UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jeremiah WROBLEWSKI, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-1692
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
March 15, 2016
816 F.3d 1021
In determining that 600 months in prison was an appropriate resentence, the district court properly gave significant weight to the extreme severity of Jefferson‘s crimes—causing “the horrific deaths of five young, innocent children,” attempting to murder another man, and distributing “vast amounts of controlled substances.” The court also properly considered that “Jefferson has not accepted full responsibility for his actions.” See United States v. Harlan, No. 15-1552, 815 F.3d 1100, 1107, 2016 WL 611832 (8th Cir. Feb. 16, 2016). “[T]he district court has wide latitude to weigh the
(iii) Contrary to Jefferson‘s suggestion, the district court carefully considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity by reviewing decisions from other districts that have applied Miller in resentencing juvenile homicide offenders to substantial federal prison terms, rather than life in prison. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 609 Fed.Appx. 925, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming an 80-year sentence). The juvenile who participated in the firebombing murders with Jefferson was thirteen years old at the time. Too young to be tried as an adult, he pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. There is no abuse of discretion when sentencing disparity arises from “legitimate distinctions” between participants in the same crimes. United States v. Johnson, 688 F.3d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1647, 185 L.Ed.2d 628 (2013).
Finally, Jefferson argues the district court committed procedural error when it failed to grant a downward departure due to his young age at the time of the crimes. See
The Third Amended Judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Cory Jon Goldensoph, argued and on the brief, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Mark Tremmel, AUSA, argued, Matthew J. Cole, AUSA, on the brief, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before SMITH, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Jeremiah Wroblewski pled guilty to violating
In October 2005, Wroblewski was sentenced to 8 years in prison and 3 years of supervised release for possessing a firearm and ammunition after he had been convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. See United States v. Wroblewski, No. 05-cr-2002 (N.D.Iowa Oct. 26, 2005). In June 2012, he started his first term of supervised release, but in December 2012, the district court revoked his release, sentencing him to 12 months in prison and 24 months of supervised release. In November 2013, Wroblewski began his second term of supervised release, but in May 2014, his probation officer petitioned to again revoke his release. The district court scheduled a June 3, 2014 hearing on the petition, and Wroblewski was served a summons to appear at the revocation hearing. Wroblewski did not appear and was arrested two days later. The court thereafter revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 14 months in prison with no additional supervised release.
In this action, an August 2014 one-count indictment charged Wroblewski with failure to appear for the June 3 revocation hearing, in violation of
II.
Wroblewski argues on appeal that he had not been released under Chapter 207, and thus could not have violated
III.
The government argues that Wroblewski‘s receipt of the summons effectively released him under Chapter 207, and cites to cases in which defendants have been convicted under
We conclude that a defendant who has merely been served with a summons, but who has not yet appeared in court pursuant to that summons, has not been “released under” Chapter 207. Wroblewski had been served a summons, but had not yet appeared in court pursuant to that summons. He therefore had not been released under Chapter 207 when he failed to appear at his supervised release revocation hearing, and could not have violated
IV.
Before a district court enters judgment on a defendant‘s guilty plea, it
To obtain relief on plain-error review, a defendant must show that the district court committed an error that was plain and that affected his substantial rights. Id. (under plain-error review, defendant must show that district court committed error, that error was obvious, and that error affected his substantial rights). A defendant satisfies the substantial-rights prong of the plain-error inquiry by demonstrating that, but for the Rule 11 violation, he would not have entered his plea. Id. Where a defendant meets these criteria, this court should correct the error if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. The district court‘s error was plain: Wroblewski had not been released under Chapter 207, an essential element of the crime to which he entered his plea. The error affected Wroblewski‘s substantial rights because there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty had he known there was no factual basis for the plea. The record shows that Wroblewski‘s conduct did not, as a matter of law, meet all of the elements of the crime to which he pled guilty, a fact that necessarily and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the district court proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (“The court of appeals should no doubt correct a plain forfeited error that causes the conviction or sentencing of an actually innocent defendant.“). We thus exercise our discretion to correct the error.
Accordingly, we vacate Wroblewski‘s conviction and sentence.