Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents, who have for over 15 years smoked “light” cigarettes manufactured by petitioners, Philip Morris USA, Inc., and its parent company, Altria Group, Inc., claim that petitioners violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act
I
Respondents are Maine residents and longtime smokers of Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights cigarettes, which are manufactured by petitioners. Invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the Federal District Court, respondents filed a complaint alleging that petitioners deliberately deceived them about the true and harmful nature of “light” cigarettes in violation of the MUTPA, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, § 207 (Supp. 2008).
Petitioners moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Labeling Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1334(b), expressly preempts respondents’ state-law cause of action. Relying on our decisions in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
Respondents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals first rejected the District Court’s characterization of respondents’ claim as a warning neutralization claim akin to the pre-empted claim in Cipollone.
In concluding that respondents’ claim is not expressly preempted, the Court of Appeals considered and rejected the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in a similar case.
II
Article VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land;... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Consistent with that command, we have long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are “without effect.” Maryland v. Louisiana,
Our inquiry into the scope of a statute’s pre-emptive effect is guidеd by the rule that “‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
When addressing questions of express or implied preemption, we begin our analysis “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
Congress enacted the Labeling Act in 1965
The stated purpose of the Labeling Act is
“to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby—
“(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes; and
“(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declаred policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.” 79 Stat. 282, 15 U. S. C. § 1331.
The requirement that cigarette manufacturers include in their packaging and advertising the precise warnings mandated by Congress furthers the Act’s first purpose. And the Act’s pre-emption provisions promote its second purpose.
As amended, the Labeling Act contains two express preemption provisions. Section 5(a) protects cigarette manufacturers from inconsistent state labeling laws by prohibiting the requirement of additional statements relating to smoking and health on cigarette packages. 15 U. S. C. § 1334(a). Section 5(b), which is at issue in this case, provides that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the adver
Together, the labeling requirement and pre-emption provisions express Congress’ determination that the prescribed federal warnings are both necessary and sufficient to achieve its purpose of informing the public of the health consequences of smoking. Because Congress has decided that no additional warning statement is needed to attain that goal, States may not impede commerce in cigarettes by enforcing rules that are based on an assumption that the federal warnings are inadequate. Although both of the Act’s purposes are furthered by prohibiting States from supplementing the federally prescribed warning, neither would be served by limiting the States’ authority to prohibit deceptive statements in cigarette advertising. Petitioners acknowledge that “Congress had no intention of insulating tobacco companies from liability for inaccurate statements about the relationship between smoking and health.” Brief for Petitioners 28. But they maintain that Congress could not have intended to permit the enforcement of state fraud rules because doing so would defeat the Labeling Act’s purpose of preventing nonuniform state warning requirements. 15 U. S. C. § 1331.
Although it is clear that fidelity to the Act’s purposes does not demand the pre-emption of state fraud rules, the principal question that we must decide is whether the text of § 1334(b) nevertheless requires that result.
Ill
We have construed the operative phrases of § 1334(b) in two prior cases: Cipollone,
In Cipollone, the plurality, which consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O’Connor, and Stevens, read the pre-emption provision in the 1969 amendments to the Labeling Act to pre-empt common-law rules as well as positive enactments. Unlike Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter, thе plurality concluded that the provision does not preclude all common-law claims that have some relationship to smoking and health.
Petitioners endeavor to distance themselves from that holding by arguing that respondents’ claim is more analogous to the “warning neutralization” claim found to be pre-empted in Cipollone. Although the plurality understood the plaintiff to have presented that claim as a “theory of fraudulent misrepresentation,” id., at 528, the gravamen of the claim was the defendants’ failure to warn, as it was “predicated on a state-law prohibition against statements in advertising and promotional mаterials that tend to minimize the health hazards associated with smoking,” id., at 527. Thus understood, the Cipollone plurality’s analysis of the warning neutralization claim has no application in this case.
Once that erroneous distinction is set aside, it is clear that our holding in Cipollone that the common-law fraud claim was not pre-empted is directly applicable to the statutory claim at issue in this case. As was true of the claim in Cipollone, respondents’ claim that the deceptive statements “light” and “lowered tar and nicotine” induced them to purchase petitioners’ product alleges a breach оf the duty not to deceive.
