Town of Delafield, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Central Transport Kriewaldt, Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.
Case No.: 2017AP2525
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
June 26, 2020
2020 WI 61
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 179, 932 N.W.2d 423 PDC No: 2019 WI App 35 - Published
OPINION FILED: June 26, 2020
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: March 27, 2020
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Waukesha
JUDGE: Michael J. Aprahamian
JUSTICES:
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, and DALLETT, JJ., joined. KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.
ATTORNEYS:
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Pamela M. Schmidt, Michael K. Roberts, and Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C., Milwaukee.
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by Kimberly M. Kershek and Law Office of Kimberly Kershek, Delafield.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports.
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, and DALLET, JJ., joined. KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed and cause remanded.
¶2 We conclude that the STAA‘s reach in this case mandates only reasonable access. The Town‘s limitation did not need to be grounded solely in safety considerations, as Central Transport maintains, so long as reasonable access was provided. The record in this case reflects that a seasonal weight limitation is a normal restriction transport companies would be
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
¶3 In order to understand Central Transport‘s arguments, we need to lay some groundwork regarding preemption generally, followed by an examination of what the STAA and related federal regulations command. Once we establish what federal law requires, we compare that to the Town‘s implementation and enforcement of its ordinance here.
¶4 Preemption presents a question of law we review de novo. Partenfelder v. Rhode, 2014 WI 80, ¶25, 356 Wis. 2d 492, 850 N.W.2d 896. We conduct this analysis accepting the circuit court‘s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
A. Preemption Generally
¶5 The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”
¶6 Preemption, however, is disfavored “in the absence of persuasive reasons—either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.” Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (quoted source omitted). This presumption against preemption is particularly strong when dealing with the historic police powers of the state. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008). Unless it is the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress,” we assume these traditional areas of state regulation are not superseded by federal law. Id. Laws purporting to preempt state police power regulations are therefore given a “narrow reading.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
¶7 The preemptive effect of any given federal law is guided by Congress‘s purpose. Altria Grp., Inc., 555 U.S. at 76. And that purpose is discerned through the text, aims, and structure of the federal enactment. Id. Sometimes Congress sets forth its preemptive purpose in the text of a law itself (express preemption). Id. Preemptive intent may also be implied when the federal legislation occupies the legislative field (field preemption) or results in an actual conflict with state law (conflict preemption). Id. at 76-77.
¶8 Central Transport argues that express preemption applies here. And in fact,
¶9 Central Transport argues in the alternative that the STAA and related regulations indirectly preempt the Town‘s enforcement of a seasonal weight limitation because they actually conflict. That is, even if a seasonal weight limitation is not expressly preempted, the Town‘s implementation and enforcement of that limitation runs contrary to the reasonable access federal law demands. Conflict preemption occurs “when compliance with both the federal and state laws is a physical impossibility or when a state law is a barrier to the accomplishment and execution of Congress[‘s] objectives and purposes.” Hazelton v. State Pers. Comm‘n, 178 Wis. 2d 776, 787, 505 N.W.2d 793 (Ct. App. 1993).
B. The STAA and Accompanying Federal Regulations
¶10 The portion of the STAA that requires states to provide reasonable access to commercial motor vehicles is found in
¶11 Section 31114(a) sets the general legal standard by prohibiting states from denying what the law calls “reasonable access.” The prohibition applies “to a commercial motor vehicle subject to this subchapter or subchapter I of this chapter.”
¶12 Section 31114(a)(2) details the potential destinations from the highway for which states must maintain reasonable access:
terminals, facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest, and points of loading and
unloading for household goods carriers, motor carriers of passengers, any towaway trailer transporter combination (as defined in section 31111(a)), or any truck tractor-semitrailer combination in which the semitrailer has a length of not more than 28.5 feet and that generally operates as part of a vehicle combination described in section 31111(c) of this title.
- terminals;
- facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest; and
- points of loading and unloading for four specific types of carriers:
- household goods carriers,
- motor carriers of passengers,
- any towaway trailer transporter combination (as defined in
§ 31111(a) ), or - any truck tractor-semitrailer combination in which the semitrailer has a length of not more than 28.5 feet and that generally operates as part of a vehicle combination described in
section 31111(c) .
¶13 This reading is confirmed by the federal regulation tied to this provision, which stands as a near word-for-word copy of the statutory language. The regulation begins, “No State may enact or enforce any law denying reasonable access to vehicles with dimensions authorized by the STAA between the [national highway network] and terminals and facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest.”
