United States of America v. Chad Eric Mink, also known as Chad Mink
No. 19-3683
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
Submitted: March 16, 2021 Filed: August 12, 2021
Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
A jury found Chad Eric Mink guilty on all counts of a 15-count indictment, and the district court sentenced him to 600 months imprisonment. Mink appeals his convictions and sentence. Having jurisdiction under
I.
“We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdict.” United States v. Galloway, 917 F.3d 631, 632 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
This case arises out of Mink‘s incessant and extreme harassment of his ex-girlfriend, L.L., and her partner, D.B., after Mink and L.L.‘s relationship ended in 2013.1 The events began on October 11, 2013, when Mink allegedly stabbed L.L. in the ear with a fork while she was asleep. Mink told law enforcement that L.L. had been drinking and must have fallen on the fork, but a preliminary breath test revealed L.L.‘s blood alcohol concentration to be 0.000. On November 14, 2013, D.B. discovered that someone had vandalized his car while parked at “Group O,” an Illinois business where D.B. and L.L. worked. That same day, L.L
Mink was employed at “Fol-Da-Tank,” a Milan, Illinois business. One of Mink‘s coworkers, a Leclaire, Iowa resident, kept a Springfield XD .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol in his truck and claimed that Mink was aware of the pistol. The coworker later reported the pistol missing. On November 18, 2013, Mink reported that his van was shot at while driving to work and
On April 14, 2014, a groundskeeper at Rock Island High School, located in Rock Island, Illinois, discovered a white trash bag containing 19 books, including:
- The Anarchist Cookbook;
- The Anarchist Arsenal: Improvised Incendiary and Explosives Techniques;
- Black Medicine: The Dark Art of Death;
- Black Medicine Volume II: Weapons at Hand;
- Black Medicine Volume III: Low Blows;
- Black Medicine Volume IV: Equalizers;
- Serial Killers and Murderers;
- The Hayduke Silencer Book: Quick and Dirty Homemade Silencers;
- Homemade Semtex: C-4‘s Ugly Sister;
- Homemade C-4: A Recipe for Survival;
- How to Build Practical Firearm Suppressors: An Illustrated Step-by-Step Guide;
- How to Create a New Identity;
- How to Disappear Completely and Never Be Found;
- How to Make Disposable Silencers: A Complete Guide;
- How to Make Disposable Silencers Volume II: A Complete Illustrated Guide;
- Improvised Munitions Black Book Volume 3;
- New I.D. in America: How to Create a Foolproof New Identity;
- Privacy: How to Get It. How to Enjoy It; and
- Ragnar‘s Homemade Detonators: How to Make ‘Em, How to Salvage ‘Em, How to Detonate ‘Em.
R. Doc. 220, 70-80. These books contained information such as how to build pipe bombs and other explosives, how to create a silencer, and how to puncture the ear in such a way that causes severe pain. A fingerprint examiner determined that one of the latent fingerprints discovered on the books was left by Mink, and Mink later admitted to law enforcement that the books were his and that he had read them.
On March 19, 2015, a man was searching for shed deer antlers at HFC when he discovered a blue drawstring backpack. Upon inspecting the bag, the man identified what he believed to be pipe bombs inside. The man notified law enforcement, and the Quad City Bomb Squad responded to the scene. Subsequent investigation determined that the backpack contained three 12-inch, galvanized steel pipes with 1.25-inch endcaps, which were drilled for the insertion of a fuse. One pipe had a set of alternating nails attached by colored rubber bands and black zip ties and was additionally wrapped with a strand of more than 200 hex nuts. This pipe further contained a circuit board, an Estes-brand model rocket igniter system, and a black powder—presumably Pyrodex, an explosive substance recovered from a Ziplock bag in the backpack. A subsequent laboratory examination established that the pipes were destructive devices. Law enforcement also discovered in the backpack six rounds of Hornady “Zombie Max” .45 caliber ammunition, one expended cartridge casing of the same ammunition, and a white trash bag matching the one containing the 19 books. On April 5, 2019, a “treasure hunter,” who canvassed public areas with a metal detector, discovered a .45 caliber pistol wrapped in black garbage bags and duct tape buried near Rock Island High School. Law enforcement later determined that the pistol was Mink‘s coworker‘s missing pistol, although the original barrel had
L.L. and D.B. eventually moved to another Davenport residence, but after that residence was burglarized, the couple moved into Room 120 at the Quad City Inn in Davenport. On February 21, 2016, a motel employee discovered two pipe bombs between Rooms 119 and 120. The pipe bombs were 12-inch, galvanized steel pipes with endcaps and resembled those discovered at HFC, likewise containing Pyrodex and sets of alternating nails held together by colorful rubber bands and zip-ties. L.L.