Our decision in Reilly is consistent with Cipollone’s analysis. Reilly involved regulations promulgated by the Massachusetts attorney general “ ‘in order to address the incidence of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco use by children under legal age . . . [and] in order to prevent access to such products by underage consumers.’ ”
It is true, as petitioners argue, that the appeal of their advertising is based on the relationship between smoking and health. And although respondents have expressly repudiated any claim for damages for personal injuries, see App. 26a, their actual injuries likely encompass harms to health as well as the monetary injuries they allege. These arguments are unavailing, however, because the text of § 1334(b) does not refer to harms related to smoking and health. Rather, it pre-empts only requirements and prohibitions— i. e., rules — that are based on smoking and health. The MUTPA says nothing about either “smoking” or “health.” It is a general rule that creates a duty not to deceive and is therefore unlike the regulations at issue in Reilly.
Petitioners argue in the alternative that we should reject the express pre-emption framework established by the Cipollone plurality and relied on by the Court in Reilly. In so doing, they invoke the reasons set forth in the separate opinions of Justice Blackmun (who especially criticized the plurality’s holding that the failure-to-warn claim was preempted) and Justice Scalia (who argued that the fraud claim also should be pre-empted). While we again acknowledge that our analysis of these claims may lack “theoretical elegance,” we remain persuaded that it represents “a fair understanding of congressional purpose.” Cipollone,
At issue in Wolens was the pre-emptive effect of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), 49 U. S. C. App. § 1305(a)(1) (1988 ed.), which prohibits States from enacting or enforcing any law “relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.” The plaintiffs in that case sought to bring a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 111. Comp. Stat., ch. 815, § 505 (West 1992). Our conclusion that the state-law claim was pre-empted turned on the unusual breadth of the ADA’s pre-emption provision. We had previously held that the meaning of the key phrase in the ADA’s pre-emption provision, “ ‘relating to rates, routes, or services,’ ” is a broad one. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
Petitioners’ reliance on Riegel is similarly misplaced. The plaintiffs in Riegel sought to bring common-law design, manufacturing, and labeling defect claims against the manufacturer of a faulty catheter. The case presented the question whether those claims were expressly pre-empted by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 21 U. S. C. § 360c et seq. The MDA’s pre-emption clause provides that no State “‘may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device . . . any requirement’ relating to safety or effectiveness that is different from, or in addition to, federal requirements.” Riegel,
The catheter at issue in Riegel had received premarket approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). We concluded that premarket approval imposes “requirement[s] relating to safety [and] effectiveness” because the FDA requires a device that has received premarket approval to be made with almost no design, manufacturing, or labeling deviations from the specifications in its approved application. The plaintiffs’ products liability claims fell within the core of the MDA’s pre-emption provision because they sought to impose different requirements on precisely those aspects of the device that the FDA had approved. Unlike the Cipollone plaintiff’s fraud claim, which fell outside of the Labeling Act’s pre-emptive reach because it did not seek to impose a
In sum, we conclude now, as the plurality did in Cipollone, that “the phrase ‘based on smoking and health’ fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the more general duty not to make fraudulent statements.”
IV
As an alternative to their express pre-emption argument, petitioners contend that respondents’ claim is impliedly preempted because, if allowed to proceed, it would present an obstacle to a longstanding policy of the FTC. According to petitioners, the FTC has for decades promoted the development and consumption of low tar cigarettes and has encouraged consumers to rely on representations of tar and nicotine content based on Cambridge Filter Method testing in choosing among cigarette brands. Even if such a regulatory policy could provide a basis for obstacle pre-emption, petitioners’ description of the FTC’s actions in this regard are inaccurate. The Government itself disavows any policy authorizing the use of “light” and “low tar” descriptors. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16-33.
In 1966, following the publication of the Surgeon General’s report on smoking and health, the FTC issued an industry guidance stating its view that “a factual statement of the tar and nicotine content (expressed in milligrams) of the mainstream smoke from a cigarette,” as measured by Cambridge Filter Method testing, would not violate the FTC Act. App. 478a. The .Commission made clear, however, that the guid
Based on these events, petitioners assert that “the FTC has required tobacco companies to disclose tar and nicotine yields in cigarette advertising using a government-mandated testing methodology and has authorized them to use descriptors as shorthand references to those numerical test results.” Brief for Petitioners 2 (emphasis in original). As the foregoing history shows, however, the FTC has in fact never required that cigarette manufacturers disclosе tar and nicotine yields, nor has it condoned representations of those yields through the use of “light” or “low tar” descriptors.
