United States v. HoustonUnited States v. Houston
This matter is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge‘s Report and Recommendation (R&R) concerning Defendant‘s motion to suppress the search of his baggage and motion to suppress his statements. (Doc. 58.) The Magistrate Judge recommends that both motions be denied. (Id.) Defendant has filed objections to the Magistrate Judge‘s R&R. (Doc. 63.) After careful consideration, the Court enters the following order.
I. Background
On June 11, 2025, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Julius Houston with (1) knowingly possessing a concealed dangerous weapon, that is, a Heritage Barkeep .22 caliber pistol, which would have been accessible to him during flight,
when attempting to board a Spirit Airlines aircraft, in violation of firearm
while entering an airport security checkpoint area, in violation of
Mr. Houston moves to suppress the search of his baggage. (Doc. 20.) He further moves to suppress all statements made by him on November 8, 2022, on the ground that his statements were elicited by law enforcement officers during a custodial interrogation in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (Doc. 12.) After conducting an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 41), the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R in which he recommended that both motions be denied (Doc. 58), to which Mr. Houston has objected (Doc. 63.)
The factual background concerning the search of Mr. Houston‘s baggage and the circumstances of his questioning by police are set forth in the Magistrate Judge‘s R&R. (Doc. 58 at 1-3.) In addition, the Court has independently reviewed the record in this case including the transcript of the evidentiary hearing and body-worn camera (BWC) footage submitted by the parties. (See Doc. 41, 76, 77.) The Court discusses relevant facts within its legal analysis and notes disagreements with the Magistrate Judge‘s factual findings where pertinent.
Pursuant to must clearly advise the district court and pinpoint the specific findings that [he] disagrees with.
United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009). Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district court.
Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988). Those portions of the R&R to which there are no objections will be assessed for clear error only. See Tauber v. Barnhart, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2006) ([I]ssues upon which no specific objections are raised do not so require de novo review; the district court may therefore accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge[,] applying a clearly erroneous standard.
) (quoting
A. Motion to Suppress Evidence
Mr. Houston moves to suppress the discovery by TSA officers of a firearm hidden in a game console that Mr. Houston allegedly tried to pass through a secure airport checkpoint on his way to board a flight. (Doc. 20.) However, as the Magistrate Judge correctly determined, Defendant‘s Fourth Amendment argument concerning the search and seizure of his game console and firearm is foreclosed by binding case law. (Doc. 58 at 4-5.) Defendant‘s objections do not persuasively challenge the Magistrate Judge‘s analysis; instead, Defendant objects generally to the determination that the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement applies under the circumstances of this case . . . .
(Doc. 63 ¶ 5.)
The Eleventh Circuit has long held that airport security checkpoints, like international borders, are critical zones in which special [F]ourth [A]mendment considerations apply.
United States v. Lopez-Pages, 767 F.2d 776, 778 (11th Cir. 1985). Airport screenings, like the one that occurred in this case, generally constitute reasonable administrative search[es] under the Fourth Amendment.
Corbett v. Transportation Sec. Admin., 767 F.3d 1171, 1179-80 (11th Cir. 2014) (The scanners at airport checkpoints are a reasonable administrative search because the governmental interest in preventing
); see also Lopez-Pages, 767 F.2d at 778 (Airport authorities . . . are justified in undertaking a search with sufficient scope to reveal any object or instrumentality that [the passenger] could reasonably have used to effect an act of air piracy.
) (quoting United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir. 1973)); United States v. Rosario, No. 1:10-CR-416-WBH-GGB, 2011 WL 4404128, at *5 (N.D. Ga. May 11, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:10-CR-0416-WBH, 2011 WL 4404127 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2011), aff‘d, 520 F. App‘x 928 (11th Cir. 2013) ([O]nce Defendant checked his bags at the airport, they were subject to administrative search.
).
Further, the Eleventh Circuit has held that passengers who voluntarily present themselves at airport security checkpoints automatically consent to a search of their carry-on articles.
United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 776 (11th Cir. 1984) (Moreover, those presenting themselves at a security checkpoint thereby consent automatically to a search[.]
