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United States v. Karam
496 F.3d 1157
10th Cir.
2007
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Docket

*1 mootness, regarding standing, their appeal

or the merits. by the

That leaves the claims Doel

plaintiffs. agree panel majority I with the III plaintiffs

that the Doel have Article

standing respect and that the with appeal merits, is not moot.

to them As

however, I see no need to address the

constitutional issues. The concedes OSDH that the challenged by its brief statute plaintiffs preclude

the Doel does not issu- they

ance of the birth certificates Although

seek. the OSDH bases that view

on its construction of the statute rather agreement

than on an the plaintiffs’ arguments,

constitutional I see no reason accept ap-

not to that concession for this concession,

peal. light of that the only

argument setting of OSDH for aside judgment

district court’s is that other stat- prohibit

utes issuance of the birth certifi- argu-

cate. But OSDH did not raise that court,

ment district so we need not and appeal.

should not consider it on Accord-

ingly, judgment we should affirm the respect

the district court with to the Doel

plaintiffs’ against claims the OSDH. America,

UNITED STATES of

Plaintiff-Appellee, KARAM, Defendant-Appellant.

Patrick

No. 06-8056. Appeals, Court

Tenth Circuit.

Aug. *2 Jubin, LLC, Zerga,

Thomas B. Jubin & WY, Defendant-Appellant. Cheyenne, Anderson, Assistant United James C. (Matthew Mead, Attorney H. Unit- States brief), him Attorney, ed on the States WY, Wyoming, Cheyenne, District of Plaintiff-Appellee. MURPHY, MeWILLIAMS, neatly stack of packaged

Before cardboard boxes McCONNELL, Judges. Circuit piece luggage, and a which he later “carry-on bag,” described as a top set on MURPHY, Judge. Circuit of the boxes behind the seat. driver’s *3 I. Introduction provided Karam his driver’s license and a Following stop one-way agreement a traffic and a search of rental indicating the vehicle, Patrick Karam was indicted for his car had been rented in Angeles, Los Cali- intent to distribute more possession with Akron, fornia and would be in returned marijuana, in viola- kilograms than 100 Ohio. Scimone then asked Karam to ac- 841(a)(1) (b)(1)(B). and tion of U.S.C. him to company patrol his vehicle. suppress Karam a motion to all filed evi- vehicle, Karam got When to the he said vehicle, arguing from his dence seized he he needed to use the restroom. Scimone unlawfully violation detained in responded by pointing just out Karam had Fourth Amendment. district court passed stop a truck with restroom facilities so, In doing denied the motion. it conclud- pulled four miles before him Scimone over. ed the detention did not violate the Fourth Karam then made a statement which Sci- Amendment because the officer had rea- interpreted mone anas assertion that Kar- engaged sonable Karam was stopped am had at the truck exit to activity. Karam then entered a Scimone, purchase tea. had plea, guilty preserving right conditional his following been Karam when passed appeal sup- to the denial of motion to and stopped exit knew Karam had not At press. sentencing, district court there. qualified determined Karam as a career 4Bl.l(a) to pursuant offender USSG and sitting While Scimone and Karam were him imprison- sentenced to 110 months’ vehicle, patrol in the Scimone asked Kar- ment. Karam appeal, challenges On both plans, am about his travel includ- the district court’s denial of the motion to ing coming where he was from and where suppress application and its of the career going. explained he was Karam he was sentencing guideline. offender Exercising traveling Angeles, to Akron from Los jurisdiction pursuant 28 U.S.C. spent where he had the last week and a this court affirms the district court’s deni- visiting half his niece. He stated he had suppress al of the motion to and affirms Angeles flown to Los and then rented the Karam’s sentence. vehicle to return to his home in Akron. Following exchange, Scimone in- Background II. formed Karam him giving he would be traveling While eastbound on Interstate warning following another too vehicle Albany County, Wyoming, 80 in Wyoming closely. began then fill Scimone out the Highway Trooper Joseph Patrol Scimone warning attempted and to run a check of observed an eastbound Pontiac Montana driver’s license dispatch. minivan driven Karam following anoth- mistakenly reported Because Scimone er closely. vehicle too Scimone activated number different from the actual driver’s emergency lights pulled Karam number, dispatch repeatedly license re- right over to the shoulder of the road. sponded that the driver’s was not license approached Scimone then the vehicle and on file. license, asked Karam regis- for his driver’s ques- Scimone continued to ask Karam tration, proof of insurance. As he history tions about his travel and his vaca- approached, Scimone looked through the windows of the vehicle and Angeles. observed tion Los When Scimone asked one count of Karam was indicted on back to to drive why he chose

