UNITED STATES of America, ex rel, Terri KING, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER-HOUSTON, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 12-20795.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 4, 2013.
Tuft claims that the district court abused its discretion in striking his supplemental response to Gonzalez‘s motion for summary judgment, which contained the revised version of the prison policy governing cross-sex strip searches enacted in 2006. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider this document as untimely, filed without leave of court, and pertaining to a policy enacted after the 2005 search.
Finally, Tuft moves to disqualify the district court judge. Because Tuft fails to raise any facts or circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to question the judge‘s impartiality, see Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2003), his motion is denied.
AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.
Brian Scott McBride, Esq., Michael Warren Mengis, Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Lesli Gwen Ginn, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Linda Ibach Shaunessy, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Terri King (“King“) appeals the district court‘s dismissal of claims she brought on behalf of the United States for alleged violations of the False Claims Act (“FCA“),
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
King is a former associate professor at UTHSCH. From 2001-2005, she served in the Center‘s Department of Internal Medicine. In 2005, she accepted a position in the Center‘s Department of Pediatrics. In March of 2001, King began working as
King filed suit on January 4, 2011, alleging that Milewicz falsified research data and results and failed to obtain her human research subjects’ written informed consent. She claims that the fraud was in connection with government-funded research and that Milewicz used falsified results in order to obtain federal funding. The Center is claimed to have defrauded the federal government by, among other things, covering up Milewicz‘s misconduct relating to federal research grants. King also claims that the Center retaliated against her for reporting this misconduct by hampering her research, relocating her to less favorable positions, and constructively firing her when she continued to raise concerns.
King‘s complaint alleges that the Center‘s actions constituted false claims under the FCA because, among other things, it “failed to fully investigate and fraudulently covered up research misconduct by Milewicz in an effort to allow her and other researchers full access to federal grants for research.” King also asserts a private action for retaliation and wrongful termination under the FCA‘s anti-retaliation provision,
On May 9, 2012, UTHSCH moved to dismiss King‘s complaint on three separate grounds: (1) UTHSCH, as a state agency, is not subject to liability under the FCA; (2) sovereign immunity bars King‘s FCA claims; and (3) King‘s complaint did not comply with the particularity requirements of
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a district court‘s ruling on a
DISCUSSION
King challenges the district court‘s dismissal of her qui tam claim based on its finding that UTHSCH is an “arm of the state,” its holding that the Center is entitled to sovereign immunity from her retaliation claim, and its dismissal of her complaint without first granting King an opportunity to amend. UTHSCH claims that this court lacks jurisdiction over King‘s appeal because she failed to timely file her notice of appeal and, as a matter of law, did not show excusable neglect or good cause in her request for an extension of time.
I. Timeliness of King‘s Appeal
“[T]he taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under
The district court entered its order of dismissal on October 31, 2012. King filed her notice of appeal, along with a motion for extension of time pursuant to
The Fifth Circuit follows the Supreme Court‘s guidance in determining when to permit extensions of time under Rule 4(a)(5).
When evaluating excusable neglect under Rule 4(a)(5), this court relies on the following standard:
The determination is at bottom an equitable one, taking account all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the party‘s omission. These include . . . the danger of prejudice . . . , the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.
Stotter v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 508 F.3d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). We review a ruling on a Rule 4(a)(5) motion for excusable neglect for abuse of discretion. Id.
UTHSCH claims that the district court abused its discretion by allowing King‘s Rule 4(a)(5) extension. The Center cites two cases for the propositions that neither ignorance of the rules nor counsel‘s busy law practice is sufficient to establish excusable neglect, Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395, and ignorance of the law does not excuse the failure to comply with a deadline that is unambiguous. Halicki v. La. Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir. 1998).
The Center overstates Pioneer‘s holding. The Court held only that counsels’ failure to file on time could be imputed to their clients, and did not create rigid rules forbidding extensions of time based on ignorance of the rules or an attorney‘s workload. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 397-98. Indeed, the Pioneer court focused on “the respondents’ good faith and the absence of any danger of prejudice . . . or of disruption to efficient judicial administration posed by the late filings.” Id. at 397. The delay here was only five days and did not prejudice UTHSCH. Pioneer does not compel us to find an abuse of discretion in the district court‘s grant of King‘s motion for an extension of time.
Nor does our opinion in Halicki foreclose a finding of excusable neglect in this case. In Halicki, we rejected a litigant‘s contention “that misconstruction of procedural rules necessarily should result in a finding of ‘excusable neglect’ where no prejudice results to the opposing party.” Halicki, 151 F.3d at 469 (emphasis in original). We did not hold that misinterpretation of the rules could never constitute excusable neglect. And although we stated that “a district court‘s determination that the neglect was inexcusable is virtually unassailable” when “the rule at issue is unambiguous,” id. at 470, this observation does not control our review of a district court‘s finding that the neglect was excusable.2
“Given the leeway granted to district courts” when evaluating excusable neglect, Stotter, 508 F.3d at 820, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting King‘s motion for an extension of time to file her notice of appeal.
