United States v. EWING
1:20-cr-00220
| D.D.C. | Nov 14, 2025|
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Case 1:20-cr-00220-JDB Document 42 Filed 11/14/25 Page 1 of 9
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES
Criminal Action No. 20-220 (JDB)
v.
JEFFREY EWING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Having been under supervision for over two years, Jeffrey Ewing now moves for early
termination of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). After considering the relevant
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court finds that early termination is warranted by Ewing’s
post-release conduct and the interest of justice. Accordingly, the Court will grant Ewing’s motion.
Background
In January 2021, Ewing pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a person
convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Plea Agreement 1, Dkt. 18. The underlying convictions were first-degree assault and
unlawful possession of a firearm. Id. at 3. At the time of Ewing’s offense, the statutory maximum
for a violation of section 922(g)(1) was ten years in prison and three years of supervised release.
18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(2) (maximum prison term for section 922(g)(1) violation), 3583(b)(2)
(maximum term of supervised release for Class C felony), 3559(a)(3) (defining felony as Class C
where maximum prison sentence is from ten to 25 years) (2018).1
1
In June 2022, Congress increased the maximum penalty from ten to fifteen years in prison and moved the
relevant penalty provision from 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) to § 924(a)(8). See United States v. Butler, 122 F.4th 584, 588
& n.3 (5th Cir. 2024).
1
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Based on Ewing’s offense level and criminal history category, the guidelines range for a
term of imprisonment was from 37 to 46 months.2 The range for supervised release was one to
three years. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(2). The government recommended 28 months in prison and
three years of supervised release. Gov’t’s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing 7, Dkt. 22. Ewing requested
20 months. Def.’s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing 9, Dkt. 23. The Court sentenced Ewing to 27
months followed by three years on supervised release. Judgment 2-3, Dkt. 27.
In August or September 2023, Ewing was released from prison and began his period of
supervised release.3 Ewing’s time under supervision has mostly passed without incident,
indicating successful reintegration into society. He has been working as a truck driver for the last
18 months, lives with his mother, and recently had a baby with his partner of several years. Def.’s
Mot. for Early Termination of Supervised Release 2, Dkt. 38. He plans to purchase a truck, get
his commercial driver’s license, and start his own trucking business. Id. He also spends time with
his siblings and their children, including volunteering as an assistant coach for his nephew’s little
league football team. Id. at 3. And his social circle is mostly his work colleagues. Id.
However, in August 2025 probation petitioned for a hearing on violations of supervised
release (HOV), reporting one instance of unlawful use and possession of tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC)—a controlled substance—and Maryland citations for moving violations, including
negligent driving, reckless driving, and driving under the influence of alcohol while transporting
2
A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after a felony conviction for a crime of violence—such as first-degree
assault—carries a base offense level of 20. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Ewing received a three-level decrease in
offense level for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 17. See id. § 3E1.1. Under the then-
applicable guidelines, Ewing had a criminal history score of eight based on two convictions of over one year each and
committing the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violation while under a criminal justice sentence, resulting in a criminal history
category of IV. See id. § 4A1.1(a), (d) (2018). Thus, Ewing’s sentencing guidelines range was 37-46 months. See
id. ch. 5, pt. A.
3
Ewing states that he was released from prison and supervision began on August 21, 2023. Def.’s Mot. for
Early Termination of Supervised Release 1, Dkt. 38. Probation states that supervision began on September 8, 2023.
U.S. Prob. Off. Pet. 1 (Set HOV Pet.), Dkt. 31. Either way, supervised release began over two years ago.
2
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a minor. U.S. Prob. Off. Pet. 2-3 (Set HOV Pet.), Dkt. 31. After Maryland decided not to prosecute
the moving violations, Probation recommended dismissing its petition and allowing supervision
to resume. U.S. Prob. Off. Pet. (Dismiss HOV Pet.), Dkt. 37. Ewing also represented to the Court
that the government agreed with that dismissal. Def.’s Status Report, Dkt. 36. The Court therefore
dismissed the violations.
Ewing now moves to terminate supervised release early. Def.’s Mot. Probation does not
oppose Ewing’s petition, id. at 1, but the government does, Govt’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot., Dkt. 39.
The motion is now fully briefed.
Discussion
Supervised release “‘fulfills rehabilitative ends’ and ‘provides individuals with
postconfinement assistance.’” Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 196 (2025) (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59-60 (2000)). It enables courts “to provide postrelease supervision
for those, and only those, who need[] it.” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 709 (2000).
Thus, after considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors except (a)(2)(A) and (a)(3), a court may
terminate a term of supervised release following the first year of supervision “if it is satisfied that
such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).
Modification of supervised release must also comport with the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Id. Under those rules, a hearing is required unless the defendant waives that right or
the relief sought is favorable and the government has received notice, has had a reasonable
opportunity to object, and has not done so. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c); United States v. Tanguay,
Crim. A. No. 8-cr-271-5 (RCL), 2021 WL 1966602, at *3 (D.D.C. May 17, 2021). The Court did
not hold a hearing here because Ewing waived his right. Def.’s Resp. to Court Order, Dkt. 40.
