UNITED STATES v. NOAH KANAYE BAUER
Case No. 25-cr-00079-AMO-1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 2, 2025
Re: Dkt. No. 22
I. BACKGROUND
A. September 6, 2024 Stop and Arrest
On September 6, 2024, at approximately 4:16 pm, the Brentwood Police Department (“BPD“) 911 emergency line received two calls regarding someone with a gun at the Raley‘s supermarket. Both calls were recorded.
In the first call, someone reported that he was calling from the Raley‘s in Brentwood and that one of his managers had seen “a couple of guys in the aisle” with a gun. See Kane Decl., Ex. 1. The 911 operator asked to speak to the employee who had seen the two individuals with the gun. Id. The second speaker reported that he saw a gun “for sure,” that they had it “in their
In the second 911 call, an individual reported that his wife was at the Raley‘s grocery store and that there were “two guys” inside with a gun. See Kane Decl., Ex. 2. The caller reported that his wife had seen the gun and that one of the individuals “racked the slide back.” Id. The caller relayed the description from his wife as he spoke with her on another line. Id. She described two white guys, lean build, early twenties. Id. The caller relayed that they were last seen on aisle six and that she had reported what she observed to the employees at the store. Id. The caller also reported that he was an Oakley police officer and gave a callback number. Id.
BPD 911 dispatch immediately relayed a message regarding the calls to Brentwood Police Officers Esperanza Rojas and Jason Fish. See Kane Decl., Ex. 3 (BPD 911 Dispatch Communication); Rojas Decl. ¶ 3; Fish Decl. ¶ 3. Officer Rojas was finishing a traffic stop across the street from the Raley‘s store, so she arrived at the store almost immediately following the call. Rojas Decl. ¶ 3. Officer Fish arrived just after her. Fish Decl. ¶ 3. At the front of the store, Officers Rojas and Fish encountered a Raley‘s employee wearing a name tag with the name “Noe,” who reported that “they” were not being threatening but that a “couple” of customers and employees had seen them and that they were feeling “uneasy.” Rojas Decl. ¶ 4; Fish Decl. ¶ 4. Noe also said that they could “see it through the shirt,” that “they were on aisle 5,” and “one of them was wearing a blue shirt.” Id.
Officers Rojas and Fish then entered the Raley‘s store, with their weapons holstered, and they walked toward aisle five to look for the two individuals with the firearm. Rojas Decl. ¶ 6; Fish Decl. ¶ 6. Both officers knew that it was a violation of California law to carry a concealed weapon without a permit. Id. When Officers Rojas and Fish turned down aisle five, they could
The officers began walking both individuals out of the store. See Rojas Decl. ¶ 9; Fish Decl. ¶¶ 9-12; Ex. 4 at 2:20-2:50; Ex. 5 at 1:22-2:05. Officer Fish led the man who had possessed the firearm and who they later learned was Noah Bauer, while Officer Rojas led Caleb Bauer, who they later learned was his brother. Id. Officer Fish paused to check the firearm he had removed from Noah Bauer‘s waistband. Fish Decl. ¶ 10. He could see and feel that the frame felt light, as if it were made of plastic. Id. Officer Fish removed the magazine, which appeared to be an authentic Glock-style magazine, and he also racked back the slide, which appeared to be made of metal and felt more substantial. Id. Neither the chamber nor the magazine contained any ammunition. Id. As they were walking out of the store, one of the individuals asked what they were “being arrested for.” Officer Fish told them that they were being detained. Fish Decl. ¶ 11.
While Bauer was seated in the vehicle, still outside the grocery store, Officer Fish used his BPD-issued Miranda card to read Bauer his rights. Fish Decl. ¶ 14; see also Ex. 5 at 6:20-8:10. After he read each right, he asked Bauer if he understood, and Bauer nodded his head. Id. At one point Officer Fish said to him “you‘re nodding your head yes” and Bauer did not respond. Id. After reading Bauer his rights, Officer Fish informed him that he was in the car, detained, because he had a gun in his waistband while walking around. Fish Decl. ¶ 15. When asked whose gun it was, Bauer did not respond. Id. Officer Fish informed him again that he did not have to talk if he did not want to, but that it was his time to tell his side of the story. Id. Again, Bauer did not respond. Id. Officer Fish asked, “do you not want to talk?” and Bauer shook his head without looking at Officer Fish. Id. Officer Fish informed Bauer that he was under arrest because it is illegal in the state of California to have a firearm without a serial number on it. Id.
Meanwhile, while Caleb Bauer was seated in her BPD vehicle, Officer Rojas used her BPD-issued Miranda card to read him his rights. Rojas Decl. ¶ 9; see also Ex. 4 at 7:15-15:16. After she read each right, she asked Caleb Bauer him if he understood, and he answered “yes.” Id. After she read his rights, she asked if he wanted to speak to her and he said “sure.” Id. Caleb Bauer told her that his brother took the gun out while they were in the store to “show it” to him. Id. ¶ 10. He further said that his brother was explaining how the gun works. Id. Caleb Bauer added that, “it‘s not a real gun,” but then said, “I take it back,” and said that Bauer told him that it can “work as a real gun” but that it did not have any ammunition in it. Id. Caleb Bauer told her that Bauer 3D-printed the gun at home. Id.
