TINA TURRIETA,
S271721
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
August 1, 2024
Second Appellate District, Division Four, B304701; Los Angeles County Superior Court, BC714153
Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, and Groban concurred.
Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Groban concurred.
Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion in which, Justice Evans concurred.
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.
The California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) has statutory authority to collect civil penalties from employers that violate certain provisions of the Labor Code. The Labor Code
This case involves what has become a common scenario in PAGA litigation: multiple persons claiming to be an “aggrieved employee” within the meaning of PAGA file separate and independent lawsuits seeking recovery of civil penalties from the same employer for the same alleged Labor Code violations. Tina Turrieta, Brandon Olson, and Million Seifu each worked as a driver for Lyft, Inc. (Lyft) and each filed a separate action seeking civil penalties under PAGA for Lyft’s alleged failure to pay minimum wages, overtime premiums, and business expense reimbursements. In early December 2019, Turrieta and Lyft signed an agreement settling Turrieta’s action and scheduled a settlement approval hearing for January 2, 2020. Before that hearing, Olson and Seifu filed separate motions to intervene in Turrieta’s action and submitted objections to the settlement. The trial court denied the motions, approved the settlement, and later denied the motions of Olson and Seifu to vacate the judgment.
Olson and Seifu appealed, challenging both the settlement and the denials of their various motions. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the trial court had properly denied the intervention motions and that Olson and Seifu lacked standing to move in the trial court to vacate the judgment or to challenge the judgment on appeal. Olson petitioned for our review of the appellate court’s decision, asserting that as a deputized agent of the state under PAGA, he has the right, on behalf of the state, to intervene in Turrieta’s action, to move to vacate the judgment in that action, and to have the court consider his objections to the proposed settlement of that action.
We agree with the Court of Appeal. PAGA provides that an aggrieved employee, after complying with specified procedural prerequisites, may “commence a civil action” to recover civil penalties that the LWDA may assess and collect. (
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 8, 2018, Turrieta sent notice to the LWDA of “representative claims” she wanted to bring under PAGA based on Lyft’s alleged violation of several “provisions of the Labor Code.” Accompanying the notice was a draft complaint identifying Turrieta as a Lyft driver and seeking, “as a Private Attorney General on behalf of the State of California with regard to current and former Lyft Drivers,” “relief recoverable under” PAGA based on Lyft’s alleged “willful misclassification of its Driver Employees as independent contractors.” In separate causes of action, the draft complaint alleged the following violations of the Labor Code: (1) willfully misclassifying drivers as independent contractors; (2) intentionally failing to pay overtime premiums; (3) failing to timely pay wages; (4) failing to pay wages due upon termination; (5) failing to provide itemized wage statements; and (6) failing to provide equipment or reimburse business expenses. On July 13, 2018, Turrieta filed the complaint in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
In late May 2018, Olson filed a class action complaint against Lyft in the San Francisco Superior Court. About the same time, he sent notice to the LWDA of PAGA claims he wanted to pursue against Lyft. Almost two months later, in August 2018, he added those PAGA claims to his pending class action by filing an amended complaint seeking penalties under PAGA based on his status as a Lyft driver and alleging that Lyft had misclassified drivers as independent contractors and had failed to reimburse business expenses, to pay overtime, to pay minimum wages, to provide adequate wage statements, and to provide required meal and rest breaks.
In April 2019, Olson filed in the San Francisco Superior Court a petition under
In September 2019, Turrieta and Lyft attended a mediation. When they failed to reach agreement, the mediator made a settlement proposal based on his valuation of the case, and the parties accepted the proposal. Among other things, the settlement agreement provided as follows: “[T]he Parties agree that they will cooperate in the sending of an amended PAGA letter to the LWDA . . . and in the drafting and filing of an amended complaint that covers all PAGA claims that could have been brought against Lyft so that PAGA Settlement Group Member Release covers all potential PAGA claims described in this paragraph. Specifically, the amended complaint shall add the following causes of action: Labor Code sections 226.7, 353, 510, 512, 554, 1174, 1174.5, 1182.12, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 2802, 2810.5, and Paragraphs 4, 7, and 10–12 of Wage Order #9-2001. Plaintiff shall provide notice of the settlement to the LWDA after the long-form settlement agreement is executed and the motion for approval is filed.”
On December 9, 2019, Turrieta filed a motion for court approval of the settlement, with a hearing set for January 2, 2020. Along with the motion, Turrieta submitted a proposed amended complaint reflecting the terms of the settlement agreement and a request for approval of the amended complaint’s filing. The same day, she sent to the LWDA copies of the proposed settlement agreement, the approval motion, and related filings, including the proposed amended complaint.
The LWDA did not file an opposition or objection to the proposed settlement. However, on December 24, 2019, Olson filed a pleading in Turrieta’s action seeking a court order: (1) granting leave to file a complaint in intervention and to intervene; and (2) denying approval of the proposed settlement or continuing the January 2 approval hearing “until such time as [his intervention] motion [could] be heard.” Olson simultaneously submitted a proposed complaint in intervention alleging the same Labor Code violations he had previously alleged in his separate PAGA action. In the proposed complaint’s Prayer for Relief, Olson requested, among other things, “Designation of [his] counsel of record as Lead Counsel for the Aggrieved Employees,” “Costs of suit,” “Appropriate service payments to Plaintiff for his service as a PAGA representative[],” and “Attorneys’ fees, pursuant to PAGA,
Two days later, on December 26, 2019, Olson filed an ex parte application for an order rescheduling the approval hearing from January 2, 2020, to a
At the approval hearing оn January 2, 2020, the court “overruled” Seifu’s objection because: (1) it “was filed on the eve of the hearing”; and (2) Seifu, like Olson, lacked “standing to be heard on this matter.” The court also approved the settlement, finding it “to be fair, adequate and reasonable.” Relatedly, the court expressly “disagree[d] with” Seifu’s assertion “that Lyft engaged in gamesmanship such that plaintiffs in other cases (as well as the State) could be shortchanged,” explaining: “[A]fter the parties engaged in mediation before a very experienced mediator, they were still not able to arrive at a resolution. Instead, they ultimately accepted the mediator’s proposal.” On January 6, 2020, the court entered a final judgment consistent with its ruling and the approved settlement.
Olson and Seifu each filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to
Olson and Seifu appealed from the trial court’s ruling, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. Regarding the motions to vacate, it held that Olson and Seifu “lacked standing . . . to bring” such a motion in the trial court — and thus to appeal from the judgment — because they could not establish a threshold standing requirement: that they were “‘aggrieved’ by the judgment.” (Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 955, 970 (Turrieta).) Their “role as PAGA plaintiffs” in their separate PAGA actions, the Court of Appeal reasoned, did not “confer[] upon them a personal interest in the settlement of another PAGA claim” because “‘[a] PAGA claim is legally and conceptually different from an employee’s own suit for damages and statutory penalties. An employee suing under PAGA “does so as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.”’ [Citation.] As such, ‘[e]very PAGA claim is “a dispute between an employer and the state.” [Citations.] . . . Relief under PAGA is designed primarily to benefit the general public, not the party bringing the action.’ [Citations.] “‘A PAGA representative action is therefore a type of qui tam action,”’ and the
Turning to the intervention motions, the Court of Appeal ruled that Olson and Seifu could not “meet the threshold” requirement under
Olson timely filed a petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s ruling, which we granted, limiting the issue for consideration to the following: “Does a plaintiff in a representative action filed under [PAGA] have the right to intervene, or object to, or move to vacate, a judgment in a related action that purports to settle the claims that plaintiff has brought on behalf of the State?”2 For reasons explained below,
we answer this question in the negative and affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
DISCUSSION
In recent years, we have addressed several issues related to PAGA litigation. We begin with a review of the basic principles set forth in our prior PAGA decisions because they provide context for deciding the issues now before us.