3
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I. Section 3553(a) factors
Section 3553 provides that the Court “shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2).” Id. § 3553(a); see also
Dean v. United States, 581 U.S. 62, 67 (2017) (describing this as the “parsimony principle”). The
paragraph (2) considerations relevant to early terminations of supervised release are the need to
“afford adequate deterrence”; to “protect the public”; and to provide the defendant with “needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D).4 The other relevant section 3553 factors are (1) the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, (4) the sentencing range for the
offense, (5) any pertinent policy statement by the Sentencing Commission, (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and (7) the need to provide any victim restitution. Id.
§ 3553(a)(1), (4)-(7).5
To begin, the Court considers the nature and circumstances of Ewing’s offense and his
history and characteristics. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The nature of the offense weighs in his favor
but its circumstances weigh against him. On the one hand, Ewing’s instant offense was non-
violent, although his predicate offense of first-degree assault was violent. Indeed, Americans
generally have a right to bear arms, U.S. Const. amend. II, and Ewing lost that right only due to
the fact of having a prior conviction for a crime punishable by over one year in prison, 18 U.S.C.
4
The four considerations of section 3553(a)(2) are, in order, “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.” Esteras, 145 S.Ct. at 2038. But section 3583(e) excludes any consideration of retribution from the
termination of supervised release analysis. Id. at 2039 & n.3 (citing section 3553(a)(2)(A)); see also id. at 2041
(distinguishing “forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution)” from “backward-
looking purpose of retribution”).
5
Section 3583(e) excludes consideration of the kinds of sentence available because supervised release—a
component of a prison sentence—is the only matter at issue. Esteras, 145 S.Ct. at 2039 (citing section 3553(a)(3)).
4
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§ 922(g)(1).6 On the other hand, in fleeing from police Ewing’s firearm accidentally discharged
and shot a hole in his trousers, highlighting the danger posed to any bystanders. Statement of
Offense 3, Dkt. 17. Ewing’s history also weighs against him but his characteristics weigh in his
favor. Ewing has a history of two prior serious offenses: first-degree assault and unlawful
possession of a firearm. See Plea Agreement 3. However, he now has a “stable home, dedicated
family, and consistent employment record.” Def.’s Mot. 5. The government argues that section
3553(a)(1) weighs against Ewing, but in support it only identifies his history of firearms-related
offenses. Gov’t’s Opp’n 3. That history is indeed troubling, but it must be balanced against the
other section 3553(a)(1) subfactors. Although the circumstances of Ewing’s offense and his
history weigh against him, the nature of his offense and his characteristics weigh in his favor, so
the Court finds the first factor is neutral overall.
Next, the Court considers deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D). First, the Court finds that a prison sentence of 27 months followed by over
two years of supervised release is a sufficient specific and general deterrent to unlawfully carrying
a firearm after being convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. In support
of its argument that deterrence weighs in favor of denial, the government concedes that Ewing has
been “doing well since being released from prison” but then makes the conclusory assertion that
“deterrence may continue to prevent him from committing crimes.” Gov’t’s Opp’n 3. Without
more, the Court is unconvinced that Ewing has not been adequately deterred.
6
As such, Ewing’s instant offense may be characterized as malum prohibitum (wrong only because
prohibited by legislation) rather than malum in se (wrong in itself). See 1 Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law
§ 1.6(b) (3d ed. 2017, Oct. 2025 update); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 379 n.21 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing malum prohibitum and malum in se (citing Wayne LaFave, Handbook
on Criminal Law § 6 (1972))); cf. Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining in 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) case that predicate offense of felony fraud is malum in se).
5
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Second, Ewing’s successful completion of “all of the treatment programs recommended by
Probation, specifically anger management and substance abuse courses,” and broader compliance
with the terms of supervised release indicate that he does not pose a danger to the public. Def.’s
Mot. 2, 5. The government argues that Ewing must remain under supervision to protect the public
because of his history of firearm offenses. Gov’t’s Opp’n 3. But Ewing has already served prison
sentences for those offenses—which took place nine and five years ago, respectively—and for the
instant offense, and the government provides no reason why he presently poses a threat to the
public. The Court also notes that, in August 2025, Probation petitioned for a hearing related to
allegations of several serious moving violations and a controlled substance violation. See Set
HOV Pet. But those alleged offenses were not prosecuted, Probation then moved to dismiss the
petition, and the Court understands that the government agreed with dismissal. See Dismiss HOV
Pet.; Def.’s Status Report. As such, the Court ascribes limited weight to the alleged violations.
Third, “Ewing’s stable housing and employment” show that further supervision is not
necessary for rehabilitative purposes. Def.’s Mot. 6. The government wonders “who is to say that
[Ewing’s] improvements are not attributable to the requirements of supervised release?” Gov’t’s
Mot. 4. That may be true—and indeed is a large part of the purpose of supervised release—but
the government provides no indication of why regression should be expected here if supervised
release is terminated early after close to 75 percent completion. Accordingly, the Court finds that
the relevant paragraph (2) factors weigh in favor of early termination.