After Noah and Caleb Bauer were transported to the BPD station, Detectives Goold and Kathain interviewed Caleb Bauer. See Ex. 6 (Caleb Bauer Interview Video); Goold Decl. ¶ 4; Kathain Decl. ¶ 4. The interview began at approximately 6:32 p.m. Id. Detective Goold read Caleb Bauer his Miranda rights. Goold Decl. ¶ 4. Caleb Bauer told the detectives that, while he and his brother were in an aisle of the grocery store, his brother pulled out his gun. Id. He said that his brother was explaining to him how the gun works and how to use it, including how to load it and reload it. Id. He confirmed that Bauer had a 3D printer in his bedroom and had printed the seized firearm. Id. He also said that his brother does not believe that it should be illegal to carry a firearm in public. Id.
Detectives Goold and Kathain then interviewed Bauer. The interview began at approximately 7:18 p.m. See Ex. 7 (Noah Bauer Interview Video) at 1:20-15:35; Goold Decl. ¶ 5; Kathain Decl. ¶ 5. Detective Goold began the interview by reading Bauer his Miranda rights. Id. Detective Goold informed Bauer that it was illegal to carry a firearm, even an unloaded one, in public in California. Id. Bauer walked the detectives through what happened, noting that the gun he possessed was a “Glock 19” that he had carried the gun in public before. Id. Bauer reported that he had printed the receiver portion of the firearm and that he had obtained the other parts online. Id. He also told the detectives that he had obtained the files to make the frame of the firearm online. Id. Bauer also discussed the content he views online. Id.
Detective Goold told Bauer that the BPD wanted to be able to report that he was not assembling weapons to “sell to the cartel,” or anything similar. See Ex. 7 at 18:10-23:00; Goold Decl. ¶ 6; Kathain Decl. ¶¶ 6-7. Detective Goold explained that he could obtain a search warrant, but that he was “optimistic” that Noah would be willing to walk them through his home to show the detectives the 3D printer, the other frames he had printed, the packaging from the “rails” he purchased, and show that he did not have any other parts or equipment for manufacturing firearms. Id. Detective Goold asked if Bauer would be willing to participate in such a walk through, and Bauer responded, “yes.” Id. Detective Goold explained that they would give him a consent to search form to sign and that it would mean that he was giving consent for the police walk into his
C. Search of Bauer‘s Home
At approximately 8:14 p.m., Detective Goold, Detective Kathain, Detective Bascom, and Officer Rojas arrived and began a warrantless search of Bauer‘s home. See Goold Decl. ¶ 8; Kane Decl., Ex. 8 (Goold Search BWC) at 00:00-1:55; Ex. 9 (Kathain Search BWC) at 00:00-1:25; Ex. 10 (Rojas Search BWC) at 00:00-2:30; Ex. 11 (Bascom Search BWC) at 00:00-1:50. Bauer opened the front door of the home and led them inside. Id. Once inside, Detective Bascom recounted the events from the grocery store to Bauer‘s mother then said that Bauer had admitted to printing firearms with his 3D printer and that he had agreed to walk them through his room, show them what he‘s doing, and for them to make sure that “he‘s not doing anything crazy.” Id. Bauer‘s mother nodded in response and said “okay,” and then led the police to Bauer‘s bedroom and turned on the light. Id. Bauer was behind her. She then moved out of the room into the hallway. Id. Immediately upon entering the bedroom, Detective Goold saw three 3D-printed handgun “receivers” or “frames” on the bed. Id.; Goold Decl. ¶ 9.
Bauer started the computer and sat at the desk. Goold Decl. ¶¶ 13-14; Ex. 8 at 8:10-17:40. He opened the Telegram application and began showing Detective Goold his Telegram channels. Id. Detective Goold asked him to scroll through and show specific channels, and Bauer manipulated the mouse to do so. Id. They discussed some of the content available on Telegram, including neo-Nazi and other extremist content. Id. At one point, after Bauer had sat back in his chair, Detective Goold asked Bauer if he could scroll himself. Id. Without objection or movement from Bauer, Detective Goold began using the mouse. Id. When Detective Goold asked about the content of a particular Telegram channel, Bauer said, “I can show you,” and then resumed use of the mouse himself. Id. Detective Goold asked defendant about the 3D printing program he uses and his “STLs,” which are files used in connection with 3D printing. Id. Bauer said the program was “Cura” and opened the program on the computer. Id. Detective Goold asked Bauer if he could use the mouse and indicated toward the mouse. Id. Bauer again let Detective Goold use the mouse to navigate to the Cura recent files list without objection. Id. He
They returned to his room, where Bauer searched for and found one piece of the auto sear. Goold Decl. ¶ 16; Kane Decl., Ex. 8 at 17:40-18:15. Detective Goold asked if he had the other piece, and he found it nearby. Id. Detective Goold recognized the items as the two pieces of a machine gun conversion device or auto sear. Id.
Detective Goold showed Bauer‘s parents Bauer‘s online activity and explained to them that Bauer had been viewing pro-Nazi, Holocaust denial, and antisemitic content. Goold Decl. ¶ 17; Ex. 8 at 27:35-39:50. He also showed them the 3D printing program on the computer, including the auto sear. Id.
When BPD were finished searching, they seized the 3D printed auto sear, handgun frames, and the 3D printer. Goold Decl. ¶ 18.
D. Search & Seizure Pursuant to March 3 Warrant
On March 3, 2025, Chief Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu signed a search warrant authorizing the search of Noah Bauer‘s home for evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of
On March 5, 2025, FBI agents executed the warrant. Furtado Decl. ¶¶ 4-7; Minor Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. When FBI agents examined a Black Fracta Computer Tower (the “PC“) that was located in the common area of the house, it was powered on, with an open browser showing ChatGPT. Id. The agents observed ChatGPT conversations about, among other things, machinegun conversion devices known as “auto sears” or “Glock switches.” Kane Decl., Ex. 17 (Furtado Aff. ¶ 20). The FBI seized the Windows PC in order to make a forensic image of the device. It was the only item seized pursuant to the warrant. Furtado Decl. ¶ 6. Bauer did not make any statements during the search. Id. ¶ 7. On March 5, 2025, an FBI special agent began the process of creating a forensic image of the PC. Minor Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.