told law enforcement that she had seen Mink in the motel parking lot earlier. Subsequent investigation revealed that Mink had rented a blue, 2015 Chevrolet Spark at the Quad City Airport in Moline, Illinois, on February 20, 2016. Video surveillance from surrounding businesses showed a blue Chevrolet Spark, or a similar car, driving near the Quad City Inn around 10:00 pm that night. On the afternoon of February 21, 2016, when the bomb was discovered, Mink and a friend drove the Chevrolet Spark to Milan, Michigan, where Mink was to self-report the following day to Federal Correctional Institution, Milan (FCI Milan) for an unrelated 2016 conviction. That evening, Mink sent the following email to the City of Davenport:
From: Nomen Nescio [mailto:nobody@dizum.com]
Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 10:44 PM
To: City of Davenport Web E-mail
Subject:
Me n [D.B.] made a cuuple of bombs just playing arond we never intended to hurt anyone. D forgot to put the bomb away. We set off a couple when we were getting fish one night and by the qc inn. We accidently forgot one over by the miss fairgrounds. I didn‘t know the serious of what we were doing until I read about it. I woold come forward but will i be charged?.
R. Doc. 224, at 46. Mink admitted to law enforcement that he sent this email, although he later denied doing so at trial. Further investigation of Mink‘s laptop revealed that it had been used on February 21, 2016, to access news articles concerning the Quad City Inn bombs and the Davenport Emergency Services Team page. R. Doc. 219, at 351. In the past, the laptop had also been used to view pages such as: “Estes Alpha III model rocket starter set construction video“; “Paladin Press,” a publisher of books similar to those found at Rock Island High School; “How to Track Down Anyone Online“; “DEADLIEST POISONS“; and “How to Vanish with a New Identity.” See R. Doc. 219, at 313-50.
On February 24, 2016, law enforcement met with R.S., an individual who lived with Mink‘s mother until her passing in 2013. R.S. surrendered to law enforcement a safe that Mink had given him prior to reporting to FCI Milan. The safe contained a magazine loader for a firearm, a lockpick set, and a Solvent Trap Adaptor, which can be used to attach a silencer to a firearm. That same day, law enforcement met with the individual who accompanied Mink to FCI Milan in the rental car. The individual provided law enforcement with Mink‘s backpack, which included Mink‘s laptop, a vehicle tracking device, and Mink‘s wallet. The wallet contained a Metabank debit card. Metabank records disclosed that the card was opened under Mink‘s email address, physical address, and phone number; however, the name, birthdate, and social security number associated with the card belonged to a Bettendorf, Iowa resident, T.S. Mink was familiar with but had not met T.S., nor had he been authorized to open an account using T.S.‘s information. Mink used the card to purchase two Springfield XD 4.7-inch threaded replacements (“after-market” barrels)
On March 11, 2016, Mink called Donald Stevens, his biological father, from FCI Milan. Mink directed Stevens to retrieve an item from Mink‘s jacket, which Mink had left at Stevens‘s residence. Mink then directed Stevens to destroy the item and to scatter the pieces around the neighborhood. Stevens did as Mink instructed. Stevens later testified that he believed the item was a detonator. On April 18, 2016, Mink again called Stevens and asked him to sign a prewritten affidavit establishing an alibi for Mink, see R. Doc. 224, at 107-10, to which Stevens responded that such an affidavit would be “perjury.” Additionally, Mink sent three letters to Stevens, one of which asked Stevens to take blame for Mink‘s conduct in order to “throw a big monkey wrench” in the government‘s case. See R. Doc. 224, at 76-77.