Karam more intent to distribute possession with flying, explained Karam than Akron rather marijuana, in viola- items, kilograms than 100 including some transporting he was (b)(1)(B). 841(a)(1) of 21 U.S.C. niece who tion for another pictures, clothes and all evi- suppress filed a motion to from Karam to Akron recently moved back had of the search of seized as a result father. dence with her sick Angeles to be Los motion, argued, Karam vehicle. In the where his his then asked alia, unlawfully detained that he was Karam first inter Angeles. lived Los niece Amendment. in violation of the Fourth she not know where that he did responded evidentiary court held an The district thirty lived indicated she lived and then *4 motion, hearing ultimately and denied Beverly Cen- from the forty-five minutes suspi- Scimone had reasonable concluding characterized Karam’s later ter. Scimone in criminal activ- engaged Karam was Even- cion vague.1 as to his answers justify the continued de- ity sufficient to ten minutes of approximately tually, after arrival of the awaiting while the valid- tention attempts to confirm unsuccessful the mo- license, unit. After the denial of canine driver’s Scimone ity of Karam’s Karam entered condi- suppress, his tion to warning, returned gave Karam the to a written guilty plea pursuant agreement, and tional license and rental driver’s way. plea agreement government. with the on his proceed him he could told plea, govern- exchange guilty for the his vehi- walking back to As Karam was agreed to recommend three-level ment if ask cle, Karam he could Scimone asked of re- acceptance reduction for sentence Karam questions and him a few more sponsibility. Karam again asked agreed. Scimone (“PSR”) recom- Report and The Presentence Angeles lived in Los where his niece of the career of- application Karam knew mended whether specifically asked sentencing guideline pursuant Karam was unable to fender Again, her address. 4Bl.l(a). § much It based this recommen- provide or to USSG an address provide that two of Karam’s niece’s dation on a conclusion the location regarding detail convictions, a 1995 Ohio conviction asked point, At this Scimone residence. marijuana in and a trafficking vehicle to search his Karam for consent marijuana trafficking in then told Ohio conviction for and Karam refused. trafficking to commit conspiracy leave and in- and Karam was not free to marijuana, qualified as controlled sub- to call a canine going formed him he was offenses, as defined USSG request- stance unit the vehicle. Scimone to sniff 4B1.2(b). calculated Karam’s The PSR brought canine unit be drug ed a detection- applying a thirty-one, unit offense level as stop. When the total to the location of the thirty-four under arrived, offense level of alerted the officers to base the canine 4Bl.l(b) down- and a three-level substances. USSG presence of controlled respon- adjustment acceptance a search of the van ward The officers conducted cou- sibility under USSG 3E1.1. When pounds found approximately and VI, history category with a criminal marijuana. pled extraordinarily appeared unusually nervous.” The 1. Scimone also testified Karam challenge stop. government does not this factual “quite during nervous” the traffic court, however, rely finding appeal and does not on Kar- rejected district this charac- suspi- support reasonable am's nervousness to demeanor and found terization of Karam's "[tjhere cion. that Mr. Karam was is no indication Ohio, 1, 19-20, advisory in an this offense level resulted 392 U.S. 88 S.Ct. (1968). range of 188 to 235 months. guideline L.Ed.2d 889 Id. Under inqui- ry, a traffic is reasonable if it is objected application Karam to the “justified inception” at its “reason- sentencing § 4B1.1 and filed a memoran- ably in scope related to the circumstances it argued improper dum. Karam justified which interference the first classify conviction as a con- his 1995 Ohio Salzano, place.” United States v. trolled substance offense because it did not Cir.1998) necessarily (quotations involve the actual distribution omitted). possession of a controlled substance or the of a controlled substance with intent justified “A seizure that solely sentencing hearing, At the distribute. issuing the interest in a warning ticket rejected arguments district court to the can driver become unlawful if it is qualified as a concluded career beyond prolonged reasonably the time re granted offender. It then Karam a six-level quired to complete that mission.” Illinois departure pursuant downward to USSG Caballes, 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 5K1.1, assistance to based on Karam’s (2005). 834, 160 L.Ed.2d During investigation stop, routine traffic *5 may request officer prosecution of others. The district court a license and registration, vehicle driver’s calculated Karam’s total offense level as run computer verification of these docu twenty-five history and his criminal cate- ments, and issue a citation or warning. VI, gory resulting advisory guide- as in an United v. Rosborough, States 366 F.3d range imprison- line of 110 to 137 months’ (10th Cir.2004). 1145, 1148 An officer can ment. The district court sentenced Karam also ask the driver about mat imprisonment, to 110 months’ a sentence ters both related and unrelated to the guideline at the range. bottom the purpose stop, long of the as ques as those Analysis prolong tions do not length