In addition, no State may enact or enforce any law denying reasonable access between the [national highway network] and points of loading and unloading to household goods carriers, motor carriers of passengers, and any truck tractor-semitrailer combination in which the semitrailer has a length not to exceed 28 feet (28.5 feet where allowed pursuant to § 658.13(b)(5) of this part) and which generally operates as part of a vehicle combination described in §§ 658.13(b)(5) and 658.15(a) of this part.
¶14 As it did before the court of appeals, Central Transport contends that its destination was a terminal. In response, the Town inverts the language of
¶15 The destination distinction is also important in light of Central Transport‘s arguments based on
Exception.—This section does not prevent a State or local government from imposing reasonable restrictions, based on safety considerations, on a truck tractor-semitrailer combination in which the semitrailer has a length of not more than 28.5 feet and that generally operates as part of a vehicle combination described in section 31111(c) of this title.
¶16
¶16 Central Transport has a different take. It asks this court to read the STAA‘s reasonable access requirement narrowly to only permit restrictions based on safety considerations. In other words, rather than a general reasonable access requirement that seems apparent from the text of
¶18 The First Circuit Court of Appeals held likewise in affirming a district court‘s conclusion that a zoning ordinance limiting nighttime access to and from a local trucking terminal was not preempted. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass‘n v. Town of Plaistow, 67 F.3d 326 (1st Cir. 1995). The argument there, as here, was primarily that the restriction was not allowable because it was not based on safety. Id. at 329.
¶19 Looking to the statute as a whole, the First Circuit observed that the reasonable access mandate extends far and wide to many local roads. Id. at 330. Disallowing local restrictions other than those based on safety “miles away from any interstate or national network highway” would not be consistent with the apparent goals of the federal law. Id. Instead, as the court explained, communities have many legitimate interests outside of safety—assuring quiet in a hospital zone, for example. Id. “It is difficult to conceive that Congress meant to exclude such a concern from the calculus used to determine whether a restriction infringes on ‘reasonable access’ to the federal highway system.” Id.
¶20 The court further pointed to the text itself, along with the statutory history, as contrary to a safety-only reading, explaining: “the original 1982 Surface Act contained the reasonable access language with no exception provision; so nothing in 1982 suggested that state access restrictions were limited to those based on safety.” Id. The safety-based exception, added in 1984, is not worded in such a way and does not appear calculated to impose far more dramatic restrictions on local regulation. Id.; Tandem Truck Safety Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-554, § 106 (codified as amended at
¶21 The Seventh Circuit has echoed this same understanding. Under
¶22 The statutory text and context, federal regulations, and federal circuit court caselaw reject a limitation on local restrictions based solely on safety concerns.10 The traditional power of state and local governments to regulate travel over local roads remains so long as reasonable access is not denied. Central Transport‘s argument that the Town‘s ordinance authorizing seasonal weight limitations is expressly preempted based on its safety-focused reading of the STAA is incorrect.11 Any conflict preemption analysis on these grounds likewise fails. The specific conflict preemption question remaining in light of the facts of this case is whether Central Transport was denied reasonable access to its destination.
II. CENTRAL TRANSPORT WAS AFFORDED REASONABLE ACCESS
¶23 As we have explained, the preemption question under
¶24 On Monday, March 7, 2016, a Waukesha County deputy sheriff cited Central Transport for violating the Town‘s seasonal weight limitation when one of its drivers operating a tractor-trailer was on his way to deliver art supplies. After the Lake County Municipal Court assessed a forfeiture in the amount of $1,532.50, Central
¶25 While the circuit court made few factual findings, the relevant record is based on the testimony of the deputy sheriff who issued the citation and the Town‘s highway department superintendent. This testimony was unrebutted; Central Transport offered no witnesses or evidence at the trial. The record reflects the following.
¶26 In 2016, the Town‘s seasonal weight limitation went into effect when the superintendent believed, based on conditions on the ground during the spring thaw, that excess weight left certain roads particularly vulnerable to damage. The limitation prohibited vehicles weighing over six tons from traveling on certain Town roads. The record is clear that Central Transport‘s offending tractor-trailer weighed more than six tons and traveled on roads where the weight limitation applied.13 The limitation was imposed on Monday, March 7, and remained in effect until Friday, March 11.14 The Town provided notice of the limitation through free-standing road signs posted on Friday, March 4. It was also the Town‘s practice to post the seasonal weight limitation on its website and in a local paper.
