United States v. Board of Directors of Special School District No. 1, Minneapolis Public SchoolsUnited States v. Board of Directors of Special School District No. 1, Minneapolis Public Schools
Plaintiff United States of America brings this pattern-or-practice employment-discrimination action against the Minneapolis Public Schools pursuant to its enforcement authority under Section 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See
This matter is before the Court on MPS’s motion to dismiss under
I. BACKGROUND
The United States challenges two provisions in the 2023–2025 CBA between MPS and the Union. One of the challenged provisions did not survive the now-expired CBA, but the other was continued into the successor (and current) CBA.1
The first challenged provision is Article 15, which governs MPS’s procedures for teacher “Transfer, Reassignment, and Recall,” and which was carried over into the current CBA. See generally CBA § 15; Compl. ¶¶ 31–60, 79, ECF No. 2. In general, “[w]hen staff reductions occur” at a particular school, teachers must be “excessed” (i.e.,
But in the spring of 2022, following a three-week teachers’ strike, see Compl. ¶ 20 n.4, MPS and the Union agreed to amend Article 15 to create a race-based exception to this seniority rule, purportedly in an effort “to remedy the continuing effects of past discrimination by the District” that “disproportionately impacted the hiring of underrepresented teachers,” CBA § 15.1.2(i).2 Under this exception, when the teacher next in line for excessing “is a member of a population underrepresented among licensed teachers in the site,” MPS must skip that teacher and instead lay off “the next least senior teacher[] who is not a member of an underrepresented population.” CBA
According to the United States, MPS uses the phrase “underrepresented populations” as “a proxy for a teacher’s race, color, or national origin.” Compl. ¶ 19. MPS does not dispute that “underrepresented” is a proxy for at least race, but it does not seem to know how broadly the term sweeps beyond race. Tr. 7:20–22. For ease of reference, and because MPS struggled at the hearing to answer the Court’s questions about which “populations” were and were not “underrepresented” for purposes of the CBA, the Court will refer to underrepresented teachers as “black” and “overrepresented” teachers as “white.” See id. 5:9–7:14, 12:22–25, 19:25–20:2. Article 15’s exception purports to be temporary, expiring “once the teachers in the District reflect the diversity of the labor market and the community served by the District.” CBA § 15.1.2(i). At the hearing, however, MPS also struggled to answer the Court’s questions about the meaning and impact of this language.
The second challenged provision is a Memorandum of Agreement (the “MOA”) between MPS, the Union, and Black Men Teach—an organization whose “stated goal is ‘to build and engage a fellowship of Black male educators.’” Compl. ¶¶ 61–62 & n.7. Under the MOA, Black Men Teach “Fellows” (all of whom are presumably black men) could interview for teaching positions at “a partnership elementary school” on a
The complaint pleads two counts, both seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Compl. at 19. Count I alleges that MPS, through Article 15 and the MOA, is engaged in a “pattern or practice of discrimination . . . by classifying or limiting [its] employees based on race, color, or national origin” in violation of Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII. Compl. ¶¶ 79–80;
MPS does not deny that the challenged provisions require it to discriminate in favor of black teachers and against white teachers on the basis of race. See Tr. 30:10–13. It contends, however, that the discrimination is lawful, voluntary, and remedial under United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). See Defts.’ Mem. at 24–28, ECF No. 10; Tr. 30:16–31:8. The Court has its doubts, but the Court need not reach the merits of this
II. ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
1. Standard of Review
MPS first seeks dismissal under
Because MPS submits declarations and exhibits in support of its jurisdictional arguments, the Court construes MPS’s motion as raising a factual challenge. Cf. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 1989) (“A determination of mootness is an intensely factual inquiry.”) (quotation omitted); Glow In One Mini Golf, LLC v. Walz, 37 F.4th 1365, 1372 (8th Cir. 2022) (“[W]e must engage in a fact-specific analysis to determine if the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review.”). The
2. Article III Standing
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and can only hear actual ‘cases or controversies’ as defined under Article III of the Constitution.” Neighborhood Transp. Network, Inc. v. Pena, 42 F.3d 1169, 1172 (8th Cir. 1994); see also
a. Article 15
MPS argues that the United States has failed to allege an injury-in-fact because Article 15’s race-based exceptions have never been applied. See Tr. 6:5–11; Letter, ECF No. 20 (confirming that “the challenged contractual language” has never been “applied to determine whether a teacher was excessed or laid off”). But Article 15 is not a historical artifact or a dormant policy; it is part of a binding contract that currently defines the legal rights of every teacher—black and white—employed by the Minneapolis Public Schools. Under Article 15, white teachers have weaker seniority rights than black teachers. See Tr. 38:10–25. This disparity does not spring into existence only if excessing occurs. It exists right now—and will continue to exist as long as the CBA remains in force.
