UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Allon ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14-1165.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: Nov. 10, 2014. Filed: Nov. 17, 2014.
771 F.3d 1064
Even if the district court abused its discretion by replaying the videos without notifying the defendant and his counsel, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court was present during the reрlay, and the transcript shows no prejudicial dialogue. Although what was said off the record is unknown, the court instructed the jury to avoid discussion and to “just tell us what you want to see.” See Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 75 F.3d 1298, 1305 (8th Cir. 1996) (“It is certainly reasonable to believe, absent evidence to the contrary, that the jury adhered to the judge‘s instructions.“). The jury was in the courtroom fоr a total of 11 minutes to view all four videos-which together last 7 minutes 45 seconds (and it appears one video was backed up and played halfway through again). Although a non-attorney IT specialist from the U.S. Attorney‘s office played the videos, the court instructed her what to play and when to play it.
Overwhelming evidencе showed Smith committed the robbery. Two tellers independently identified him as the robber in a photo lineup a week after the robbery. He owned a unique Cadillac identical to the one used in the robbery (which soon had its license plates removed). The drive times on the ignition interlock device meshed with the robbery timeline. Despite claiming to be unemployed, he made large cash transactions within 24 hours after the robbery. Smith‘s clothing resembled the bank robber‘s.
Finally, Smith was present and did not object during trial when the court admitted the videos into evidence and they were played to the jury. Defense counsel played one video during his closing argument. This cоurt finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the video replay outside of Smith‘s (and his counsel‘s) presence was harmless.2
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The judgment is affirmed.
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Allison Waldrip Bragg, AUSA, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.
Before BYE, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
BYE, Circuit Judge.
Allon Anderson was indicted with failing to register as a sex offender. Anderson filed a motion to dismiss the indictment аrguing, in part, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) violates the Commerce Clause. After the district court1 denied Anderson‘s motion to dismiss, Anderson entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 30 months of imprisonment. Anderson appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss. We affirm.
I
Anderson was convicted of failing tо register as a sex offender in violation of
II
“We review a challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute de novo.” United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir.2008). “[I]t is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks
Federal courts have “a general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation‘s elected leaders” and “‘[p]roper respect for a coordinate branch of the government’ requires that [a federal court] strike down an Act of Congress only if ‘the lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly demonstrated.‘” Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Buss. v. Sebelius, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2579, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) (quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635, 1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290 (1882)); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) (requiring a “plain showing” Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds before a federal court can invalidate a congressional enactment).
As relеvant to Anderson‘s appeal, SORNA, enacted in July of 2006, makes it a crime for a person (1) “who is required to register under the [Act]” and (2) who “travels in interstate... commerce” to (3) knowingly “fail[] to register or update a registration.”
A
Prior to National Federation, we concluded
We began Howell by recounting Congress‘s three categories of Commerce Clause power as described by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). The Commerce Clause empowers Congress: (1) “[to] regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce;” (2) “to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities;” and (3) “to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” Id. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court entertains four further considerations to determine whether a regulation is valid under the third category: (1) whether the regulated activity is economic in nature; (2) whether thе statute contains an express jurisdictional element linking its scope in some way to interstate commerce; (3) whether Congress made express findings regarding the effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce; and (4) the attenuation of the link between
In Howell we recognized
[T]he authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Where necеssary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce. . . .
The regulation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate сommerce even though the intrastate activity does not itself “substantially affect” interstate commerce. Moreover, . . . Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce. The relevant quеstion is simply whether the means chosen are “reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.
Id. at 34-37, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). While doubting the constitutionality of
In National Federation, Chief Justice Roberts2 acknowledged the Commerce
The individual mandate . . . does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Every day individuals do not do an infinite number of things. In some cases they decide not to do something; in others they simply fail to do it. Allowing Congress to justify federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless decisions an individual could potentially make within the scope of federal regulation, and-under the Government‘s theory-empower Congress to make those decisions for him.
Id. at 2587. Since “[t]he individual mandate forces individuals into commerce precisely becаuse they elected to refrain from commercial activity,” it “cannot be sustained under a clause authorizing Congress to ‘regulate Commerce.‘” Id. at 2591.
Chief Justice Roberts also determined the individual mandate could not be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause because the individual mandate was not “‘incidental’ to the exercise of the commerce power.” Id. at 2592 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 418, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)). The government had argued the Supreme Court did not have to consider the effect of inactivity on interstate commerce because it was sufficient that Congress regulated commercial activity in a manner which required the government to regulate inactivity. Id. at 2591-93; see Raich, 545 U.S. at 22, 125 S.Ct. 2195. In dispеnsing of the government‘s argument, the Chief Justice distinguished Raich by holding the issue presented in Raich only concerned the constitutionality of “individual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme,” Nat‘l Fed‘n, 132 S.Ct. at 2593 (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 23, 125 S.Ct. 2195), whereas the individual mandate allows “Congress [to] reach beyond the natural limit of its authority and draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would be outside оf it,” id. at 2592. In other words, any law upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause must “involve exercises of authority derivative of, and in service to,” a separate power granted to Congress. Id. at 2592.
With regard to the constitutionality of
Reading Raich and the Necessary and Proper Clause together, we believe Howell correctly decided that even if the constitutionality of
B
Prior to National Federation, we also found
Nothing in National Federation calls into question the analysis of May in regard to the jurisdictional hook of
III
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