E. Search & Seizure Pursuant to March 10 Warrant
On March 10, 2025, U.S. Magistrate Judge Robert M. Illman signed an additional “rollover” warrant to search the Windows PC already in FBI possession. See Kane Decl., Ex. 18 (“March 10 warrants“). This warrant differed from the previous warrant because it authorized a search for evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of
Also on March 10, 2025, Magistrate Judge Illman signed a search warrant authorizing the search of Noah Bauer‘s home and mobile device for evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of
On the same day, Special Agent Minor connected Bauer‘s mobile phone to a forensic access tool in order to extract the data on his phone. Minor Decl. ¶ 11; Ex. 13 at 4:30-end; Ex. 14 at 4:25-7:05. Special Agent Furtado reviewed the phone data and documented those results. Furtado Decl. ¶ 10.
Both of the March 10, 2025 affidavits detailed similar probable cause as the March 3 warrant regarding defendant‘s manufacture of a firearm and machinegun conversion device. Kane Decl., Ex. 17 (Furtado Aff. ¶¶ 20-23); Ex. 18 (Furtado Aff. ¶¶ 20-23). The affidavits provided additional evidence establishing probable cause as to
Bauer moves to suppress evidence gathered by BPD and the FBI on the basis that law enforcement violated his constitutional rights. After setting forth the relevant legal standards for suppression, the Court considers the asserted constitutional violations in mostly chronological order to determine after what point the Government‘s evidence must face suppression.
A. Legal Standards
Under the exclusionary rule, a criminal defendant may move to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment. United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2014);
1. Fourth Amendment – Search and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
A “search” occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the government invades a place in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Olson v. Cnty. of Grant, 127 F.4th 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). Warrantless searches and seizures violate the Fourth Amendment unless they fall within one of a “few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” City of L.A., Calif. v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 419 (2015) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). “Because warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, the government bears the burden of showing that a warrantless search or seizure falls within an exception to the Fourth Amendment‘s warrant requirement.” United States v. Steinman, 130 F.4th 693, 711 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012)).
2. Fifth Amendment – Miranda Protections
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
B. Initial Stop – Grocery Store
Bauer argues that BPD violated the Fourth Amendment when Officers Fish and Rojas seized him without a warrant at the grocery store on September 6, 2024. “Under the Fourth
As noted above, Bauer argues that the initial stop and detention in the grocery store on September 6, 2024, constituted a warrantless seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment and requires suppression of all fruits of that seizure. See Mot. at 10; Reply at 1-5. The Government responds that the Officers Fish and Rojas had probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest of Bauer based on the information relayed to them from the 911 calls, the information provided in person when they arrived at the grocery store, and their observations of Bauer. See Opp. at 11-12. The Government alternatively argues that BPD Officers Fish and Rojas held reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory or Terry stop of Bauer and his brother in the grocery store based on the facts and circumstances known to them at the time. See Opp. at 12-15 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
When Officer Rojas and I turned down aisle 5, I could see two white males at the end of the aisle. The two males matched the description I had been given. I could see the grip portion of a handgun protruding from the front waistband of one of the males. When he saw us, he lifted his shirt and put it in front of the gun to conceal it, and walked a few steps away from us, then turned and was out of sight for a moment.
Fish Decl. ¶ 7; see also Fryzek Decl., Ex. A (Bauer -001185) (Fish Misdemeanor Report dated 9/6/2024). Officer Fish‘s observation of the grip portion of the gun protruding from Bauer‘s waistband followed by Bauer‘s action to conceal the gun suffices to establish probable cause in support of arrest because carrying a concealed handgun violates California‘s gun laws. See United States v. Vandergroen, 964 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing
Despite Bauer‘s contention of implausibility, Reply at 4, the Court gives due credit to Officer Fish‘s sworn testimony that he saw the gun, particularly where there is no countervailing evidence. See United States v. Job, 871 F.3d 852, 861 (9th Cir. 2017) (giving “significant weight to an officer‘s observation of a visible bulge in an individual‘s clothing that could indicate the presence of a weapon” justifying stop under lesser “reasonable suspicion” standard). Officer Fish‘s observation of such illegal and potentially dangerous activity merited “immediate detention of [the] suspect” to mitigate any threat to public safety. Vandergroen, 964 F.3d at 881 (quoting United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Further, under the “search incident to arrest” exception to the Fourth Amendment, officers making a lawful arrest can conduct a search of both the suspect‘s person, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), and the area within the arrestee‘s “immediate control,” United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2014). Officer Fish searched Bauer incident to and contemporaneous with a lawful arrest. See Fish Decl. ¶ 8 (“I handcuffed him, lifted his shirt, and removed the handgun, which was still in his waistband where I had seen it.“); Rojas Decl. ¶ 8 (“I saw Officer Fish pull a gun from Noah Bauer‘s waistband.“). Therefore, the
C. Interrogations
Bauer moves to suppress any statements he made to law enforcement prior to being given his Miranda warnings. At the outset, the Government represents that it “does not intend to use any statements by defendant prior to Officer Fish‘s reading of the Miranda warnings in its case-in-chief,” rendering this portion of Bauer‘s motion moot. Opp. at 15. The Court accepts this representation and will accordingly preclude any effort by the Government to introduce Bauer‘s pre-Miranda statements in its case-in-chief.
