UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. BERNANDINO GAWALA BOLATETE
No. 18-14184
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
September 29, 2020
D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00240-HES-JBT-1
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus BERNANDINO GAWALA BOLATETE, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
(September 29, 2020)
Before BRANCH, LUCK, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
At 70 years old and in failing health, Bernandino Bolatete decided that his last act on this Earth would be one of hatred and violence. He made plans to climb to the top of a tower at a mosque in Florida and shoot innocent Muslims. He had an arsenal of rifles to carry out the attack and knew how to use them. Fortunately, someone overheard Bolatete talking about his plans and reported him to law enforcement. An undercover detective gained Bolatete‘s trust, confirmed that he planned to attack the mosque, and then sold him an unregistered firearm silencer. Because possessing an unregistered silencer is a federal crime, Bolatete was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to prison where he is today.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
In late 2017, the Jacksonville Sheriff‘s Office received a tip that Bolatete was planning to commit a mass shooting at a local mosque. The person who provided the tip said that Bolatete had just been given some “bad news” about the condition of his one remaining kidney and would have to start dialysis soon. She reported that Bolatete was going to time the mass murder for when he otherwise would have had to start dialysis; apparently, he did not plan on surviving his crime.
A Sheriff‘s Office detective with a long resumé of undercover work was assigned to investigate. The detective‘s plan was to take on an undercover persona as a Muslim-hating gun enthusiast named “Drew” and gain Bolatete‘s trust so he could find out if he was serious about killing Muslims at the mosque. The detective introduced himself as Drew at the liquor store where Bolatete worked, and the two of them bonded over their “shared” hatred of Muslims and love of guns.
Less than two weeks after the detective and Bolatete met, they went to a shooting range together. The detective drove Bolatete to the range in a car that had been wired to covertly record video and sound. Their route took them by the mosque that Bolatete had planned to attack, and as they drove by, the detective made a comment about the mosque. That passing comment was all it took to get Bolatete to start sharing his violent plans.
Bolatete pointed out a tower near the mosque and said that was where he was “planning to stay” after his kidney doctor told him it was time to start dialysis. By “stay,” he meant that he would go up the tower and start “shooting those Muslims” until the police killed him. Bolatete said that he wanted to “try a Christian doing [a] terroristic . . . act this time . . . to the Muslims,” because Muslims were “doing it all the time.” The detective asked Bolatete: “You[‘re] just going to climb up in the tower and —” Bolatete answered that yes, he was just going to “go up to the tower and start shooting.” He laughed and asked his new friend: “[I]t will be great, right?”
Even though Bolatete was laughing, his plan was no joke. He explained that he had already gone onto the mosque property to scope out the tower and make sure he could get in it. He had learned that the best day to carry out the attack would be a Friday, when Muslims attend religious services. And he had an arsenal of five rifles, including an AR-15 assault rifle, that he could use to carry out the attack. He told the detective that his next kidney appointment was less than a month away. Time was running out.
Over the next ten days, the detective and Bolatete exchanged text messages and spent more time together, and Bolatete twice steered their conversation toward firearm silencers.1 The first time he mentioned silencers was while the detective was driving him home from a second trip to the shooting range together. The two men were talking about the availability of automatic weapons in the United States compared to the Philippines, where Bolatete
The second time Bolatete brought up silencers was at the liquor store when the detective visited him on November 20. As part of his undercover story, the detective told Bolatete that he and his boss had done some electrical work for a Muslim client who had refused to pay them, costing his boss $30,000. Bolatete responded that the “only thing to do is, uh, shoot him somewhere.” He recounted that there had been “one asshole like that in, um, in the Philippines,” and he had settled their differences by shooting the man with a .22 caliber pistol equipped with a silencer. Bolatete suggested that the detective and his boss could do something similar to deal with their problem client. He advised that they should “study [the client‘s] movements” and “hit” him in a rough part of town. He also recommended taking the client‘s wallet after the hit so that it looked like a robbery gone wrong.
Because Bolatete had mentioned silencers twice, the detective decided to gauge his interest in buying one. The next time they went to the shooting range, on November 24, the detective brought a rifle that had a silencer attached. His story was that he had borrowed the rifle and silencer from a friend who was in financial trouble and needed to sell all of his guns. He told Bolatete that his friend was selling the rifle for $300 or $400.
