March, United States’ Opp‘n to Mot. [ECF No. 88]
(“Opp‘n“) at 33, and
Legal Standards
The compassionate release statute authorizes a court to reduce a defendant‘s sentence in limited circumstances. See
Under the most recent version of
Analysis
Johnson‘s motion raises three main questions: what may a court consider when determining whether a defendant has presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, has Johnson established extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release, and do the
I. What May a Court Consider When Resolving a Compassionate Release Motion
The parties disagree about what factors a Court may consider when determining
The D.C. Circuit confronted this problem in United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2021), and held that while
But the parties disagree on two related issues. The first is whether a court should consider § 1B1.13‘s guidance at all when considering a compassionate release motion brought by a defendant. Compare Opp‘n at 21-22 (arguing the policy statement should be a “guidepost” and that courts should not “reject the policy statement and instead venture into their own, idiosyncratic, case-by-case assessments“), with Reply at 5 (“[The government] never explains how a policy statement whose ‘inapplicability is plain on its face’ can function as a ‘guidepost.‘” (citations omitted)). The Court has considered this question in this litigation before, and, for the reasons explained previously, concludes that “the criteria in § 1B1.13 still provide ‘persuasive (albeit not binding) authority when considering’ compassionate release motions brought directly by defendants. Johnson IV, 2021 WL 3737681, at *4 (collecting cases); accord United States v. Shabazz, Crim. A. No. 17-43 (JDB), 2021 WL 4306129, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2021) (“Though no longer binding . . . [§ 1B1.13] remains an important and useful guidepost for courts considering [compassionate release] motions, and the Court sees ‘no reason to disregard completely the Commission‘s decades of expertise in assessing the substantive contours of the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that might
The parties’ second disagreement is more difficult to resolve: may a court consider nonretroactive changes in law as a factor supporting a compassionate release motion? Section 1B1.13 does not specifically state that changes in law can support finding that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, but it does include a catch-all, “Other Reasons” category. U.S. Sent‘g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D) (U.S. Sent‘g Comm‘n 2021). Courts across the country are divided on the appropriateness of considering nonretroactive changes in law when deciding a compassionate release motion. The Eighth, Sixth, Third, and Seventh Circuits have answered this question in the negative, holding that nonretroactive changes in law are irrelevant in the compassionate release context, or, at the very least, not sufficiently weighty to be considered “extraordinary and compelling.”5 At least one judge in this District has agreed with this approach. Hicks, 2021 WL 1634692, at *8 (“To treat changes in the law and related mitigating factors as an extraordinary and compelling reason would effectively override [clear] statutory limitations with a definitional sleight-of-hand by allowing any defendant sentenced under any subsequently amended statute to seek early release under
The First and Fourth Circuits disagree and have held that nonretroactive changes in law can at least partially justify finding that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant reducing a defendant‘s sentence.6 The Tenth Circuit has largely agreed with the First and Fourth Circuits, United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1047 (10th Cir. 2021), but it has specified that a nonretroactive change cannot by itself justify sentence reduction, id. at 1048.7 Several
United States v. Price, 496 F. Supp. 3d 83, 88 (D.D.C. 2020) (“But those changes to the law have not been made retroactive. Nonetheless, this situation, as a number of courts have recognized, can present an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a defendant‘s sentence . . . .“). The D.C. Circuit has not yet taken a clear stance on the issue. See United States v. Perkins, 857 F. App‘x 663, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (citing, but not necessarily endorsing, the Fourth Circuit‘s opinion in McCoy, 981 F.3d at 285, which held that nonretroactive changes in law can be relevant in the compassionate release context).
After considering these cases, and the parties’ arguments, this Court concludes for two reasons that nonretroactive changes in law can form part of—and indeed, a substantial part of—a finding that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant reducing a defendant‘s sentence.8
First, and most importantly, considering nonretroactive changes in law when deciding whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist best aligns with separation-of-powers principles and the need to follow legislative intent. The compassionate release statute provides that a court may reduce a defendant‘s term of imprisonment “in any case” if the statute‘s requirements have been satisfied, including that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”
Courts reaching the opposite conclusion have emphasized the need to respect Congress‘s decision not to make an intervening change in law retroactive.9 E.g., United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Why would the same Congress that specifically decided to make these sentencing reductions non-retroactive in 2018 somehow mean to use a general sentencing statute from 1984 to unscramble that approach?“). But the fact
individual defendant has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons does not conflict with respecting Congress‘s decision not to make a legal change retroactive, and a desire to respect Congress‘s decision not to make a change retroactive is not a reason to rewrite the compassionate release statute and insert limitations that Congress has not authorized. See Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 27.
