UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WALLACE RAYMOND CROOKS, Defendant - Appellant.
No. 20-1025
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT
May 18, 2021
PUBLISH. FILED. Christopher M. Wolpert, Clerk of Court. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO (D.C. NO. 1:00-CR-00439-MSK-6)
John C. Arceci, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public Defender, with him the briefs), Office of the Federal Pubic Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant.
Paul Farley, Assistant United States Attorney (Jason R. Dunn, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee.
Bеfore TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
Wallace Crooks appeals from the district court‘s denial of his First Step Act motion for sentence reduction. Because the district court legally erred by finding that Crooks is ineligible for relief and that his designation as a career offender is unreviewable, we reverse and remand.
I. Background
A. Crooks‘s Crime, Trial, and Sentence
Two decades ago, Wallace Crooks was charged with conspiraсy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of
At the time of Crooks‘s crime and sentencing, the quantity of crack cocaine he was convicted оf conspiring to distribute—50 grams or more—triggered
B. Evolving Crack Cocaine Punishment
The punishment associated with crack cocaine has changed significantly since Crooks‘s crime and sentencing. Prior to Crooks‘s crime and sentencing, Congress adopted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. This Act established tiers of punishment based on the amount of crack cocaine involved in an offense. For 5 to 49 grams of crack cocaine, the statutory penalty was 5 to 40 years’ imprisonment; for 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, the statutory penalty was 10 years to life imprisonment. These punishments were dramatically more severe than punishments for powder cocaine offenses, as each gram оf crack cocaine was treated as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine under the Act.
Congress aimed to address this disparity by enacting the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. It modified
Congress further responded to the crack/powder cocaine disparity in 2018 with the First Step Act, P.L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. The Act made the Fair Sentencing Act‘s 2010 changes to crack cocaine penalties retroactive by allowing prisoners sentenced under the previous laws to personally file motions for sentence reductions.1
C. Crooks‘s First Step Act Motion
Crooks filed a motion for sentence reduction under the First Step Act in 2019.
(2001). By Crooks‘s calculation, his proper offense level of 322 and criminal history category of VI rendered a guidelines range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. Finally, Crooks urged the district court to consider the
The district court denied Crooks‘s motion. It found that Crooks was ineligible for a sentence reduction, and even if he were eligible, a sentence reduction was not warranted due to his designation as a career offender. The district court reasoned that Crooks‘s career offender status was unrеviewable under the First Step Act. So, even if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect at the time of the offense, Crooks‘s guidelines range would have been the same as it was in 2002: 360 months to life imprisonment.
II. Analysis
Crooks contends the district court erred in determining both that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction and that even if he were eligible, he should not receive one because the district court could not review Crooks‘s career offender designation. Because we agree with Crooks that he is eligible for a sentence
reduction and that his career offender status is reviewable, we reverse and remand.
A. Eligibility
During the appeal, the government changed its position and now concedes Crooks is eligible for First Step Act relief. Crooks is eligible if he was convicted of a “сovered offense” under § 404(a).3 The First Step Act defines “covered offense” as:
a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, . . . that was committed before August 3, 2010.
§ 404(a).4
The meaning of “covered offense” turns on what “the statutory penalties for which” modifies: “a violation,” “a Federal criminal statute,” or “a violation of a Federal criminal statute.”
We conclude that interpreting “the statutory penalties for which” to modify “a violation of a Federal criminal statute” is the approach most consistent with the text and structure of the First Step Act. As an initial matter, we start with the text. Recall, the First Step Act defines “covered offense” as “a violation of a Federal
criminal statute, the statutory penalties for
The clause “a violation of a Federal criminal statute” is a “concise and integrated clause” that “refers to a single thing—a type of violation.” United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1299 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1077 (2018) (explaining “the most natural way to view the [rеlevant] modifier is as applying it to the entire preceding clause . . . because that clause hangs together as a unified whole, referring to a single thing“).
This interpretation is further supported by an analysis of the final clause of § 404(a). A “covered offense” is “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing
Act оf 2010, . . . that was committed before August 3, 2010.” First Step Act § 404(a) (emphasis added). A defendant cannot “commit” “a Federal criminal statute“—but he can “commit” “a violation of a Federal criminal statute.” See Jones, 962 F.3d at 1299.