); see also Corbett v. Transportation Sec. Admin., 568 F. App‘x 690, 697 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating
In this case, the Government has presented evidence that, on November 8, 2022, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Officer Theodosia White was screening luggage at the x-ray machine at the main domestic checkpoint. (Transcript of January 21, 2026, Evidentiary Hearing, Doc. 41 at 7-8, 13-15.)2 As she performed her duties, she noticed on the x-ray screen what appeared to be a game console with a gun inside it. (Id. at 7, 13-16, 20-21.) Officer White stopped the x-ray machine and summoned a co-worker to look at the screen and confirm her impression. (Id. at 16-17, 24-25.) Officer White then asked for a supervisor, who, after looking at the screen, summoned an Atlanta Police Department (APD) officer from a booth near the checkpoint.
The unidentified APD officer retrieved the bag in question from the belt, took it to a table, and opened it. (Id. at 17, 30-32.) The APD officer then removed an Xbox gaming console from the bag and asked for the console to be run through the x-ray machine again. (Def‘s Ex. 3, Unidentified APD officer BWC Footage, Doc. 77-3 at 00:20:30-20:50.)4 After confirming that the x-ray machine showed that the firearm was concealed within the Xbox console, the APD officer asked Mr. Houston how the Xbox could be opened without breaking it. (Id. at 00:20:50-22:00.) The officer then proceeded to attempt to pry open the Xbox and confirm that there was a firearm wedged inside. (Id. at 00:22:00-23:20.) After facing some difficulty removing the firearm from the Xbox, the
Shortly thereafter, two other uniformed APD officers—Officers Pierre5 and Ubedullah Hussain—approached the security checkpoint. (Id. at 00:27:15-27:40.) After being debriefed by the unidentified APD officer, Officers Pierre and Hussain directed Mr. Houston to follow them to a police precinct within the airport. (Id. at 00:27:40-32:00.) Officer Pierre kept possession of the Xbox during the walk to the police precinct. (Def‘s Ex. 1, Ofc. Pierre BWC Footage, Doc. 77-1 at 00:31:30-36:30.) Upon arriving at the police station, the APD officers directed Mr. Houston to wait on a bench in the lobby of the precinct. (Id.) Officer Pierre then removed the firearm from the console and removed screws and wiring taped to the firearm in full view of Mr. Houston. (Id. at 00:36:30-46:00.)
In the Court‘s view, once the x-ray machine showed the outline of a firearm, officers on the scene acted reasonably and well within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment to remove the bag from the belt and conduct a further administrative search of its contents. See Herzbrun, 723 F.2d at 777 (The inquiry is whether the officer, on the basis of the articulable facts at hand, had
[T]he fact that the x-ray scan machine indicated Clay‘s shoulder bag contained an unidentifiable dark object created sufficient suspicion to justify a complete physical search of the luggage until the object was positively identified as harmless.
); United States v. Wehrli, 637 F.2d 408, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding search of entire bag and seizure of cocaine at airport checkpoint after x-ray machine revealed three shapes that might have been cylinders with attached wiring
).
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge‘s analysis that the TSA and APD officers’ actions to open the Xbox, retrieve the firearm, and remove the screws and wires attached to the firearm remained within the permissible scope of the administrative search—namely, to protect against threats to aviation. (Doc. 58 at 5-7); see Herzbrun, 723 F.2d at 779 (noting airport police‘s interest in deterring, identifying, and investigating those planning mischief aboard airplanes
). Upon encountering a firearm concealed within a gaming console in his carry-on baggage, TSA and APD officers had reason to suspect that [Mr. Houston] was carrying materials that could endanger the safety of a flight
and had a legitimate interest in making a
Accordingly, the officers’ actions to retrieve the firearm discovered in Mr. Houston‘s baggage were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Defendant‘s motion to suppress evidence is denied.
B. Motion to Suppress Statements
Defendant moves to suppress all statements he made to officers during the incident on the grounds that (1) he was not given Miranda warnings prior to being questioned and (2) his statements were not voluntary. (Doc. 12.) The Court addresses each argument in turn.