After they shot the rifle together, Bolatete told the detective that $300 would be a good price, especially if it included the silencer. The detective offered to buy the silencer from his friend and sell it to Bolatete. Bolatete did not say anything in response to that offer but he nodded and, according to the detective, appeared interested. Bolatete also commented that the silencer was not very silent, that it was much louder than the one that he had on his .22 caliber pistol in the Philippines, and he added that it was louder than it should have been even considering the bigger powder load of a rifle round. His appraisal was not all criticism, though. He did offer his view that the silencer was attached to the rifle very well. Bolatete knew a thing or two about silencers.
During the drive home, Bolatete called a friend of his — another gun enthusiast — and spoke with him in a language that the detective couldn‘t understand. Then he told the detective that according to his friend, $300 for the rifle was a “giveaway price” and if the silencer were included it would be even better. But, Bolatete noted, there was no need for the silencer because they were not going hunting (where a silencer would be useful to avoid scaring off the animals). He also warned the detective that the police were “very hot” on silencers.
During the same drive, the detective offered to help Bolatete with the mosque shooting. That offer, it seems, went too far. Bolatete immediately downplayed the seriousness of his plan, saying that it was just “wishful thinking.” He refused the detective‘s offer of assistance, explaining that the reason he was turning him down was that the detective was healthy, young, and had a child.
Bolatete then started talking about his own family. He said that his eldest son, who had cerebral palsy, had always wanted to see this country, and he wanted to bring him to the United States and let him see it “before I [unintelligible].”2
The detective feared that he had offered too much help too fast and had blown his cover as a result. Frustrated, he called his supervisor. He told him that Bolatete had “no desire to own a silencer,” and that the timeline for the mosque attack had changed because Bolatete wanted to bring his son to the United States first. The detective commented that the only angle they had left was to start sending Bolatete more anti-Muslim rhetoric by text message, “since he says he doesn‘t need a silencer or a rifle or anything like that.”
The detective gave up on selling Bolatete a silencer, but he kept up contact with Bolatete, hoping to learn more about his plans for mass murder. Over the next few days, Bolatete texted the detective twice asking whether he had bought the rifle from his friend. The detective said that his friend was asking $300 for the rifle or $400 for the rifle and silencer, and he was looking into the licensing rules for the silencer.
On November 27 the detective visited Bolatete again at the liquor store. He didn‘t plan to mention the silencer. And he didn‘t have to because Bolatete brought it up, asking the detective if there was “[a]ny solution” yet to the problem of the Muslim client who hadn‘t paid his bill. When the detective said there wasn‘t, Bolatete suggested: “[Y]ou can use the silencer for that guy.” Then Bolatete asked about the rifle. The detective said that he was still researching the registration and licensing rules for the silencer.
Bolatete volunteered: “If I were you, don‘t register the suppressor.” That was the first time either of them had mentioned an unregistered silencer. Bolatete warned that if the detective registered the silencer, the police would be able to search his house without a warrant at any time to inspect the silencer. Then he asked whether the detective‘s friend had any more silencers to sell because he was interested in buying one, but only if it was unregistered.
The detective said that his friend had four or five more silencers and would not care if they went unregistered because he needed the money. Bolatete reiterated that he “[did not] want to have any record about it.” He told the detective that when he arrived in the United States, he had started looking for a silencer right away because he had owned one in the Philippines. He found one for sale at a gun store but was told that he needed a special license to buy it, and one condition of the license was that the police could search his house at any time. That condition was not one Bolatete was willing to agree to.
After that meeting, the detective and Bolatete continued to send text messages back and forth about the unregistered silencer. In one particularly long text message, Bolatete said that he was thinking about putting the silencer on a gun he owned that was also unregistered because “it will be difficult to trace just in case.” He suggested that the right time to “hit” the (fictional) Muslim client would be around the Fourth of July or New Year‘s because the sound of the suppressed gunshots would “easily blend with the sound of the fireworks.” Bolatete warned the detective not to be seen arguing with the client so that the detective wouldn‘t be a “person of
The detective met Bolatete on December 1 in the parking lot of a sporting goods store to sell him the unregistered silencer. After the detective put the silencer in Bolatete‘s car, Bolatete paid him $100, and the two men went inside the store to shop for ammunition. When they left the store, they were met by a swarm of police officers who arrested Bolatete and pretended to arrest the detective.