To achieve this purpose, PAGA, as it applies in this case, specifies that civil penalties recoverable by the LWDA “may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees pursuant to specified procedures. (
Our previous decisions highlight several important “legal characteristics” of PAGA actions. (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 380.) “‘[E]very PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state.’” (Id. at p. 387.) “It is a dispute between an employer and the state,” in which the state alleges “through its agents” — i.e., aggrieved employees — “that the employer has violated the Labor Code.” (Id. at pp. 386–387.) It “is an enforcement action between the LWDA and the employer, with the PAGA plaintiff acting on behalf of the government.” (Kim v. Reins Internat. Cal., Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 86 (Kim).) As such, a PAGA action “functions as a substitute for an action brought by the government itself.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 986 (Arias
An aggrieved employee who files a representative PAGA action is asserting a “claim[] belonging to a government agency” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 388) and “represents the same legal right and interest as state labor law enforcement agencies — namely, recovery of civil penalties that otherwise would have been assessed and collected by” the LWDA (Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986). Thus, the employee-plaintiff sues “as the state’s authorized representative” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 80) — its “‘proxy or agent’” (id. at p. 81). A PAGA plaintiff’s “status as ‘the proxy or agent’ of the state [citation] is not merely semantic; it reflects a PAGA litigant’s substantive role in enforcing [California’s] labor laws on behalf of state law enforcement agencies.” (Iskanian, at p. 388.) “The government entity on whose behalf the plaintiff files suit is always the real party in interest in the suit.” (Id. at p. 382.) These legal characteristics make “[a] PAGA representative action . . . a type of qui tam action.” (Ibid.)
Consistent with their representative relationship to the state, aggrieved employees must, before filing a PAGA action in court, give written notice of any alleged Labor Code violations to both their employer and the LWDA, and the notice must describe the facts and theories supporting the alleged violations. (
As to whether PAGA allows multiple, overlapping representative actions filed by different aggrieved employees against the same employer based on the same facts and theories, one federal court observed in 2016 that PAGA’s “‘express terms’” do not address the question. (Tan v. Grubhub, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2016) 171 F.Supp.3d 998, 1013 (Tan).) Citing the federal court’s observation, a California appellate court stated in Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853, 866, that “nothing in the PAGA statutory scheme forecloses separate but similar actions by different employees against the same employer.” Based on Julian, the Court of Appeal in this case held that “[o]verlapping PAGA actions may be brought by different employees who allege the same violations and use the same theories.”
Several PAGA provisions exрressly provide for the LWDA’s involvement in an aggrieved employee’s pending PAGA action. For cases filed on or after July 1, 2016, a PAGA plaintiff “shall, within 10 days following commencement of a civil [PAGA] action,” “provide the [LWDA] with a file-stamped copy of the complaint.” (
With this general background in mind, we turn to Olson’s claims.
I. Intervention
Olson argues that, under the general intervention statute —
Turrieta and Lyft disagree with Olson. They assert that PAGA does not authorize him to intervene in the PAGA action of another PAGA plaintiff asserting identical claims. According to Turrieta, section 2699, subdivision (a), “defines the rights bestowed upon a PAGA litigant” and its “plain language . . . provides [only] a limited authorization for employees to bring an action to recover civil penalties.” “That is it. No other rights are listed.” Lyft offers this similar argument: “A PAGA plaintiff like Olson derives his authority to act as the state’s proxy solely from a statutory delegation: if an aggrieved employee follows certain statutory procedures, he or she ‘may commence a civil action pursuant to [Labor Code] [s]ection 2699.’ (Lab. Code,
Olson, in response, concedes that PAGA’s text “does not explicitly provide for” intervention in an overlapping PAGA action by someone who has been separately “deputized” to bring identical claims. But, he asserts, the fact that no such “right to intervene . . . exist[s] within the PAGA statute itself” is irrelevant because “[t]hat right [separately] exists in well-established California civil procedure,” specifically, section 387. In Olson’s view, “[c]ases are legion recognizing an aggrieved party’s right to intervene if that party is able to meet the qualifications for intervention under” section 387, and “nothing in the language of” PAGA establishes “an exclusion from” this “traditional civil procedure rule[]” or “operates as a complete bar to participation as an intervenor . . ., according to the standards set forth in California civil procedure.” To conclude otherwise, Olson asserts, would violate the rule that “‘[a] court may not, under the guise of construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.’” Olson further asserts that “constru[ing]” PAGA’s text “narrowly” as Turrieta suggests — conferring on him “only [the] right . . . to proceed apace with his own PAGA action, no matter how, when or why the claims he has been deputized to pursue may otherwise be compromised” — would be “antithetical to PAGA’s aims.”8
These differing views reflect fundamental disagreement about, as Olson puts it, “the scope of a duly deputized plaintiff’s right to prosecute and resolve claims brought on behalf of the State in a PAGA action.” Before PAGA’s enactment, civil penalties for Labor Code violations could be pursued and recovered “‘only by the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.’” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 381.) Our prior decisions have generally described PAGA as “simply a procedural statute” that “allow[s] an aggrieved employee to recover” those civil penalties “as the proxy or agent of state labor law enforcement agencies” (Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 (Amalgamated)), i.e., “as the state’s authorized representative” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 80). This broad description of a PAGA plaintiff’s status does little to establish or define the scope of a PAGA plaintiff’s authority to act on the state’s behalf, either in general or with respect to the specific question here: may a PAGA plaintiff, based solely on
The dissent reads our prior decisions differently. In its view, our previous characterization of a PAGA plaintiff “as a representative of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies” settles the issue. (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 5, italics added.) Based on that characterization, the dissent declares, it is “clear” that Olson and others like him may “assert[] the state’s interest in intervening in” the PAGA action “of another plaintiff prosecuting the same or overlapping claims.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 5–6.)
For several reasons, we disagree. First, the term “representative” is just one of several terms we have used in generally describing the role of a PAGA plaintiff. As earlier explained, we have simultaneously described a PAGA plaintiff as the state’s “agent” or “proxy.” (Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986 [“An employee plaintiff suing” under PAGA “does so as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies”]; Amalgamated, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1003 [aggrieved employee bringing a PAGA action “acts as the proxy or agent of state labor law enforcement agencies”].) The dissent rejects any analysis based on our prior use of the word “agent” to describe a PAGA plaintiff’s relationship to the state. (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 16.) Yet, without analysis or explanation, the dissent relies entirely on our simultaneous and alternative use of the word “representative” as the basis for concluding that a PAGA plaintiff has a “right” to “assert[] the state’s interest in intervening in” the PAGA action “of another plaintiff prosecuting the same or overlapping claims.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 6.)
Second, in using the word “representative” to generally describe the role of a PAGA plaintiff, we did not establish, define, or address the precise scope of a PAGA plaintiff’s authority to act on the state’s behalf. Rather, we used the word in a very general “sense” to convey the idea that the action of a PAGA plaintiff is brought “on the state’s behalf.” (ZB, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 185 [“All PAGA claims are ‘representative’ actions in the sense that they are brought on the state’s behalf”]; see Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 387 [“‘every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state’”].) Moreover, as noted above, our prior decisions are inconsistent with the dissent’s apparent view that a PAGA plaintiff’s authority as the
Indeed, consistent with these decisions, Olson agrees that he is not authorized under PAGA to “act on the State’s behalf for all purposes” or to exercise “the sweep of the LWDA’s entirе authority.” Instead, he acknowledges that the fundamental “question” to be answered here is whether “the scope of” his authority under PAGA, as someone “duly deputized . . . to prosecute and resolve [PAGA] claims brought on behalf of the State,” includes seeking intervention, based exclusively on the interests of the state, in “the prosecution of [a] parallel action[] involving overlapping claims.” If not, then Olson is not, as he
asserts, “able to meet the qualifications for intervention under”In resolving this issue, “our fundamental task,” as with any question of statutory interpretation, “is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose.” [Citation.] “We begin by examining the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to the entire substance of the statutes in order to determine their scope and purposes. [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question in context, keeping in mind the statutes’ nature and obvious purposes. [Citation.] We must harmonize the various parts of the enactments by considering them in the context of the statutory [framework] as a whole. [Citation.] If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.”10 (Skidgel v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 14.)