1. Whether Defendant Was Entitled to Miranda Warnings
The Fifth Amendment‘s Self-Incrimination Clause provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
the Supreme Court announced a prophylactic [rule] to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause.
United States v. Morgan, 143 F.4th 1264, 1273 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636 (2004)). Miranda‘s universally recognized mandate . . . requires police to afford any individual who has become the object of custodial interrogation specific warnings regarding his or her right to counsel and to
Miranda‘s demands apply only to custodial interrogation[s].
Morgan, 143 F.4th at 1273 (quotation omitted). A custodial interrogation occurs whenever law enforcement officers question a person after taking that person into custody or otherwise significantly deprive a person of freedom of action.
Garcia v. Singletary, 13 F.3d 1487, 1489 (11th Cir. 1994). Words or actions constitute interrogation when, from the standpoint of an objective officer, they are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
Morgan, 143 F.4th at 1273 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)).
More specifically, custody is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.
Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508-09 (2012). Such a coercive environment exists, . . . when a reasonable person would have understood that his freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.
United States v. Woodson, 30 F.4th 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d 876, 881 (11th Cir. 2010)). In determining whether a person was in custody within the meaning of Miranda, the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a
To answer that question, [courts] examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including the location and duration of the questioning, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints, and whether the person was released after the interview.
Woodson, 30 F.4th at 1303 (quoting Howes, 565 U.S. at 509); see Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 881 ([W]e consider the totality of the circumstances, including whether the officers brandished weapons, touched the suspect, or used language or a tone that indicated that compliance with the officers could be compelled[.]
(cleaned up)).
However, the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010). Sometimes, the circumstances of a detention—for instance, a brief traffic stop or Terry stop—may lack the shock that very often accompanies arrest.
Howes, 565 U.S. at 511, see Woodson, 30 F.4th at 1303. This kind of shock, which follows when a person is cut off from his normal life and companions and abruptly transported from the street into a police dominated atmosphere, can create pressure to speak, as one may hope that, after doing so, he will be allowed to leave and go home.
Woodson, 30 F.4th at 1303 (quoting Howes, 565 U.S. at 511). As such, courts must ask[ ] the additional question [of] whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda. Howes, 565 U.S. at 509. The ultimate task, in sum, is to compare the interview environment at hand to the paradigmatic Miranda situation—where a person is arrested in his home or on the street and whisked to a police station for questioning. Woodson, 30 F.4th at 1303.
Put another way, a Fourth Amendment seizure, standing alone, does not necessarily constitute custody for Miranda purposes.
United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2006). The Fourth Amendment seizure analysis uses the free to leave test: a person is seized when a reasonable person would [not] feel free to terminate the encounter with the police.
Id. at 1310 (quoting Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006)). By contrast, a person is in custody for Miranda purposes only when there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.
Id. (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). Thus, the temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop, . . . does not constitute Miranda custody.
Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113 (citation omitted).
in custody
and entitled to Miranda warnings is a mixed question of law and fact[.]
United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119 (11th Cir. 1996). The determination of custody under Miranda depends entirely on the objective circumstances of the interrogation
as viewed from the perspective of the reasonable innocent person.
Woodson, 30 F.4th at 1303-04 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994); Moya, 74 F.3d at 1119). [T]he actual, subjective beliefs of the defendant and the interviewing officer on whether the defendant was free to leave are irrelevant
to the custody inquiry. Moya, 74 F.3d at 1119.
In this case, the Magistrate Judge determined that Defendant was not subject to a custodial interrogation by police officers in the airport. (Doc. 58 at 9-10.) Among other facts, the R&R highlights that Defendant was never placed in any cuffs, handled in any coercive manner, or told he was under arrest.
(Id. at 9-10.) The Magistrate Judge found that, instead, Defendant was told, . . . that it was necessary to continue the inspection in the precinct office for safety reasons
6 and that once the process was complete, he was
simply allowed to leave and continue his journey. (Id. at 10.) The R&R also reasons that [i]f anything, the testimony suggests that Defendant remained insistent on getting his property back, and was trying to convince the police that the gun lacked a cylinder and thus was no danger.