Subsequent Commission actions further undermine petitioners’ claim. After the tobacco companies agreed to report tar and nicotine yields as measured by the Cambridge Filter Method, the FTC continued to police cigarette companies’ misleading use of test results. In 1983, the FTC responded to findings that tar and nicotine yields for Barclay cigarettes obtained through Cambridge Filter Method testing were deceptive because the cigarettes in fact delivered
This history shows that, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, the FTC has no longstanding policy authorizing collateral representations based on Cambridge Filter Method test results. Rather, the FTC has endeavored to inform consumers of the comparative tar and nicotine content of different cigarette brands and has in some instances prevented misleading rеpresentations of Cambridge Filter Method test results. The FTC’s failure to require petitioners to correct their allegedly misleading use of “light” descriptors is not evidence to the contrary; agency nonenforcement of a fed
More telling are the FTC’s recent statements regarding the use of “light” and “low tar” descriptors. In 1997, the Commission observed that “[t]here are no official definitions for” the terms “ ‘light’ ” and “ ‘low tar,’ ” and it sought comments on whether “there [is] a need for official guidance with respect to the terms” and whether “the descriptors convey implied health claims.” 62 Fed. Reg. 48163. In November 2008, following public notice and comment, the Commission rescinded its 1966 guidance concerning the Cambridge Filter Method. 73 Fed. Reg. 74500. The rescission is a response to “a consensus among the public health and scientific communities that the Cambridge Filter method is sufficiently flawed that statements of tar and nicotine yields as measured by that method are not likely to help consumers make informed decisions.” Id., at 74503. The Commission’s notice of its proposal to rescind the guidance also reiterated the original limits of that guidance, noting that it “only addressed] simple factual statements of tar and nicotine yields. It d[id] not apply to other conduct or express or implied representations, even if they concerned] tar and nicotine yields.” Id., at 40351.
In short, neither the hаndful of industry guidances and consent orders on which petitioners rely nor the FTC’s inaction with regard to “light” descriptors even arguably justifies the pre-emption of state deceptive practices rules like the MUTPA.
We conclude, as we did in Cipollone, that the Labeling Act does not pre-empt state-law claims like respondents’ that are predicated on the duty not to deceive. We also hold that the FTC’s various decisions with respect to statements of tar and nicotine content do not impliedly pre-empt respondents’ claim. Respondents still must prove that petitioners’ use of “light” and “lowered tar” descriptors in fact violated the state deceptive practices statute, but neither the Labeling Act’s pre-emption provision nor the FTC’s actions in this field prevent a jury from considering that claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Notes
The MUTPA provides, as relevant, that “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are declared unlawful.” §207. In construing that section, courts are to “be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to Section 45(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 United States Code 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.” §207(1).
The Cambridge Filter Method weighs and measures the tar and nicotine collected by a smoking machine that takes 35 millilitеr puffs of two seconds’ duration every 60 seconds until the cigarette is smoked to a specified butt length. App. 294a, 668a. As discussed below, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) signaled in 1966 that the Cambridge Filter Method was an acceptable means of measuring the tar and nicotine content of cigarettes, but it never required manufacturers to publish test results in their advertisements.
79 Stat. 282.
Pub. L. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87. Though actually enacted in 1970, Congress directed that it be cited as a “1969 Act.”
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. 98-474, §4(a), 98 Stat. 2201,15 U. S. C. § 1333(a).
