Lisa Marie Winkowski, Respondent, vs. J. Vincent Winkowski, Appellant.
A21-1115
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
Filed: April 26, 2023
Moore, III, J.
Court of Appeals. Office of Appellate Courts.
Thomas R. Braun, Bruce K. Piotrowski, Restovich Braun & Associates, Rochester, Minnesota, for appellant.
Kyle R. Kroll, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Elizabeth M. Cadem, Burns & Hansen, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, appointed attorneys, Minnesota State Bar Association.
S Y L L A B U S
Dismissal is appropriate when a case is moot and no exception to the mootness doctrine applies.
Dismissed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
MOORE, III, Justice.
This case arises from a harаssment restraining order issued against appellant J. Winkowski pursuant to
Here, the district court concluded that J. Winkowski had engaged in repeated incidents of harassing conduct against his ex-spouse, respondent Lisa Winkowski, and issued a 6-month HRO. J. Winkowski appealed, arguing that his actions did not constitute “repeated incidents” of the type of conduct necessary for a finding of harassment. While his appeal was pending at the court of appeals, the underlying HRO expired. After the court of appeals affirmed the district court‘s decision to grant the HRO, J. Winkowski filed a petition for further review, which we granted. We conclude, however, that J. Winkowski‘s challenge to the HRO issued аgainst him does not present a justiciable controversy because it is moot. We therefore decline to reach the merits and instead dismiss the appeal.
The facts in this case are undisputed. Lisa and J. Winkowski divorced in 2016, and they have two young children.2 In June 2021, Lisa and J. were engaged in a legal dispute about their parenting time schedule. The events underlying Lisa‘s HRO petition occurred during a 2-hour period on June 25, 2021. That afternoon, Lisa picked up the children from her parents’ home and drove them to her home. About 45 minutes later, J. arrived at Lisa‘s parents’ home to pick up the children.3 While parked outside the residence, J. texted Lisa, asking where the children were. Lisa responded that they were with her. J. then drove to Lisa‘s rеsidence and parked his car outside her home. Over the next 2 hours, J., repeatedly called Lisa, honked his car‘s horn, knocked on Lisa‘s door, and rang her doorbell. Lisa eventually called the police, and J. drove away before a police officer was dispatched.
On July 1, 2021, Lisa filed a petition in Olmsted County District Court, seeking an HRO against J. based on his alleged acts of harassment on June 25. Lisa‘s petition sought protection for herself, but not for the parties’ minor children. The following day, a referee of the district court issued a temporary HRO for a period of 1 year on an ex parte basis. J. filed a timely request for an evidentiary hearing, which the district court held in August. At the hearing, the district court heard testimony from Lisa, J., Lisa‘s parents, and two police officers.
Had [J.] only ominously sat in his car outside [Lisa‘s] house for two hours; only honked his horn repeatedly; only come up to the house to repeatedly knock and ring; or only called [Lisa‘s] phone two dozen times in twenty minutes, we would have a single incident case. But he did them all. In my judgment [J.‘s] multiple, distinct harassing actions, temporally separated and spread out over a two hour period, constitute “repeated incidents.”
Based on its findings, the district court issued a 6-month HRO that prohibited J. from harassing or having сontact with Lisa (except through Our Family Wizard, a court-ordered communication website) and, among other directives, from being at or near her home.4
On appeal, J. argued that his conduct during the 2 hours at Lisa‘s home did not amount to “repeated incidents” and that, therefore, the district court erred by concluding he engaged in harassment. In an order opinion, thе court of appeals affirmed the district court‘s order. Winkowski v. Winkowski, No. A21-1115, 2022 WL 1297622, at *4 (Minn.
The court of appeals proceeded to apply these factоrs to the facts of the case. It noted that J.‘s conduct “occurred intermittently during a rather prolonged two-hour time period,” with some periods of intensive contact with Lisa and some periods during which “he paused his offensive conduct.” Id. Recognizing that J.‘s conduct occurred in “one general place” (i.e., Lisa‘s residence), the court of appeals also reasoned that J. engaged in offensive conduct in “two specific locations” (i.e., his car and Lisa‘s front door). Id. Finally, the court determined that “J.‘s conduct consisted of multiple forms of intrusive or unwanted acts and gestures: placing unanswered telephone calls, honking his car horn, knocking on Lisa‘s front door, and pushing Lisa‘s doorbell button.” Id.