In separate arguments, Bauer challenges two interrogations by BPD following his arrest and Miranda warnings: the interrogation at the BPD station following his arrest and the interrogation during the search of his home. Though the Court‘s discussion of Bauer‘s challenges largely proceeds chronologically in this Order, the Court takes up the interrogation at Bauer‘s home in this section for purposes of addressing the Miranda-based challenges together.
1. Interrogation at Station
Bauer challenges BPD‘s interrogation at the police station on two grounds: (a) BPD did not “scrupulously honor” Bauer‘s invocation of his right to remain silent when he was arrested at the grocery store, and (b) Bauer did not voluntarily waive his right to remain silent. The Court addresses these two arguments in turn.
a. Bauer‘s Invocation
The Government initially argues that there existed no need to scrupulously honor Bauer‘s invocation of his right to remain silent because his invocation, a headshake in response to the question Officer Fish‘s query, “do you not want to talk,” was ambiguous. Not so. As Officer Fish‘s body camera showed, Kane Decl., Ex. 5, and he explained in his declaration, Bauer “nodded his head” repeatedly to indicate he understood his rights, remained silent in response to the officer‘s questions and then “shook his head” when the officer asked, “do you not want to talk.‘” Fish Decl. ¶¶ 14-15. The officer reasonably understood Bauer‘s head shake to mean “no.” Kane Decl., Ex. A, Bates 1185. By nodding his head to indicate understanding, remaining silent
b. Voluntary Waiver
The Government alternatively argues that Bauer, after having invoked his right to remain silent in response to Officer Fish‘s Miranda warnings, voluntarily waived that right following another set of Miranda warnings at the BPD station. Bauer contends that BPD failed to scrupulously honor his invocation of his rights and that any statements made at the BPD station to be suppressed.
It is permissible for police to resume questioning in certain circumstances after an invocation of the right to remain silent. The Supreme Court has “rejected the proposition that its earlier decision in Miranda barred law enforcement officials from ever questioning a suspect after the suspect had invoked his right to remain silent,” in favor of a case-by-case inquiry into all the relevant facts to determine whether the suspect‘s rights have been respected. United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 409-10 (9th Cir. 1988). In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), the Supreme Court imposed a totality of the circumstances standard to assess whether interrogations following an initial invocation of the right to remain silent violated the accused‘s rights, requiring review of factors such as (1) whether a significant amount of time elapsed between the defendant‘s invocation of the right to remain silent and further questions; (2) whether the same officer conducted the interrogation where the defendant invoked the right to remain silent and the subsequent interrogation; (3) whether the defendant was given a fresh set of Miranda warnings before the subsequent interrogation; and (4) whether the subsequent interrogation concerned the same crime as the interrogation previously cut off by the defendant. See Id. at 104-06. The Supreme Court, considering the totality of circumstances, held that the admission of an incriminating statement made after the defendant initially refused to answer questions did not violate Miranda where the police gave full Miranda warnings to the defendant at the very outset of each interrogation, subjected him to only a brief period of initial questioning,
Following Mosley, the Ninth Circuit held in Hsu that a defendant‘s right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored where the defendant asserted their right to remain silent during an initial interrogation, then answered questions during a second interrogation after a second, fresh provision of Miranda warnings. Hsu, 852 F.2d at 411-12. The court reasoned that neither the amount of elapsed time between interrogations, which was about 30 minutes, nor that the suspect was interrogated about the same subject matter, were of primary importance in determining whether a suspect‘s rights were “scrupulously honored” under Mosley. Hsu, 852 F.2d at 410. Rather, Hsu clarified that the Mosley factors are not exhaustive and, focusing on the validity of the second waiver, found “fresh warnings” to be the “most important factor” to readvise the suspect of his Miranda rights, in addition to consideration of “the actual coercion exerted by police upon a suspect in order to extract information.” Id. at 410, 411. Since Hsu, the Ninth Circuit has not established a per se rule requiring a suspect be readvised of their rights after the passage of time or changed circumstances. See United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1130 (9th Cir.), amended, 416 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that statements made on the second day of questioning, 16 hours after original Miranda warnings, were sufficiently close in time that no readvisement was required).