A. The
Turning first to the statutory language, we begin with Olson‘s acknowledgement that PAGA‘s text “does not explicitly provide for” intervention in a PAGA action by someone who has filed a separate PAGA action asserting overlapping claims. Indeed, PAGA‘s provisions speak only in general terms.
The absence of such language, however, is not, as Turrieta and Lyft suggest, determinative. As we have explained, “whatever is necessarily implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.” (Johnston v. Baker (1914) 167 Cal. 260, 264.) Relatedly, “[i]t is а well-recognized rule of statutory construction that a general grant of power, unaccompanied by specific directions as to the manner in which the power is to be exercised, implies the right and duty to adopt and employ such means and methods as may be reasonably necessary to a proper exercise of the power.” (Laurelle v. Bush (1911) 17 Cal.App. 409, 415-416 (Laurelle); see Western U. Tel. Co. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (1911) 15 Cal.App. 679, 692 [as to a legislative “grant of powers,” “the body clothed with such powers may exercise, additionally, such implied or incidental powers as may be found necessary to enable it to execute its express powers, or, in other words, to properly and fully carry out its main purposes“].)11
Here, Turrieta‘s PAGA action serves these statutory purposes. By filing and prosecuting it, Turrieta “sue[d] on behalf of the state and [sought to] collect [civil] penalties” on the state‘s behalf for Lyft‘s alleged violations of the Labor Code. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 545.) In so doing, she was attempting “to vindicate the [LWDA‘s] interest in enforcing the Labor Code” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 388-389), to “enforce the state‘s interest in penalizing and deterring employers who violate California‘s labor laws” (id. at p. 387), and to “assist [the state] with labor law enforcement” (Williams, at p. 538). She was “represent[ing] the same legal right and interest as state labor law enforcement agencies,” i.e., “‘recovery of civil penalties that otherwise would have been assessed and collected by’ the LWDA.” (Iskanian, at p. 380.) “Practically,” she and her counsel stood “to gain from proving as convincingly as possible as many Labor Code violations as the evidence [would] sustain, thereby maximizing the recovery for aggrieved employees as well as any potential attorney fee award.” (Williams, at pp. 548-549Ibid.) In light of these considerations, it is debatable whether recognition of the intervention power Olson asserts — which he bases on his simultaneous representation of the very same state interests that Turrieta already represents — is reasonably necessary to effectuate the Legislature‘s objectives in authorizing PAGA actions. (See id. at p. 548.)
Not surprisingly, on this precise question, the parties starkly disagree. Olson argues that declining to recognize the power of a PAGA plaintiff to intervene in another plaintiff‘s PAGA action involving overlapping claims would be “antithetical to PAGA‘s aims” and the Legislature‘s “purpose.” It would, he asserts, “permit[] hasty, secret settlements to be quickly approved by busy trial courts” without the benefit of the special “insight [and]
Turrieta, by contrast, argues that allowing intervention would make PAGA claims “dramatically harder to pursue.” It would enable “competing litigants” on the plaintiff‘s side of the action asserting “conflicting positions” — “all purportedly on behalf of the same real party in interest” — to “disrupt settlements” and “derail litigation and resolution for years.” Moreover, Turrieta argues, in light of the PAGA provision on recovery of attorney‘s fees and costs (
Given these conflicting views, and because a textual analysis is not dispositive, we examine additional considerations, including other PAGA provisions that are relevant to the parties’ arguments on whether intervention on the state‘s behalf would further PAGA‘s purpose.
B. The Broader Statutory Scheme
Other aspects of the statutory scheme suggest that recognition of the intervention power Olson asserts is neither reasonably necessary to effectuate PAGA‘s purpose nor consistent with the Legislature‘s intent. As earlier noted, insofar as the provisions of PAGA that apply here speak to the involvement in
Indeed, as Lyft points out, the absence of any provision for involvement of, or even notice to, “other PAGA plaintiffs” is particularly notable and “conspicuous” in the settlement context given the existence of a PAGA provision requiring that any proposed settlement “be submitted to the [LWDA] at the same time that it is submitted to the court” for review and approval. (
Olson insists that settlement oversight by only the courts and the LWDA is insufficient. He first suggests that courts, unless provided with “independent perspectives” and “important information” from intervening PAGA plaintiffs, are not adequately equipped to “‘sniff out bad deals‘” and “assess[] [the] fairness” of a proposed settlement. He next argues that the LWDA, due to insufficient “resources” and “personnel,” lacks “the capacity to review” proposed settlements and provide courts with the necessary input. “[B]y definition,” Olson asserts, the LWDA is “too overburdened to weigh in upon the hundreds of PAGA settlements presented to it each year.” Because the “beleaguered” LWDA “simply does not have the capacity to quickly respond to settlements brokered in secret and then hаstily pushed through the approval process,” relying on settlement review by the LWDA — in lieu of review by “its proxy,” i.e., a PAGA plaintiff in a separate, parallel action who intervenes — is “impractical.”
The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), participating as amicus curiae, likewise asserts that the LWDA‘s “resources are inadequate to
We find these arguments unpersuasive in light of several considerations suggesting that the Legislature contemplated formal oversight and review of proposed settlements only by the LWDA and trial courts. First, the Legislature, in passing PAGA, emphasized that under its provisions, “state labor law enforcement agencies’ enforcement actions have primacy over any private enforcement efforts undertaken pursuant to” PAGA. (Stats. 2003, ch. 906, § 1, subd. (d).) Second, although it is true the Legislature enacted PAGA in 2003 in part because of a then-perceived “shortage of government resources” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 at p. 379), it also true the Legislature expected and intended that PAGA actions by aggrieved employees would provide additional revenue to the state in general and to the LWDA in particular. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Senate Bill No. 796 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.), as amended Apr. 22, 2003, p. 4 [this bill
The third consideration that cuts against Olson‘s argument is the evolution of PAGA‘s settlement oversight provisions. The initial version of PAGA contained no provision regarding settlement. (Stats. 2003, ch. 906, § 2, pp. 6629-6631.) The Legislature first addressed this subject in 2004, adding a provision —
In 2016, the Legislature amended former subdivision (l) of
According to relevant legislative history, the purpose of these changes was “to improve the review and oversight of PAGA cases by” the LWDA. (Dept. Finance, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 836 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.), June 16, 2016, p. 7.) Because of an unanticipated “explosion in [PAGA] claims and the same lack of [agency] resources” that initially led to PAGA‘s enactment (Dept. Industrial Relations, Enrolled Bill Rep., supra, at p. 2), the LWDA “lacked the capacity ... to oversee PAGA cases in any meaningful way” (id. at p. 4). It was unable to “conduct[] a meaningful [initial] review in more than a handful of the 6,000 or more notice claims submitted annually.” (Id. at p. 2.) And it had “no way of knowing what happen[ed]” in cases it had “not taken over, unless and until [it] receive[d] a check for its share of the PAGA penalties.” (Ibid.) This аfter-the-fact receipt of penalty payments, which “appear[ed] to occur in only about 10-15% of the cases” (ibid.), did not enable the LWDA “to determine or verify whether penalty recoveries [were] appropriate in the context of an individual case or in the broader context of the volume of PAGA litigation being conducted” (id. at p. 4). Extending the time for LWDA review and investigation and requiring that PAGA complaints, proposed settlements, and judgments be submitted to the LWDA would give the agency “the ability to track PAGA litigation through to conclusion” (Dept. Industrial Relations, Enrolled Bill Rep., supra, at p. 4), “to better evaluate what happens with these cases” and, “in turn,” “to better assess PAGA‘s fairness and effectiveness as an enforcement tool” (id. at p. 6). These changes, along with expanded judicial review of settlements, would “ensure that PAGA cases [were] pursued in the public‘s interest and not just for private purposes.” (Id. at pp. 1-2.) They were expected and intended “to create meaningful oversight mechanisms” that would “improve oversight of PAGA cases, consistent with the law‘s original intent, to improve outcomes for workers and the state.” (Id. at pp. 4, 6.)