On December 14, 2016, a Fol-Da-Tank employee discovered a pistol barrel tucked behind some insulation in the company‘s walls. The serial number on the barrel matched the Springfield XD .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol reported missing by Mink‘s coworker. Containers of dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) and zinc
phosphide, a compound commonly used in rat poisoning, were also discovered in the walls.
On November 8, 2017, a grand jury returned a 15 count indictment, charging Mink with: one count of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of
Before trial, Mink stipulated that, prior to the conduct alleged in the indictment, he “had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.” R. Doc. 221, at 53. Mink moved to sever counts in the indictment for trial pursuant to
district court denied Mink‘s motion, finding that the counts described a common motive, plan, and preparation. Mink also filed motions in limine to exclude evidence of the uncharged conduct,
II.
Mink asserts that venue was improper in the Southern District of Iowa as to Count 6. “[I]mproper venue can be waived,” United States v. Morrissey, 895 F.3d 541, 550 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted), and Mink did not raise the issue before the district court. However, the record does not indicate that Mink made any affirmative waiver of this argument, so we view the failure to raise the issue as inadvertent. Compare United States v. McCorkle, 688 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 2012) (treating defendant‘s failure to challenge venue below as inadvertent when the record did not indicate that he “expressly or intentionally abandoned his right to
object to venue“) with Morrissey, 895 F.3d at 550-51 (finding that defendant waived the issue of venue when he declined a jury instruction on venue and stated that it was not at issue). Therefore, we construe such inadvertent failure as forfeiture and review the challenge on appeal for plain error. See McCorkle, 688 F.3d at 522. Accordingly, Mink “must show that there was an error, the error is clear or obvious under current law, the error affected [his] substantial rights, and the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted).
“‘Proper venue is required by
Here, the jury was instructed to find whether the “offenses charged were begun, continued or completed in the Southern District of Iowa,” R. Doc. 207, at 18, and “[a] jury is presumed to follow its instructions,” United States v. Thomas, 877 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Mink nonetheless argues that the jury could not have found that venue was proper as to Count 6 because he applied for, received, and used the fraudulent debit card in Illinois. Mink‘s argument fails
as a matter of law. Mink was charged with fraudulently using the means of identification of another person with the intent to commit another felony under
Whoever . . . knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law . . . shall be punished as provided in . . . this section.
Mink argues that the essential conduct elements of the offense are confined to the transfer, possession, and use of the means of identification and that all those events—Mink‘s application, receipt, and use of the fraudulent debit card—occurred in Illinois. However, to prove the charged
Therefore, venue is proper not only in any district where Mink used the means of identification but also in any district where he illegally possessed the firearm. The jury was permitted to find that venue was proper in the Southern District of Iowa on either basis. Even if Mink‘s use of the means of identification did not support the
jury‘s venue determination, he offers no argument with respect to the predicate felony. Cf. United States v. Boyle, 700 F.3d 1138, 1143 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen one theory of conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and another is not, a reviewing court presumes that the jury convicted on the supported theory.“). Because Mink challenges only one of the two possible bases for the jury‘s determination, his argument “fails as a matter of law[,] and we have no basis for overturning the jury‘s finding that venue was proper in the Southern District of Iowa.” Cf. United States v. Nguyen, 608 F.3d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding the jury‘s verdict in a conspiracy charge when defendant failed to challenge other bases for the jury‘s finding).
III.
Mink contends that various counts of his conviction are multiplicitous of others in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
IV.
