TIMOTHY W., Appellant, v. JULIA M., Appellee.
Supreme Court No. S-16222
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
August 25, 2017
7196
Superior Court No. 3AN-12-06387 CI. Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Frank A. Pfiffner, Judge.
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email corrections@akcourts.us.
O P I N I O N
No. 7196 – August 25, 2017
Appearances: Meredith A. Ahearn, Law Office of Meredith Ahearn, Anchorage, for Appellant. Notice of nonparticipation filed by Appellee.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, and Bolger, Justices. [Carney, Justice, not
WINFREE, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The father in a custody, support, and visitation dispute maintains that the trial court was biased against him. The father challenges the court‘s: (1) denial of his judicial recusal motion; (2) decision to keep certain hearings open to the public; (3) sua sponte admission of evidence during its oral decision on the record; and (4) findings that the father had a history of domestic violence against a “domestic living partner” requiring the court to impose limitations on his visitation. We affirm the trial court as to the first three matters, but we vacate the visitation order and remand for further proceedings, specifically, for findings on whether the acts of domestic violence occurred while a domestic living partnership was in effect.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Julia M. and Timothy W.,1 both attorneys, married in 2005 and have three children, born in 2006, 2008, and 2010. The couple separated in 2011 and in April 2012 Julia filed for divorce.
Julia and Timothy initially appeared before Superior Court Judge Frank A. Pfiffner in May 2012, and in July entered into an agreement concerning custody, visitation, and support for their children. The agreement lasted through the fall; in December Timothy requested that Julia‘s sole legal custody and primary physical custody be modified.2 The trial court denied that request because there had been no material change in circumstances. Timothy also sought to have his child support reduced or eliminated.3 Julia in turn requested that the court impute income to Timothy and increase his child support.4 Both parties requested changes to Timothy‘s visitation schedule. The court held evidentiary hearings to resolve these and other motions in early 2013.
The trial court decided the visitation and child support issues in a March 2013 order. The court ruled that the previously established unsupervised visitation schedule would remain in effect, but instituted logistical guidelines to minimize conflict. Timothy‘s request for a hardship reduction in his child support was denied, and his payments were slightly increased based on a change in his net income. The court denied Julia‘s request to impute income to Timothy, finding he was not voluntarily and unreasonably underemployed. In reaching that determination the court made a number of harsh observations about Timothy‘s legal and parenting skills, business acumen, and mental health.
The initial 2012 divorce and custody proceedings had been, at the parties’ request, confidential and closed to the public. After the March 2013 order — containing the trial court‘s harsh observations about Timothy‘s abilities and mental health — Timothy again moved to keep the proceedings confidential. Julia had not opposed keeping the earlier proceedings confidential, but she opposed this request. The court denied Timothy‘s motion and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.
In June 2014 Timothy filed a motion to disqualify Judge Pfiffner from further proceedings in the case. The disqualification motion “precede[d] a contemplated” motion to modify custody, visitation, and support. Timothy filed the disqualification motion because he believed “that a fair and impartial hearing cannot occur in respect of the contemplated [modification] motion.” Timothy requested Judge Pfiffner‘s recusal in this case and “from any other matter where [Timothy is] participating as an attorney . . . (so as to
Timothy‘s recusal motion was denied and referred for assignment to another superior court judge for review pursuant to
In September 2015 Julia filed a visitation modification motion. Alleging that Timothy‘s “mental health and personal circumstances and stability [had] deteriorated,” she requested that Timothy be limited to supervised visitation with the children. The trial court held evidentiary hearings in January and February 2016. Both parties were self-represented at the first hearing; at the second Timothy was represented by counsel. At the first hearing Timothy again requested that the matter be confidential; Julia opposed the request. The court again ruled that the matter would remain open.
During these hearings one of Timothy‘s clients played a prominent role. Jackie6 had been referred to him in November 2014 for assistance with ongoing legal issues. By early 2015 their attorney-client relationship had “evolved into a romantic, sexual relationship.” At the second evidentiary hearing Julia called Jackie to testify about her relationship with Timothy; Jackie‘s testimony was corroborated by text messages she and Julia had exchanged. Jackie testified to actions by Timothy that the trial court later determined constituted domestic violence.7 As the trial court summarized: in one incident “[Timothy] ended up in [Jackie‘s] . . . locked house, uninvited, after he had swiped a credit card to jimmy the lock so that he could get in with his children . . . and [Jackie] came home and found him there and asked him what he was doing“; in a second incident when Timothy was at Jackie‘s home and she found text messages he had sent another woman, Jackie “became infuriated and ordered [Timothy] to leave . . . . [Timothy] initially . . . declined to do so and [Timothy] did not leave . . . until [Jackie] threatened [Timothy] with pepper spray and by calling the police.” Finally, the court summarized Jackie‘s testimony concerning how Timothy “demanded sex” from her on numerous occasions in exchange for “continu[ing to do] a good job” on her legal work, and how she “allowed the sex to occur, even though she didn‘t always want it.”
