997 F.3d 1273
10th Cir.2021Background
- In 2002 Crooks was convicted at a bench trial of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine and the court found he personally distributed 567 grams. He was sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment.
- The PSR labeled Crooks a career offender under USSG §4B1.1, but that designation did not raise his guidelines range because his base offense level was higher; the guidelines range was calculated as 360 months to life. Crooks did not object at sentencing.
- The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) raised the crack thresholds that triggered enhanced statutory sentences; the First Step Act (2018) made those Fair Sentencing Act changes retroactive for eligible defendants via §404 motions.
- Crooks moved under the First Step Act in 2019 seeking a reduction to time-served (~260 months), arguing (1) his offense of conviction is a "covered offense" because §841(b)(1)(A)(iii) was modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, and (2) his career-offender status should be vacated because a §846 conspiracy is not a "controlled substance offense."
- The district court denied relief, finding Crooks ineligible and holding his career-offender designation unreviewable; on appeal the government conceded eligibility.
- The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding Crooks eligible because eligibility depends on the offense of conviction (not underlying conduct), and that the career-offender designation was reviewable and was improperly applied to Crooks (§846 does not require an overt act). The case was remanded for recalculation under the 2001 Guidelines without the career-offender enhancement and for consideration of §3553(a) factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Crooks is eligible under the First Step Act §404(a) | Crooks: eligibility is determined by the offense of conviction; his §841(b)(1)(A)(iii) conviction was modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, so he is a "covered offense" | District court (initially): ineligible because focus on underlying conduct; gov. later conceded eligibility on appeal | Eligibility turns on the offense of conviction, not underlying conduct; Crooks is eligible |
| Whether the court may review and vacate a career-offender designation on a First Step Act motion | Crooks: designation is reviewable and erroneous because §846 conspiracy is not a "controlled substance offense" under the Guideline (requires overt act) | District court: career-offender status was unreviewable and thus sentence would remain unchanged | Career-offender status is reviewable on First Step Act motions and Crooks was improperly designated because §846 does not require an overt act |
| Remedy and resentencing scope | Crooks: district court should recalculate Guidelines (using the 2001 edition used at original sentencing) without the career-offender enhancement and then consider §3553(a) | District court: declined review so no recalculation; on appeal gov. did not oppose recalculation | Remand for recalculation under the 2001 Guidelines without the career-offender enhancement and consideration of §3553(a) factors |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Brown, 974 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2020) (First Step Act allows challenging erroneous career-offender designations)
- United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2020) (interpreting "covered offense" to depend on the offense of conviction)
- United States v. Shaw, 957 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2020) (construction of First Step Act eligibility language)
- United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 836 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 2016) (generic definition of "conspiracy" requires an overt act for guideline application)
- United States v. Karam, 496 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. 2007) (career-offender classification reviewed de novo)
- United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2020) (district court may consider §3553(a) factors on First Step Act resentencing)
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (application of Fair Sentencing Act to post‑effective-date sentences)
- Shabani v. United States, 513 U.S. 10 (1994) (§846 conspiracy does not require proof of an overt act)