Next, Mink contends that, pursuant to
Here, Mink argues that Counts 1-3—involving the stolen box truck and subsequent vehicular assault—share nothing in common with the remaining counts except that L.L. and D.B. were the victims and Mink was the alleged perpetrator. He contends the government‘s theory that Mink engaged in a common scheme to harass L.L. and D.B. rested on evidence later presented at trial rather than on the face of the indictment. However, “[t]he government is not required to put on a full court press on the evidence” for the counts to be properly joined at the outset. United States v. McCarther, 596 F.3d 438, 442 (8th Cir. 2010). The indictment sufficiently connected the counts together with recurring dates, similar conduct and victims, and references to other counts. While the indictment did not explicitly allege a common scheme, we find that the multiple alleged offenses were properly connected by these common characteristics into a common scheme or plan to harass, stalk, or otherwise harm L.L. and D.B. in satisfaction of
Additionally, Mink argues that severance under
Here, Mink cannot overcome the strong presumption against severance because evidence of each charge would be admissible against him in a separate trial for another charge. He argues that each independent charge layers bad conduct against him in violation of the
States v. Wright, 993 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2021). As described above, each charge alleges a step in Mink‘s plan to harass L.L. and D.B., which in turn establishes his motive, preparation, plan, and identity for the other charges. Further, we find that the probative value of this evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
Next, Mink argues that the inclusion of Counts 5 and 13 (being a prohibited person in possession of an unregistered destructive device) unfairly prejudiced him as to the remaining counts because Counts 5 and 13 required the government to prove that Mink is a felon. Because he raises this argument for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. Under the plain
However, the issue in Aldrich was one of “retroactive misjoinder,” which occurs “when joinder of multiple counts was proper initially, but later developments . . . render the initial joinder improper.” Id. at 528 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). There, the defendant was convicted of two felon-in-possession charges and one charge of possessing an illegal firearm. Id. at 527. After the jury trial, the government and the defendant discovered that—before the
defendant‘s possession of the firearm—the state had restored all of the defendant‘s “rights, privileges and immunities” that were previously forfeited as a result of his prior felony. See id. at 527. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that his two felon-in-possession convictions should be vacated based on the prior restoration of his rights and “that the evidence of his prior felony unfairly prejudiced his right to a fair trial” on the remaining count. Id. The district court granted the vacatur as to the defendant‘s felon-in-possession convictions but denied the defendant a new trial on the remaining count. Id. at 528. On appeal, the defendant argued that “the evidence of his prior felony conviction had a sufficiently prejudicial spillover effect to deprive him of a fair trial” on the remaining count, and we agreed. Id. The government should not have prosecuted the felon-in-possession charges, and “the jury should have never heard evidence concerning [the defendant‘s] prior felony conviction.” Id. at 529. We found that the defendant suffered clear prejudice because the evidence of his prior conviction “divert[ed] the attention of the jury from the question of the defendant‘s responsibility for the crime charged to the improper issue of his bad character.” Id. at 528 (citation omitted).
Here, Mink does not suffer from the same prejudice even under the typical abuse of discretion standard. First, his case is not one of retroactive joinder where his prior conviction was admitted under a now-vacated or -dismissed charge. Second, he stipulated to his status as a felon without any additional detail of his past felonies, which minimizes the prejudicial effect, if any, on his other convictions. See United States v. Rock, 282 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2002). Finally, he has not shown that he would have had “an appreciable chance for acquittal” on the other charges absent his stipulation to his prior felony conviction. Because Mink cannot show prejudice, much less an extraordinary reason for reversal, we find that the district court did not plainly err in refusing to sever the indictment.
V.
Next, Mink argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence revealing that he was incarcerated at the time of the conduct alleged in Counts 14 and 15.
When, as here, the district court definitively rules on a party‘s in limine objection to the admission of evidence, we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695, 698-99 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Big Eagle, 702 F.3d 1125, 1130 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Under the
Moreover, this probative value was not substantially outweighed by potential prejudice. In denying the motion, the district court said that it would “use strong and appropriate limiting instructions in an attempt to cure potential unfair prejudice as a result of this evidence.” R. Doc. 152, at 3. The district court did in fact instruct the jury accordingly. R. Doc. 296, at 69-70 (explaining to the jury that it could not “infer from the fact that someone [had] previously been convicted of a crime that they must have committed others in the future” and that it could “use [the] evidence for the purpose for which it [was] admitted to demonstrate,” which was “some
motive for when things happened and for no other purpose“). “[T]he presence of a limiting instruction diminishes the danger of any unfair prejudice arising from the admission of other acts.” United States v. Buckner, 868 F.3d 684, 690 (8th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also Wright, 993 F.3d at 1064 (“[A] jury is presumed to follow all instructions.“). Therefore, because the evidence was probative and the district court issued proper limiting instructions, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence showing that Mink was incarcerated.
VI.