The Legislature simultaneously provided the LWDA with additional funds to perform its oversight responsibilities. It established filing fees for both
This legislative history, viewed collectively, undermines Olson‘s assertion that because joint oversight by courts and the LWDA is inadequate, the power to intervene in Turrieta‘s action must be within the scope of his power to commence and prosecute a PAGA action on the state‘s behalf. As detailed above, when the Legislature expressly addressed oversight, it looked only to the courts and to the LWDA, and it provided the funds it deemed necessary for the LWDA to effectively perform its statutorily assigned oversight functions. These actions of the Legislature and the explanatory comments in the legislative history — which contain no mention or suggestion of oversight by anyone else — indicate the Legislature does not share Olson‘s view that courts are not adequately equipped to “‘sniff out bad deals‘” and “assess[] [the] fairness” of proposed settlements, that the LWDA‘s financial “resources are inadequate to fully” perform its oversight functions, and that joint oversight by courts and the LWDA is insufficient to fulfill the Lеgislature‘s purposes in enacting PAGA.
Moreover, in light of this legislative background, we find it especially noteworthy that neither Olson nor the DLSE point to any evidence — in the record or otherwise — to support their assertion that the financial resources of the LWDA, notwithstanding its budget allocation and the fees and civil penalties it receives through PAGA litigation, are insufficient to perform its oversight functions. “[I]t is axiomatic that statements made in briefs are not evidence” (People v. Edwards (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1259, 1269) and that reviewing courts “do not consider” unsupported “factual assertions” in appellate briefs “that find no basis in the record.” (Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 376, fn. 5.) Given these principles and the legislative history, the argument of Olson and the DLSE that the LWDA lacks sufficient resources to do its statutory job is ultimately a matter for the Legislature to consider, not a basis for concluding
The 2016 legislative history also reflects another legislative concern that is relevant to Olson‘s arguments in support of intervention: the difficulty of “pursu[ing] PAGA litigation.” (Dept. Industrial Relations, Enrolled Bill Rep., supra, at p. 2.) There was discussion of this subject during earlier attempts — in 2006 and 2010 — to amend PAGA to require that a “notice of the request for court [settlement] approval” be served on the LWDA well before the filing of the approval request in court. (Sen. Bill No. 989 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.), as amended Mar. 23, 2010, § 1; see also Assem. Bill No. 2997 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.), as introduced Feb. 24, 2006, § 1 [“The parties seeking court approval of a settlement ... shall serve the [LWDA] notice of the request for court approval“].) In 2006, opponents of the proposed amendment argued it would make the settlement process “more difficult and costly by allowing the eleventh-hour involvement of an agency whose prior lack of participation in the case means it will have no appreciation for what each side compromised on, and why.” (Assem. Com. on Labor and Employment, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2997 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.), as introduced Feb. 24, 2006, p. 4.) Opponents voiced similar concerns in 2010, arguing that the amendment “would weaken the PAGA,” would be “counterproductive to the settlement process,” and would “discourage legitimate PAGA actions” by allowing “interfere[nce] with” settlements “to which the plaintiff and defendant have agreed,” “increas[ing] the hurdles plaintiffs must jump through in order to process a viable claim,” “unreasonably slow[ing] the process,” and “increas[ing] the likelihood of prolonged litigation.” (Senate Com. on Labor and Industrial Relations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 989
supra, at p. 6.) Proponents of the legislation countered that the еxtension of time “between the filing a PAGA notice and the right to commence litigation” was “minimal” (id. at p. 6); that the other “modest changes to the PAGA” (id. at p. 2) would “add a few additional procedural hurdles that potentially could become litigation issues if not strictly or substantially adhered to” (id. at p. 6); and that the “intent” was to provide for “improved public oversight of PAGA cases,” not “to curtail or make it harder to pursue PAGA litigation” (id. at p. 2).
Olson‘s proposed reading of PAGA — which would permit multiple PAGA plaintiffs, all representing the same state interest, to formally intervene in and become parties to the PAGA action of another PAGA plaintiff who is already representing that state interest — clearly implicates concerns about curtailing PAGA litigation by making it more difficult. As Turrieta points out, such intervention would “create[] a situation where” a single “real party in interest” — the state — is represented in a single action by multiple proxies or agents with multiple “sets of lawyers,” all “purporting to advocate for the same client” and pursuing the state‘s single claim for civil penalties based on the same Labor Code violations. As Olson rightly acknowledges, the various “proxies may, at some point, have differing views on how to proceed.” Where such differing views exist, several questions would arise: Which plaintiff controls and directs the litigation and the settlement process? Do all plaintiffs have equal authority? May any one of them unilaterally settle the claims on the state‘s behalf without agreement of, or in the face of affirmative opposition from, other proxies? If there is a successful resolution of the state‘s claim, may all of them recover attorney‘s fees and costs under the provision of PAGA that states, “Any employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney‘s fees and costs“? (
PAGA, which does not reference intervention in a PAGA action by another aggrieved employee who is pursuing identical claims in a separate PAGA action, offers no guidance on these questions. PAGA‘s legislative history is
Nor do other statutes or judicial decisions offer any specific or clear guidance regarding the questions that would arise were we to find that the scope of a PAGA plaintiff‘s authority includes the intervention power that Olson posits.
The dissent‘s primary response on this issue actually helps to make our point. Citing “[o]ther qui tam statutes [that] contemplate the intervention of multiple representatives of the state in a single suit,” the dissent states that “our trial courts” have faced — and therefore are “equipped” to deal with —
Perhaps more importantly, unlike PAGA, which is silent as to intervention, the qui tam statutes the dissent cites contain extensive and detailed provisions expressly addressing this subject. These provisions specify, among other things, who may intervene, when intervention is allowed, who controls the action after intervention, the limits a court may impose on the private qui tam plaintiff in the event of intervention by a government official, the allocation of proceeds, and the recovery of costs, expenses and attorney‘s fees in a successful action in which there has been intervention. (
For several reasons, we are unpersuaded by the dissent‘s analysis of the Legislature‘s intent. First, insofar as intervening plaintiffs and their counsel seek to take over and control another plaintiff‘s PAGA action — which, as earlier noted, is what Olson requested here in his proposed complaint in intervention — their participation would create delay and complexity of an entirely different order than would the statutory judicial approval requirement. Second, the dissent‘s analysis ignores the financial interest that intervening plaintiffs and their counsel — but not courts — have in the original plaintiff‘s action and its settlement. In light of this financial interest, we do not share the dissent‘s view that the Legislature‘s decision to require approval of all PAGA settlements by neutral judges indicates or in any way suggests a legislative “goal of” allowing financially interested PAGA plaintiffs in overlapping actions — represented by financially interested counsel — to “disrupt[] settlements” through intervention on behalf of the state. (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 17.)