7 (Id.)
Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge‘s R&R on several grounds. (Doc. 63.) The Court does not recount Defendant‘s nine independent objections here,8 but it suffices to say that Defendant objects both to certain factual findings made by the R&R and the R&R‘s overall conclusion that Defendant was not in custody
for purposes of Miranda. (Id.) For the reasons below, the Court overrules Defendant‘s objections except for his first objection, see supra
As a threshold matter, Mr. Houston was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda prior to entering APD‘s airport police station. At all times before arriving at the station, Mr. Houston was in publicly accessible areas of the airport. Moreover, he was not physically restrained or placed in a police dominated area. Therefore, Mr. Houston was not in a sufficiently coercive environment to constitute custody under Miranda. However, the issue of whether Mr. Houston was subject to a custodial interrogation while he was questioned in the APD precinct presents a closer call. After weighing the totality of circumstances, the Court finds that while Mr. Houston may have been subject to a brief investigative detention pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), he was not in custody
for the purposes of Miranda.
Initiation of Interview. First, the Court considers the manner in which the APD officers at the TSA security checkpoint initially instructed Mr. Houston to accompany officers to the police station. Upon finding the firearm in Mr. Houston‘s luggage, the unidentified APD officer told him: Here‘s the deal, we have another officer coming, they‘re going to take you down to the precinct to do some paperwork. When they‘re done, they‘re going to release you with your gun. Okay? You gotta find somewhere to store it or some way to pack
Y‘all do y‘all‘s paperwork. You release him with the gun. After that, it‘s up to him . . . .
(Def‘s Ex. 1, Ofc. Pierre BWC Footage, Doc. 77-1 at 00:31:05-31:15 (emphasis added).) Officers Pierre and Hussain then directed Mr. Houston to follow them to the station. (Id. at 00:31:00-36:30.) In other words, although the APD officers indicated that Mr. Houston would have to go to the police station so that the officers could complete some paperwork, they noted that Mr. Houston would be released following any detention.
Location. Second, the Court considers the location of the questioning. Woodson, 30 F.4th at 1303. Although Mr. Houston was taken to APD‘s police precinct, he was not placed in an office, interrogation room, or holding cell. Instead, Mr. Houston was told to wait on a bench in the lobby of the police station as Officer Pierre sat on a conference table nearby and retrieved the firearm from the Xbox gaming console. Officer Hussain, a TSA Supervisor, and an official from the City of Atlanta‘s Department of Aviation (DOA) were also present and appeared to be completing paperwork related to the firearm.
(Doc. 77-1 at 00:37:12.)
The mere fact that Mr. Houston was asked questions inside a secure police station, however, does not automatically render his questioning a custodial interrogation. Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.
Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). As the Eleventh Circuit has held, being questioned in a secure facility . . . does not necessarily make the
Duration. Third, the Court considers the duration of the questioning. Woodson, 30 F.4th at 1303. In total, Mr. Houston was present in the police station for approximately 42 minutes, from 12:36 AM to 1:18 AM. (Doc. 77-1 at 00:36:00-01:18:00.) However, he was asked questions only intermittently during that time. For much of that period, the officers were conversing amongst themselves and completing other tasks rather than asking Mr. Houston questions. For example, from approximately 12:38 AM to 12:46 AM, Officer Pierre worked to pry the firearm from the gaming console and remove screws and wires taped to the firearm. (Id. at 00:38:00-46:00.) Officer Pierre sporadically asked Mr. Houston questions, such as whether the firearm had sentimental value to him, why he didn‘t purchase a more functional firearm, and where he purchased the firearm. (Id.) Officer Pierre also informed Mr. Houston that he doesn‘t need a permit to transport a firearm, but simply needs to declare it when checking in. (Id.) From approximately 12:51 AM to 1:00 AM, Officer Pierre did not speak to Mr. Houston at all, but rather to a
In short, the Court finds that the duration of Mr. Houston‘s questioning was not so long as to convert it from a Terry stop to a custodial interrogation. See Muegge, 225 F.3d at 1269-71 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the suspect was not in custody where he was directed by supervisor to speak with investigators at a secure site in an interview room with the door closed and was interviewed for approximately two and a half hours); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 761 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that a detention that lasted approximately fifty minutes was not too long to convert a Terry stop into an arrest).
