Lead Opinion
A jury convicted James Fry of five counts of securities fraud, four counts of wire fraud, and three counts of making false statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission, in connection with a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Thomas Petters. The district court
I.
Beginning in approximately 1999, Fry solicited funds from investors and directed them into promissory notes issued by Pet-ters Company, Inc. Fry told investors that the notes would be used to finance purchases of consumer merchandise that would be resold to retailers at a profit. In fact, the Petters Company notes were part of a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Thomas Petters, who was convicted and sentenced in a separate case. See United States v. Petters,
Fry raised money from investors through hedge funds known as the Arrowhead Funds, where he recruited others to assist in perpetrating the fraud. Between 1999 and 2008, the Arrowhead Funds invested over $500 million in Petters Company notes. Beginning around 2001, Fry knowingly misrepresented to investors that the Arrowhead Funds received payment directly from retailers, in genuine transactions, when in fact payment was received only from the Petters Company. Fry also told investors and potential inves
Fry also made false statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission during its investigation of the Arrowhead Funds. Fry falsely denied that he approved several pitch books regarding the Petters Company notes for distribution to investors, and falsely claimed that he instructed an employee not to distribute the books. Fry also lied about his knowledge that retailers were not making payments on the Petters Company notes.
A grand jury charged Fry with securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a) and 77x and 18 U.S.C. § 2, wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2, and making false statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). He proceeded to trial and was convicted on all twelve counts. The district court sentenced Fry to 210 months’ imprisonment, and this appeal followed.
Several other participants in the Petters scheme pleaded guilty to various charges and were sentenced by the same judge. Fry’s appeal is premised in large part on a comparison of his sentence with the punishment imposed on four of these other participants, so a brief summary of their cases is appropriate here.
Gregory Bell was convicted on one count of wire fraud. Bell managed several hedge funds that invested in Petters Company notes. In late 2007, Bell extended the due dates on the Petters Company notes and failed to advise investors that payment had not been received by the original due date. Bell also engineered so-called “round trips,” in which money was shuffled between his investment funds and a Petters Company bank account to create the appearance that the investment funds were receiving payment on the notes. The court found that Bell was responsible under the sentencing guidelines for a loss amount of more than $200 million. Bell pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government. The court sentenced him to seventy-two months’ imprisonment, before Fry was sentenced.
Larry Reynolds was convicted on one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering after assisting Petters in “routing $12 billion in investor funds through Reynolds’s company’s California bank account.” United States v. Reynolds,
David Harrold and Bruce Prevost were Fry’s co-defendants. Harrold and Prevost founded investment funds that solicited money from investors for Petters Company notes, starting in 2002. They falsely represented to investors that payments on the notes were received directly from the retailers and that payments were timely after Fall 2007. Harrold and Prevost traded notes that were close to default against new notes with new payment dates, so they would not have to disclose a
• Harrold and Prevost both pleaded guilty to four counts of securities fraud and cooperated with the government. They were sentenced after Fry. The court sentenced Harrold to sixty months’ imprisonment and gave Prevost a term of ninety months.
At the sentencing hearing for Fry, the government asserted that Fry’s role in the Petters Company scheme was more substantial than the involvement of Harrold, Prevost, and Bell. According to the government, the structure that Fry developed to infuse investor funds into the Petters Company notes was later adopted by Pre-vost and Harrold. With Fry’s knowledge, the prosecution explained, Bell, Prevost, and Harrold copied marketing materials containing misrepresentations about the Petters Company notes that Fry had developed. Fry then lied to the Securities and Exchange Commission and obstructed the investigation of the fraud scheme.
II.
Fry’s only challenge to his convictions concerns two counts of making false statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission. He contends that two of the counts were multiplicitous (ie., that they charged the same offense), and that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids his conviction on both counts. Fry did not present this claim in a pretrial motion, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(ii). Under Rule 12(c)(3), as amended December 1, 2014, a court may consider an issue not timely raised under Rule 12(b)(3) only upon a showing of “good cause,” which requires a showing of cause and prejudice. See Davis v. United States,
Amended Rule 12 applies to pending appeals such as this one where it is “just and practicable.” Order Amending Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2014 U.S. ORDER 0015 (U.S. Apr. 25, 2014) (West-law). Given that Fry failed to raise the issue as required by rule, and at most might have claimed entitlement to plain-error review under former circuit law, compare United States v. Robertson,
Applying amended Rule 12(c)(3), Fry has not shown “good cause” for failing to raise a timely challenge to the multiplicity of the indictment. He claims that the two disputed counts “related to the creation and distribution of pitch books for investments in Arrowhead funds by one individual,” and that the identity between the counts was “not apparent from the face of the indictment.” The third superseding indictment, however, plainly revealed the essence of the two charges. The first count charged Fry with falsely stating that “he never approved the ... pitch books for distribution to investors,” while the second count alleged that “he informed [an employee] that the ... pitch books were inaccurate and he instructed her not to send them to investors.” R. Doc. 181, at 16-17. The indictment gave sufficient notice for
III.