Second, this Court is also guided by the Supreme Court‘s instructive, but not directly on-point, recent decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022). There, the Supreme Court considered what factors a court may consider when exercising its discretion to reduce a sentence under the First Step Act. Id. at 2396; see also First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (“A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.“). The Supreme Court emphasized the significant discretion courts exercise in both selecting an appropriate sentence and deciding to modify that sentence, 142 S. Ct. at 2398-2400, and concluded that “[t]he only limitations on a court‘s discretion to consider any relevant materials at an initial sentencing or in modifying that sentence are those set forth by Congress in a statute or by the Constitution,” id. at 2400; see also id. at 2401, 2404 (holding that district courts may consider “unrelated Guidelines changes” when deciding whether to reduce a sentence under the First Step Act). As explained previously, nothing in the compassionate release statute suggests that courts are prohibited from considering changes in law, and the fact that a particular change is not retroactive does not mean it should not be considered when deciding whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist. Hence, in accordance with Concepcion, and to give full effect to
II. Johnson Has Presented Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Warranting a Reduction in His Sentence
Johnson‘s letter to his warden requesting compassionate release and his motion
A. The Disparity Between the Sentence Johnson Received and the Sentence He Would Likely Receive If Sentenced Today
Johnson‘s main argument in support of compassionate release is that he was sentenced to nearly 27 years of incarceration for crimes that would likely result in a sentence of around 13 to 15 years if sentenced today. See Mot. at 14-21 (“A sentence to twice the amount of time which should have been imposed is surely an extraordinary and compelling circumstance.“). As discussed above, at the time Johnson was sentenced, the guidelines were mandatory, see Sentencing Tr. at 18:5-14, 18:16-19:2, and the guideline range of incarceration for the first count of Johnson‘s conviction was 262 to 327 months since he was a career offender, id. at 5:6-18, 6:12-16; PSR ¶¶ 33, 81; Mot. at 14. He was sentenced as a career offender because, among other things, he had “at least two prior felony convictions of . . . a controlled substance offense.” 2002 USSG § 4B1.1(a); PSR ¶ 33; Mot. at 3. These convictions were for (1) unlawful distribution of PCP and marijuana and (2) attempted distribution of PCP. PSR ¶ 20 & n.1; Mot. at 3.
In Winstead, the D.C. Circuit held that attempted distribution of controlled substances does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” for the purpose of determining whether a defendant is a career offender. 890 F.3d at 1091 (“Section 4B1.2(b) presents a very detailed ‘definition’ of controlled substance offense that clearly excludes inchoate offenses.“); see also United States v. Campbell, 22 F.4th 438, 442-43 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting circuit split on issue). Without the career offender enhancement, the total offense level for Johnson‘s count one conviction would have remained at 24,12 see PSR ¶¶ 32-33, and
Johnson has served over 20 years as of the date of this Memorandum Opinion. Sentence Monitoring Computation Data at 3.
Johnson does not contend that the legal changes that have occurred since his sentencing are retroactive. See Reply at 2-3 (describing the issue as “irrelevant“).13 The government argues at length that because these legal changes are not retroactive, they cannot support granting Johnson‘s motion. Opp‘n at 17-25 (“[Johnson]‘s claim that he should be released in light of Winstead has no merit because the decision is not retroactive and, in any event, such a claim is not properly presented in a compassionate-release motion.“). For the reasons outlined in the prior section, the Court disagrees with the government. Nonretroactive changes in law, including the Winstead decision, can be relevant when deciding whether there are extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce a defendant‘s sentence, and hence are relevant in this case.