Statements, Language, and Tone. Fourth, the Court considers the statements made during the interview,
Woodson, 30 F.4th at 1303, and whether the officers used language or a tone that indicated that compliance with the officers could be compelled,
Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 881. To be sure, the APD officers instructed Mr. Houston to accompany them to the police precinct and did not inform him that he was free to leave. Further, throughout
While some of the APD officers’ statements were accusatory in nature, as noted above, the fact that an individual is the focus of a criminal investigation does not turn an interview into a custodial interrogation. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1124-25; Muegge, 225 F.3d at 1270 (“The fact that an investigation has focused on a suspect does not necessarily trigger the need for
After careful review of the BWC footage submitted by the parties, the Court does not view the APD officers’ statements as sufficiently coercive to cross the line from an investigatory detention to a custodial interrogation. Although the APD officers communicated to Mr. Houston that he had committed wrongdoing, they did not suggest to him that he was under arrest or even that they were contemplating an arrest. To the contrary, from the
Physical Restraints or Other Force. Fifth, the Court considers “the presence or absence of physical restraints,” Woodson, 30 F.4th at 1303, and whether the officers “touched the suspect” or “brandished weapons,” Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 881. As is undisputed, the officers never placed Mr. Houston in physical restraints or otherwise made any physical contact with him. Nor did the officers brandish their weapons or use any other force. See United States v. Barry, 479 F. App‘x 297, 299 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding that an interview was voluntary and not custodial where the defendant was not threatened or physically detained, the agents never brandished their weapons,
Release. Sixth, the Court considers “whether [Mr. Houston] was released after the interview.” Woodson, 30 F.4th at 1303. Consistent with the first APD officer‘s statement that Mr. Houston would be released following the completion of paperwork at the precinct, the officers released Mr. Houston after they retrieved his firearm from the Xbox gaming console, documented the incident, and asked him questions about his firearm.
Totality of the Circumstances. Weighing the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that while Mr. Houston may have been subject to a Terry stop within the airport, his brief detention was insufficiently coercive to constitute a custodial interrogation under Miranda. While a reasonable person in Mr. Houston‘s position may not have felt free to terminate the encounter, as noted above, the freedom-of-movement test is “only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 112. Here, the circumstances of Mr. Houston‘s questioning did not
Although Mr. Houston was taken to a police precinct for further investigation of his belongings, he was not subject to a “restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Street, 472 F.3d at 1310 (quoting Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125) (emphasis added). From the beginning of the encounter, Mr. Houston was told that he would be released and permitted to travel after APD officers completed paperwork related to his undeclared firearm. He was not placed in an interrogation room or holding cell but rather told to wait on a bench in the lobby of the police precinct. The duration of Mr. Houston‘s detention was less than an hour, and Mr. Houston was only asked questions intermittently during that time. While a reasonable person in Mr. Houston‘s position would have understood that the APD officers suspected him of committing a criminal offense, the officers displayed a calm and conversational demeanor throughout the encounter. APD officers never placed Mr. Houston in physical restraints, suggested he was under arrest, or otherwise deployed any force against him.
Alongside those traditional Miranda custody factors, the Court also considers that Mr. Houston‘s brief detention took place at an airport where security concerns are heightened. Cf. Lopez-Pages, 767 F.2d at 778 (“[A]irport
2. Whether Defendant‘s Statements Were Voluntary
“Even if no Miranda violation occurred, the court still must determine that any confessions or incriminatory statements made by a defendant were voluntary in order to admit them at trial.” Lazarus, 552 F. App‘x at 895. In determining whether any incriminatory statements were voluntary, courts “consider the totality of the circumstances” including the accused‘s education, intelligence, “the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.” United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1319 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Waldrop v. Jones, 77 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir. 1996)) (cleaned up); see Hubbard v. Haley, 317 F.3d 1245, 1253 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Among the factors we must consider are the defendant‘s intelligence, the length of his detention, the nature of the interrogation, the use of any physical force against him, or the use of any promises or inducements by police.“). The voluntariness inquiry ultimately directs courts to determine whether a “statement was the product
The Magistrate Judge determined that Mr. Houston‘s statements were voluntary because they “were not based on unconstitutional coercive tactics, torture, threats, or false promises.” (Doc. 58 at 10.) Further, the Magistrate Judge noted that “Defendant was briefly asked questions while sitting on a bench in a waiting area, without being cuffed or threatened, and was subsequently allowed to continue his trip.” (Id.) Defendant generally objects to the Magistrate Judge‘s assessment of voluntariness, but does not point to any specific evidence supporting his contention that his statements were not voluntary. (Doc. 63 ¶ 8.) Further, Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge‘s finding that “[i]f anything the testimony suggests that Defendant remained insistent on getting his property back.”9 (Id. ¶ 9.)