Petitioners also urge us to find support for their claim that Congress gave the FTC exclusive authority to police deceptive health-related claims in cigarette advertising in what they refer to as the Labeling Act’s “saving clause.” The clause provides that, apart from the warning requirement, nothing in the Act “shall be construed to limit, restrict, expand, or otherwise affect the authority of the Federal Trade Commission with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the advertising of cigarettes.” § 1336. A plurality of this Court has previously read this clause to “indicate] that Congress intended the phrase ‘relating to smoking and health’... to be construed narrowly, so as not to proscribe the regulation of deceptive advertising.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
In his dissent, Justice Thomas criticizes our reliance on the plurality opinion in Cipollone, post, at 96-98, 103-108, 111-112, and advocates adopting the analysis set forth by Justice Scalia in his opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part in that case, post, at 95-96, 109-110. But Justice Scalia’s approach was rejected by seven Members of the Court, and in the almost 17 years since Cipollone was decided Congress has done nothing to indicate its approval of that approach. Moreover, Justice Thomas fails to explain why Congress would have intended the result that Justice Scalia’s approach would produce— namely, permitting cigarette manufacturers to engage in fraudulent advertising. As a majority of the Court concluded in Cipollone, nothing in the Labeling Act’s language or purpose supports that result.
The Cipollone plurality further stated that the warning neutralization claim was “merely the converse of a state-law requirement that warnings be included in advertising and promotional materials,”
As the Court of Appeals observed, respondents’ allegations regarding petitioners’ use of the statements “light” and “lowered tar and nicotine” could also support a warning neutralization claim. But respondents did not bring such a claim, and the fact that they could have does not, as petitioners suggest, elevate form over substance. There is nothing new in the recognition that the same conduct might violate multiple proscriptions.
Justice Thomas contends that respondents’ fraud claim must be pre-empted because “[a] judgment in [their] favor will. .. result in a ‘requirement’ that petitioners represent the effects of smoking on health in a particular way in their advertising and promotion of light cigarettes.” Post, at 93. He further asserts that “respondents seek to require the cigarette manufacturers to provide additional warnings about compensatory behavior, or to prohibit them from selling these products with the ‘light’ or ‘low-tar’ descriptors.” Post, at 109-110. But this mischaracterizes the relief respondents seek. If respondents prevail at trial, petitioners will be prohibited from selling as “light” or “low tar” only those cigarettes that are not actually light and do not actually deliver less tar and nicotine. Barring intervening federal regulation, petitioners would remain free to make nonfraudulent use of the “light” and “low-tar” descriptors.
In implementing the MUTPA, neither the state legislаture nor the state attorney general has enacted a set of special rules or guidelines targeted at cigarette advertising. As we noted in Cipollone, it was the threatened enactment of new state warning requirements rather than the enforcement of pre-existing general prohibitions against deceptive practices that prompted congressional action in 1969.
Petitioners also point to Morales as evidence that our decision in Cipollone was wrong. But Morales predated Cipollone, and it is in any event even more easily distinguishable from this case than American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,
In a different action, the FTC charged a cigarette manufacturer with violating the FTC Act by misleadingly advertising certain brands as “low in tar” even though they had a higher-than-average tar rating. See In re American Brands, Inc., 79 F. T. C. 255 (1971). The Commission and the manufacturer entered a consent order that prevented the manufacturer from making any such representations unless they were accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the cigarettes’ tar and nicotine content as measured by the Cambridge Filter Method. Id., at 258. Petitioners offer this consent order as evidence that the FTC authorized the use of “light” and “low tar” descriptоrs as long as they accurately describe Cambridge Filter Method test results. As the Government observes, however, the decree only enjoined conduct. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26. And a consent order is in any event only binding on the parties to the agreement. For all of these reasons, the consent order does not support the conclusion that respondents’ claim is impliedly pre-empted.
It seems particularly inappropriate to read a policy of authorization into the FTC’s inaction when that inaction is in part the result of petitioners’ failure to disclose study results showing that Cambridge Filter Method test results do not reflect the amount of tar and nicotine that consumers of “light” cigarettes actually inhale. See id,., at 8-11.
Dissenting Opinion
with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Alito join, dissenting.
This appeal requires the Court to revisit its decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
Whether § 5(b) pre-empts state common-law claims divided the Court in Cipollone. The plurality opinion found some
The majority today ignores these problems and adopts the methodology of the Cipollone plurality as governing law. As a consequence, the majority concludes that state-law liability for deceiving purchasers about the health effects of smoking light cigarettes is not a “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health” under the Labeling Act. The Court’s fidelity to Cipollone is unwise and unnecessary. The Court should instead provide the lower courts with a clear test that advances Congress’ stated goals by interpreting § 5(b) to expressly pre-empt any claim that “imposes an obligation ... because of the effect of smoking upon health.” Cipollone, supra, at 554 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
I
In Cipollone, a smoker and her spouse brought state common-law claims for fraud, breach of warranty, and failure to warn against cigarette manufacturers for their alleged failure to adequately disclose the health risks of smoking.