The government argues in the alternative that nonretroactive changes in law may be considered only when deciding whether the factors outlined at
COVID-19 constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason. See United States v. Hickman, Crim. No. CCB-07-261, 2020 WL 6393391, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 2, 2020) (noting the court “agree[d] with the parties” that COVID-19
The Court accordingly adheres to its conclusion that it may consider nonretroactive changes in law, including Winstead, when deciding whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant reducing Johnson‘s sentence. Indeed, when confronted with a similar motion, Judge Chutkan held that Winstead, “given its significant bearing on [the defendant‘s] sentence, is itself an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence.” Order at 3, United States v. Smith, No. 14-cr-189 (TSC) (D.D.C. May 14, 2020), ECF No. 76 (emphasis added). Johnson‘s argument is even stronger than the defendant‘s argument in Smith since the sentencing guidelines were not mandatory at the time of that defendant‘s sentencing and he had already received a sentence below the guideline range. See id. at 1, 3 (noting the defendant was sentenced to 100 months of incarceration even though the guideline range with the career offender enhancement was 188 to 235 months). In this case, by contrast, Johnson‘s career-offender designation is directly responsible for more than eleven years of his twenty-seven-year sentence. Hence, like Judge Chutkan in Smith, this Court concludes that the disparity between the sentence Johnson received and the sentence he would likely receive if sentenced today weighs strongly in favor of finding that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant reducing his sentence.14
B. Johnson‘s Physical Conditions and the Threat Posed by COVID-19
Johnson also argues that his physical conditions support finding that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence, particularly given the COVID-19 pandemic. See Mot. at 21-27. He primarily relies on the briefing in support of his prior compassionate release motion to outline his health conditions, see id. at 5, 7, 21-25, but his current motion mentions that he suffers from “hypertension, high cholesterol, and farsightedness,” id. at 5; see also First Compassionate Release Mot. at 5, 22-23 (further explaining Johnson‘s health conditions). Johnson highlights his age (61) and race (Black) as risk factors that increase his susceptibility to COVID-19. Mot. at 26-27; see also COVID-19 Risks and Vaccine Information for Older Adults, CDC (Aug. 4, 2021), available at https://www.cdc.gov/aging/covid19/covid19-older-adults.html (noting “[t]he risk [of severe illness from COVID] increases for people in their 50s and increases in 60s“); Risk for COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death By Race/Ethnicity, CDC (June 24, 2022), available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-discovery/hospitalization-death-by-race-ethnicity.html (noting that African Americans have higher rates of hospitalization and death from COVID-19 than White, non-Hispanic individuals).
The government‘s opposition focuses on the fact that “Johnson [has] received his first and second shots of the Moderna vaccine as well as a booster shot.” Opp‘n at 26; see also Sealed Medical Records
The Court has fully analyzed Johnson‘s physical conditions and susceptibility to COVID-19 in two prior opinions, Johnson IV, 2021 WL 3737681, at *4-7; Johnson II, 2020 WL 5518360, at *2-3, and the discussion here will be brief. Once again, the Court concludes that Johnson‘s health concerns are not weighty enough to constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release. As an initial matter, the CDC‘s guidance does not list farsightedness or high cholesterol as factors that increase an individual‘s risk of becoming seriously ill from COVID-19. See People with Certain Medical Conditions, CDC (May 2, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html; see also Morales, 2021 WL 4622461, at *4 (discussing uncertainty over whether high cholesterol is a COVID-19 risk factor). While Johnson‘s hypertension may increase his susceptibility to severe illness, see People with Medical Conditions, CDC (May 2, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html (stating it is “possibl[e]” that hypertension increases risk),15 the Court previously concluded that Johnson‘s hypertension is well-managed, Johnson IV, 2021 WL 3737681, at *5-6, and Johnson has not disputed this characterization.16
Johnson‘s age (61) also is not so advanced as to significantly change the Court‘s analysis. See Johnson IV, 2021 WL 3737681, at *6 (noting Johnson‘s age increases his risk but concluding this increase did not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release). In reaching
this conclusion, the Court is guided, but not bound, by the policy statement at § 1B1.13, which indicates that age-based compassionate release may be warranted when other requirements are met and the defendant “is at least 65 years old.” U.S. Sent‘g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(B) (U.S. Sent‘g Comm‘n 2021). And this Court joins other courts in rejecting Johnson‘s argument for release on the basis of his race. E.g., United States v. Rice, Crim. A. No. 17-128 (JEB), 2020 WL 6887790, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 2020); United States v. King, Crim. A. No. 00-cr-313-01, 2021 WL 2588976, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 2021) (noting that courts
Most importantly, however, the fact that Johnson has received three COVID-19-vaccination shots significantly undermines his argument. Morales, 2021 WL 4622461, at *6; United States v. Martinez, Case No. 1:05-cr-445-1 (RCL), 2021 WL 2322456, at *2 (D.D.C. June 7, 2021) (“[A]lthough [defendant] may have underlying conditions that could increase his risk of severe illness from the virus, the fact that he has been fully vaccinated mitigates that risk almost entirely.“). In part due to Johnson‘s vaccination status and the effectiveness of the COVID-19 vaccines generally, the Court is similarly still “not persuaded that Johnson‘s incarceration at FCI Cumberland considerably increases his chance of getting COVID-19.” Johnson IV, 2021 WL 3737681, at *7; see also COVID-19 Coronavirus, Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (reporting that only four inmates at FCI Cumberland are currently COVID-19 positive) (last visited July 20, 2022); FCI Cumberland, Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/cum/ (last visited July 20, 2022) (reporting 1,278 total inmates at the facility). Suffice it to say, if Johnson‘s only argument for compassionate release were the risk he faces due to COVID-19, his motion would fail. Cf. United States v. Broadfield, 5 F.4th 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[F]or the vast majority of prisoners, the availability of a vaccine makes it impossible to conclude that the risk of COVID-19 is an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason for immediate release.“).