Relatedly, we are unwilling to assume, as does the dissent, that such intervention would necessarily further the goal of producing “appropriately valued [settlement] agreements.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 17.) In making this assumption, the dissent adopts Olson‘s policy arguments wholesale while barely acknowledging the competing policy arguments of Turrieta and Lyft. (See id. at pp. 2-3 [allowing intervention furthers PAGA‘s “purpose” by enabling intervenors to “help ensure that proposed settlements are fair,” eliminating “settlement incentives that drive a race to the bottom,” and avoiding the “substantial risk of” reverse “auctioning“].) In this regard, the dissent appears to overlook the fact that Accurso — a decision on which the dissent heavily relies (dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 6-8) — featured
The dissent summarily dismisses this concern based on Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, but that decision did not, as the dissent asserts, discuss “formal intervention motions” as a tool “for trial courts to screen out opportunistic private plaintiffs who object to settlements only to obtain a share of attorneys’ fees.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 9.) Hernandez recognized in the class action context a concern that Turrieta raises here: the threat presented by ” ‘professional objectors’ ” who “harm the [very] class members whose interests they claim to protect” by filing “groundless” and “[m]eritless objections” that ” ‘disrupt settlements,’ ” “require[] class counsel to expend resources,” and ” ‘delay the provision of relief to class members who . . . have already waited years for resolution.’ ” (Hernandez, at p. 272.) Hernandez cited this threat as a “policy” reason for retaining the California rule that class members may not appeal from a class settlement unless they become a named party through formal intervention or by filing a motion to set aside and vacate the class judgment. (Ibid.) Earlier in the opinion, in the passage the dissent cites, Hernandez stated that requiring intervention “promotes judicial economy by providing clear notice of a timely intent to challenge the class representative‘s settlement action.” (Hernandez, at p. 272, italics added.) Abandoning that requirement, Hernandez reasoned, would allow untimely challenges by class members who make “a strategic
We also disagree with the dissent‘s alternative explanation for the Legislature‘s silence on the procedural problems arising from intervention and the Legislature‘s failure to recognize or even suggest an oversight role for PAGA plaintiffs in overlapping actions.17 According to the dissent, “the better inference” to be drawn from these facts “is that the Legislature sought to strengthen the LWDA‘s oversight role even with the availability of intervention by private plaintiffs.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 13.) This inference, the dissent argues, arises from the Legislature‘s awareness, when it enacted PAGA‘s oversight provisions, of ” ’ “existing laws” ’ ” — i.e., the intervention statute,
Nor does our opinion foreclose other ways in which “deputized PAGA plaintiffs [may] assist[]” both courts and “the LWDA with [their settlement oversight] function.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 13.) Courts, in evaluating the adequacy and fairness of proposed PAGA settlements, remain free to exercise discretion to consider arguments and evidence informally offered by plaintiffs pursuing overlapping PAGA claims in separate actions. Indeed, Turrieta and Lyft concede that such plaintiffs may offer objections to courts and that “courts have discretion to consider [those] objections.”
Plaintiffs in overlapping PAGA actions may also inform the LWDA of their concerns about proposed settlements. Turrieta and Lyft, although asserting that the state itself has no right to formally involve itself in a PAGA action, concede that the LWDA may informally submit comments on the
C. Moniz, Uribe, and Accurso
As earlier noted, Olson relies on Moniz and Uribe — as does the dissent (dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 10-11) — but those decisions do not persuade us toward Olson‘s view because neither considered whether the scope of a PAGA plaintiff‘s statutory authority to commence and prosecute a PAGA action includes the right to seek intervention on behalf of the state in the overlapping PAGA action of another aggrieved employee. Uribe, as here relevant, addressed the standing of a plaintiff in intervention — Isabel Garibay — to appeal from a judgment entered upon the court‘s approval of a settlement covering the class claims and PAGA claim of the original plaintiff, Uribe. When Uribe and the defendant sought preliminary approval of the settlement, “the trial court authorized Garibay,” who “had earlier filed” her own, separate “representative PAGA cause of action,” “to intervene as a named party in [Uribe‘s] lawsuit to oppose the settlement.” (Uribe, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 989.) Garibay, who “opted out of the class action component of Uribe‘s lawsuit” (id. at p. 990), thereafter filed a complaint in intervention in Uribe‘s action that “expressly stated” an overlapping PAGA claim (id. at p. 1001). After the trial court approved the settlement and entered a judgment confirming it, Garibay appealed. (id. at p. 989.) The Court of Appeal held that she had “standing” on appeal “to challenge the settlement‘s PAGA component” (id. at p. 991) because (1) by intervening, she had officially “becom[e] a party of record” (id. at p. 1000), and (2) the “PAGA cause of action” she had asserted “in [Uribe‘s] lawsuit” by filing the complaint in intervention “was resolved against her” by “the other parties’ settlement of Uribe‘s PAGA claim” (id. at p. 1001).
Of significance to our analysis, the Court of Appeal in Uribe declared the Court of Appeal‘s decision in Turrieta to be “distinguishable.” (Uribe, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 1002.) The Uribe court expressly “decline[d] to” consider whether “the trial court‘s intervention rulings” were correct. (Id. at p. 1002, fn. 4.) Instead, it “presume[d]” those rulings were “correct” (id. at p. 1002) because no one had challenged them on appeal. Thus, Uribe simply did not consider whether a PAGA plaintiff‘s authority includes the right to intervene in another aggrieved employee‘s separate PAGA action. Moreover, the lynchpin of the Uribe court‘s standing analysis was that (1) Garibay formally asserted a “PAGA cause of action in [Uribe‘s] lawsuit” by filing a complaint in intervention and becoming a named party (id. at p. 1001, italics added), (2) the PAGA cause of action “was resolved against her” by “the other parties’ settlement of Uribe‘s PAGA claim” (ibid.), and (3) the cause of action would be “precluded if Uribe‘s PAGA settlement stands” (id. at p. 1002). Thus, not only did the court decline to consider whether intervention was proper, it rested its standing analysis, not on Garibay‘s authority to assert the state‘s interest in an overlapping PAGA action, but on the effect of the settlement on the PAGA claim that Garibay had formally asserted in Uribe‘s action by filing a complaint in intervention. For these reasons, Uribe sheds no light on whether the scope of a PAGA plaintiff‘s authority, as the state‘s representative, includes the right to assert whatever authority the state may have to request intervention in the PAGA action of another plaintiff.26
Moniz addressed a somewhat similar question of apрellate standing but involved a different factual scenario. There, Paola Correa, who had filed a PAGA action, was denied permission to intervene in the overlapping PAGA action of Rachel Moniz. (Moniz, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 66.) When Moniz and the defendant later moved for court approval of a proposed settlement, “Correa filed an opposition to the motion,” “objections to the settlement,” and a “motion for attorney fees and costs for herself,” and her
For several reasons, Moniz‘s analysis is unpersuasive. First, according to the opinion in that case, the parties who contested Correa‘s standing to appeal based their challenge solely on the fact that Correa was not “a party of record,” and they did “not argue in their briefing that . . . she [was] not ‘aggrieved’ by the judgment confirming the settlement.” (Moniz, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 71, 72.) Thus, the latter issue was uncontested and the court addressed it without the benefit of any legal input from counsel. Second, and likely related to the first, the court made no examination of PAGA‘s text or of the question now before us: Whether the scope of a PAGA plaintiff‘s authority includes the authority to “seek to become a party to the settling action.” (Moniz, at p. 73.) Nor did the court consider any of the complex problems, as discussed above, that arise from the conclusion that a PAGA plaintiff‘s authority includes the power of intervention, or whether recognizing such authority would further or undermine PAGA‘s purpose. Without examining any of thesе issues, the court declared that such authority necessarily “follows” from and is “part of” a PAGA plaintiff‘s “role as [a] designated prox[y] of” and “effective advocate for the state.” (Moniz, at p. 73.) Having here considered these matters with the benefit of extensive briefing from the parties and amici curiae, we conclude, for reasons stated above, that the scope of a PAGA plaintiff‘s authority does not include this
The dissent also relies heavily on Accurso (dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 6-8), but we find that decision to be no more persuasive than Uribe or Moniz. Contrary to what the dissent suggests, the Accurso court did not consider or comment on whether the intervention motions there at issue were properly denied “for lack of authority under PAGA.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 7, italics added.) Instead, it focused only on the interpretation and application of the general intervention statute,
II. Motion To Vacate And Standing To Appeal
Because, as a general matter, “only parties of record may appeal,” a person “denied the right to intervene in an action ordinarily may not appeal from a judgment subsequently entered in the case.” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 736.) “Nevertheless,” a person denied intervention “who is legally ‘aggrieved’ by a judgment may become a party of record and obtain a right to appeal by moving to vacate the judgment pursuant to
and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment.”28 (Id. at pp. 736-737.)
Olson‘s assertion of authority to move to vacate the judgment and thus gain standing to appeal rests largely on the same arguments he made in asserting a right to seek intervention. Relying solely on his status as the state‘s “deputized” representative, he argues: The state “is aggrieved by the judgment” because the settlement “resolve[d] [its] claims for .05% of their value.” Because “the State is aggrieved by the judgment and he has standing,” as the state‘s deputized representative, “to assert the State‘s interest,” he “meets the standard to move to vacate the judgment” and to appeal.