III. Stewart, detention. United v. States 473 Suppress A. Motion to (10th Cir.2007). 1265, F.3d 1269 Once the reviewing district court’s deni warning or citation has been issued and al to suppress, of motion this court views registration the driver’s and have license light the evidence in the most favorable to returned, however, been gener the officer government accepts and the factual ally proceed must allow the driver to with findings unless’they of the district court delay. out further United States v. Pat clearly are erroneous. United States v. (10th Cir.2006). terson, 767, 472 F.3d 776 Chavira, (10th 1286, 467 1290 Cir. Further permissible only detention is if 2006). The ultimate determination of rea “(1) develops objectively the officer an rea sonableness under the Fourth Amend suspicion sonable and articulable that the ment, however, a question is of law that is engaged illegal activity, driver is some de reviewed novo. Id. or initial detention becomes a con Although stop a traffic is considered a Rosborough, sensual encounter.” 366 F.3d purposes seizure for of the Fourth Amend- (quotations and alterations omit ment, it investigative constitutes an deten- ted). tion rather than a custodial arrest. Unit- challenge Karam does not the va (10th Wood, 942, ed v. States 106 F.3d Cir.1997). lidity stop. of the initial traffic The reasonableness of such a following observed Karam another vehicle stop is therefore determined under the two-part inquiry Terry closely Wyo. established in v. too in violation of Ann. Stat. just passed an exit with “jus- despite having therefore stop