In challenging his sentence, Fry’s lead contention is that this court should presume that the district court vindictively sentenced him in retaliation for his exercise of the right to a jury trial, in violation of the Due Process Clause. Fry complains that he was sentenced to a term of 210 months’ imprisonment after a jury trial, while “similarly situated” participants in the Petters scheme received lesser terms after pleading guilty.
The Supreme Court applied a presumption of vindictiveness in North Carolina v. Pearce,
Positing that a more severe penalty after reconviction would violate due process of law if imposéd as purposeful. punishment for having successfully appealed, the court concluded that such untoward sentences occurred with sufficient frequency to warrant' the imposition of a prophylactic rule to ensure “that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction ... (would) play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial ...” and to ensure that the apprehension of such vindictiveness does not “deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction.... ”
Colten v. Kentucky,
The Court’s decision in Alabama v. Smith,
Smith involved a defendant who first pleaded guilty and received a sentence, but then withdrew his plea, proceeded to trial, and received an increased sentence from the same judge after a reeonviction. Id. at 795-96,
It follows from Smith that no presumption of vindictiveness is warranted in the class of cases where a defendant who is convicted after trial alleges that “similarly situated” defendants who pleaded guilty were sentenced to lesser punishment. Even where the very same person receives a greater punishment after trial than after guilty plea, there is no presumption of vindictiveness. The reasons cited in Smith for rejecting a presumption apply at least as strongly when a defendant complains about a disparity of sentences imposed on two different people. A sentencing judge likely has more information about an offender who proceeds to trial than about a defendant who pleads guilty. And guilty pleas — as they conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources and often represent an expression of remorse and acceptance of responsibility by the defendant — provide a legitimate reason for leniency that is not present in the case of a defendant convicted after trial. Brady v. United States,
The case against presuming vindictiveness is even stronger where a court is asked to compare sentences involving different defendants. “It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate', sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.” Koon v. United States,
Fry relies on two decisions of other circuits to support a presumption of vindictiveness where a sentencing judge imposes greater sentences for a defendant convicted after trial than for a defendant in a related case who pleads guilty. See United States v. Mazzaferro,
No presumption of vindictiveness applies, and Fry does not advance a claim of actual vindictiveness on this record. There was no violation of the Due Process Clause.
IV.
Fry also claims that the district court committed procedural error at sentencing by failing to consider sufficiently the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), and by failing adequately to explain the sentence. Fry did not object on these grounds in the district court, so we review under the plain-error standard. United States v. Jones,
A district court need not “categorically rehearse the § 3353(a) factors on the record,” or “make specific findings on the record about each § 3353(a) factor.” United States v. Deegan,
There was no obvious procedural error at Fry’s sentencing. The district court specifically discussed the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and even assumed that it was required to consider disparities among co-conspirators. The court acknowledged Fry’s arguments on that point, and listed the nine defendants previously sentenced in related cases, but remarked that “it’s hard to match people,” and that “all of these individuals are different.” R. Doc. 355, at 36. The court explained that the amount of loss attributable to each defendant did not necessarily dictate the appropriate sentence, and concluded that the differences among sentences were not unwarranted because “there is a wide disparity here”— meaning the various defendants were situated differently. Id. at 38. The court thus explicitly responded to Fry’s argument and considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.
Fry also complains that the district court failed to consider the need to avoid sentencing disparities with Prevost and Harrold. But these two offenders were sentenced after Fry, and the court at Fry’s
The court’s explanation for the sentence was not plainly inadequate. The court cited the statutory factors of § 3553(a) and highlighted particular concerns with Fry’s offense conduct: that he lied to the Securities and Exchange Commission, withheld information from his investors, and withheld information about the criminal record of a confederate'—-thereby extending' the scheme and causing more losses than would have been incurred if he had been truthful and forthright. Under a plain-error standard, there was sufficient explanation on the record to show that the court considered the arguments of the parties and exercised reasoned judgment.
Fry also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, a matter we review under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
At sentencing, the court found that Fry was responsible for a total loss of approximately $130 million inflicted on at least forty-four victims. The court found several aggravating circumstances: that Fry was an organizer or leader of extensive criminal activity, USSG § 3Bl.l(a), that he obstructed justice by lying to the Securities and Exchange Commission during its investigation, id. § 3C1.1, that he committed the offense as a registered broker or investment adviser, id. § 2Bl.l(b)(19), and that a substantial part of the fraudulent scheme was committed from outside the United States through a fund that was based in Bermuda. Id. § 2Bl.l(b)(10)(B). Fry scored in criminal history category II based on a prior conviction for driving while intoxicated and his commission of the instant offense while on probation. Id. § 4Al.l(c)-(d).