Olson‘s argument, which is based on the same analysis as his intervention argument, is unpersuasive for essentially the same reasons. The provisions of PAGA contain no language expressly referencing the power to make a motion to vacate the judgment in another aggrieved employee‘s PAGA action asserting overlapping claims, and concluding that this power is necessarily implied in a PAGA plaintiff‘s authority to commence and prosecute a PAGA action on the state‘s behalf would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme as a whole. When the Legislature expressly addressed the issue of oversight, it looked only to the courts and to the LWDA, and it provided for the funds it deemed necessary for the LWDA to effectively perform its statutorily assigned oversight functions consistent with existing budgetary constraints. The omission of any mention or suggestion of oversight by anyone else is significant given the unanswered questions that would arise from adopting Olson‘s construction, which could leave courts faced with multiple motions to vacate and multiple appeals in a single PAGA action, filed by multiple PAGA plaintiffs and their counsel, all purporting to represent the interests of the same client: the state. In addition to these procedural problems, Olson‘s view implicates conflicting policy arguments that should be evaluated and addressed by the Legislature in its policymaking role, not by this court as part of interpreting the statute. Nothing in PAGA‘s text, the statutory scheme, or the legislative history suggests the Legislature understood or intended an aggrieved employee‘s authority to commence and prosecute a PAGA action on the state‘s behalf to include the power to move to vacate a judgment obtained by another aggrieved employee — representing the same state interest — after a proposed settlement has been submitted for review to both the trial court and the LWDA, and the court has determined that the proposed settlement “is fair to those affected.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 549.)
We find Olson‘s arguments unpersuasive. As noted above, Olson asserts he may move to vacate the judgment because “[t]he state ... is a party aggrieved by [that] judgment” and, as the state‘s deputized representative, “he has standing to assert the State‘s interest.” But
III. Right to Object
Olson‘s arguments for the existence of a right to object to the proposed settlement mirror his arguments for the existence of the rights to intervene and to move to vacate. He reasons: The right to object “follows” from his status “as the State‘s proxy” and the fact that the state “deputized [him] to pursue [the] claims” at issue in Turrieta‘s action. This “logical,” “common sense reading of the statute” is “consistent with the State‘s ability” under
On this score, we again find Olson‘s arguments unpersuasive. As previously noted, PAGA is silent regarding a PAGA plaintiff‘s authority to object to a proposed settlement in another PAGA plaintiff‘s action and, in light of all the relevant considerations, his arguments fail to convince us that such authority necessarily “follows” from the authority to commence and prosecute a civil action. As earlier discussed, although the PAGA provisions that apply here expressly contemplate and provide for the LWDA‘s involvement in a PAGA plaintiff‘s action, they say nothing about the involvement of anyone else, including, as here relevant, PAGA plaintiffs who have brought separate PAGA actions asserting identical claims. Were we to conclude that the scope of an aggrieved employee‘s authority to act on the state‘s behalf includes the right to file objections to a proposed settlement in the PAGA action of another aggrieved employee acting on the state‘s behalf and representing the same state interest, the absence of any PAGA provision addressing this subject would, as noted above, give rise to numerous complex and unanswered questions about the relative authority of the PAGA plaintiff who filed and agreed to settle the action, and nonparty PAGA plaintiffs who object to the settlement.30
This silence also undermines Olson‘s reliance on the PAGA provision that requires submission of proposed settlements “to the agency,” i.e., the LWDA. (
Finally, insofar as Olson bases his argument on the “reason that PAGA was enacted” — i.e., “a shortage of State personnel employed in an enforcement capacity” — we reject it for the reasons stated above. To reiterate, the legislative history shows that when the Legislature expressly addressed the issue of oversight, it looked only to the courts and to the LWDA, and it provided for the funds it deemed necessary for the LWDA to effectively perform its statutorily assigned oversight functions in light of the State‘s budget. Olson‘s unsupported assertions regarding the LWDA‘s current capacity to perform its functions do not persuade us to adopt his view.
Olson also asserts that finding a “proxy‘s[] right to object is consistent with the [PAGA‘s] aim,” “recognizes [it] as a vehicle to enforce public rights and deter future violations,” and “serves its legislative purpose[s],” i.e., “to protect the interests of workers,” “‘to achieve maximum compliance with state labor laws,‘” and “to ‘advance the state‘s public policy of affording employees workplaces free of Labor Code violations, notwithstanding the inability of state agencies to monitor every employer or industry.‘” Failing to recognize this right, on the other hand, would “‘ill-serve[]’ ” these “purpose[s].” From a policy perspective, because parties who have agreed to settle “are no longer adverse,” finding that another state “proxy” may object — and submit “valuable information that provides a lens through which the court may see the settlement terms in sharper relief” — “helps ensure that the court‘s required review of the settlement is meaningful, informed and fair to those affected,” and “guard[s] against the risk that” the settling parties “may be inclined to promote a settlement that is ... advantageous to them, but ... inconsistent with the purposes of PAGA, or even inconsistent with the record in the case.” Additional “support” for finding that another proxy has a right to object exists in
Of course, Turrieta and Lyft disagree with Olson‘s claim that his reading would serve PAGA‘s purpose and public policy. Lyft asserts that “settlement objections present an opportunity for disruption and delay unrelated to the merits of a settlement,” and that “[r]estricting objector interference in the PAGA settlement context allows for prompt payment of PAGA penalties to
As earlier explained, nothing in PAGA‘s text, statutory scheme, or legislative history suggests the Legislature understood or intended an aggrieved employee‘s authority to commence and prosecute a PAGA action on the state‘s behalf to include the power to file objections to the settlement reached by another aggrieved employee representing the same state interest and also acting on the state‘s behalf.
Finally, Olson‘s argument that
For the reasons stated above, we hold that an aggrieved employee‘s status as the State‘s proxy in a PAGA action does not give that employee the right to seek intervention in the PAGA action of another employee, to move to vacate a judgment entered in the other employee‘s action, or to require a court to receive and consider objections to a proposed settlement of that action. At the same time, we reiterate that the Legislature, in its policymaking role, remains free to consider the questions we have addressed and resolved in this opinion — along with the various related policy arguments — and to decide whether statutory recognition оf the rights Olson asserts is wise and/or necessary to achieve PAGA‘s goals.
DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal‘s judgment is affirmed.
JENKINS, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger
I concur in the majority opinion, which I have signed. I write separately for three reasons.
First, although the majority does not decide the issue, I agree with Justice Liu that there is no apparent basis for questioning the right of the state to participate in litigation brought by a private party under the
But I also think it is a different question whether a plaintiff in a different, overlapping PAGA action has the same powers as the state to enter the action as a party. The statute does not provide clear answers. It is true that PAGA deputizes private parties to pursue Labor Code enforcement on the state‘s behalf. But while it is possible for the state‘s interests to be represented in court by multiple governmental officials with competing perspectives, this is relatively rare. (Cf., e.g., Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (2022) 597 U.S. 179, 184.) It would be especially unusual for multiple private parties to compete to represent the state‘s interests in the same litigation. This is a possibility the Legislature has effectively foreclosed in other, prototypical qui tam proceedings. (Cf., e.g.,
Second, the question we address in this case is limited to an argument for intervention based solely on a private PAGA plaintiff‘s statutory authorization to act as a proxy for the state in the context of a particular lawsuit. As the majority notes, this case does not present any question about private plaintiffs’ ability to intervene to vindicate their own personal interests, as employees who have been aggrieved by the employer‘s practices. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14, fn. 6; cf. Simpson Redwood Co. v. State of California (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1192, 1200.) Resolution of those issues must await another case in which they have been briefed and argued.
Finally, I wish to underscore the undisputed point that a trial court has a duty to ensure the fairness and soundness of any settlement of PAGA claims alleging an employer‘s Labor Code violations. (
With these observations, I concur.
KRUGER, J.
I Concur:
GROBAN, J.