¶27 Despite this one-week weight limitation, the Town‘s roads were not off limits. The Town offered permits that allowed overweight vehicles to drive on otherwise restricted roads. A permit could be obtained by calling the Town and going into the superintendent‘s office. The superintendent would then issue a temporary permit along with a route the driver needed to take to minimize travel on restricted roads. The superintendent testified that, to his knowledge, he never denied a request for a permit in the fifteen years he served in his role. He also explained that many companies would call the Town to inquire if the seasonal weight limitation was in effect. The Waukesha County Sheriff‘s Office, according to testimony from the deputy sheriff who issued the citation, also received phone calls inquiring if any seasonal weight limitations were in effect in the county. While the posted signs did not say anything about the permitting process,15 the website included information regarding how to obtain a permit to travel on weight-limited roads and the phone number for the superintendent.
¶28 We read this record to reflect that at the time Central Transport received its citation, seasonal weight limitations were normal and known for those making commercial deliveries during that time of year
¶29 Taken together, we conclude the specific facts of this case demonstrate that Central Transport had reasonable access to its destination. Central Transport‘s driver could have checked the website or called ahead to determine whether any restrictions were in effect. Or, upon seeing the seasonal weight limitation was posted, the driver could have contacted the Town, driven to the office, and obtained a permit that would have allowed the tractor-trailer to lawfully traverse necessary roads. The weight limitation was also based on a reasonably tailored and well-founded police power consideration—damage to roads that were especially vulnerable during the spring thaw.
¶30 While such a system did not provide Central Transport unfettered access to its delivery point, it also did not prohibit all access. Cf. Aux Sable Liquid Prods., 526 F.3d at 1037 (holding that a weight restriction prohibiting all access to a road was not reasonable access); N.H. Motor Transp. Ass‘n, 67 F.3d at 329, 331 (concluding that a limitation of access at night, in the interest in curbing noise, odor, and dust in residential areas, granted reasonable access). The weight-limited roads were, plainly put, reasonably accessible through a readily available permit process.17 Central Transport had a reasonable means of getting from the highway to its destination, the main concern of the STAA. In light of the presumption that the state retains its police powers, and that this federal restriction should be read narrowly, we conclude the implementation and enforcement of the Town‘s ordinance, which Central Transport admits it violated, does not conflict with and therefore was not preempted by the STAA and its related regulations.
III. CONCLUSION
¶31 Central Transport‘s tractor-trailer had reasonable access from the highway to its intended destination when it was cited for violating the Town‘s seasonal weight limitations on certain Town roads as authorized by the Town‘s ordinance. The facts of this case demonstrate Central Transport could have lawfully made its delivery by obtaining a permit, which was readily available. Therefore, the Town‘s implementation of its weight-limit ordinance in 2016 was not preempted by the STAA, and the citation was permissibly
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.
¶32 DANIEL KELLY, J. (concurring). A truck driver for Central Transport Kriewaldt (“Central Transport“) was delivering goods to a customer at a residential address when he was ticketed for violating the Town of Delafield‘s seasonal permitting system. Central Transport says Delafield may not have such a system because it interferes with its “reasonable access” between an interstate freeway and a “terminal” in violation of
¶33 The goal the court set for itself was not an easy one. In fact, unlocking the meaning of “reasonable access” is a bit of a paradox, which was succinctly described in Aux Sable Liquid Prod. v. Murphy, 526 F.3d 1028 (7th Cir. 2008). There, the court recognized that Congress had made a decision “not to define ‘reasonable access’ more specifically.” Id. at 1036. But this, it said, was not an invitation for states “to define the term however they see fit” because “[i]f states were truly left to define this term on their own, the express preemption language in
[T]his broad language can be viewed as reflecting a recognition on Congress‘s part that the manner and degree of access to and from the Interstate necessary to protect Congress‘s overarching goal of uniformity for commercial motor vehicles utilizing the Interstate will vary across the country depending on factors such as whether the Interstate is cutting across rural or metro areas, traffic density on the road, and other considerations.
Id. at 1036. So, at least according to Aux Sable Liquid Prod., the STAA requires “uniformity for commercial motor vehicles utilizing the Interstate” (meaning states may not define “reasonable access” for themselves), but the uniformity will “vary across the country.” Id. I‘m not saying that circle can‘t be squared, but finding the edges requires work that the majority opinion simply didn‘t do.
¶34 I suppose the easiest response to a paradox is to ignore it, and that seems to have been our choice today. The court says Delafield‘s seasonal permitting process was reasonable, but did so without discussing, or even acknowledging, the uniformity mandate that is the motivating rationale for the STAA‘s existence. Instead, we discussed the benefits of the permitting system and made some case-specific observations such as that “seasonal weight limitations were normal and known for those making commercial deliveries during that time of year in Wisconsin[]“; that permits could be obtained on a 24/7 basis; and that a permit has never been denied. Majority op., ¶28. And the court‘s conclusion was explicitly case-specific: “[T]he specific facts of this case demonstrate that Central Transport had reasonable access to its destination.” Id., ¶29.