The court computed an advisory guideline sentence of 1440 months’ imprisonment, but varied downward considerably and arrived at a final sentence of 210 months. Where a court sentences the defendant below the advisory range, it is unlikely that the court abused its discretion in not varying downward still further. United States v. McKanry,
Fry augments his contention by comparing his sentence with those of other participants in the Petters scheme. Most courts say that the statutory direction to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), refers to national disparities, not differences among co-conspirators. See United States v. Grigsby,
In any event, disparate sentences among dissimilar defendants are not unwarranted. The four comparators proffered by Fry pleaded guilty and accepted responsibility, thus earning leniency that justified differential treatment. They also cooperated with the government, another factor that warranted favorable consideration in their sentences. The court reasonably could have determined that Fry’s offense conduct was more serious than the others. He was convicted on nine counts of fraud, as compared to four each for Prevost and Harrold, and one each for Reynolds and Bell. There was a básis to conclude that Fry developed elements of the fraud scheme that were then employed by the others. Unlike the comparators, Fry also was convicted of making false statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission, a factor that the district court cited in explaining why a substantial term of imprisonment was appropriate. We are not convinced by comparisons to other participants in the Petters scheme that Fry’s sentence was substantively unreasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I concur with respect to the majority’s decision denying Defendant-Appellant James Fry’s (Fry) claim under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because of the absence of “good cause” for failing to make a timely challenge. But I dissent as to Fry’s 210-month (17 ]é-year) heavy sentence. In my view, Fry’s sentence lacks a proper legal basis and is, instead, based solely on the personal opinion of the sentencing judge without a proper analysis under 18 U.S.C; § 3553(a).
Many courts and commentators state the Guidelines related to fraud convictions do not present a reasonable starting point for sentencing.
Because of the lack of guidance provided by the Guidelines, the sentencing judge was left to fashion a sentence under section 3553(a).
The Supreme Court states that when a sentencing judge makes a departure from the Guidelines range, the sentencing judge “must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall,
As previously noted, the sentencing judge imposed a 210-month (17 /¿-year) sentence while failing to analyze any of the section 3553(a) factors except the “nature and circumstances of the offense.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). In so doing, the sentencing judge imposed a much harsher sentence than received by other individuals involved in the same fraudulent scheme. Most notably, the same sentencing judge imposed a 60-month (5-year), 72-month (6-year), 90-month (7/¿-year), and 130-month (almost 11-year) sentence on 4 other members of the same fraudulent scheme without meaningfully explaining why Fry’s crime warranted a more serious punishment. In the absence of an explicit analysis of the section 3553(a) factors, this Court is left guessing as to the reasoning and motives of the sentencing judge for imposing this punishment. Thus, I would hold the sentencing judge was required, and failed, to hand down a “well-reasoned sentence, and to do so in a fashion that demonstrated that the defendant received the individual consideration due to him under [section] 3553(a).” See Spencer,
Fry also makes a compelling argument that we should presume the sentencing judge imposed a vindictive sentence. Fry asserts that vindictiveness should be inferred because his sentence is significantly higher than other similarly-situated defendants who did not exercise their right to trial. To support this claim, Fry cites United States v. Mazzaferro,
Remand in cases like Mazzaferro and Capriola is appropriate because, in the absence of some inference of vindictiveness when a sentencing judge imposes disparate sentences among co-defendants without explanation, “retaliatory motivation [is] ... extremely difficult to prove in any individual case.” North Carolina v. Pearce,
The disparity in sentences between Fry and other members of the fraudulent scheme should concern this Court. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
Here, there is anecdotal evidence that Fry was given a heavier sentence because he exercised his right to trial by jury. The anecdotal evidence comes in the form of lighter sentences imposed by the- same judge on individuals involved in the same fraudulent scheme who elected not to exercise their right to trial by jury. Without a well-reasoned analysis for this disparity by the sentencing judge, we have little, if any, evidence to determine whether vindictiveness actually occurred. We also place Fry in the precarious position of attempting to prove vindictiveness when, I believe, we should await a more robust analysis by the sentencing judge before reaching the issue.
I add another observation to the ruling in this case. Using poker verbiage, the majority gives prosecutors yet another “hole card”
In sum, the heavy sentence imposed upon Fry was made without reference to any Guideline and .without a thorough analysis under section 3553(a). Without a reasoned analysis under section 3553(a), we are not left with a sufficient explanation of Fry’s sentence to allow for “meaningful appellate review.” See Gall, 552 .U.S. at 50,
. This is yet another example that “our sentencing system is broken and a new approach must be taken.” United States v. Noriega,
. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides that a court "shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the purposes of sentencing. (Emphasis added). To determine the proper sentence/ a sentencing judge is required to consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines— (i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) ], subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress ...; and (ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(3) ], taking into account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress ...;
(5) any pertinent policy statement—
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) ], subject to any amendments made to such policy statement by act of Congress ...; and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
. I have repeatedly urged the members of this Court to change our precedent that sentencing judges are not required to make specific findings on the record about each section 3553(a) factor. See Spencer,
. The majority dismisses the persuasive authority of both Mazzaferro and Capriola, concluding the Supreme Court’s analysis in Alabama v. Smith,
Most importantly, however, I disagree with the majority that the reasoning in Mazzafeiro and Capriola is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith. In Smith, the Supreme Court “clarified that a presumption of vindictiveness only arises where there is a reasonable likelihood that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” United States v. Anderson,
. A "hole card” is defined as "a hidden advantage or undisclosed resource.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary 680 (4th ed.2007).