In deciding the case, the Court could not agree on the meaning of the Labeling Act’s express pre-emption provision. It produced three separate opinions, none of which reflected the views of a majority of Justices. Relying heavily on a “presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations,” id., at 518, a plurality opinion by Justice Stevens settled on a “narrow reading” of the Labeling Act that tested § 5(b)’s pre-emptive effect under a claim-by-claim approach, id., at 524. This approach considered each state-law claim and asked whether it is predicated “on a duty ‘based on smoking and health.’ ” Id., at 528; see also id., at 524. If so, the claim is pre-empted. Id., at 524, 528. If,
Applying a test that it conceded lacked “theoretical elegance,” id., at 530, n. 27, the plurality held that the failure-to-warn claims were pre-empted “to the extent that those claims rel[ied] on omissions or inclusions in . . . advertising or promotions” of cigarettes. Id., at 531. The same was true for one of the fraud claims, which alleged that the cigarette manufacturers had used their advertising to neutralize the federally required warning labels. Id., at 527-528. The plurality determined that these claims were “predicated on a state-law prohibition against statements . . . that tend to minimize the health hazards associated with smoking.” Id., at 527. Thus, according to the plurality, these state-law claims sоught recovery under the theory that the cigarette manufacturer breached a duty based on smoking or health. But the plurality found that the other fraud claim, which alleged misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, was not pre-empted because it was based on a more general state-law obligation: “the duty not to deceive.” Id., at 528-529.
Justice Blackmun, writing for three Justices, departed from the plurality on the antecedent question whether the Labeling Act pre-empted state common-law damages claims at all. Id., at 535-542 (opinion, joined by Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). He concluded that the phrase “ ‘State law’ ” in § 5(b) referred only to “positive enactments such as statutes and regulations.” Id., at 535. But Justice Blackmun specifically noted that even if state common-law claims were within the scope of the Labeling Act, he could not join the plurality’s claim-by-claim approach because he “perceive[d] no principled basis for many of the plurality’s asserted distinctions among the common-law claims.” Id., at 543. Justice Blackmun wrote that Congress could not have “intended to create such a hodgepodge of allowed and
Justice Scalia, writing for two Justices, also faulted the plurality for its claim-by-claim approach. Id., at 544-556 (opinion, joined by Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Although he agreed with the plurality that the phrase “ ‘State law’ ” in § 5(b) encompassed state common-law claims as well as state statutes and regulations, id., at 548-549, Justice Scalia objected to the plurality’s invocation of a presumption against pre-emption to narrowly interpret § 5(b), id., at 544, 545-547. Because Congress had expressed its intent to pre-empt state law by enacting § 5(b), the Court’s “responsibility [was] to apply to the text ordinary principles of statutory construction.” Id., at 545.
Applying “ordinary principles” of statutory construction, id., at 548, Justice Scalia determined that the proper test for pre-emption of state-law claims under § 5(b) was far less complicated than the plurality’s claim-by-claim approach. As he explained, “[o]nce one is forced to select a consistent methodology for evaluating whether a given legal duty is ‘based on smoking and health,’ it becomes obvious that the methodology must focus not upon the ultimate source of the duty . . . but upon its proximate application.” Id., at 553.
II
Sixteen years later, we must confront Cipollone to resolve the question presented in this case: whether respondents’ class-action claims for fraudulent marketing under the MUTPA are pre-empted by § 5(b) of the Labeling Act. The majority adheres to Cipollone because it “remain[s] persuaded” that the plurality’s construction of §5(b) was “‘fair.’” Ante, at 84. I disagree. The Court should discard the Cipollone plurality’s ill-conceived predicate-duty approach and replace it with Justice Scalia’s far more workable and textually sound “proximate application” test.
The majority does not assert that the Cipollone plurality opinion is binding precedent, and rightly so. Because the “plurality opinion ... did not represent the views of a majority of the Court, we are not bound by its reasoning.” CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
A
As predicted by a majority of the Justices in Cipollone, the plurality opinion’s claim-by-claim approach has proved unworkable in the lower federal courts and state courts. The District Court in this case properly observed that “courts remain divided about what the decision means and how to apply it” and that “Cipollone’s distinctions, though clear in theory, defy clear application.”
