United States v. Allon Anderson
771 F.3d 1064
8th Cir.2014Background
- Anderson, a prior Kansas sex-offender convict, registered in Kansas but moved to Oklahoma and then Arkansas in 2012 and failed to update his registration in Arkansas as required by SORNA.
- He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) for traveling in interstate commerce and thereafter failing to register under 42 U.S.C. § 16913.
- Anderson moved to dismiss, arguing SORNA’s registration and enforcement provisions exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power (and raised nondelegation concerns), relying on National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.
- The district court denied the motion; Anderson entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss.
- The Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo and considered whether Sebelius undermined prior Eighth Circuit precedents upholding SORNA.
- The court affirmed, holding §§ 16913 and 2250(a)(2)(B) are constitutional under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause as applied to persons who cross state lines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (registration requirement) under Commerce Clause / Necessary and Proper Clause | §16913 exceeds Commerce Clause/Necessary and Proper after NFIB; it improperly regulates inactivity or purely intrastate conduct | §16913 is necessary and proper to a broader interstate regulatory scheme to track sex offenders who travel; it supports enforcement of §2250 | §16913 is valid: even if doubtful under Commerce Clause alone, it is a legitimate exercise of the Necessary and Proper Clause as part of SORNA |
| Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (criminalizing failure to register after interstate travel) | Post-NFIB, §2250(a)(2)(B) is invalid because NFIB limits Congress’s power to regulate inactivity | §2250(a)(2)(B) contains the interstate-travel jurisdictional hook; it regulates persons who have already engaged in interstate commerce and thus is within Commerce Clause authority | §2250(a)(2)(B) is valid: the interstate-travel element brings defendants within Congress’s commerce power |
Key Cases Cited
- Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (limits on Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper analysis for laws compelling individuals into commerce)
- Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Congress may regulate intrastate activity integral to comprehensive interstate regulation)
- United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding §16913 as necessary and proper to interstate regulation of sex offenders)
- United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding §2250(a)(2)(B) based on interstate-travel jurisdictional hook)
- United States v. Robbins, 729 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2013) (post-NFIB upholding §2250(a)(2)(B) because offenders "opted in" via prior criminal activity and interstate travel)
- United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (broad statement of Commerce Clause power)
- United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limitations on Congress’s power under third Lopez category)
- Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (rule for construing fragmented Supreme Court opinions)