II. Ability to Sue UTHSCH Under the FCA‘s Qui Tam Provision
The FCA imposes liability to “any person who . . . knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” or “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”
King argues that the district court erred in dismissing her qui tam claims “by erroneously concluding that UTHSCH is an arm of the State of Texas and thus . . . not a ‘person’ who can be liable under the federal False Claims Act.” In her opening brief, King states also that “[t]he Stevens case was wrongly decided,” that it “created an unwarranted exception to the FCA for states and state agencies,” and that “[i]t is error to dismiss the qui tam claims against UTHSCH when Stevens should instead be reversed.” Because we lack the authority to reverse Supreme Court decisions, we
In Stevens, the Supreme Court stated that in cases where defendants move for dismissal on both statutory and Eleventh Amendment grounds, courts should address the statutory question first:
We . . . have routinely addressed before the question whether the Eleventh Amendment forbids a particular statutory cause of action to be asserted against States, the question whether the statute itself permits the cause of action it creates to be asserted against States (which it can do only by clearly expressing such an intent). When these two questions are at issue, not only is the statutory question “logically antecedent to the existence of” the Eleventh Amendment question, but also there is no realistic possibility that addressing the statutory question will expand the Court‘s power beyond the limits that the jurisdictional restriction has imposed.
Stevens, 529 U.S. at 779 (internal citations omitted). Pursuant to Stevens, we address first whether the FCA allows for King‘s suit against the UTHSCH.
As did the district court, we evaluate whether the Center is an arm of the state using the six-factor test set forth in Clark v. Tarrant County, Texas, 798 F.2d 736, 744-45 (5th Cir. 1986). Although Clark‘s arm-of-the-state analysis took place in the context of determining Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have applied its test when determining whether an entity was subject to FCA liability. See U.S. ex rel. Adrian v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 363 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2004).
In deciding whether a suit against an entity is in reality a suit against the state, several factors must be determined: (1) whether the state statutes and caselaw characterize the agency as an arm of the state; (2) the source of funds for the entity; (3) the degree of local autonomy the entity enjoys; (4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide problems; (5) whether the entity has authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether the entity has the right to hold and use property. Khan, 2005 WL 1994301, at *2; see also Richardson v. S. Univ., 118 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 1997). We address each factor in turn.
A. Texas Statutes and Caselaw
A survey of Texas statutes and caselaw reveals that the first Clark factor weighs in favor of finding UTHSCH an arm of the state. The state constitution provides for the establishment of the University of Texas System.
Texas courts also treat UTHSCH to be a state agency. In Klein v. Hernandez, 315 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2010), the Texas Supreme Court held that a resident was an “employee of a state agency” in finding him entitled to immunity. See also id. at 6 (referencing legislative materials referring to UTHSCH as “a state agency-owned
King argues that these cases “never actually characterize UTHSCH as an ‘arm of the state,‘” that Klein never directly implicated UTHSCH or sovereign immunity, and that other cases referring to the Center as a “governmental unit” are meaningless because that term is much broader than what is required for finding an entity to be an “arm of the state.” We acknowledge that there does not appear to be any case that evaluates all six Clark factors and finds the Center to be an arm of the state for either FCA or sovereign immunity purposes. But we do not read Clark‘s first factor as requiring an entity claiming sovereign immunity to first identify on-point court decisions evaluating the issue and holding it to be entitled to sovereign immunity. If that were the case, we would not need a six-factor test.
We find the aforementioned Texas authorities to weigh in favor of UTHSCH being an arm of the state.
B. Sources of Funding
According to King, “[f]rom 2005 until 2009, state funding and federal funding have contributed an approximately equal percentage of the revenue collected by UTH[S]CH” and “[s]tate funding has only contributed between 23% and 26.5% of the gross revenue for UTHSCH from 2005 to 2009.” Despite King‘s attempts to downplay state funding‘s importance, the magnitudes are substantial. The district court noted that in 2009, UTHSCH took in more than $26 million from student tuition and fees, received about $170 million in direct state appropriations, and received over $25 million from other state agencies.
King asserts that despite the significant amounts of state funding, UTHSCH would be unable to reach into segregated state funds in order to pay a judgment here because the Center‘s federal and state funding are “strictly and carefully segregated,” with state funding only available to support state-funded missions. We disagree.
“[T]he most significant factor in assessing an entity‘s status is whether a judgment against it will be paid with state funds.” Richardson, 118 F.3d at 455 (quoting McDonald v. Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm‘rs, 832 F.2d 901, 907 (5th Cir. 1987)). But this does not mean we can find sovereign immunity or an arm of the state only “where payment would be directly out of the state treasury.” United Carolina Bank v. Bd. of Regents of Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982). “The crucial question . . . is whether use of . . . unappropriated funds to pay a damage award would interfere with the fiscal autonomy and political sovereignty of Texas.” Id. at 560-61.