But the threat of COVID-19 is not Johnson‘s only argument for compassionate release. And though his health-related arguments are not independently sufficient to warrant granting his motion, they are still relevant to the Court‘s ultimate decision. See Long, 997 F.3d at 357 (noting that courts must “balance all relevant considerations as part of a release decision“); Order at 3, United States v. Smith, No. 14-cr-189 (TSC) (D.D.C. May 14, 2020), ECF No. 76 (“[Defendant‘s] age, health, and the COVID-19 pandemic all weigh in favor of a sentence reduction . . . .“). Courts “accept that vaccines . . . reduce risk,” but that does not mean that “no risk remains for vaccinated inmates.” United States v. Moe, Crim. No. 17-277 (KSH), 2021 WL 5277202, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2021). Hence, the Court concludes that particularly given his age and underlying health conditions, Johnson‘s COVID-19 related arguments for release provide some, albeit meager, support for finding that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant releasing Johnson from incarceration.
C. Johnson‘s Rehabilitation
Johnson‘s final argument for finding extraordinary and compelling reasons is that his “rehabilitation has been truly extraordinary.” Mot. at 27. He explains that “[f]or the past more than 16 years[,] he has had no disciplinary incidents.” Id. He also reports that he has had only “one minor disciplinary report for being absent from an assignment” during his roughly two decades of incarceration, and that this incident occurred in 2005. Id.; see also First Compassionate Release Mot. at 30-31 (detailing courses Johnson completed while incarcerated). The government does not dispute Johnson‘s description of his disciplinary record. Opp‘n at 31 (“We note that Johnson has incurred only one infraction and completed a number of courses while he has been incarcerated. The government appreciates that Johnson has avoided trouble while in prison and attempted to turn his life around.“). But the government argues that
The government is correct; Johnson‘s rehabilitation “alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason” for release.
D. Final Balancing
Taken together, Johnson‘s three arguments establish that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” reducing his sentence.
III. The § 3553(a) Factors Favor a Sentence Reduction
In determining that Johnson‘s motion should be granted, the Court has considered “the factors set forth in [S]ection 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.”
demonstrate only that Johnson‘s crimes required a serious punishment. The over 20-year sentence Johnson has served fits that description and adequately reflects the seriousness of his offenses. The government‘s second argument is that Johnson‘s release plan is “non-specific.” Opp‘n at 31 (citing United States v. Allison, Case No. CR16-5207RBL, 2020 WL 3077150, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 10, 2020) (“Shortening a defendant‘s sentence where there is no adequate release plan offers no benefit to the health of the inmate and in the process likely further endangers the community into which the defendant is release[d].“)). But Johnson “intends to live with his girl friend in Northeast D.C.,” Mot. at 29, and the several vocational and life skills courses he has completed, see First Compassionate Release Mot. at 31, give the Court confidence that he will be able to find gainful employment after he is released. The Court will not deny Johnson‘s motion simply because he does not have a job lined up at this point in time. Cf. United States v. Lii, 528 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1167 (D. Haw. 2021) (granting compassionate release motion brought by defendant who did not have post-release employment secured); United States v. Adeyemi, 470 F. Supp. 3d 489, 533 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (same).
After considering all the facts of Johnson‘s case and the factors outlined in
Dated: July 21, 2022
/s/
JOHN D. BATES
United States District Judge