MPS’s citation to out-of-district authority is instructive only by contrast. In United States v. City of Tampa, the city had repealed its allegedly discriminatory parental-leave policy five years before the government sued, and there was no evidence that the city was under any legal obligation to resume the discarded policy. 739 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1064–65 (M.D. Fla. 2024). Here, MPS made a legally enforceable promise, and the United States alleges a concrete, presently existing disparity in legal rights between
b. Black Men Teach MOA
The Black Men Teach MOA is a different matter. “An actual controversy must exist not only at the time the complaint is filed, but through all stages of the litigation.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2013) (quotation omitted). And a dispute “which became moot before the action commenced” cannot be heard at all. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991); see also Brandywine, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 359 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We can neither declare unconstitutional nor enjoin the enforcement of a provision that is no longer in effect.”). Unlike Article 15, the MOA does not presently have any impact on any teacher—black or white. The MOA expired by its own terms nearly six months before the United States filed its complaint. CBA at 235.
True, the United States seeks only prospective relief—specifically, an injunction prohibiting MPS “from further violating Title VII by implementing” the MOA or by “entering into . . . any contractual provision that is substantially similar . . . in any future
The United States invokes the voluntary-cessation exception to the mootness doctrine, arguing that MPS “voluntarily chose not to renew the agreement” only after “the United States notified [MPS] of its determination that the[] contested terms were unlawful.” Pl.’s Resp. at 24–25, ECF No. 15; see also Jones Decl. ¶¶ 2–4, ECF No. 16; Compl. ¶ 86. Under this exception, courts will “deny the mootness defense to a defendant who may be seeking to ‘engage in unlawful conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared moot, then pick up where he left off, repeating this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful ends.’” LaBatte v. Gangle, 161 F.4th 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91). This argument fails twice over.
Second, even treating the expiration and non-renewal of the MOA as a “cessation,” the exception is still inapplicable. The United States relies on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000), and in particular on the Court’s assertion that “[a] case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. at 189; see also Pl.’s Resp. at 24, ECF No. 15 (also citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 719 (2007)). But the United States ignores more recent cases clarifying that the exception will rarely revive a case when the defendant is a government entity and the
In Kaler, the Eighth Circuit placed the burden on the plaintiff to “show[] that it is ‘virtually certain’ that the [policy] will be reenacted.” Kaler, 14 F.4th at 887 (quoting Teague, 720 F.3d at 977). Here, the record shows that the MOA was not extended, renewed, or replaced, and that the successor CBA contains no similar provision. See Second Miller Decl. Ex. 5, ECF No. 22-1; Tr. 48:18–20 (conceding that “this might be a different case if we had a finalized CBA that didn’t have a renewal”). Against all of this, the United States offers only its observation that “school district proposals and agreements with third parties . . . could be . . . renewed again . . . at some certain point.” Tr. 52:13–19. Speculation about what three parties “could” do “at some . . . point” is a long way from “virtual[] certain[ty].” Kaler, 14 F.4th at 887. Accordingly, the voluntary-cessation doctrine cannot save the United States’s claim.
1. Standard of Review
Returning to the United States’s challenge to Article 15: MPS also seeks dismissal of this claim pursuant to
2. Rule 19(a)
To begin, the Court must determine if the Union is a required party under
(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
This is not a difficult question in this case. The United States does not allege that MPS has applied neutral contract language in a discriminatory way. Rather, it alleges that Article 15 discriminates on its face, asks this Court to declare Article 15 unlawful, and seeks to enjoin any enforcement of Article 15. Courts have long recognized that when a challenge is made to the lawfulness of the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement—as opposed to a particular application of those terms—the union is a required party. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 73 F.R.D. 467, 469 (D. Minn. 1977) (concluding that joinder was required when allegedly discriminatory practices “may be embodied in provisions of the collective bargaining agreements which were negotiated by and between [the defendant] and the two unions” and it was “clear that at least some of the relief which the plaintiffs seek may affect the rights and interests of the unions”); Ware v. City of Buffalo, 186 F. Supp. 2d 324, 330 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Obviously the union, as the bargaining representative of its members, has a great interest in the court’s determination” whether the terms of a
Here, the United States all but admits that the Union has an interest in the CBA. See Tr. 60:16–62:3. The United States could hardly argue otherwise, as the Union is a signatory to both the CBA and the MOA, and the Union’s members are the intended beneficiaries of those agreements. Moreover, it is the Union (not MPS) that holds exclusive-representative status for Minneapolis teachers and is statutorily obligated “to meet and negotiate with” MPS “on behalf of all employees.”