Next, Mink argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged conduct, including evidence that someone vandalized D.B.‘s car, that someone placed putty in L.L.‘s home exhaust pipe, that someone placed a pipe bomb in L.L.‘s sister‘s car, and that someone stole his coworker‘s firearm. According to Mink, this evidence, coupled with the timing of the acts in relation to the charged conduct and their similarity to the same, gave rise to the inference that Mink was the individual behind these acts. Specifically, Mink argues that this evidence constitutes impermissible propensity evidence under
Here, the government asserts that the uncharged conduct is intrinsic to the charges against Mink and is therefore not subject to
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” However, ”
VII.
Next, Mink contends that the district court erred by not dismissing or even questioning the entire venire after a venireperson made prejudicial comments during voir dire, thus violating Mink‘s
attorney moved to dismiss the entire jury pool; the district court summarily denied the request but struck the venireperson from the jury pool for cause.
We review “whether the district court conducted voir dire in a way that protected [a defendant‘s]
Mink relies solely on Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1997), where a venireperson, a social worker, talked extensively before the entire venire about how “she had never, in three years in her position, become aware of a case in which a child had lied about being sexually assaulted,” the crime with which the defendant was charged. Id. at 632. The Ninth Circuit found that given the nature of the venireperson‘s “expert-like” statements, “the certainty with which they were delivered, the years of experience that led to them, and the number of times that they were repeated,” at least one juror had presumably been “tainted” by the statements and had “entered into jury deliberations with the conviction that children simply never lie about being sexually abused,” creating a biased jury. Id. at 633. We rejected a similar comparison to Mach in United States v. Lussier, 423 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2005), where a venireperson made disparaging comments about the defendant‘s witness before the entire venire. See id. at 840 (noting the venireperson‘s statement that the defendant‘s witness “had been a neighborhood nuisance“). There, we found that the remarks were distinct from Mach because they did not pertain to the defendant, much less bear upon his guilt of the crime charged. Id. at 842. We also
noted that the remarks were neither “expert-like nor highly inflammatory” as to cause the same type of prejudicial concerns. Id.
Here, we find Mink‘s case more analogous to the facts present in Lussier. The venireperson‘s comments were not directed at Mink or his guilt but rather Mink‘s counsel. See id.; cf. United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353, 1360-61 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not question jurors individually about possible prejudice arising out of a newspaper article quoting a prosecutor stating that the defense counsel often misled the jury). Further, this vague, isolated comment does not mirror the extensive, expert-like, and highly inflammatory statements at issue in Mach. See Lussier, 423 F.3d at 842. Given the nature of the venireperson‘s comments, which had no bearing on Mink‘s guilt, we find that the district court was under no obligation to further question the venire about the potential impact of the statements. Cf. United States v. Medrano, 925 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2019) (“In general, the district court has substantial discretion in conducting voir dire.“). Further, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the entire venire. See Pendleton, 832 F.3d at 945 (“Requiring the court inflexibly to start over again with a new venire panel every time—regardless of the nature, credibility, brevity, or volume of the statement—is a ‘burden [that] cannot be placed upon the criminal processes and the selection of a jury.‘” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
VIII.
Next, Mink contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury‘s verdict on Counts 6, 14, and 15. Specifically, Mink argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove (1) that Mink fraudulently used a means of identification, an element of Count 6; and (2) that there was an “official proceeding” underway on the dates alleged in the offense, an element
438, 441 (8th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). If the argument turns upon statutory interpretation, “we review the district court‘s statutory interpretation de novo.” Id. (citation omitted).
A.
Mink argues that there was no evidence that he used a “means of identification” because the debit card did not contain information sufficient to identify a specific individual.
Additionally, Mink argues that he did not “use” the means of identification within the meaning of the statute. Relying on United States v. Gatwas, 910 F.3d 362 (8th Cir. 2018), Mink contends that his use of the individual‘s information was merely incidental to the debit card transactions because the debit card did not identify T.S. and the funds were drawn from Mink‘s own bank account. See id. at 368 (noting that
B.
Mink also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on Counts 14 and 15, the witness tampering
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person with intent to . . . cause or induce any person to . . . alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object‘s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Section 1512(c)(2) (Count 15) similarly states: “Whoever corruptly . . . obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years or both.”