B. Procedural History
Bolatete was indicted in December 2017 on one count of receiving and possessing an unregistered firearm silencer in violation of
Bolatete‘s Presentence Investigation Report stated that he was a 70-year-old lawful permanent resident of the United States who immigrated here from the Philippines in 2009. The PSR noted that he suffers from high cholesterol, rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes, macular edema, and hypertension. It calculated a base offense level of 18 under
Bolatete objected to the 4-level enhancement under
At sentencing the district court overruled Bolatete‘s objection to the 4-level
II. DISCUSSION
Bolatete raises six issues. He contends that: 1) the National Firearms Act,
A. The Taxing Power Issue
Bolatete‘s first contention is that the National Firearms Act in general, and
The National Firearms Act, and the criminal penalty for violating it, are grounded in Congress’ power to tax. See United States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2009). The Act creates a comprehensive taxation and registration scheme for certain statutorily defined “firearm[s],” which include silencers. See
violating, prohibits any person from “receiv[ing] or possess[ing] a firearm which is not registered to him.” The maximum penalty for violating any provision of the Act, including § 5861(d), is ten years in prison and a $10,000 fine.
According to Bolatete, the National Firearms Act is not a tax but instead a public safety measure thinly disguised as a tax. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 603, 609 (1971) (describing the Act as “a regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety“). Bolatete concedes that a law does not stop being a valid tax measure just because it also serves some other goal besides raising revenue. “[E]very tax is regulatory to some extent.” United States v. Ross, 458 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972)5; see Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 567 (2012) (“[T]axes that seek to influence conduct are nothing new.“). In deciding whether a law is a valid tax measure we take a “practical” approach that does not depend on how the law is labeled. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 565. We consider “whether on its face the tax operates as a revenue generating measure and the attendant regulations are in aid of a revenue purpose.” Ross, 458 F.2d at 1145. Bolatete contends that the tax does not operate as a
revenue generating measure and the attendant regulations are not in aid of a revenue purpose.
He argues that § 5861(d), which is one of the Act‘s “attendant regulations,” see Ross, 458 F.2d at 1145, does not aid any revenue-raising purpose because it punishes the recipient of an unregistered firearm even though the recipient has no obligation or opportunity to pay the transfer tax. He also argues that the Act does not “look[ ] like a tax,” NFIB, 567 U.S. at 563, or operate like one on its face because: the Department of Justice enforces the Act, not the Department of the Treasury or the Internal Revenue Service; the criminal penalties for violating the Act are disproportionately severe for a tax; and the $200 transfer fee has no connection to raising revenue. Bolatete says that the Act exceeds Congress’ power to tax and for that reason violates the Tenth Amendment.6
Generally, we review a district court‘s denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2010). “When a defendant challenges the constitutionality of a statute, however, the review is de novo.” United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1377 n.3 (11th Cir. 2011).
Bolatete‘s contention runs headlong into two decisions that bind us.7 The first decision
The defendant in Ross argued that the transfer tax was unconstitutional as applied to Molotov cocktails because it was a “prohibitory statute” that exceeded Congress’ power to tax. Ross, 458 F.2d at 1145. Our predecessor Court rejected that argument, reasoning that § 5861(d) “is part of the web of regulation aiding enforcement of the transfer tax provision in § 5811.” Id. The Court observed: “Having required payment of a transfer tax and registration as an aid in collection of that tax, Congress under the taxing power may reasonably impose a penalty on possession of unregistered weapons.” Id. The penalty that § 5861(d) imposes on
those who possess and receive certain unregistered firearms is a valid exercise of the taxing power, the Court held, because that penalty “ultimately discourages the transferor on whom the tax is levied from transferring a firearm without paying the tax.” Id.
The second decision that binds us in this matter is Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236. In that case the defendant was charged with, among other things, possessing an unregistered pipe bomb (quite obviously a destructive device) in violation of § 5861(d). See id. at 1241–42. The defendant facially challenged the constitutionality of the National Firearms Act on the ground that it exceeds Congress’ power to tax. Id. at 1245. Relying on Ross, we held unequivocally that “[t]he National Firearms Act is facially constitutional” and that “Congress under the taxing power may reasonably impose a penalty on possession of unregistered weapons.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The defendant also challenged the Act as applied to him because “pipe bombs are unlawful and cannot be taxed.” Id. We rejected that argument as well, explaining that “[t]he unlawfulness of an activity does not prevent its taxation.” Id. at 1245–46 (quotation marks omitted).
Bolatete‘s arguments are clearly foreclosed by Spoerke. It was true when that case was decided, just as it is true now, that the Department of Justice enforces the Act; that the maximum penalty for a violation is ten years in prison; and that the Act imposes only a $200 tax on firearm transfers.9 Yet in Spoerke we upheld
Bolatete insists, however, that he has a way around the Spoerke decision. At oral argument he tried to distinguish it by pointing out that in Spoerke the defendant created the pipe bomb he was charged with possessing and therefore did not “receive” it.10 That means, Bolatete said, that the defendant in Spoerke had no occasion to raise one of the arguments Bolatete raises here: that § 5861(d) does not aid any revenue-raising purpose because it punishes the recipient of an unregistered firearm even though the recipient has no obligation or opportunity to pay the transfer tax.