Several days after the second evidentiary hearing the trial court entered an oral decision with both Timothy‘s counsel and Julia in attendance. The court sua sponte entered into evidence the text messages Julia and Jackie had exchanged, noting that Julia had established a foundation for them during the evidentiary hearings. The court found that Timothy and Jackie were both “household members” and “domestic living partner[s]” for purposes of relevant domestic violence and visitation statutes. The court then found that Timothy had committed three acts of domestic violence against Jackie — two counts of criminal trespass and one of coercion. Because the court determined that Timothy had committed three acts of domestic violence against a domestic living partner, the court applied the
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We “review[] the decision on a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion.”9 “[We] will not overturn a trial judge‘s recusal decision unless it is plain that a fair-minded person could not rationally come to that conclusion on the basis of the known facts.”10
In determining whether to limit access to a case file under
“We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, although whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard presents a question of law that we review de novo.”15
“We will reverse a superior court‘s custody and visitation determination ‘only if the superior court has abused its discretion or if its controlling findings of fact are clearly erroneous.’ ”16 “We will conclude that a trial court‘s factual finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when we are left with a ‘definite and firm conviction that the . . . court has made a mistake.’ ”17 But “[we] review de novo whether a superior court‘s findings satisfy the requirements” of statutes and rules.18
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Declining To Recuse.
Timothy first argues that the trial court erred when it failed to recuse “and compounded this error by disseminating this information to opposition counsel in another case before the same trial court judge.”
We have held that “[t]o succeed on a motion to disqualify a judge for bias, the movant must show that the judge‘s actions ‘were the result of personal bias developed from a nonjudicial source.’ ”22 More specifically “a judge is not disqualified if the judge‘s ‘knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings.’ ”23 Finally, “[i]t should be kept in mind that a judge has as great an obligation not to [recuse], when there is no occasion to do so, as . . . to do so in the presence of valid reasons.”24
1. Timothy abandoned his claim that the trial court was a material witness under AS 22.20.020(a)(3).
Timothy asserts that recusal was required because the trial court was “a material witness.”25 Timothy raised and argued this ground for recusal in his 2014 disqualification motion, and it was addressed in the denial order. But Timothy‘s appeal brief does not discuss the material-witness question, including why
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining there was no bias or appearance of bias under AS 22.20.020(a)(9).
Timothy more extensively develops his assertions of bias and appearance of bias under
a. Timothy does not establish that any alleged bias resulted from a nonjudicial source.
Timothy fails to address whether the court‘s “actions ‘were the result of personal
Timothy perhaps chose not to address this restriction on findings under
b. Timothy does not demonstrate that the trial court‘s statements displayed an inability to render fair judgment.
Despite failing to address basic elements of the improper bias analysis, Timothy‘s appeal might nonetheless have merit were he to demonstrate that the trial court‘s statements were “so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.”30 He does not. Although the language may have been intemperate, the court‘s findings overall demonstrate a thorough and impartial consideration of the relevant facts.
Timothy asserts that “[A]ny reasonable person reading the trial judge‘s orders would conclude that the judge was biased, or harbored some unknown animus,” asking rhetorically how any person “considering hiring him . . . [could] not be influenced by the judge‘s excessive comments about [Timothy‘s] legal ability, his character, or his mental stability.” But that concern is properly considered under
Timothy next faults the trial court for “liberally c[oming] to conclusions not in evidence,” presumably referring to the unemployability finding. This argument is not further developed in his brief. But the court explained why it reached this conclusion: “[T]his court routinely helps pro se litigants by considering legal arguments that are warranted by the evidence even when those arguments are not presented by the litigants themselves.” As noted above, Julia “made a very strong argument that [Timothy] was unreasonably underemployed,” an outcome Timothy sought to avoid. Had the court not found that Timothy was unemployable as an attorney then “the court might well have determined that [Timothy] was voluntarily underemployed.” Contrary to any suggestion that this finding demonstrates an inability to
Timothy‘s arguments are notably undeveloped. Other than citing three cases for unobjectionable rule statements,32 Timothy makes no attempt to provide authority for his claims of impermissible bias or to demonstrate any error that might have resulted from that alleged bias.33 Timothy‘s argument under
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by serving its order on opposing counsel in another case.
Timothy asserts that the bias he alleges above was “compounded . . . by disseminating th[e] information to opposition counsel in another case before the same trial judge.” Timothy fails to substantially develop this argument in his brief, but when Timothy submitted his 2014 disqualification motion he was counsel of record in one other case before the same judge. The trial court noted that if it were to grant the motion it “would have to ‘sua sponte’ recuse [itself] from participating in” the other case and served the denial order on opposing counsel in that case as well.
