UNITED STATES оf America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Robert HALDEMANN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-13873
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Date Filed: 11/08/2016
Non-Argument Calendar
Ray reported for work in the LUES on April 23. Ray had the same kind of problems she manifested in the BI—particularly in forwarding phone calls and handling permit information. On June 2, Palmer and Harrison met with Ray regarding her probationary period and provided her with a document outlining her deficiencies. Palmer informed her that she was being terminated.
Ray‘s claim of retaliation fails for two reasons. First, she failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation or to present evidence that the City‘s reason for terminating her employment was pretextual. As for her prima facie case, Ray established the first two еlements: she engaged in protected expression, complaining about Horsey‘s discriminatory behavior in the work place, and she suffered adverse employment action. But she failed to establish the third element, a causal connection between her complaint about Horsey and the adverse employment action Palmer took. Neither Palmer, the LUES Administrator and ultimate decision maker, nor Harrison, her immediate supervisor who recommended her termination, knew anything at all about the complaint Ray had made about the racial discrimination in the BI, brought about by Horsey‘s conduct. Even if we were to assume that Palmer and/or Harrison knew about the complaint, the reason for terminating Ray‘s employment was legitimate and non-discriminatory, and Ray offered nothing to show that it was pretextual.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Adeel Bashir, Federal Public Defender‘s Office, Tampa, FL, Rosemary Cakmis, Donna Lee Elm, Federal Public Defender‘s Office, Orlando, FL, George Ellis Summers, Jr., Federal Public Defender‘s Office, Fort Myers, FL, for Defendant-Appellant
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Robert Haldemann appeals his concurrent sentеnces of 211 months imposed after pleading guilty to three counts of armed bank robbery, in violation of
We review de novo whether a defendant‘s prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under § 4B.2. United States v. Romo-Villalobos, 674 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2012). A defendant qualifies as a career offender under § 4B.2 if he has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.1 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Section 4B1.2 defines a “crime of violence” аs any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that “(1) has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, [the elements clause] or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, extortion, involves use оf explosives [enumerated offenses], or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another [the residual clause].” Id. § 4B1.2. To determine whether a crime is covered by § 4B1.2‘s elements clause, we apply a categorical approach, looking only at thе statutory elements of the offense, rather than than the particular facts underlying the conviction. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2283-86, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013).
Haldemann contends, as he did to the District Court in his objections to the pre-
When Haldemann was convicted, the Wisconsin substantial battery statute provided that “[w]hoever causes substantial bodily harm to another by an act donе with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a [] felony.”
And whether that use of force occurs indirectly, rather than directly, by way of the defendant‘s actions is of no consequence because intentional use of indirect force to cause substantial bodily harm still qualifies as a use оf violent force within the meaning of § 4B1.2‘s elements clause. See United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1414-15, 188 L.Ed.2d 426 (2014) (rejecting the defendant‘s argument that the Tennessee domestic assаult statute did not have as an element the use or attempted use of physical force because a defendant could be convicted under the Tennessee statute for causing bodily injury through the use of indirect force, reasoning that “[i]t is impossible to cause bodily injury without applying force in the common-law sense. . . . That the harm occurs indirectly, rather than directly (as with a kick or punch), does not matter“). Because the Wisconsin substantial battery statute has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, it qualifies as a crime of violence undеr § 4B1.2‘s elements clause. Accordingly, Haldemann‘s sentence is AFFIRMED.