Nonetheless, the United States argues that the Union’s interests are adequately represented by the existing defendants. See Pl.’s Resp. at 28 (“Defendants’ interests in this matter are essentially aligned with the Union’s.”). The Court disagrees. MPS and the Union sit on opposite sides of the bargaining table, and the Court cannot simply trust that one party to a CBA will safeguard the interests of the other party.
Finally, the United States suggests that even if the Union has an interest, that interest is not protectable because the Union has no right to preserve “illegal” contractual provisions and, in any event, the challenged provisions are severable from the rest of the CBA. Pl.’s Resp. at 27–31. Both arguments put the cart before the horse. While the Union has no right to include unlawful provisions in a CBA, it has every right to be heard about whether a provision is unlawful. And the Union’s interest in being heard
As to
3. Rule 19(b)
a. Feasibility of Joinder
Because the Union is a required party under
This transfer created an anomaly: The EEOC—which alone had authority to bring pattern-or-practice suits—did not have authority to sue government entities. See Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 592 F.2d at 1091–92. Effectively, then, Congress insulated government entities from pattern-or-practice suits. To resolve this anomaly, President Jimmy Carter submitted Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978 to Congress, thereby “transferr[ing] to the Attorney General any authority the EEOC may have assumed in 1974 to bring [pattern-or-practice] suits against public employers.” Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 592 F.2d at 1091–92; see also Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 5, 92 Stat. 3781; compare
More fundamentally, the United States never explains how its “non-liability party” proposal would work, and it struggled to answer the Court’s questions about its proposal at the hearing. See Tr. 64:22–67:17. If the Union could not be bound by the Court’s judgment, then its joinder would presumably accomplish nothing because MPS would still be subject to inconsistent legal obligations.
b. Equity and Good Conscience
The Court must therefore determine whether, in “equity and good conscience,” this case should proceed without the Union.
The first three factors mitigate in favor of dismissal for many of the reasons discussed above. With respect to prejudice, the Court has already concluded that the Union’s absence would, as a practical matter, impair its ability to protect its bargained-
With respect to the adequacy of judgment: Adequacy in this context refers not to the satisfaction of the plaintiff’s claims, but to the public’s interest “in the efficient administration of justice and the avoidance of multiple litigation.” Pimentel, 553 U.S. at 870 (quotation omitted). Any judgment in this case would disserve the public interest for the reasons already explained: A judgment binding MPS alone could leave it subject to conflicting court-ordered and contractual obligations, while the Union—unbound by any judgment—would be free to relitigate the lawfulness of Article 15. Thus, proceeding without the Union “would not further the public interest in settling the dispute as a whole because [the Union] would not be bound by the judgment in an action where [it was] not [a] part[y].” Id.
Only the final factor—whether the United States has an adequate alternative remedy—gives the Court pause. As explained at the hearing, the Court has grave
First, when the “prejudice to the absent entit[y]” is sufficiently serious, the Supreme Court has endorsed dismissal under
Second, any lack of remedy for the United States is the direct result of decisions made by Congress. The United States may be correct that the Court’s holding could shield discriminatory provisions of a public employer’s CBA from a pattern-or-practice attack. But through the 1972 Amendments and the 1978 Reorganization Plan, Congress placed private entities—including labor organizations—beyond the reach of the
Finally, any discrimination wrought by Article 15 can be challenged, because any aggrieved teacher may file a charge with the EEOC. See Tr. 68:23–69:21 (conceding that the government would “have other ways to attack the allegedly illegal provisions of the CBA,” such as a Section 706 claim, but arguing that “would be . . . in a totally different context”). As the Court has explained, Article 15 presently harms white teachers even though MPS has not yet laid off a more-senior white teacher in place of a less-senior black teacher under its provisions. Id. 20:3–14. And, of course, if Article 15 is ever implemented, the more-senior white teacher who is laid off because of her race can file a charge with the EEOC. In effect, the only “remedy” the United States loses as a result of the Court’s ruling is its preferred vehicle for enforcement—that is, a pre-enforcement, facial attack on the terms of a CBA, brought without any charging party.
The United States responds that “dismissal would allow the plainly racial classifications [in the CBA] to remain, which would be severely prejudicial to the United States and the public interest in the fair enforcement of civil rights law under Title VII.” Pl.’s Resp. at 28. Once again, the cart precedes the horse. MPS concedes that Article 15’s classifications are discriminatory, but it strongly disputes whether that
For these reasons, the Court concludes that this action cannot proceed “in equity and good conscience” without the Union.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
- Defendants’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 8] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART.
- Plaintiff’s complaint [ECF No. 2] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and12(b)(7) .
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: August 10, 2026
/s/ Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz
United States District Judge