§ 31-5-210. follow-up facilities and his state- restroom inception.” See tified at its Williams, as a false interpreted which Scimone ment Cir.2005) (“A exit; valid under the stop stopped traffic is that he had at the assertion based on stop if the is plans” Fourth Amendment Karam’s “unusual travel ” (quota- .... violation traffic Angeles renting observed a vehicle flying to Los omitted)). not chal- Karam also does tion appeal, back to Ohio. On to drive the initial detention lenge scope give these factors are insufficient argues before Sci- occurred questioning necessary rise to reasonable vehi- consent to search his mone asked for detention. justify his continued Rather, only that the Karam asserts cle. investiga whether an To determine arrival of pending the continued detention suspi tory supported is reasonable stop unit, after the citation had been the canine totality cion, look at the this court “must registration had issued and his license to see the circumstances of each case returned, an unreason- constituted been partic detaining officer has a whether of the Fourth in violation able seizure objective suspecting basis for ularized and Amendment. Because the States v. Arvi legal wrongdoing.” United argue this continued' detention does not zu, 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. consensual, validity its turns omitted). (2002) (quotations L.Ed.2d “objectively possessed an whether Scimone Thus, although court discusses each of suspicion” and articulable reasonable individually, factors the ultimate these activity justify sufficient to detain- whole, “whether, taken as a question of the traffic ing purpose Karam after they finding suspi of reasonable support Rosborough, completed.2 had been *6 Santos, cion.” United States omitted). (quotation 366 F.3d at 1148 (10th Cir.2005). 1120, 1127 While reason concluding Scimone had reasonable a suspicion may not be based on able Karam, the district suspicion to detain hunch,” likelihood of criminal “mere “the (1) following court relied on the factors: required to the level activity need not rise presence professionally packaged the of cause, and it falls consider probable to cardboard boxes similar to those used ably satisfying preponderance a short of (2) case; marijuana in another transport Arvizu, the evidence standard.” luggage which the small size of Karam’s omitted). 274, (quotation 122 S.Ct. 744 a Scimone believed to be insufficient for Further, must “defer to the this court (3) trip; Karam’s one-and-one-half-week ability law enforcement officer trained Angeles, drug from eastbound travel Los suspi innocent and distinguish to between area, Ohio, area; to a market source Santos, 1124 actions.” 403 F.3d at cious vague responses Karam’s to re- omitted). (quotation garding plans, travel the location of his matter, initial this discounts As an court Angeles, in Los and the niece’s residence gov- relied the boxes; three of the factors content of the Karam’s state- support to the ernment and the district court having ment about to use restroom fully delay. the Because Karam does not 2. Karam also mentions in footnote that fifty-eight-minute delay pending appeal the arrival of than this issue on other address scope an canine unit exceeded the summarily preserve that this [ ] [ ] “assert investigative required detention and therefore lengthy delay plain under the Fourth error suspicion. sup- than reasonable At the more Amendment,” this court need not consider expressly pression hearing, the issue. challenging length of stated he was not suspicion conclusion that reasonable cle contributes nothing to the reasonable First, government suspicion analysis. present. relies heavily presence neatly pack- on the This court signifi- also attaches little boxes in the back of Kar- aged cardboard cance to either the luggage size sup- am’s vehicle. Scimone testified at the Karam’s vehicle or Karam’s eastbound hearing that these boxes were pression drug travel from a well-known source area significant because he was aware of anoth- a large market area. government marijuana er case in which a trooper found does not argue either of these factors packaged neatly new cardboard boxes give would alone rise to suspi- reasonable along stacked the bottom of a van. The cion or even that particularly either is a expressed familiarity district court its with factor, strong but it nevertheless relies on presence case and concluded the each part as a of the overall circumstances significant of these boxes was a factor creating suspicion. reasonable While this analysis. suspicion the reasonable court recognizes even seemingly innocent