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge‘s conclusion that Mr. Houston‘s statements were voluntary. Although Mr. Houston argues in briefing that the “circumstances during the encounter indicate that Mr. Houston is susceptible to misunderstandings[,]” (Doc. 52 at 13), that is not the
As such, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Mr. Houston‘s statements to the APD officers were voluntary. See, e.g., Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d at 1320 (finding that a defendant‘s statements were voluntary where he “was questioned shortly after his arrest, the questioning was not particularly long or drawn out, and there [was] no evidence that the agents intimidated him with threats or force“); Lazarus, 552 F. App‘x at 896 (“[T]he district court did not err in finding that Lazarus‘s confession was voluntary. Lazarus‘s confession was made during a brief, non-custodial interview during which she was not subject to any threats and was not
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules Mr. Houston‘s objections to the R&R as to the motion to suppress evidence (Doc. 20), and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge‘s R&R (Doc. 58) to the extent that it recommends denial of the motion to suppress evidence. Defendant‘s motion to suppress evidence (Doc. 20) is DENIED.
Further, the Court overrules all but the first of Mr. Houston‘s objections to the R&R concerning the motion to suppress statements (Doc. 12), and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge‘s R&R (Doc. 58) to the extent that it recommends denial of the motion to suppress statements. Defendant‘s motion to suppress statements (Doc. 12) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 13th day of July, 2026.
SARAH E. GERAGHTY
United States District Judge
Notes
implied consenttheory, under cases like United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987), provides an alternative basis upon which the search and seizure in this case was reasonable. (Doc. 63 ¶ 6.) However, Mr. Houston does not explain why the Magistrate Judge was incorrect in this regard or provide any authority in support of his objection. Given the above-quoted language in McKennon and Herzbrun, the Court overrules this objection.
ISO 8601standard as follows: YYYY-MM DD HH:MM:SS. See Timestamp watermark for camera videos - Axon Evidence product guide, https://my.axon.com/s/article/Timestamp-watermark-for camera-videos-Axon-Evidence-product-guide?language=en_US (last accessed March 25, 2026). The
-0500that appears at the end of the timestamp indicates that the time being displayed is 5 hours before Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), which corresponds with Eastern Standard Time (EST) when daylight savings time is not in effect. Thus, the timestamp
2022-11-08 00:20:30 -0500indicates 30 seconds after 12:20 AM EST on November 8, 2022.
the officers conducted the additional inspection at the airport precinct for security reasons.(Doc. 63 ¶ 1.) Upon review of the APD officers’ body camera footage, the Court does not find that the APD officers clearly told Mr. Houston that they were bringing him to the police precinct to conduct a further inspection
paperwork.See infra at 16-17. That said, the Court still credits Officer Hussain‘s testimony that concern for the safety of other passengers motivated, at least in part, the APD officers’ decision to search Defendant‘s Xbox in a secure police precinct. Moreover, this objection does not alter the result of the Miranda custody analysis for the reasons set forth in this order.
apparently without a cylinder.(Doc. 63 ¶ 3.) Per Mr. Houston, the firearm was
clearlywithout a cylinder, not
apparentlywithout a cylinder. (Id.) The Court finds that this slight disagreement over verbiage is not material to the motions to suppress and is thus overruled.