Here, Bauer nodded his head to confirm that he understood his Miranda rights as read by Detective Fish, and then he remained silent in conformity with those rights, further demonstrating that he understood his right to remain silent. Fish Decl. ¶ 14. Indeed, Bauer made clear that he intended to remain silent by shaking his head in the negative in response to Officer Fish‘s query, “do you not want to talk?” Fish Decl. ¶¶ 14-15. Officer Fish cut off questioning after Bauer‘s head shake in the car. Fish Decl. ¶ 15; Kane Decl., Ex. 5 at 2:40-3:45. Approximately two hours later, Detective Goold then re-advised Bauer of his rights before interviewing him at the station in the detectives’ interview room. Kane Decl., Ex. 7 at 11:15-1:45; Goold Decl. ¶ 5; cf. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 98 (finding the passage of two hours between initial invocation of right to remain silent and subsequent interrogation sufficient to honor accused‘s initial invocation). When Detective
Bauer emphasizes that several factual considerations weigh against a knowing and voluntary waiver in this case, including his “youth; his inexperience with the criminal-justice system; his being under arrest; his having been held in custody for several hours; his being in an interrogation room with two officers between him and the door; BPD‘s minimizing the conduct it was investigating; and the absence of a written or verbal acknowledgement of understanding or waiver of his rights.” Reply at 9. But none of these, alone or in combination, amount to coercion on the part of BPD or even an inference that the officers sought to “wear down [Bauer‘s] resistance and make him change his mind” about remaining silent. See United States v. Olof, 527 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1975). By willingly answering Detective Goold‘s questions following an additional recitation of the Miranda warnings Bauer previously understood and invoked while handcuffed, Bauer voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. See Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1127 (“a suspect may impliedly waive the rights by answering an officer‘s questions after receiving Miranda warnings.“). Analyzing the totality of the circumstances presented here, the factors indicate that Bauer understood his rights and therefore knowingly and intelligently waived them at the BPD station. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 385 (“the law can presume that an individual who, with a full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.“). This is not a case “where the police failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by
2. Interrogation at Home
Bauer additionally challenges the propriety of the interrogation that took place during the search of his home. See Mot. at 15-16. Bauer argues in significant part that such questioning constituted a custodial interrogation despite the change of venue from the police station to Bauer‘s home – the in-home interrogation was custodial because of the “police dominated atmosphere.” See Mot. at 15 (citing United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Government effectively concedes that the questioning of Bauer in his home during the search remained custodial, and it argues instead that Bauer‘s Miranda waiver remained valid. Opp. at 24. The Court agrees with the Government. As noted above, Bauer understood the Miranda warnings as demonstrated by his affirmative answers to Officer Fish and his silence in response to further questioning, see Fish Decl. ¶¶ 14-15, and he voluntarily waived the right to remain silent when, after another set of Miranda warnings, he spoke with Detective Goold in the BPD station, see Goold Decl. ¶ 5. The second advisement by Detective Goold and Bauer‘s responses to questioning took place at approximately 7:15 p.m., and the search of Bauer‘s home, along with associated interrogation, began at approximately 8:15 p.m., about an hour later. There was no need for BPD to re-issue the Miranda warnings given this brief intervening period. Cf. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1127 (holding that officers did not need to readminister Miranda warnings when questioning a defendant in jail, after he was originally advised of his Miranda rights when he was arrested the day before in a different locale). Bauer‘s Miranda waiver remained valid for the interrogation and statements made during the search of his house, and the Court accordingly denies his motion to suppress any statements he made at home.
Bauer seeks suppression of the evidence gathered as part of the September 6, 2024 search by BPD on two grounds: (1) Bauer‘s consent for the search of his home was not voluntary and (2) if the Court finds the consent voluntary, BPD‘s searches exceeded the scope of that consent. The Court addresses these two arguments in turn.
1. Voluntariness
Bauer challenges BPD‘s warrantless search of his home on the basis that the Government fails to establish his signed consent for the search of his home was voluntary. See Reply at 9-11; see also Kane Decl., Ex. 15. “It is well settled that ‘a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible.‘” Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d at 501 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973)). The Ninth Circuit identified five factors for courts to consider in determining the voluntariness of consent:
(1) whether the [consenting individual] was in custody; (2) whether the arresting officers had their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings were given; (4) whether the [consenting individual] was notified that she had a right not to consent; and (5) whether the [consenting individual] had been told a search warrant could be obtained.
United States v. Brown, 563 F.3d 410, 414-15 (9th Cir. 2009) (alterations in original; citations omitted). These factors are merely “guideposts,” not a “mechanized formula” to resolve the issue of voluntariness. Id.; see also Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1126 (noting that “[i]t is not necessary to check off all five factors” when analyzing the voluntariness of consent) (citing Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d at 502). Rather, whether consent was voluntary must “be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. “A suspect may ‘unequivocal[ly] and specific[ally]’ consent by giving express permission, or consent can be inferred from conduct, such as a head nod.” United States v. Taylor, 60 F.4th 1233, 1243 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 828 (2024) (quoting United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2011)).
The parties argue most vigorously over the fifth Brown factor – whether BPD‘s disclosure that a search warrant could be obtained constituted a threat that a search warrant would necessarily