But that‘s a distinction without a difference. The defendant in Ross, like the defendant in Spoerke, was charged under § 5861(d) for possessing unregistered
firearms, not for receiving them. See Ross, 458 F.2d at 1144. In upholding the defendant‘s conviction in Ross, we did not suggest that the defendant had a chance to pay the transfer tax or that a chance to pay it is required for a § 5861(d) conviction to be valid. See id. at 1144–46. Instead, we held that § 5861(d) is a valid regulation “aiding enforcement of the transfer tax provision in § 5811” because it “discourages the transferor on whom the tax is levied from transferring a firearm without paying the tax.” Id. at 1145. In other words, § 5861(d) aids a revenue-raising purpose even though it punishes possessors and transferees who have no obligation or opportunity to pay the transfer tax themselves. See id. That holding squarely forecloses Bolatete‘s argument.
Even if Bolatete could somehow clear the legal hurdles of Ross and Spoerke, he still could not get over a factual one. Although Bolatete‘s taxing power challenge is both facial and as applied, at oral argument he tried to distinguish from Spoerke only the as-applied aspect of his challenge. To bring a successful as-applied challenge, he would have to show that the Act is “unconstitutional on the facts of [his] particular case.” Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). In this case, Bolatete asked the detective to sell him an unregistered silencer and insisted that there be no paper trail. The evidence establishes that Bolatete would not have registered the silencer he bought, even if he could have. As a result, he cannot defeat the Act‘s application to him on the ground that he never had a chance to register the silencer that he would not have registered anyway or to pay the transfer tax that he would not have paid anyway.
Because Bolatete‘s taxing power challenge is contrary to our precedent and unsupported by the facts of this case, we reject it.
B. The Unpreserved Constitutional Challenges
Bolatete raises two constitutional issues for the first time on appeal. We review only for plain error a district court‘s failure to rule without a motion that a statute is unconstitutional. See United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001). To prevail under plain error review, Bolatete must show that the district court made an error, that the error was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005). If he carries that burden, we have discretion to reverse the district court‘s judgment, but only if “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
1. The “Fee Jurisprudence” Issue
The first unpreserved constitutional issue comes in Bolatete‘s challenge to the National Firearms Act based on the Supreme Court‘s “fee jurisprudence” cases. In a pair of decisions in the 1940s, the Supreme Court held that the government “may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal
constitution,” Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 (1943), although it may collect a fee to defray administrative costs associated with the exercise of a constitutional right, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576–77 (1941). Those principles are most often applied in the First Amendment context. See, e.g., Fly Fish, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, 337 F.3d 1301, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “a licensing fee on adult entertainment establishments is controlled by Cox and Murdock and must be reasonably related to recouping the costs of administering the licensing program“). Bolatete argues that we should apply the principles of those two administrative fee decisions to the
Bolatete contends that he preserved this issue for de novo review here when he argued to the district court that the Act exceeds Congress’ taxing power because it is not actually a tax; his theory is that argument implicitly “encompasse[d] his alternative argument . . . that even if the [Act] is a tax, it is an unconstitutional tax.” But constitutional challenges are not all-encompassing, they are not interchangeable, and one does not serve as a placeholder for others. Attacking a statute on one ground in the district court does not entitle a litigant to de novo review of an attack on another ground in a court of appeals.
At no point in his motion to dismiss the indictment did Bolatete mention Murdock, Cox, the
Bolatete‘s contention can‘t meet the strictures of plain error review. Our Court has not decided whether it is appropriate to apply the fee jurisprudence of Murdock and Cox in the context of
2. The Second Amendment and Silencers Issue
The second constitutional issue Bolatete offers up for the first time in this appeal is his claim that the
The Supreme Court has held that the
Once again, the strictures of plain error review defeat his belated contention. See Lange, 862 F.3d at 1296. Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever held that silencers are “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. In fact, neither Court has ever decided the preliminary question of whether silencers are “Arms” for
C. The Entrapment Defense
Bolatete also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury‘s finding that he was not entrapped. “We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the verdict‘s favor.” United States v. Deason, 965 F.3d 1252, 1262 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).