The Court should not retain an interpretative test that has proved incapable of implementation. “[T]he mischievous consequences to litigants and courts alike from the perpetua
B
Furthermore, in the years since Cipollone was decided, this Court has altered its doctrinal approach to express preemption. The Cipollone plurality justified what it described as the “theoretical [injelegance” of its construction of § 5(b) by relying on the presumption against pre-emption, which, it argued, required a narrow, but “fair,” construction of the statute.
The Court has invoked the presumption sporadically during this timeframe. As the majority notes, ante, at 77, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
More recently, in Reilly,
The majority also relies on Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
If any doubt remained, it was eliminated last Term in Riegel. The question in Riegel, as noted above, was whether the MDA expressly pre-empts state common-law claims “challenging the safety and effectiveness of a medical device given premarket approval by the Food and Drug Administration.”
This was not accidental. The dissent focused on the Court’s refusal to invoke the presumption in order to save the state-law claims from pre-emption.
Justice Stevens also declined to invoke the presumption in his opinion. Id., at 330-333 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In his view, the “significance of the pre-emption provision in the [MDA] was not fully appreciated until many years after it was enacted” and, therefore, it is “a statute whose text and general objective cover territory not actually envisioned by its authors.” Id., at 330-331. But Justice Stevens’ opinion in Riegel — unlike the majority opinion here, the plurality opinion in Cipollone, and the dissenting opinion in Riegel — did not invoke the presumption to bend the text of the statute to meet the perceived purpose of Congress. Instead, Justice Stevens correctly found that “ ‘it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.’ ”
In light of Riegel, there is no authority for invoking the presumption against pre-emption in express pre-emption cases. The majority here thus turns to Lohr to revive the presumption and, in turn, to justify its restrictive reading of the Labeling Act’s express pre-emption provision. But, as Riegel plainly shows, the Court is no longer willing to unreasonably interpret expressly pre-emptive federal laws in the name of “ ‘congressional purpose,’ ” ante, at 84, or because “Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by
Riegel also undermined Cipollone in an even more fundamental way: It conclusively decided that a common-law cause of action imposes a state-law “ ‘requirement]’ ” that may be pre-empted by federal law.
C
The Cipollone plurality’s reading of §5(b) of the Labeling Act was further undermined by this Court’s decision in Reilly,
Reilly, therefore, cannot be reconciled with the Cipollone plurality’s interpretation of § 5(b) of the Labeling Act. The regulations at issue in Reilly were enacted to implement a Massachusetts state law imposing a duty against unfair and deceptive trade practices — the same predicate duty asserted under the MUTPA in this case.
And yet, the majority today finds that Reilly and Cipollone are perfectly compatible. It contends that, although the regulations in question in Reilly “derived from a general deceptive practices statute like the one at issue in this case,” they were pre-empted because they “targeted advertising that tended to promote tobacco use by children instead of prohibiting false or misleading statements.” Ante, at 83. According to the majority, that legal duty contrasts with the regulations here, as “[t]he MUTPA says nothing about either ‘smoking’ or ‘health.’” Ante, at 84; see also ante, at 81. But the Cipollone plurality expressly rejected any distinction between targeted regulations like those in Reilly and general duties imposed by the common law.
Accordingly, Reilly is better understood as establishing that even a general duty can impose requirements or prohibitions based on smoking and health. Reilly weakened the force of the Cipollone plurality’s “predicate duty” approach to the pre-emptive effect of § 5(b) and cast doubt on its continuing utility.
Finally, the Cipollone plurality’s approach should be discarded because its “predicate duty” approach is unpersuasive as an initial matter. In considering the warning-neutralization claim, for example, the Cipollone plurality asserted that the claim is predicated on a state-law prohibition against minimizing the health risks associated with smoking.
It is therefore unsurprising that the Court’s defense of the plurality’s confusing test is confined to one sentence and a footnote. See ante, at 84 (“While we again acknowledge that our analysis of these claims may lack Theoretical elegance,’ we remain persuaded that it represents ‘a fair understanding of congressional purpose’” (quoting Cipollone, supra, at 529-530, n. 27)); ante, at 81, n. 7. The majority instead argues that this approach “fails to explain why Congress would . . . permiftj cigarette manufacturers to engage in fraudulent advertising.” Ibid. But no explanation is necessary; the text speaks for itself. Congress has preempted only those claims that would impose “requirement[s]
Furthermore, contrary to the majority’s policy arguments, faithful application of the statutory language does not authorize fraudulent advertising with respect to smoking and health.