The Court turns to the remaining factors to assess the voluntariness of Bauer‘s consent. Though Bauer was in custody at the time he consented to the search of his home, the circumstances of his consent show that it was informed and freely given. The detectives in the room with him at the time he executed the signed consent form wore polo shirts and their guns remained in their holsters while Bauer sat unrestrained, with the door to the room open. Kane Decl., Ex. 7 at 1:20-15:35. Bauer received two separate Miranda warnings prior to Detective Goold‘s request for consent to search his home. Fish Decl. ¶¶ 14; Goold Decl. ¶ 5. By saying that he “hoped” Bauer would agree to the search and asking if that was something he could agree to, Detective Goold expressed that Bauer had the power to refuse. Kane Decl., Ex. 7 at 18:10-23:00 (Goold: “you‘re giving us consent to walk into your bedroom with you . . . as Americans, we have the lovely Constitution and I‘m not, just like a vampire, I‘m not going in your house unless you invite me.“). Bauer avers that the BPD detectives raised the threat of more-serious charges if he did not allow the search when they suggested that they had to look in his bedroom to verify that he did not have ammunition, did not “have a hidden cache of weapons,” and was “not a school shooter,” id., Ex. 7 at 19:55-20:30, but those comments do not rise to the level of a threat within context of the interrogation. The video of the interrogation shows Bauer‘s consent was resolute rather than hesitant; moreover, Bauer was not rushed into granting consent — he was given and
2. Scope of Consent
Bauer argues that, even assuming he granted consent for the search of his home, BPD unreasonably exceeded the scope of that consent by searching the contents of his 3D printer and the PC in the living room. Reply at 11-15. During a consent search, the police violate the suspect‘s Fourth Amendment right when they exceed the scope of the consent given. United States v. McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006). “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect‘s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness — what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (internal citations omitted); United States v. Lopez-Cruz, 730 F.3d 803, 809 (9th Cir. 2013). Importantly, “the government‘s burden to show voluntariness cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.” United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
Here, Detective Goold explained at the station that if Bauer invited them to do so, BPD would examine the 3D printer, look at the frames he had already made, and check to see whether he was manufacturing firearms for sale. See Kane Decl., Ex. 7 at 18:10-23:00. In the same description, Detective Goold also told Bauer that they wanted to confirm that he was “not a school shooter” and otherwise demonstrate where his “head was at.” Id. Bauer verbally and unequivocally affirmed his willingness to allow BPD to conduct such a search and then signed his written consent on a form that stated such consent included “all portions of property under my control.” Id.; Ex. 15. The only limit on this search was Detective Goold‘s comment that they would not search Bauer‘s parent‘s bedroom. Ex. 7 at 18:10-23:00. An objective review of this
Bauer relies on United States v. Lewis, 81 F.4th 640, 652-53 (6th Cir. 2023), and United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 2009), for the premise that BPD was obligated to obtain specific consent for the search of his electronic devices beyond the broad consent he granted to permit the search of his bedroom and the common areas of his home. Reply at 18-19. Though both cases considered the specific grant of authority necessary to search electronic devices in light of the large amount of material they may potentially contain, neither case imposed a brightline rule requiring law enforcement to obtain separate and distinct permission to search electronic devices. See Payton, 573 F.3d at 864 (confirming that there exists no heightened, “technology-specific” Fourth Amendment protection and that the scope of electronic device searches remains limited by “reasonableness“).3 Bauer‘s reference to these cases thus fails to alter the conclusion that the searches of the 3D printer and the PC generally fell within the scope of his consent. This is particularly so because Detective Goold told Bauer that the purpose of the search was to discover information regarding the firearms Bauer had been 3D printing and his intended conduct with his 3D printed firearms. Ex. 7 at 18:10-23:00.
The parties further dispute whether Bauer‘s cooperation without objection during the search of his home demonstrated that the search of the 3D printer and PC fell within the scope of the initial consent. In significant part, the Government avers that Bauer‘s conduct in the course of the search, largely cooperating with detectives rather than objecting, demonstrated that the scope of the search fell within the scope of his earlier consent to broadly search the home, including his
Detective Goold asked to look at the computer after finding the evidence that Bauer had printed an auto sear on the 3D printer in the bedroom. Goold Decl. ¶ 11. Bauer then stated that he accessed Telegram on the PC, Detective Goold said, “we can go to the PC if that works,” and Mr. Bauer “gestured out of the room” and led him to the PC in a common area of the home. Goold Decl. ¶ 12; Kane Decl., Ex. 8 at 7:50. Bauer contends that his leading Detective Goold to the PC did not constitute consent and that it did not demonstrate consent to view the contents of the PC, Reply at 12, but that argument does not comport with the record, including video of his conduct. It was Bauer who woke the computer up to show Detective Goold the contents of the Telegram app and the 3D printing program, Cura. Goold Decl. ¶¶ 13-14; cf. United States v. Rosi, 27 F.3d 409, 413-14 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming search where individual, after consenting to agents’ request to enter home, “volunteered to an agent that pertinent evidence might be found in a lamp” with the “full expectation that the agents would search it” and “did not object when they proceeded to do so“). When Detective Goold asked if he could scroll through the Telegram app, Bauer remained leaned back in the chair and did not object, showing assent to Goold‘s use of the mouse. Goold Decl. ¶ 13; Kane Decl., Ex. 7 at 11:00-12:30. When Detective Goold inquired about the content of a particular Telegram channel, Bauer said, “I can show you,” and then resumed use of the mouse himself. See id. Bauer‘s conduct was not mere acquiesce to the search of his electronic devices, he manifested consent.
Bauer contests that he granted effective consent to Detective Goold to search the PC because a person in his “situation reasonably would believe they ‘had no authority to limit or withdraw their consent,’ ” Reply at 14 (quoting McWeeney, 454 F.3d at 1036), but Bauer fails to identify any indicia of duress or coercion. There is no indication that Detective Goold used “an authoritative tone,” that he threatened Bauer in any way, or that he led Bauer to believe that he had no choice other than to show him his 3D printer and PC. Cf. United States v. Marquez, 503 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1008 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (finding that similar factors demonstrated the absence of duress or coercion for consent search of electronic device). Rather than objecting at any point, Bauer actively facilitated BPD‘s search, demonstrating that the search of his devices was consistent with the scope of the voluntary consent he granted.
3. Seizure of Devices
Bauer further challenges BPD‘s warrantless seizure of his property, including the 3D printer, an SD card, and what was identified as an auto sear device. Mot. at 16-17. To seize property without a warrant, law enforcement need only have probable cause to believe the property contains evidence of a crime. For example, in United States v. Place, the Supreme Court stated:
Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have not secured a warrant, the Court has interpreted the Amendment to permit seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its contents if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present.