“An ‘official proceeding’ includes a proceeding before a federal judge, court, or grand jury, but not a state proceeding.” Petruk, 781 F.3d at 444. Importantly, “the government need not prove that the defendant was aware that the proceeding was federal in nature,” nor does “[t]he official proceeding ‘need [to] be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.‘” Id. (citation omitted). The government must prove merely “that the defendant contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding, and that the contemplated proceeding constituted an ‘official proceeding.‘” Id. at 445. Here, Mink‘s actions—i.e., instructing Stevens to destroy a detonator after law enforcement had searched the house and to sign a false affidavit—by their very nature evince that Mink contemplated criminal liability in a future proceeding. Moreover, when instructing Stevens on the phone to destroy the detonator, Mink expressly acknowledged that the government was building a case against him. And in his letter requesting that Stevens sign the false affidavit, Mink explained how the affidavit would detrimentally affect the government‘s case against him. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdict, we find that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Mink contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding. Accordingly, we find that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict Mink on Counts 14 and 15.
IX.
Next, Mink contends that there were myriad errors in the jury instructions. Specifically, he argues (1) that a mens rea element was omitted from multiple instructions; (2) that the instructions for Count 2 presupposed a factual finding; and (3) that the instructions for Count 3 allowed the same weapon to serve as both the “deadly weapon” for the underlying crime and the “dangerous weapon” for the enhancement. “A challenge to a jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Stanley, 891 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir. 2018). However, because Mink failed to object to these instructions at trial, “this [C]ourt reviews only for plain error.” Id.
“The district court has wide discretion in formulating appropriate jury instructions,” and rarely will “an improper instruction . . . justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.” Stanley, 891 F.3d at 739 (citations omitted). We “will not find error when the jury instruction ‘fairly and adequately submitted the issue[] to the jury‘” and will only reverse when “the ailing instruction by itself so infected the
A.
Mink contends that the district court omitted a mens rea term, specifically “knowingly,” from multiple jury instructions.3 First, he argues that to be convicted of violating
the jury. See United States v. Henderson, 482 F.2d 558, 559-60 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (finding no error in similar jury instructions when the “knowing” requirement was contained in the given definition of “possession“). Accordingly, there was no error.
Next, Mink argues that to be convicted of violating
has failed to show “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that he would have been acquitted.” Id. at 2097.
Next, Mink argues that to be convicted of violating
In conclusion, we find that there were no plain errors in the jury instructions that affected Mink‘s substantial rights.
B.
Next, Mink contends that the district court erred by giving an instruction on Count 2 that presupposed that the vehicle (the red box truck) was a “dangerous weapon,” a finding necessary for an enhanced sentence under
C.
Next, Mink argues that the instructions for Count 3 were erroneous.6 To convict an individual under
harass, or intimidate L.L.; and (3) in doing so, committed or attempted to commit a crime of violence against L.L. To establish that Mink committed or attempted to commit a crime of violence, the government had to prove that Mink committed aggravated battery under Illinois law, which requires a finding that the defendant used a “deadly weapon.” R. Doc. 207, at 9. In order to establish the enhanced sentence under
Mink further relies on a line of Seventh Circuit cases, but those cases are inapposite here as they concern sentencing enhancements specific to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, not mandatory minimum sentence enhancements under the United States Code. See, e.g., United States v. Tenuto, 593 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing a sentencing court‘s inability to use conduct accounted for in a defendant‘s base offense level to additionally enhance the defendant‘s guideline range). Additionally, Mink argues that
Lastly, Mink contends that his conviction on Count 8 must be vacated because the predicate crime of violence alleged in the count is impermissibly broader than the definition of “crime of violence” in
In response, the government requests that Mink‘s sentence be vacated on all counts under the “sentencing package doctrine” so the district court can guarantee that the overall sentencing plan remains adequate. “Under the sentencing package doctrine, we ‘may vacate the entire sentence on all counts so that, on remand, the trial court can reconfigure the sentencing plan to ensure that it remains adequate to satisfy the sentencing factors in
[Mink‘s sentence] remains adequate to satisfy the sentencing factors in [
XI.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Mink‘s conviction on Count 8, affirm his convictions on the remaining counts, vacate Mink‘s entire sentence, and remand for resentencing.7