Although court is mindful that may this “offi factors be relevant to the reasonable possess determination, expertise permitting suspicion cers often “some facts are so them to understand the criminal connota susceptible innocuous and so varying may tions associated facts that seem they carry with interpretations little or no untrained,” Santos, Mendez, innocent to the weight.” United States v. 1133, (10th Cir.1997) government F.3d at pro has not (quotation omitted). any objective associating vided basis for Each of these facts falls square- style packaging ly these boxes or this within category. Although this activity.. To the extent previously Scimone’s court has considered insuffi- suspicion of the boxes was based on a cient amount of luggage as a relevant fac- single tor, Ledesma, regarding drug stop e.g., anecdote United States v. Wyoming trooper, Cir.2006), made another his F.3d suspicion wholly subjective and thus suitcase was not so small as to contribute significantly irrelevant to the reasonable cal suspicion. to reasonable Be- many culus. Neither nor the cause there person are reasons a district provided anything court has other choose to lightly, travel the size of the *7 than single support luggage this instance to Sci- in given Karam’s vehicle must be only mone’s association of the boxes with crimi the slightest weight, any. if See Reid Arvizu, 277, nal activity. 438, 441, 534 at v. Georgia, U.S. 100 S.Ct. Cf. 122 (discussing “special S.Ct. 744 officer’s L.Ed.2d (characterizing 890 training familiarity luggage ized with the cus a lack of aas circumstance that inhabitants”). toms of the area’s very large category Absent could “describe a of travelers”). any objective justification presumably an Similarly, such asso innocent ciation, presence neatly packaged significance the of court the this has discounted in drug cardboard boxes the back of a vehicle is of travel between location source destination, of “incorrigibly drug explaining one those circumstances so and a “[i]f activity” country’s larg- free of associations with criminal travel between two “[djeference that population ground to law enforcement offi est on centers is Santos, inappropriate.” suspicion may predi- cers which [is] F.3d reasonable be Thus, cated, case, at in imagine activity 1133. the context of this it is difficult to an in incapable justifying police suspicion even when viewed combination with the below, other factors discussed an pres accompanying investigative detention.” new, Santos, neatly taped ence of in a at boxes vehi- 403 F.3d stopped Karam said he him to believe significance limited Notwithstanding the Thus, facts as viewing factors relied the last exit. three of the be, court, viewed in reasonably perceived circumstances them to district Scimone support to entirety certainly were sufficient to their contributes Karam’s statement suspicion. Im- conclusion of reasonable articulable objectively reasonable and in got Karam Scimone’s mediately after necessary justify pro to car, he had to use the he stated patrol detention. See United States longed Scimone, and, then according to restroom (10th 1149, 1157 Cir. Bradford, 423 F.3d exit at the last stopped he had explained 2005) “conflicting” answers to “ba (listing testified this tea. Scimone get to some Wood, factor); as one questions” sic Scimone suspicious because statement “inconsistencies (explaining F.3d at 947 passed he following Karam when had been during to the officer provided information stop knew Karam did not exit and the last rise to reasonable stop give the traffic sup- to of the motion there. its denial Santos, activity”); suspicion of criminal cf. make a court did not press, the district (concluding false denial of at 1132 falsely whether Karam finding as to history powerful “the most exit, prior at the stopped claimed to have sustaining, finding ... reason recording of the traffic noting the suspicion.”). reasonable Instead, the on this matter. was unclear next relies on Karam’s only that be- court found district questions regarding vague responses such a statement and Karam made lieved travel, history content of the card- and the such a statement was that Scimone knew Specifically, board boxes his vehicle. false. that Karam was government points out assertions, Contrary to where his precisely unable to remember Karam’s statement does significance Angeles, stating first he niece lived Los actually turn on claimed not whether lived and then did not know where she Even as stopped at the exit. have approximate- that lived explaining she mistaken about Kar- suming Scimone was Beverly from the ly forty-five minutes statement, that it is well established am’s Similarly, asked what items Center. when may support “an officer’s mistake of fact Akron, bringing Karam he was back suspicion ... probable cause or reasonable “just “just and then first said clothes” said mistake of fact was provided the officer’s Although that.” pictures and stuff like objectively States v. reasonable.” United charac- disputes the district court’s Herrera, Cir. “vague,” there terization of his answers as 2006) omitted). Here, the dis (quotation in the record for the ample support express finding, made an factual trict court determination that Karam district court’s record, supported which is responses to Scimone’s gave vague ques- *8 falsely understood Karam Scimone Indeed, of the recording tions. at the exit. stopped previous claim he had than when confirms Karam was less clear finding in and the district Implicit this questions about his answering Scimone’s court’s reliance on it as a factor contribut stayed in Los plans, travel where he had the conclu ing to reasonable was and the content of the boxes. Angeles, interpretation sion that Scimone’s not alone indicative Vague conversation is Viewing the statement was reasonable. wrongdoing and this kind of conversa- light evidence in the most favorable to the in very heavily weigh tion does not agrees this court with the government, at suspicion calculus. Id. that, reasonable if district court even “[cjonfusion Nevertheless, about de- mistaken, objectively reasonable for it was story an indication that a tails is often each of the factors is insufficient. This being spot,” vague not, however, fabricated on the may court in' engage a “di considered, may and evasive answers be in vide-and-conquer analysis,” evaluating and factors, conjunction with other as contrib- disposing of each factor individually. Id. uting to an officer’s determination of rea- Rather, at 122 S.Ct. 744. this court suspicion. sonable Id. at 1131. “must consider the whole, factors as a giving weight due to the reasonable infer Finally, relies Kar- ences of the resident district court and to unusual travel plans, am’s which involved Santos, expertise.” [the officer’s] 403 F.3d flying one-way from Akron Angeles to Los at-1133. Even factors which are not alone renting and then one-way vehicle probative illegal may conduct combine drive back to Akron. This prece court’s to amount to suspicion. reasonable See regarding significance dent of such Arvizu, 277-78, at 122 S.Ct. 744. plans travel is less than clear. “un While plans may provide usual travel an indicia Applying standard, this court con- suspicion,” of reasonable this court has totality cludes the of the circumstances previously explained the combination of a gave particularized Scimone a objec- one-way in flight one direction and a one- tive basis suspecting' Karam was en- way rental vehicle the other direction is gaged in activity. Upon stopping type itinerary not the of unusual gives Karam, Scimone noted the vehicle awas Wood, suspicion. rise to reasonable 106 one-way rental traveling Angeles from Los case, F.3d at 946-47. In a more recent to Akron. Karam later offered as an ex- purchase this court concluded the planation one-way for the rental that he one-way plane of “a series of tickets and had flown to Angeles Los for a week-and- one-way car-rentals” il- “financial[ly] a-half vacation and then rented a vehicle to logic[al]” and “defied common sense” and drive home transport so he could therefore was a factor contributing to rea niece’s pictures. clothes and After enter- suspicion. Bradford, sonable at vehicle, ing Scimone’s Karam told Scimone Because the plans 1157-58. travel de despite needed to use the restroom scribed implausible Karam were not just having passed a truck stop and then and were consistent with innocent behav made statement which Scimone reason- ior, places this court little weight on this ably interpreted as a lie. Scimone then Supreme factor. The Court has neverthe asked Karam about his vacation less cautioned that a factor not be - responded only to which Karam completely ignored simply because it is vague answers. Karam not was un- “susceptible explanation.” of innocent Arv able to remember the address where he izu, 276-77, 534 U.S. at 122 S.Ct. 744. stayed had Angeles, Los but was unable Thus, although purported itinerary give location, much detail about his re- this case was not so implausible unusual or sponding point by saying one he did not independently suggest as to criminal activ know where he had been staying. Karam ity, the uncommon nature of the travel gave vague responses also to Scimone’s plans, when combined with the other fac questions about the contents of the boxes tors, may not be entirely. discounted in the back his vehicle. Viewing these aggregate circumstances in the giving