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu
Today‘s opinion reaches the wrong result because it starts in the wrong place. The court holds that the
The court holds that the same or overlapping PAGA claims initiated by different plaintiffs must be prosecuted in separate actions, regardless of what a trial court might view as the benefits of another PAGA plaintiff‘s intervention. This result is contrary to basic principles undergirding the rules of civil procedure, which facilitate (even if they do not require) adjudication of the same claims in a single proceeding. It also deprives trial courts of discretion to permit knowledgeable and interested plaintiffs to intervene in suits, even when their participation would help ensure that proposed settlements are fair to aggrieved employees and the state. And it deprives appellate courts of the opportunity to consider challenges to allegedly wrongful settlements. Taken together, the court‘s decision creates a substantial risk of auctioning the settlement of representative PAGA claims to the lowest bidder and insulating those settlements from appellate review. These consequences, which the court views as required by PAGA despite the lack of textual support, are inconsistent with the statute‘s purpose: to maximize enforcement of the Labor Code by permitting private attorneys general to prosecute labor violations against defendants on behalf of the state.
Although the court misconstrues PAGA, the Legislature is not without recourse. It may wish to expressly authorize PAGA plaintiffs to seek intervention and to move to vacate a judgment in a parallel proceeding as a means of augmenting the state‘s limited enforcement capacity. At the least, it may wish to examine whether, in light of today‘s decision, the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) has adequate resources to carry the burden of ensuring fair PAGA settlements without the assistance of other deputized PAGA plaintiffs. California is a big state, and the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), as amicus curiae, asserts that the LWDA lacks the resources to supervise settlement negotiations in each case, as would be required for it to intervene in appropriate cases and appeal from unfair settlements. Today‘s opinion steers PAGA into avoidable shoals, and the unfortunate result calls for legislative attention, lest the statute‘s goal of strengthening Labor Code enforcement be thwarted by settlement incentives that drive a race to the bottom.
I.
Although this court has not previously considered whether the state has a right to intervene in a PAGA suit, the answer is straightforward. As the court in California Business & Industrial Alliance v. Becerra (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 734 explained, despite PAGA‘s lack of “an express provision authorizing the executive to intervene” in an action, “California law independently requires courts to permit intervention in an action by any person who ‘claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person‘s ability to protect that interest, unless that person‘s interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties’ (
Becerra‘s holding is in line with our case law that has held for over a century that “[a]ny person who is a real party in interest may intervene in any type of action or proceeding.” (Cohn v. County Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 180, 184, citing Robinson v. Crescent City etc. Co. (1892) 93 Cal. 316, 319 (Robinson) [holding that
Further, the basic premise that a real party in interest is nevertheless a “nonparty” who can intervene under
Once it is acknowledged that the Attorney General has a right to seek intervention in any PAGA action under
Our case law over the decades is consistent: When a PAGA plaintiff sues an employer, the plaintiff acts as a representative of the state‘s labor law enforcement agencies. “In a lawsuit brought under the act, the employee plaintiff represents the same legal right and interest as state labor law enforcement agencies — namely, recovery of civil penalties that otherwise would have been assessed and collected by the Labor Workforce Development Agency.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 986 (Arias); accord, Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003; Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 81 (Kim); see also Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 548 [“Representative PAGA actions ‘directly enforce the state‘s interest in penalizing and deterring employers who violate California‘s labor laws.’ “].) Petitioner Brandon Olson asserts the state‘s interest in intervening
This conclusion accords with that of the Court of Appeal in Accurso v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1128 (Accurso), review granted, November 29, 2023, S282173. In considering the right of a PAGA plaintiff to intervene in an overlapping PAGA action, the court in Accurso reasoned that “ordinary rules of civil procedure, supplemented where necessary and appropriate by rules governing coordination of complex cases, are adequate to the task of resolving the difficult procedural problems that arise when multiple LWDA-deputized PAGA claimants sue the same target employer in different courts.” (Accurso, at p. 1148, fn. omitted.) The Court of Appeal adopted the phrasing of the federal standard for intervention under
Accurso concluded that the trial court‘s denial of mandatory intervention under
But the Court of Appeal went on to find the denial of permissive intervention to be an abuse of discretion because the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that the proposed intervenors did not have a “‘significantly protectable interest.‘” (Accurso, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145, review granted.) The court reasoned that “permissive intervention supplies a means to make sure the perspective of potentially affected nonparty PAGA claimants is included in the settlement approval process.” (Id. at p. 1153.) “Naturally, the proponents of a hard-won settlement will have little or no incentive to point out that the proposed settlement terms exceed
deficiencies in a proposed PAGA settlement without assistance from anyone other than participants to the settlement negotiations.” (Id. at pp. 1153–1154.) Thus, “in situations where PAGA claimants with their own overlapping claims in other pending cases show up and wish to provide input, we see no reason why they should not be given a seat at the table. And should trial courts wish to ensure that such PAGA claimants are meaningfully involved in the settlement approval process, permissive intervention even before the settlement approval process begins may be a way to ensure that they are fully prepared to do so.” (Id. at p. 1154.) The appellate court remanded to the trial court to consider the motion for permissive intervention, which it considered “a case management tool busy trial judges may wish to utilize in managing PAGA cases when a potentially valuable source of information is available.” (Id. at p. 1155–1156.)
To be sure, the identity of interest between a PAGA plaintiff and the LWDA in a parallel, representative action does not mean that a PAGA deputy is authorized to act on behalf of the state for all purposes. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19). It simply reflects the identity of interest between the state and a PAGA plaintiff in enforcing civil penalties for labor violations and a PAGA plaintiff‘s statutory authorization to prosecute the claim on the state‘s behalf to its resolution. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1117 [“Once deputized, the aggrieved employee has authority to ‘seek any civil penalties the state can.’ “].)
Nor does their identity of interest mean that a PAGA plaintiff and the LWDA could each obtain mandatory or permissive intervention under
Importantly, trial courts would retain ample discretion to weed out unhelpful “professional objectors” who may be primarily seeking a cut of attorney‘s
Just as a PAGA plaintiff has a ” ‘significantly protectable interest’ ” in the resolution of a parallel suit such that she or he may seek intervention under
This conclusion is in accord with Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 73, where the court held that a PAGA plaintiff in a parallel suit against the same employer was aggrieved by the judgment confirming the settlement and had standing to appeal. The Court of Appeal reasoned, “Accepting the premise that PAGA allows concurrent PAGA suits [citation], where two PAGA actions involve overlapping PAGA claims and a settlement of one is purportedly unfair, it follows that the PAGA representative in the separate action may seek to become a party to the settling action and appeal the fairness of the settlement as part of his or her role as an effective advocate for the state.” (Moniz, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 73, fn. omitted.)
Similarly, in Uribe v. Crown Building Maintenance Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 986, 999–1002, the court held that a PAGA plaintiff who had been granted intervention hаd standing to appeal a PAGA settlement reached by the original parties to the action. “Under these circumstances,” the court explained, the intervening plaintiff, Garibay, had “standing to appeal because, having intervened and yet unable to opt out of the other parties’ settlement of Uribe‘s PAGA claim, Garibay‘s PAGA cause of action in this same lawsuit was resolved against her by the trial court‘s entry of judgment on its final approval of the settlement. She is therefore a party ‘aggrieved’ by the judgment.” (Id. at p. 1001.)
Against this weight of precedent, today‘s opinion concludes that PAGA bars a deputized plaintiff from seeking to intervene in overlapping PAGA actions to assert the state‘s interest in an adequate settlement and from moving to vacate a deficient judgment. While acknowledging that the statute is silent on the issue and that the absence of express authorization is not determinative (maj. opn., ante, at p. 22), the court nevertheless infers from the statute a bar on intervention. This inference does not withstand scrutiny.