The district court in United Carolina found that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suit against Stephen F. Austin State University (“SFA“) in part because “SFA could itself pay such an award be
Similarly, in Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976), we held that tuition refunds would implicate the state treasury. The tuition “fees were factored into the preparation of the annual budget for [Mississippi State University] and were relied upon by the state legislature in determining the maximum amount of expenditures allowed.” Id. at 1176. The refunds would have “add[ed] an expenditure not figured in the budget.” Id. We explained:
The Eleventh Amendment was fashioned to protect against federal judgments requiring payment of money that would interfere with the state‘s fiscal autonomy and thus its political sovereignty. Retroactive monetary relief . . . would have just that effect. Mississippi has devised a complex statutory design which governs the state‘s schools of higher education and their control by the Board of Trustees. The Board is required to submit budgetary proposals for legislative acceptance. To require refund payments from the Board for overpayment of tuition fees would be the kind of tampering the Eleventh Amendment sought to avoid.
Id. (footnote omitted).
We hold that Texas provides substantial funding to the Center and that allowing for civil recovery would interfere with the state‘s fiscal autonomy, even if payment is not made directly from the state treasury. Clark‘s second factor supports finding UTHSCH to be an arm of the state.
C. Degree of Local Autonomy and Right to Hold and Use Property
A board of regents, appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate, governs the University of Texas System, and “govern[s], operate[s], support[s], and maintain[s] each of the component institutions.”
With respect to UTHSCH‘s right to hold and use property, “[t]he board of regents of the University of Texas System has the sole and exclusive management and control of the lands set aside and appropriated to, or acquired by, The University of Texas System.”
We find that Clark‘s third and sixth factors support finding UTHSCH to be an arm of the state.
D. Local vs. Statewide Concerns
The University of Texas System, of which UTHSCH is a part, has locations
Clark‘s fourth factor supports finding UTHSCH to be an arm of the state.
E. Authority to Sue and Be Sued in its Own Name
Texas law provides for the University of Texas System‘s ability to sue on behalf of a component institution “to recover a delinquent loan, account, or debt owed.”
Nonetheless, King identifies several cases in which UTHSCH either sued or was sued, and in none of them did it object to proceeding in its own name or insist that the University of Texas System be substituted in its stead. See Duncan v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Hous., 469 F. Appx. 364 (5th Cir. 2012); Watson v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., No. H-09-0881, 2009 WL 1476469 (S.D. Tex. May 27, 2009); Butcher v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Hous., No. H-08-cv-0244, 2008 WL 4935723 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2008); Cheatham, 357 S.W.3d 747. The number of cases in which the Center is a named party leads us to conclude that, for arm-of-the-state purposes, it has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name.3
Clark‘s fifth factor weighs against finding UTHSCH to be an arm of the state. But because five out of the six Clark factors weigh in favor of finding the Center to be one, we conclude that UTHSCH is an arm of the state and that Stevens applies. UTHSCH is not a “person” under the FCA, and is not subject to qui tam liability. We affirm the district court‘s dismissal of King‘s qui tam claim under
III. Retaliation Claim
King sues UTHSCH for retaliation pursuant to the FCA‘s anti-retaliation provision,
Any employee, contractor, or agent shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make that employee, contractor, or agent whole, if that employee, contractor, or agent is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment because of lawful acts done by the employee, contractor, agent or associat-
ed others in furtherance of an action under this section or other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of this sub-chapter.
Congress amended this section in 2009. The previous version stated that “[a]ny employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer . . . shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole.” (Emphasis added.)
In Elizondo, a district court applied Stevens‘s holding that states and state agencies are not within the FCA‘s definition of “any person” to the older version of § 3730(h)‘s use of the phrase “his or her employer” and held that states are not subject to suit under § 3730(h). Elizondo v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, No. CI-VASA-04-CA-1025-XR, 2005 WL 823353, at *4-5 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2005). But the amendment to § 3730(h) prevents us from applying Elizondo‘s analysis here. See Bell v. Dean, No. 2:09--CV-1082-WKW, 2010 WL 1856086, at *4 (M.D. Ala. May 4, 2010) (”Elizondo and the other cases are no longer on all fours . . . given the 2009 amendment removing the word ‘employer’ from the statute“). Unlike the Court in Stevens, we are unable to resolve all of our case‘s issues on statutory grounds, and must review the Center‘s argument that it is entitled to sovereign immunity from FCA anti-retaliation claims.
“Congress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). In Foulds, we held that the Eleventh Amendment barred a qui tam action seeking damages against Texas Tech University and Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center. U.S. ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Nelson v. Univ. of Tex. at Dall., 535 F.3d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 2008) (FMLA action against University of Texas at Dallas “subject to an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense“).
King does not argue that § 3730 intends to strip states of their sovereign immunity, or any other reason to find that Congress abrogated sovereign immunity here. Rather, she applies her arguments against finding UTHSCH to be an arm of the state in the statutory context to the sovereign immunity inquiry as well. We apply our finding that UTHSCH is an arm of the state and hold that sovereign immunity bars King‘s claim for monetary relief under the FCA‘s anti-retaliation provision.
We affirm the district court‘s dismissal of King‘s retaliation claim under
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court‘s dismissal of King‘s suit.4