462 U.S. 696, 701 (1984); see also Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462-63 (2011); United States v. Steinman, 130 F.4th 693, 717 (9th Cir. 2025). As explained above, the BPD officers present had a lawful basis to enter Bauer‘s home and discover the property they seized — Bauer‘s consent. Moreover, BPD officers had probable cause to believe that the property they seized, including the 3D printer, files, and an auto sear, included or constituted evidence of a crime, including manufacture of machineguns. See, e.g., Goold Decl. ¶¶ 14-15 (discussing 3D-printed auto sears, “I asked, ‘so you‘re trying to manufacture fully automatic pistols?’ I then told him that it was ‘a
E. March 3 Warrant and March 5 Execution of the Warrant and Search
Bauer initially challenged the sufficiency of the March 3 warrant on several grounds, including (1) the warrant‘s reliance on evidence, including the statements and evidence gathered on September 6, 2024, that must be excluded on the basis of his other challenges, (2) the warrant was unsupported by probable cause, and (3) the warrant fails as both insufficiently particular and overbroad.4 But in his Reply brief, Bauer states, “If the Court were to find no prior constitutional violations, Mr. Bauer would agree that the March 3 warrant authorized the seizure of the PC.” Reply at 18. The Court has found no constitutional violations in law enforcement‘s conduct prior to this point of its analysis. Accordingly, and in light of Bauer‘s concession, the Court finds that the March 3 warrant authorized the seizure of the PC.
Bauer argues separately, however, that the March 5 search of the PC violated the Fourth Amendment, apparently challenging the ChatGPT-related content that FBI agents found in plain view at the time they seized the PC on March 5. See Reply at 18-20. The Court considers whether the plain view exception covers the ChatGPT-related content to the extent it was used to inform the March 10 warrants.
Under the plain view doctrine, “the government may seize evidence without a valid warrant so long as government officials are ‘lawfully searching the area where the evidence is found’ and ‘the incriminatory nature of the evidence [is] immediately apparent.’ ” United States v. Holcomb, 132 F.4th 1118, 1135 (9th Cir. 2025) (alteration in original, citation omitted). “The burden of demonstrating that both requirements are satisfied lies with the Government.” Id. at 1135 (citation omitted).
F. March 10 Search Warrant
Bauer argues that the searches based on the March 10 warrants violated the Fourth Amendment because (1) the warrants were the fruit of prior constitutional violations, (2) the warrants were unsupported by probable cause, (3) the warrants were insufficiently particular and overbroad, (4) the FBI‘s intrusion into his Internet activity in the course of the searches raised First Amendment concerns. See Mot. at 21-23. For the reasons provided above, the Court finds no constitutional violation that would support suppression up to this stage of its analysis. Further, as conceded by Bauer, his remarks about the First Amendment implications of the FBI‘s conduct do not rise to the level of a challenge to the sufficiency of the warrant and therefore do not mandate suppression. See Reply at 20. Accordingly, the Court turns to address whether the March 10 warrants were supported by probable cause as well as whether they were sufficiently limited in breadth and particularity. After that discussion, the Court considers the Government‘s argument that suppression is not necessary because the FBI relied on the warrants in good faith.
1. Probable Cause
Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Whether there is probable cause is a “commonsense practical question,” and “[n]either certainty nor a preponderance of the evidence is required.” United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court evaluating the constitutionality of a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by a magistrate reviews the magistrate‘s probable cause determination for clear error.” United States v. Nguyen, 673 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). On review, the duty of the court “is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (internal quotations and citation omitted, modifications in original). If “the magistrate had a substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more.” Id. at 236 (internal
The probable cause laid out in the March 10 warrant affidavits included information regarding Bauer‘s use of a 3D printer to manufacture firearms and machineguns at home. See, e.g., Kane Decl., Ex. 17 ¶¶ 9-11. It also included that BPD had seen evidence of the 3D printing, including the auto sear, on the PC. Id. ¶ 12. Both March 10 warrants established additional probable cause to search for evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of
Bauer contends the March 10 warrants were insufficiently specific. The Fourth Amendment requires specificity in two important regards: “breadth and particularity.” United States v. Holcomb, 132 F.4th 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2025). “Breadth is the requirement that a warrant ‘be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based,’ while particularity is the requirement that a warrant ‘clearly state what is sought.’ ” Id. at 1127 (quoting United States v. SDI Future Health Inc., 568 F.3d 684, 702 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Bauer avers that the 13 categories of computer-related records that the warrant authorized agents to search for and seize were temporally unlimited and extremely broad. Kane Decl., Ex. 17, Att. B-1 ¶¶ 2-9; Ex. 18, Att. B-2 ¶¶ 1-8. These categories covered “evidence indicating how and when the computer was accessed or used,” “records of information about the computer‘s internet activity,” “evidence of the times the computer was used,” and “contextual information necessary to understand the evidence described in this attachment.” Id. The affidavit submitted by Special Agent Furtado laid out the evidence regarding Bauer‘s possession and manufacture of the machinegun conversion device in detail, specifying that it occurred at the location to be searched. See, e.g., Ex. 17 (Furtado Aff. ¶¶ 12-17) (describing the September 2024 search, the discovery of the 3D-printed auto sear, and the testing of the machinegun conversion device). She noted the evidence that Bauer had used the PC to search for information regarding auto sears and that he had the program for his 3D printer on the PC. Id. Special Agent Furtado‘s affidavit also contained a section discussing “Computers, Electronic Storage, and Forensic Analysis.” See, e.g., Ex. 17 (Furtado Aff. ¶¶ 30-33). Among other things, she attested in that section that files can persist on computers for long periods of time, even if overwritten. Id. These particular factual considerations provided the necessary fair probability of finding evidence in the computer to establish probable cause.