In light of “the unique facts and circumstances of this case,” the court of appeals determined that the district court did not err by concluding that J. engaged in harassment, as defined by
J. petitioned for further review on the issue of what constitutes “repeated incidents” under
ANALYSIS
Our analysis must begin by addressing whether this appeal presents a justiciable cоntroversy, a question that appointed counsel raised for the first time in their brief filed with this court.6 “Justiciability is an issue of law, which we review de novo.” Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2015). A moot case is nonjusticiable.7 State ex rel. Ford v. Schnell, 933 N.W.2d 393, 401 (Minn. 2019). We will dismiss an appeal as moot when “a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5. Mootness is not, however, “a mechanical rule
It is undisputed that the HRO underlying this appeal expired in February 2022, meaning that there is no longer “a live controversy that can be resolved.” In re Minnegasco, 565 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 1997). However, the parties dispute whether an exception to оur mootness doctrine applies. We address each exception in turn.
A.
We begin by considering our exception for “issues that are capable of repetition, yet likely to evade review.” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2005). This “exception applies to issues that are likely to reoccur, but also would continue to evade judicial review.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5. To apply this exception, two prongs must be satisfied: (1) there must be “a reasonable expectation that a complaining party would be subjected to the same action again,” and (2) “the duration of the challenged action [must be] too short to be fully litigated before it ceases or expires.” Id. The party seeking this exception to mootness bears the burden of showing that an injury is сapable of repetition, yet likely to evade review. See Snell v. Walz, 985 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Minn. 2023).
J., the party seeking an exception to the mootness doctrine in this case, makes no argument in his brief for why his injury is capable of repetition, yet likely to evade review. Accordingly, we conclude that J. has failed to meet his burden, and we therefore decline to apply the cаpable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to this case.
J. asserts that we should apply our collateral consequences doctrine to reach the merits of his appeal. “Where an appellant produces evidence that collateral consequences actually resulted from a judgment, the appeal is not moot.” In re McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. 1999). Moreover, if a party demonstrates that “‘real and substantial’ disabilities attach to a judgment,” then we will presume that collateral consequences result from the judgment and will not require “actual evidence of collateral consequences.” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. State, 174 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Minn. 1970)). “A party may rebut this presumption of collateral consequences only by showing ‘there is nо possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged [judgment].‘” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968)).
J. has produced no evidence that collateral consequences have actually resulted from the HRO issued in this case. However, we may still consider the merits of J.‘s appeal if he demonstrates that “real and substantial disabilities” attaсh to the HRO. McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d at 329 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have generally applied this prong of the collateral consequences exception in the context of criminal convictions and civil commitments, noting the serious consequences that can stem from such cases. See, e.g., id. at 331 (“Due to the seriousness of the potential consequences created by the early intervention provisions, we conclude that collateral consequences attach to appellant‘s [civil] commitment.“); State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 546 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (concluding that a criminal defendant‘s appeal was not moot even though he had
In conclusory fashion, J. asserts two ways in which the HRO underlying this appeal carries collateral consequences. First, J. points to the possibility that a future HRO could be issued against him for a period of up to 50 years if more HROs are issued against him for conduct similar to that alleged in this case, which he disputes is “harassment” covered by the statue. See
Second, J. points to the possibility he could be denied the “ability to conceal a weapon lawfully,” citing
C.
Under our third exception to the mootness doctrine, “[w]e have the discretion to consider a casе that is technically moot when the case is ‘functionally justiciable’ and presents an important question of ‘statewide significance that should be decided immediately.‘” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 6 (quoting Rud, 359 N.W.2d at 576).
“A case is functionally justiciable if the record contains the raw material (including effective presentation of both sides of the issues raised) traditionally associated with effective judicial decisionmaking.” Rud, 359 N.W.2d at 576. We conclude that this case is functionally justiciable given that the record was fully developed at the district court (and there are no real disputes of fact), one of the principal issues is a matter of statutory interpretation, and each party‘s arguments have been adequately briefed and/or argued at the district court, the court of appeals, and here. See, e.g., Pfoser v. Harpstead, 953 N.W.2d 507, 514 n.4 (Minn. 2021) (“The issue here is functionally justiciable because the record is fully developed, the issue involves a matter of statutory interpretation, and the issue has been adequately briefed.“); In re Schmalz, 945 N.W.2d 46, 49 n.3 (Minn. 2020) (“This case is functionally justiciable because it is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review
But for this exception to apply, the issue on appeal must also “present[] an important question of statewide significance that should be decided immediately.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 6 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because neither party addresses this mootness exception in their briefs, the record before us is devoid of any indication of the statewide importance of the issue raised in this appeal.9 Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this appeal as a functionally justiciable issue of statewide importance.
In sum, we conclude that this cаse is moot and that no exception to our mootness doctrine applies.10 Accordingly, dismissal of the appeal is proper.11
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal as moot.
Appeal dismissed.
(Minn. 1985). Here, the parties and appointed counsel do not suggest that vacation of the court of appeals’ decision is proper, and indeed they do not discuss the issue at all. Under the circumstances of this case, and absent any argument by a party or appointed counsel that we should do so, we decline to vacate the court of appeals’ decision.