Finally, the Court considers the sentencing guidelines range, Sentencing Commission
policy statements, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide
any victim restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(7). There is no restitution in this case and the
parties state that there are no pertinent policy statements, so these factors are irrelevant. See Def.’s
6
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Mot. 6 n.2; Gov’t’s Opp’n 2 n.1. The sentencing guidelines range for supervised release is one to
three years, so terminating supervised release now would still put Ewing’s period of supervised
release at almost three quarters of the recommended range. Courts have often found the sentencing
disparities factor to be of “limited utility” in the early-termination context because it is a “case
specific inquiry.” United States v. Braithwaite, Crim. A. No. 11-186 (JDB), 2025 WL 1784435,
at *4 (D.D.C. June 26, 2025) (first quoting United States v. Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d 137, 145
(D.D.C. 2017); then quoting United States v. Raymond, Crim. A. No. 9-183 (RMC), 2019 WL
1858285, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2019)). But see United States v. Tanguay, Crim. A. No. 8-271-5
(RCL), 2021 WL 1966602, at *5 (D.D.C. May 17, 2021) (comparing to co-defendants’ sentences).
Of course, it would be unwarranted to grant early termination to certain defendants and not grant
it to otherwise similarly situated defendants. But the parties have not identified any such
circumstances here. Thus, these factors are neutral.
On balance, therefore, the section 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of terminating Ewing’s
period of supervised release early.
II. Post-release conduct and interest of justice
Some courts in this district and other circuits have held that more than “model post-
incarceration conduct and unblemished compliance with the terms of supervised release” is
required for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 148-49 & n.9
(collecting cases and disagreeing with that interpretation); see also United States v. Taylor, 729 F.
App’x 474, 475 (7th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (“[M]ere compliance with the terms of supervised release
is expected, and without more, insufficient to justify early termination under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e).”).
7
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That is a “misreading of the statute” arising from United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32 (2d
Cir. 1997), that most circuits—including the Second Circuit—have subsequently abandoned. See
Braithwaite, 2025 WL 1784435, at *5 (collecting cases repudiating that interpretation). As
explained in Harris, “construing § 3583(e)(1) to require the defendant to exhibit objectively
extraordinary or unusual conduct during supervision is a stretch not expressed in the statutory
text.” Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 149-50; accord Braithwaite, 2025 WL 1784435, at *5.7 Instead,
the statutory text gives the Court broad discretion to terminate supervised release after the first
year, provided that it has considered the section 3553(a) factors and it is “satisfied that such action
is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(1); see also United States v. Hale, 127 F.4th 638, 641 (6th Cir. 2025) (recognizing
district courts’ “broad discretion” when considering section 3583(e)(1) motions).8 The Court is so
satisfied.
Ewing “exhibits not only compliance with supervision terms but also dedication to
excelling in his career and close family ties.” Braithwaite, 2025 WL 1784435, at *5. He has
obtained and kept a full-time job as a truck driver, recently welcomed a new baby, volunteers as
an assistant coach at his nephew’s school, and socializes with family and work colleagues. Def.’s
Mot. 2-3. This post-release conduct indicates that further supervision is not needed. See Harris,
258 F. Supp. 3d at 150 (granting early termination where defendant “compli[ed] with all of the
7
Harris also noted that, although the D.C. Circuit quoted approvingly from Lussier in United States v. Mathis-
Gardner, 783 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2015), it did so only to highlight that the district court there abused its discretion
in denying without explanation a motion to terminate supervised release early where the record indicated that the
defendant met even Lussier’s “high burden.” Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 148 n.9 (quoting Mathis-Gardner, 783 F.3d
at 1289-90).
8
Even starting from the premise that “mere compliance ‘generally’ is not enough to satisfy a court that early
termination is warranted” because “compliance with all conditions is expected of an individual on supervised release,
and non-compliance is a ground for revocation,” Braithwaite, 2025 WL 1784435, at *5 (quoting Hale, 127 F.4th at
641), compliance with all conditions for multiple years is, in fact, “fairly extraordinary,” id. (quoting Raymond, 2019
WL 1858285, at *3).
8
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terms of his supervised release”; changed his “circle of friends”; achieved “gainful and successful
full-time employment”; and “participat[ed] in his community through church attendance, assisting
at his son’s pre-school, and volunteering in a youth program); Tanguay, 2021 WL 1966602, at *3
(granting early termination where defendant was “entirely compliant” and “successfully
reintegrated into his community,” including by maintaining a stable residence, spending time with
family, participating as member of his church, and taking care to pay towards his fine balance).
For the same reason, early termination is also in the interest of justice. See Harris, 258 F. Supp.
3d at 150; Raymond, 2019 WL 1858285, at *4.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Ewing’s motion for early termination of
supervised release. A separate order will accompany this opinion.
/s/
JOHN D. BATES
United States District Judge
Date: November 14, 2025
9