Congress chose a uniform federal standard. Under the Labeling Act, Congress “establish[ed] a comprehensive Federal Program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising,” 15 U. S. C. § 1331, so that “commerce and the national economy may . . . not [be] impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health,” § 1331(2)(B).
In light of these serious flaws in the majority’s approach, even if the Cipollone plurality opinion were binding precedent, the Court “should not hesitate to allow our precedent to yield to the true meaning of an Act of Congress when our statutory precedent is ‘unworkable’ оr ‘badly reasoned.’ ” Clark v. Martinez,
Applying the proper test — i. e., whether a jury verdict on respondents’ claims would “imposte] an obligation” on the. cigarette manufacturer “because of the effect of smoking upon health,” Cipollone,
Respondents’ claims seek to impose liability on petitioners because of the effect that smоking light cigarettes had on their health. The alleged misrepresentation here — that “light” and “low-tar” cigarettes are not as healthy as advertised — is actionable only because of the effect that smoking light and low-tar cigarettes had on respondents’ health. Otherwise, any alleged misrepresentation about the effect of the cigarettes on health would be immaterial for purposes of the MUTPA and would not be the source of the injuries that provided the impetus for the class-action lawsuit. See State v. Weinschenk,
Because the proper test for pre-emption is to look at the factual basis of a complaint to determine if a claim imposes a requirement based on smoking and health, there is no meaningful distinction to be drawn in this case between common-law failure-to-warn claims and сlaims under the MUTPA.
In any event, resрondents sought “such injunctive relief as may be appropriate” in this case. App. 42a. The MUTPA specifically authorizes “other equitable relief, including an injunction,” to remedy unfair or deceptive trade practices. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, §213(1) (2002). And a court-crafted injunction' prohibiting petitioners from marketing light cigarettes would be no less a requirement or prohibition than the regulations found to be pre-empted in Reilly. In the end, no matter what form the remedy takes, the liability with respect to the specific claim still creates the requirement or prohibition. When that liability is necessarily premised on the effects of smoking on health, as respondents’ claims are here, the civil action is pre-empted by §5(b) of the Labeling Act.
IV
The Court today elects to convert the Cipollone plurality opinion into binding law, notwithstanding its weakened doctrinal foundation, its atextual construction of the statute, and the lower courts’ inability to apply its methodology. The resulting confusion about the nature of a claim’s “predicate
Justice Scаlia also criticized the plurality for announcing a new rule that the enactment of an express pre-emption clause eliminates any consideration of implied pre-emption. He explained that this new rule created mischief because, when combined with the presumption against preemption, it placed a heavy burden of exactitude on Congress when it wishes to say anything about pre-emption. See Cipollone,
Also, as in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
The majority’s policy-based attack could just as easily be leveled against its own determination that the Labeling Act pre-empts failure-to-warn claims. But just as there is no basis in fact or law to contend that the Labeling Act encourages the marketing of hazardous products without adequate warning labels, ante, at 81-82, n. 8, there is no basis to contend that the text of the Labeling Act permits fraudulent advertising.
The majority contends that the relatively constrained enforcemеnt power of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1970 undermines any argument that Congress intended the Labeling Act to prevent States from
The United States, in its amicus brief and at oral argument, conspicuously declined to address express pre-emption or defend the Cipollone opinion’s reasoning. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-33. Instead, it addressed only the question of implied pre-emption, an issue I do not reach because of my resolution of the question on express pre-emption.
The majority’s observation that ho warning-neutralization claim is at issue in this case, ante, at 82, n. 9, misses the point. The principal weakness in the Cipollone plurality’s logic is not its distinction between claims for warning neutralization and claims for fraud. It is the fact that the predicate duty underlying New Jersey’s products liability law, from which the majority now claims the warning-neutralization claim derived, see ante, at 81-82, n. 8, was no more specific to smoking and health than the predicate duty underlying the fraud claim, see Cipollone,