Every circuit court of appeals to have considered this issue has reached the same conclusion: that eligibility depends on a defendant‘s offense of conviction, not his underlying conduсt. See United States v. Smith, 954 F.3d 446 (1st Cir. 2020); United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Beamus, 943 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2019); Shaw, 957 F.3d 734; United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2019); Jones, 962 F.3d 1290. But most of these courts have taken a different route than we adopt here. They did so by determining that “the statutory penalties for which” modifies “a Federal criminal statute” rather than the entire preceding clause. That approach, however, improperly broadens the definition of “covered offense” because it “would mean that the First Step Act covers offensеs unaffected by the Fair Sentencing Act.” Jones, 962 F.3d at 1300. As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Jones, that
alternative interpretation would mean that a movant with any drug-trafficking offense—even, say, a heroin offense—would have a “covered offense” because the movant violated section 841 and the Fair Sentencing Act modified some of the penalties that apply to section 841,
even though the Act did not alter the penalties for heroin оffenses.
Id. Now, even if a heroin defendant moved for First Step Act relief and could get past § 404(a), his motion would be dead in the water once the district court reached § 404(b), because applying the Fair Sentencing Act as if it were in effect at the time the offense was committed would do
We accordingly hold that a defendant‘s federal offense of conviction, not his underlying conduct, determines First Step Act eligibility.6 Crooks wаs convicted of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. When he committed the offense, the statutory penalty for his crime was 10 years to life imprisonment. See
been modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, he committed a “covered offense” and is eligible for resentencing under the First Step Act, despite his responsibility for 567 grams of crack cocaine.
B. Career Offender Status
Because the district court ruled in the alternative by assuming eligibility, we must next address Crooks‘s career offender status. The district court held that even if Crooks were eligible for First Step Act reliеf, it would decline to reduce his sentence because it could not review Crooks‘s career offender designation. “Whether a defendant was erroneously classified as a career offender is a question of law subject to de novo review.” United States v. Karam, 496 F.3d 1157, 1166 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Congress granted courts nearly unfettered discretion to reduce, or to decline to reduce, an eligible defendant‘s sentence рursuant to a First Step Act motion. But, notwithstanding this discretion, to “impose a reduced sentence as if . . . the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed” necessarily requires a correct calculation of the guidelines range. See Brown, 974 F.3d at 1145 (“If the district court erred in the first Guideline calculation, it is not obligated to err again.“).
The district court should have reсalculated the guidelines range. In denying Crooks‘s motion, the district court concluded that if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in
effect at the time of Crooks‘s offense conduct, his guidelines range would have been identical to the range calculated at his initial sentencing. The district court reached this conclusion because it determined Crooks‘s designation as a career offender wаs unreviewable.
Not only is a career offender designation reviewable in a First Step Act motion, but this designation was incorrectly applied to Crooks at his initial sentencing in 2002 and led the sentencing court to incorrectly calculate his guidelines range. In Brown,7 we held that a defendant may challenge the legality of his career offender status in a First Step Act motion because an improрer designation as a career offender can lead to a miscalculation of the guidelines
The government concedes on appeal that Crooks was improperly designated as a career offender because his drug conspiracy conviction of
Defendants classified as career offenders under
We addressed the interplay of an identical application note and
time, application note 5 stated that “[p]rior convictiоns of offenses counted under subsection (b)(1) include the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.” (emphasis added). But the application notes to § 2L1.2 did not define “conspiring,” so we had to decide whether the defendant‘s prior conspiracy conviction was a conspiracy triggering a sentencing enhancement under application note 5. Id. at 1310.
We held that it was not. Because “conspiring” was not defined by § 2L1.2 or its application notes, we applied the categorical approach to such a “generic, undefined term[] in the Guidelines.” Id. at 1313. After doing so, we “conclude[d] that the generic definition of ‘conspiracy’ requires an overt act.” Id. at 1314. And because the defendant‘s prior conspiracy conviction of
This reasoning applies with equal force to Crooks‘s designation as a career offender. Section 4B1.2 application note 1 uses identical language to define “controlled
conspiracy conviction,
As a result, Crooks was erroneously designated as a career offender.
* * *
On remand, the district court should recalculate Crooks‘s guidelines range using the 2001 edition, see Brown, 974 F.3d at 1144, and without the career offender guidelines enhancement. It then may consider the
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE the district court‘s order denying Crooks‘s First Step Act motion and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.10
Notes
а) DEFINITION OF COVERED OFFENSE.—In this section, the term “covered offense” means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372), that was committed before August 3, 2010.
(b) DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY SENTENCED.—A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may, on motion of the defendant, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the court, impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the (continued...)
(...continued)Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372) were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.
(c) LIMITATIONS.—No court shall entertain a motion made under this section to reduce a sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or previously reduced in accоrdance with the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-220; 124 Stat. 2372) or if a previous motion made under this section to reduce the sentence was, after the date of enactment of this Act, denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this seсtion.
First Step Act § 404.