The defense of entrapment has two elements: “(1) government inducement of the crime; and (2) lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant.” United States v. Sistrunk, 622 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). The defendant bears the initial burden of production on inducement, which is a legal question for the court to decide. Id. at 1332–33; United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2002). If the defendant meets his burden by showing “some evidence” of inducement, the burden shifts to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. See Ryan, 289 F.3d at 1343. Unlike inducement,
The inducement element of the entrapment defense was not disputed at trial: the government agreed with Bolatete that the jury should be instructed on entrapment, and it was. Because the defense was submitted to and rejected by the jury on the predisposition issue, “our review is limited to deciding whether the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant was predisposed to take part in the illicit transaction.” United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 622 (11th Cir. 1995). “[T]he predisposition inquiry is a purely subjective one which asks the jury to consider the defendant‘s readiness and willingness to engage in the charged crime absent any contact with the government‘s officers or agents.” Id. at 624.
Bolatete argues that no reasonable jury could have found, as the one in this case did, that he was predisposed to buy an unregistered silencer. He focuses on his initial refusal to buy a silencer. When the detective first offered to sell one, Bolatete did not explicitly accept or reject the offer but instead criticized the silencer they were test firing. Then in the car he said that there was “no need” for the detective to buy a silencer with the rifle because they were not going hunting, and he warned that the police were “very hot” on silencers. After the car ride Bolatete told the detective not once but twice that he did not need a silencer for the mosque shooting. The detective clearly got the message. He called his supervisor afterward and reported that Bolatete had “no desire to own a silencer” and “sa[id] he doesn‘t need a silencer or a rifle or anything like that.”
Those facts are favorable to Bolatete. So much so that if he had continued with that attitude and conduct, Bolatete could not have been charged, much less convicted, for receiving and possessing an unregistered silencer. But there was other evidence, enough of it that a reasonable jury could find that Bolatete was predisposed to receive and possess an unregistered silencer.
During the investigation, Bolatete was the first person to bring up silencers, and he showed more than once that he knew a lot about them. He told the detective that he had owned a silencer in the Philippines and had used it to shoot someone with whom he had a dispute. When Bolatete arrived in the United States, he had immediately started looking for a silencer.
During his conversations with the detective, Bolatete was the first one to mention an unregistered silencer. That fact matters. Owning a silencer generally is not a crime, but owning an unregistered silencer is. It was Bolatete who suggested out of the blue that the detective should not register the silencer he was buying from the friend. And it was Bolatete who said, without being prompted, that he too wanted to buy a silencer from the detective‘s friend if, but only if, it was unregistered. He said that he didn‘t buy a silencer when he first came to the United States because he thought that registering it would give the police authority to search his home at will and without a warrant.
Based on all of the evidence, a reasonable jury could have found, as the one in this case did, that Bolatete was ready and willing to buy an unregistered silencer “absent any contact with the government‘s officers or agents.” Brown, 43 F.3d at 624.
D. The Sentencing Issues
Bolatete raises two issues involving his sentence. First, he contends that the district court erred by imposing an enhancement under
Second, Bolatete contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence only for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). A district court abuses its discretion and imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence when it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). We will vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable only if we “are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
Bolatete argues that the court failed to consider two factors that it should have: his age and failing health. And, he asserts, it committed a clear error of judgment by overemphasizing the deterrence and protection of the public factors.
Finally, he argues that the degree of the court‘s variance from the guidelines range was excessive.
The district court didn‘t fail to consider Bolatete‘s age and health. The court expressly stated that it had taken into account his age and health, which is why it did not grant the government‘s request for a statutory maximum sentence. See Doc. 93 at 15 (“I‘ve taken into consideration the Defendant‘s age, the Defendant‘s health. And I think that ten years was too much.“). As for the weight it gave to deterrence and protection of the public, that was a matter within the court‘s discretion. See United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Gomez, 955 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2020) (“In fashioning a sentence, the district court enjoys discretion to give greater weight to one or more factors than to the others.“); United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2020) (“When it comes to weighing the
The court based the 60-month sentence on “what went on between [Bolatete] and the undercover officer,” and those goings-on gave the court plenty of reasons to be concerned about public safety and deterring Bolatete and others like him from committing future crimes. Bolatete told
Finally, the extent of the variance imposed by the district court was reasonable even without considering the
For all of those reasons, a 60-month sentence is reasonable in light of the need to protect the public and to deter Bolatete from committing future crimes.
Given the sentencing judge‘s statement that he would have imposed the same sentence anyway, the issue involving the
III. CONCLUSION
Bolatete‘s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.