¶36 I reach the same conclusion as the court, however, for a more straightforward reason. Central Transport had recourse to the STAA for the purpose of striking down the ordinance that was the source of authority for Delafield‘s citation. As the proponent of this proposition, it bore the burden of establishing that the STAA preempted that ordinance. See, e.g., Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Review, 2014 WI 9, ¶19, 352 Wis. 2d 576, 843 N.W.2d 39 (quoting Loeb v. Bd. of Regents, 29 Wis. 2d 159, 164, 138 N.W.2d 227 (1965)) (“[A] party seeking judicial process to advance his position carries the burden of proof[.]“); see also Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. Seafarers’ I. Union, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 125 N.W.2d 324 (1963).
¶37 The first step in such an undertaking is establishing that the route it was driving was covered by the federal statutes. The STAA is applicable to travel between certain interstate highways (of which Interstate 94 is one) and
terminals, facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest, and points of loading and unloading for household goods carriers, motor carriers of passengers, any towaway trailer transporter combination (as defined in section 31111(a)), or any truck tractor-semitrailer combination in which the semitrailer has a length of not more than 28.5 feet and that generally operates as part of a vehicle combination described in section 31111(c) of this title.
¶38 For the STAA to apply in this case, therefore, Central Transport had to describe where it fit in the matrix of destinations and carrier types. It settled on the claim that its truck was headed to a “terminal” when its driver was ticketed. But the claimed “terminal” was a residence. At least two federal courts have noted that not every delivery address is a “terminal” within the meaning of the STAA: “Points of loading and unloading, unlike locations of terminals, necessarily change with great
¶39 Unfortunately, everyone seems to have just assumed that a residence qualifies as a terminal within the meaning of
¶40 I think we should have resolved this case based on Central Transport‘s failure to establish that its destination was a terminal. This is important because what constitutes “reasonable access” could be very different depending on which of the STAA-defined categories of destinations we are considering. The categories don‘t appear to be arbitrary—they describe very different types of places that are likely to be present in very different parts of a town, village, or city. Terminals (that is, fixed points of cargo transfer) as well as places where commercial truckers go for food, fuel, repairs, and rest are generally physically concentrated near interstate freeways, and are consequently served by a more robust infrastructure. The types of destinations described in the second category can be anywhere, including residential neighborhoods and other sensitive areas (such as near hospitals, playgrounds, etc.) where the infrastructure may not be as sturdy. What constitutes “reasonable access” for one category of destinations may be entirely unreasonable for the other. But because we just assumed Central Transport‘s destination was a terminal, our pronouncement on “reasonable access” applies to both without the benefit of ever considering what relevant distinctions might exist between the two categories.
¶41 For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the court‘s judgment, but I do not join the opinion.
¶42 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY joins this concurrence.
Notes
No State may enact or enforce any law denying reasonable access to vehicles with dimensions authorized by the STAA between the NN and terminals and facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest. In addition, no State may enact or enforce any law denying reasonable access between the NN and points of loading and unloading to household goods carriers, motor carriers of passengers, and any truck tractor-semitrailer combination in which the semitrailer has a length not to exceed 28 feet (28.5 feet where allowed pursuant to § 658.13(b)(5) of this part) and which generally operates as part of a vehicle combination described in §§ 658.13(b)(5) and 658.15(a) of this part.
The corresponding Town of Delafield, Wis. Ordinance § 7.01(1) provides:No person, whether operating under a permit or otherwise, shall operate a vehicle in violation of special weight limitations imposed by state or local authorities on particular highways, highway structures or portions of highways when signs have been erected as required by [Wis. Stat. §] 349.16(2) giving notice of such weight limitations, except when the vehicle is being operated under a permit expressly authorizing such weight limitations to be exceeded or is being operated as authorized under sub. 4.
STATUTORY REGULATIONS. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, all provisions of Chs. 340 to 348, Wis. Stats., describing and defining regulations with respect to vehicles and traffic for which the penalty is a forfeiture only, including penalties to be imposed and procedures for prosecution, are hereby adopted and by reference made a part of this chapter as if fully set forth herein. Any act required to be performed or prohibited by any statute incorporated herein by reference is required or prohibited by this chapter. Any further amendments, revisions or modifications of statutes incorporated herein are intended to be made part of this chapter in order to secure uniform statewide regulation of traffic on the highways, streets and alleys.