To begin, the court reasons that “[o]ther aspects of the statutory scheme suggest that recognition of the intervention power Olson asserts is neither reasonably necessary to effectuate PAGA‘s purpose nor consistent with the Legislature‘s intent.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.) The only other aspect of the statutory scheme that the court can point to is the statute‘s provision that the LWDA receive notice of proposed settlements and copies of PAGA judgments. (
But the court overreads the significance of the fact that the statute speaks only of notice to the state. After all, the state is in the best position to identify plaintiffs in overlapping PAGA actions, as all plaintiffs are required to provide notice to the LWDA prior to commencing an action. (
Moreover, although the text and legislative history of
The “purposes of intervention” include “protect[ing] the interests of those who may be affected by the judgment” and “obviat[ing] delay and multiplicity of actions.” (County of San Bernardino v. Harsh California Corp. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 341, 346; accord People v. Superior Court (Good) (1976) 17 Cal.3d 732, 736.) As we have explained, courts have discretion to permit a real party in interest to intervene under
As another basis for its decision, the court says several “complex and unsettled questions” would arise if a PAGA plaintiff could intervene in the parallel action of another plaintiff, such as who would direct the negotiations and hоw attorney‘s fees would be allocated. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 42.) However, “[i]f a movant meets the requirements for mandatory intervention, ‘the fact that such intervention would add to the complexity of the action . . . is of no moment.’ ” (King v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.) In any event, such complexity arising from multiparty litigation is not new to our trial courts, nor would it be unique to PAGA actions. Other qui tam statutes contemplate the intervention of multiple representatives of the state in a single suit. (See, e.g.,
Although the court and my concurring colleagues note that other qui tam statutes prohibit parallel private actions (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 42–43; conc. opn. of Kruger, J., ante, at pp. 1–2), that observation is of no consequence here, where it is undisputed that PAGA authorizes parallel suits by private plaintiffs. Moreover, the court does not explain why trial courts would find it more difficult to evaluate intervention motions when the representatives of the state are private attorney generals than when the multiple state representatives are government officials, as in other qui tam contexts. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 43.) Trial courts are just as equipped here as in other contexts to determine which complaints in intervention in parallel actions meet the criteria in
“Whether to allow permissive intervention in a particular case ’ “is best determined by a consideration of the facts of that case” [citation], and the decision is ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” (State Water Bd. Cases (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1043; see also Squire v. City and County of San Francisco (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 974, 978 [“Intervention . . . is not a matter of absolute right but is discretionary with the court“]; Cuneo v. Superior Court for Merced County (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 452, 454; Merriam v. Bryan (1929) 36 F.2d 578, 579.) Instead of deferring to the sound judgment of our trial courts, which have handled intervention motions in California for over a century, today‘s opinion withdraws from the courts and PAGA plaintiffs a basic tool of civil procedure.
The court further reasons that its holding is consistent with the Legislature‘s intent to increase settlement oversight without making PAGA litigation more difficult. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 38-40, citing Enrolled Bill Report, supra, at p. 2.) But the Legislature‘s statement that it did not intend for the bill “to curtail or make it harder to pursue PAGA litigation” (Enrolled Bill Report, supra, at p. 2, italics added) is entirely consistent with the Legislature‘s goal of disrupting settlements. (Id. at p. 6 [“The requirement for court approval of all settlements . . . will make it far more difficult for parties to settle PAGA cases simply by agreeing to dismiss PAGA claims or by focusing exclusively on the interests of the plaintiffs’ counsel, named plaintiffs, and defendant, to the exclusion of other employees and former employees whose interests purportedly are being represented“], italics added.) Indeed, today‘s decision will likely make it harder to pursue PAGA litigation because plaintiffs and their attorneys know that defendants can settle the state‘s representative claims for the lowest price with no possibility of intervention by plaintiffs with overlapping claims, including plaintiffs who may have spent considerably more time in litigation. And while it is true that intervention by the LWDA or other PAGA plaintiffs may prolong settlement negotiations in a given suit, the bill history makes clear that the Legislature knowingly traded expediency in exchange for appropriately valued agreements.
Finally, the court reaches its conclusion that intervention and vacatur by PAGA plaintiffs is barred despite the DLSE‘s representation that it does not have capacity to review all proposed settlements and requires the assistance
Today‘s opinion dismisses the DLSE‘s concern as unsupported by “any evidence.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 37.) The court notes that the Legislature allocated additional funds to support the LWDA‘s enforcement efforts in 2016 on top of the civil penalties it receives through PAGA litigation (id. at pp. 36–37), and it quotes at length from university reports that the court formally declines to notice (id. at pp. 31–32, fn. 13).
But we have relied on amicus briefs submitted by the DLSE in the past (see, e.g., Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 1, 15–16, 20), and we consistently accord respect to the DLSE‘s views (see, e.g., Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors (2024) 15 Cal.5th 908, 935–936). No one disputes — indeed, the court does not deny — that the DLSE is well positioned to assess the LWDA‘s capacities. And no appellate factfinding is needed to observe that the DLSE‘s assessment is fully consistent with the Legislature‘s express recognition of the role of deputized PAGA plaintiffs in augmenting the state‘s limited capacity to vigorously enforce the Labor Code. (See Stats. 2003, ch. 906, § 1, subds. (c)-(d); see also Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 86 [“The Legislature‘s sole purpose in enacting PAGA was ‘to augment the limited enforcement capability of the [LWDA] by empowering employees to enforce the Labor Code as representatives of the Agency.’ “].)
The court seems to think that even though the PAGA framework is entirely premised on the LWDA‘s limited capabilities, it is somehow possible that the LWDA has sufficient resources to monitor the thousands of PAGA settlements proposed each year and to intervene where appropriate. I suspect this would come as a surprise to the Legislature that enacted PAGA as well as the Legislature that enacted the settlement notice provision in 2016 (as well as the Legislature today, for that matter). Virtually all our decisions construing PAGA have recognized and affirmed PAGA‘s core premise that state resources are too limited to ensure proper Labor Code enforcement. We have not previously questioned that premise, and there is no reason for the court to start now.
Today‘s decision is an aberration, but one that the Legislature can correct. The LWDA is faced with a significant task: “protect[ing] and improv[ing] the health, safety, and economic well-being of over 18 million wage earners.” (State of California Department of Industrial Relations, About Us <https://www.dir.ca.gov/aboutdir.html> [as of Aug. 1, 2024].) PAGA was intended to augment the LWDA‘s limited law enforcement capacity. Although the Legislature enacted PAGA against a legal backdrop that permits civil litigants — and deputized PAGA plaintiffs are no exception — to make use of the full panoply of procedural tools, the court withdraws two mechanisms, intervention and vacatur, that play a critical role in ensuring fair settlements for aggrieved employees asserting violations of the Labor Code. In so holding, the court puts the onus back on the Legislature to ensure that future PAGA settlements are not sold to the lowest bidder.
The Legislature may wish to consider whether the LWDA‘s capacity for oversight of PAGA settlements is sufficient and whether any insufficiency can realistically be remedied by allocation of more resources. In assessing the LWDA‘s capacity, the Legislature may consider the volume of claims associated with each of the several other PAGA oversight functions the agency plays, including reviewing new claim notices, employer response or cure notices, amended claim notices, employees’ cure disputes, court complaints, court orders or judgments, and other responses or documents submitted to the LWDA. (See State of California Department of Industrial Relations, Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) — Filing <https://www.dir.ca.gov/Private-Attorneys-General-Act/Private-Attorneys-General-Act.html> [as of Aug. 1, 2024].) The Legislature may also wish to study the reasonableness of recent PAGA settlements. With such information, the Legislature can consider appropriate responses to the substantial risk of weakened Labor Code enforcement that today‘s opinion has regrettably wrought.
I respectfully dissent.
LIU, J.
I Concur:
EVANS, J.
Notes
Olson asserts in opposition to Turrieta‘s request that the data analyses, opinions, and conclusions contained in these reports are “reasonably subject to dispute” and that the inference Turrieta asks us to draw from them — “the LWDA has unlimited resources to review PAGA settlements” — “is false” as shown by the following: (1) the assertions in the DLSE‘s amicus brief regarding the inadequacy of the LWDA‘s resources and the volume of PAGA cases filed; and (2) documents related to the state budget showing that “funds from PAGA settlements and judgments payable to the LWDA have ... been ‘loaned’ to the state‘s General Fund.” Olson, although citing and quoting the budget-related documents and providing internet links to electronically access them, does not ask for judicial notice of them.
For the reasons stated in Olson‘s opposition, we deny Turrieta‘s request for judicial notice of the two PAGA reports issued by the UCLA Labor Center.