Moreover, Attachment B to the warrants added specific categories of records to be seized. The categories were tied to the violations at issue and to the identification of co-conspirators in those violations. Kane Decl., Ex. 17, Att. B-1 ¶¶ 2-9; Ex. 18, Att. B-2 ¶¶ 1-8. Attachments B-1 ¶ 10(a) and B-2 ¶ 9(a) authorized seizure of “evidence of who used, owned, or controlled the
3. Good Faith
Having found the March 10 warrant valid, the Court need not address the Government‘s alternative argument that the FBI‘s good faith reliance on the warrant overcomes any defects. The Court takes up this argument, however, in a belt-and-suspenders approach.
When a warrant fails as constitutionally infirm, evidence seized during its execution should generally be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). However, an exception to the exclusionary rule exists where an officer, in good faith, reasonably relies on a defective search warrant. United States v. Underwood, 725 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013). “[A] warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But the good faith exception does not apply where an affidavit is ” ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable’ ” or “where the warrant is ‘so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.’ ” Underwood, 725 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). In Leon, the Supreme Court held that evidence seized by police officers acting in good faith pursuant to a facially valid warrant would be admissible even though the warrant was subsequently found to lack probable cause. Id., 468 U.S. at 926; accord Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241-42 (2009). Leon articulates four circumstances in which the good faith exception does not apply on the ground that reliance is per se unreasonable:
(i) where an affiant misleads the issuing magistrate or judge by making a false statement or recklessly disregarding the truth in making a statement; (ii) where the magistrate or judge wholly
abandons [their] judicial role in approving the warrant, acting only as a “rubber stamp” to the warrant application rather than as a neutral and detached official; (iii) where the warrant is facially deficient in detail as to the place to be searched or the things to be found that the officers could not reasonably presume it to be valid; or (iv) where the affidavit upon which the warrant is based is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer could rely upon it in good faith.
United States v. Crews, 502 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923-26).
This is not a case where the affiant presented false information to the issuing judge or where the warrant is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” or “so facially deficient” that the executing officers could not reasonably believe the warrant to be valid. See Crews, 502 F.3d at 1136. As discussed at length above, the warrants described in detail the circumstances of defendant‘s arrest by BPD and the evidence that he had manufactured a firearm and led to the conclusion that he could be manufacturing more, including a machinegun conversion device, at home. Indeed, two federal Magistrate Judges separately reviewed the warrant affidavits, and they both found that the warrant applications were supported by probable cause. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (“[T]he fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or, as we have sometimes put it, in ‘objective good faith.’ “) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23). The affidavits supporting the federal warrants are thus nowhere near the “bare bones” affidavits that would justify imposing the “substantial social costs generated by the [exclusionary] rule.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, even if the Court had found the March 10 warrant defective, the good faith exception would apply. The evidence obtained from execution of the warrant is not subject to exclusion.
G. Cell Phone Password
Bauer finally argues that the contents of his cell phone must be suppressed because the FBI obtained his cell phone password in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Miranda. Mot. at 23-25. In particular, Bauer argues that the FBI violated his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination when it asked for his passcode while he was in custody and un-Mirandized. Mot. at 23-24. The Government argues that there is no need to suppress the evidence flowing from Bauer‘s un-Mirandized disclosure of his password because Bauer‘s statement was voluntary.
It is the Government‘s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a criminal defendant‘s statement was voluntary. United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1981). Where a defendant alleges psychological coercion, courts “look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding a confession.” United States v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003). Such circumstances include “the youth of the accused, his intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.” Id. The failure to give Miranda warnings creates a “generally irrebuttable” “presumption of coercion.” United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004) (plurality).
The Government attempts to analogize this case to United States v. Amiri, No. 23-CR-00264-JSW-2, 2024 WL 3757507, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2024) in which the district court found that the contents of phone admissible because the defendant provided his passcode voluntarily. See Opp. at 38. This case is distinct, however, because agents elicited Bauer‘s passcode while he was in custody but before the issuance of Miranda warnings. See Ex. H. On the other hand, Bauer relies on United States v. Maffei, No. 18-cr-00174-YGR-1, 2019 WL 1864712, at *8-11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2019), but that case is also distinct because the court suppressed defendant‘s disclosure of her phone passcode based on a violation of the defendant‘s unambiguous invocation of her right to counsel, a situation not present here. See Reply at 22-23.
Here, the evidence must be suppressed for a separate reason than those identified in either Amiri or Maffei — the Government fails to bear its burden to show Bauer‘s disclosure of his password was voluntary. See Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1335. Bauer was asleep when seven law enforcement officers arrived at his home to execute federal search and arrest warrants. Fryzek Decl., Ex. H. Officers searched and handcuffed him and took his cell phone from his pocket. Id. In addition, Bauer had been surrounded by armed and uniformed FBI agents, handcuffed, pat-searched, led to a different room, had his phone seized from his pocket by an agent, and had another agent start to search it by swiping on it before she turned it towards him and said, “What‘s
The Government attempts to evade this conclusion based on the inevitable discovery of the evidence through the March 10 warrant‘s permission to use biometric unlocking of the device. See Opp. at 38. “However, the government bears the burden of demonstrating, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that the [evidence] would have been inevitably discovered.” United States v. Bradford, 772 F. App‘x 554 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000)). Though the Government‘s contention may indeed be likely given the scope of the valid warrant, “the record is silent as to what would have happened next,” and the Government thus fails to meet is burden to invoke the protections of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Bradford, 772 F. App‘x at 555.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Bauer‘s motion to suppress. The Court SUPPRESSES the contents of Bauer‘s cell phone and fruits flowing from the Fifth Amendment violation, but the Court finds no other evidence merits suppression at this stage.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 2, 2025
ARACELI MARTÍNEZ-OLGUÍN
United States District Judge