None of the factors relied on *9 government experience district court or the due deference to the of would the officer, justify prolonged alone be sufficient to Scimone had reasonable Indeed, justify detaining detention. con Karam pending the cedes that when independently, viewed arrival of the canine unit. The district

1166 manufacture, export, distribu- import, the motion the denied properly court therefore a sub- tion, of controlled dispensing or suppress. a controlled possession or the of stance ... Offender Application of Career B. manufacture, ... intent to substance Sentencing Guideline distribute, dispense.” export, or import, 4B1.2(b). note ex- application § Id. the district argues next includes the of- this definition also plains the career offender applying court erred abetting, conspiring, aiding of fenses his advi to calculate guideline sentencing a sub- attempting to commit controlled USSG sentencing range. See sory § n. 1. Fur- Id. 4B1.2 cmt. stance offense. considering the district § “[I]n 4B1.1. 4B1.2(b) Guidelines, ther, held encom- we this court has of the application court’s conduct that could clear error and “convictions for findings passes factual review sub- charged as a controlled de novo.” United have been determinations legal (10th 1050, Kristl, offense,” charged if the actual F.3d 1054 even v. 437 stance States Cir.2006). necessarily satisfy a defendant was er would not “Whether offense Smith, is a career offender v. 433 roneously classified as States definition. United (10th Cir.2006). subject to de novo re 714, law question a 717 F.3d Mitchell, v. 113 States view.” United prior whether a con To determine Cir.1997). Because this 1528, 1532 predicate as a offense qualifies viction prior conviction court concludes enhancement, sentencing of a purposes a controlled sub classified as properly initially the fact of court must look “to this pursuant USSG stance offense statutory conviction and the definition 4B1.2(b), properly ap court the district Taylor v. prior offense.” United sentencing guide plied the career offender States, 575, 2143, 602, 110 S.Ct. line. (1990). In context of L.Ed.2d 607 4Bl.l(a), a defen- to USSG Pursuant statutory language where the guilty plea, if: a career offender qualifies dant as conclusive, court look be is not (1) eighteen at least the defendant of the statute yond express language document, the defendant com- years old at the time charging to the terms of the conviction; the instant offense mitted a tran plea agreement, terms of written of conviction is the instant offense plea colloquy, and other ex script a crime of violence felony that is either by findings factual assented to plicit offense; and States, or a controlled substance v. Shepard defendant. United prior at least two the defendant has 13, 16, L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. of either a crime felony convictions Smith, (2005); Al 433 F.3d at 718. substance of- controlled violence ad Taylor Shepard each though fense. prior of a convic dressed the classification Armed purposes tion for' Career 4Bl.l(a). Karam does not dis- USSG Act, equally approach their Criminal first two criteria pute that he satisfies the in the context of the career applicable Instead, guideline. of the career offender Smith, sentencing guideline. See offender improperly court argues the district Shepard to de (applying F.3d at 718 conviction for traf- classified his 1995 Ohio as prior qualified whether offense termine marijuana a controlled sub- ficking in as offense); see also substance a controlled of- stance offense. A controlled substance Galloway, or state fense is “an offense under federal (6th Cir.2006) (concluding Shepard law, for a 323-24 punishable by imprisonment eonvic- to determine whether prohibits applies exceeding year, term one *10 qualifies prohibits as a controlled substance of- an offense ... that tion the ... dis- 4B1.1); § fense under tribution ... a controlled sub- (7th Cir.2005) McGee, ...”); stance. Cherry, United States v. (10th Cir.2005) (“[T]he Shepard “applies equal with (explaining term guidelines’ career force to offender ‘distribute’ ... intentionally means to de- provision”). liver person.” narcotics to another (quota- omitted)). tion and alterations can Nor The Ohio statute under which Karam any there be dispute prepara- it previously convicted makes unlaw- tion of a controlled substance for distribu- “knowingly [pjrepare ful to ... for ship- tion and any commission of of the deliver, ment, ship, transport, prepare for prohibited drugs acts with intended for distribution, distribute a controlled or sub- by sale the defendant each posses- involve stance, when the offender knows or has sion with intent to distribute and fit also reasonable cause to believe the controlled squarely within the definition of a con- by substance is intended for sale or resale trolled substance offense. See USSG the offender or another.” Ohio Rev.Code 4131.2(b). Thus, § the resolution of Kar- (1995).3 2925.03(A)(2) Ann. Karam ar- am’s appeal turns on whether the prepara-' a conviction under can- gues this statute shipment, shipment, tion for transport or categorically not a qualify as controlled of a controlled substance knowledge with substance offense because the pro- statute or reasonable cause to believe the con- qualifying hibits both and non-qualifying ‘ trolled substance is intended by for sale Specifically, conduct. Karam contends “manufacture, another constitutes the im- preparing shipment, for shipping, and distribution, port, export, or dispensing of transporting drugs may all involve mere a controlled substance ... or posses- and, thus, possession may the statute be sion of a controlled substance ... with by possession violated of a controlled manufacture, intent to import, export, dis- substance reasonable cause to believe tribute, dispense.”4 or Id. Because each drugs are intended for sale. He ar- prohibited of these acts involves the actual gues this “reasonable cause to believe” of a distribution controlled substance rath- mens rea falls standard short of intent possession, er than mere this court need satisfy and is insufficient to the definition knowledge not address whether offense, or reason- controlled substance which alia, able cause to requires, believe controlled sub- possession inter with intent 4131.2(b). stance is intended for sale to distribute. USSG another equivalent to an intent to distribute. dispute There can be no that a convic- delivery portion tion for the or of a While the relevant of the Ohio distribution controlled prohibits substance constitutes a con- statute conduct which alone (“The trolled substance offense. See id. consist of more than mere it possession, no term ‘controlled substance offense’ means does so “when the offender or knows 3. objection All references to Ohio Rev.Code Ann. and conceded the conviction carried § 2925.03 are to the version of statute in possible penalty up eighteen months' effect the time of Karam's conviction imprisonment. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. in 1995. 2925.03(E)(2) (classifying a conviction un- (A)(2) trafficking der subsection in mari- sentencing In Karam’s memorandum filed juana felony degree); as a of the fourth id. court, argued in the district his 1995 con- (1995) ("For 2929.11(D)(2) felony punishable imprisonment viction was not months, degree, fourth the term shall be six exceeding year. term one At the sen- months.”). year, eighteen one tencing hearing, he withdrew this *11 § 4B1.1. Id. at of USSG con- for purposes the fense cause to believe

has reasonable dicta, however, for sale or the court distin- intended In is 492. trolled substance Rev.Code Ohio Ann. by ... another.” resale Ohio Rev.Code. guished 2925.03(A)(2). language This § Ann. 2925.03(A)(2), it as § which characterized only prohibits that the statute makes clear non-qualify- qualifying and covering both to does extend not acts distribution of at The court did conduct. Id. ing use. drugs personal for of possession the it portion of the statute which specify not knowledge or reason- has If an individual satisfy not would definition determined drugs are intended to believe able cause offense, it substance but of controlled another, preparation for sale focused primarily appears the court of those transport or shipment, shipment, “reasonable between distinction possessory involve the simply cannot drugs distribute, to to and intent cause believe” drugs, as moving his own person act of one not this court need address distinction Rather, these acts each of asserts. Karam prohibited that the conclusion light our pro- of the distribution integral part is an actual distribution. constitutes conduct an act of distribution therefore cess and is extent 493. To the Montanez See id. at Simply because the Ohio in and of itself. trans- proposition can be for the that read phas- each of the various prohibits statute a controlled substance porting shipping process does not es of the distribution to be- knowledge or reasonable cause with acts intervening these any make one of is intended lieve the controlled substance than the any an act of distribution less act qualify not as an for sale does Additionally, the step process. final in the distribution, disagrees this court with substance sale of controlled intended dis- dicta for the reasons Sixth Circuit necessarily requires party a third cussed above. substance to of the controlled distribution is, therefore, no party. There that third holding reliance on this court’s the Ohio way a defendant violate v. Herrera-Roldan also in conduct which engaging without statute Cir.2005). (10th 414 F.3d 1238 misplaced. sub- the definition of controlled meets Herrera-Roldan, this court concluded 4B1.2(b). § stance offense under USSG Texas conviction for mere the defendant’s opposite an reached The Sixth Circuit trafficking of “drug was not a possession to Ohio Rev.Code respect conclusion fense,” nearly a term with a definition 2925.03(A)(2) States United Ann. identical that of “controlled substance Montanez, Cir. 1240; 2L1.2 cmt. offense.” Id. USSG 2006). holding of Montanez The central l(B)(iv) (defining “drug trafficking of n. Ann. addressed Ohio Rev.Code fense”). court declined to infer This 2925.03(A)(6), prohibited “pos which intent to distribute from the defendant’s in an a controlled substance sessing] fifty pounds, of more than but possession exceeding three times equal to or amount marijuana. pounds, than 2000 not more 2925.03(A)(9), amount,” the bulk Herrera-Roldan, Id. at 1240-41. Unlike a controlled “possessing] which prohibited under which the statute or ex equal in an amount substance prohibit does not previously convicted the bulk one hundred times ceeding Rather, as discussed possession. mere (quotations Id. at 491-92 amount.” above, language of the statute express omitted). The court held alterations of a only the actual distribution prohibits of these sections “contains because each ” possession substance or controlled ‘possession,’ neither only the element to distrib- with intent of- controlled substance could as a controlled substance qualify

H69 beyond ute. This court need not look

language of the statute. statutory

Because the language of Kar-

am’s prohibits offense of conviction

only conduct which is the “distribution ...

of a controlled substance ... or the pos-

session of controlled substance ... with distribute,” ...

intent to the prior convic- categorically qualifies

tion as a controlled 4B1.2(b).

substance offense. USSG

The district court therefore did not err in

applying the guideline. career offender

IV. Conclusion reasons, foregoing

For the this court

affirms the denial of Karam’s motion to

suppress and the imposed by sentence

district court.

McCONNELL, Judge, Circuit

dissenting in part.

The Fourth question Amendment in this

case is close and reasonable minds balance, view,

differ. On in my the officer objective

lacked the and reasonable suspi-

cion necessary justify the detention. I

therefore dissent from that holding of the

majority. I majority’s concur in the hold-

ing on sentencing issue.

UNITED STATES America ex rel. BOOTHE,

Louanne Plaintiff-

Appellant, GROUP,

SUN HEALTHCARE Defendant-Appellee.

INC.

No. 06-2156. Appeals,

United States Court of

Tenth Circuit.

Aug.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Karam
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 7, 2007
Citation: 496 F.3d 1157
Docket Number: 06-8056
Court Abbreviation: 10th Cir.
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