Although Timothy argues that this prejudiced him in the other case because opposing counsel “would likely determine its chances were better when litigating against [Timothy] before the court versus some other counsel,” he fails to appreciate that his recusal request constituted an ex parte communication in the other case. Timothy hoped for “sua sponte” recusal from the other case so that Timothy could “avoid duplicative filings that have the same or similar information“; opposing counsel in that other case would not have considered a motion to disqualify the judge a duplicative filing and had a right to respond.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Declining To Close The Hearings.
Timothy next argues that the trial court erred by “fail[ing] to close the hearings.” Whether to keep the case file confidential and the hearings closed arose several times during the proceedings. Timothy challenges only the court‘s decision to make the January and February 2016 modification hearings public, and he raises this claim only under
Timothy sought to close the hearings because he believed “the trial judge‘s comments . . . would damage his ability to practice law in this community, and impact his ability to earn a living.” He provides little argument in support of his claim that the trial court erred. Timothy notes that the court acknowledged “that family cases are often ugly with a fair amount of mudslinging going on and that this case was worse than most,” and he argues that “if in the future any of his children chose to go into the court record, it would be detrimental to his relationship with [them].”
But Timothy provides no reason for us to reweigh the trial court‘s balancing of the competing interests in this case. And the court thoroughly explained its reasoning. The court believed that its initial decision to close the record had “been a license for bad behavior by both [parties].” As the court noted,
The trial court considered the mandated factors and did not consider any improper factors.37 Timothy simply disputes the outcome of the trial court‘s balancing test, providing no basis to conclude that the decision was manifestly unreasonable.38 We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by electing not to close the 2016 hearings.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Sua Sponte Admitting Into Evidence The Messages Between Julia And Jackie.
Timothy next argues that the trial court erred by sua sponte admitting into evidence email and text messages between Julia and her witness, Jackie. He claims “[t]here was no opportunity to test the validity or completeness of the messages . . . as they were admitted during the recitation of [the] trial court‘s order in the case.” Timothy makes no claim that the messages were invalid or incomplete; he merely asserts they show only Julia‘s “blatant effort to manipulate and befriend the third party for [her] own agenda.” He argues that the court‘s sua sponte admission of the communications into evidence during its decision on record infringed his due process rights to notice and opportunity to be heard, as well as his right of cross-examination.
Timothy‘s arguments have no merit, either procedurally or substantively. The messages were properly marked and included on the exhibit list prior to trial as required by
Beyond the procedural defects in his claim, Timothy‘s argument fails on the merits as well.
D. The Trial Court Made Insufficient Findings To Demonstrate Jackie Was A Domestic Living Partner When The Acts Of Domestic Violence Occurred.
Timothy finally argues the trial court erred in concluding that he had “a history of perpetrating domestic violence against . . . a domestic living partner” under
Because there was no allegation that Timothy had caused anyone serious physical injury, to conclude that
Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, to find that
1. The trial court did not err in determining Timothy had committed three acts of domestic violence.
a. A “household member” can commit trespass against another “household member.”
“A person commits the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully . . . in or upon [a] premises . . . .”49 A person commits “domestic violence” by criminally trespassing “against another household member.”50 Household members include people “who live together or who have lived together . . . who are dating or who have dated . . . [or] who are engaged in or who have engaged in a sexual relationship.”51
Timothy‘s sole challenge to the trial court‘s two trespass findings is his argument that “household members” cannot commit criminal trespass against each other; if he “were a residen[t] of the household, as defined, then he could not commit trespass.” This argument is flawed. The legislature defined domestic violence as an offense committed “by a household member against another household member” and in the same section included criminal trespass as a listed offense.52 “Household members” is a broadly defined term of art including people who may, but need not, reside in the same home.53
“Household members” under
Nor is there any conflict between Timothy’s “household member” status and the second criminal trespass finding, when Timothy refused to leave Jackie’s home despite being ordered to do so. A person can commit criminal trespass despite being initially privileged to enter a premises by “fail[ing] to leave . . . after being lawfully directed to do so.”56 The court did not err by concluding Timothy had committed two counts of criminal trespass against a “household member” for purposes of the statutory domestic violence provisions. We note here, however, and discuss at length below, that the extent of Timothy’s privilege to enter Jackie’s home — or, relative to the second
b. The trial court’s coercion finding was not clearly erroneous.
The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Timothy committed the crime of coercion or attempted coercion under
A person commits the crime of coercion if the person compels another to engage in conduct from which there is a legal right to abstain . . . by means of instilling in the person who is compelled a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the person who makes the demand or another may
. . . .
(6) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to a person’s legal claim or defense.
Timothy begins his coercion challenge by noting “[t]here was no testimony that [he] threat[ened] physical violence,” and there was likewise no testimony that Jackie “was actually coerced.” We presume Timothy intends these to be claims of error. But
Timothy’s more substantial argument against the coercion finding is that “[t]here was absolutely no evidence of intent.” The trial court did not explicitly address the issue of intent; failing to enter an express finding on a critical issue requires a remand in some circumstances.58 But the court did describe the conduct it concluded was coercion and cited Jackie’s testimony and text messages as the evidence upon which it relied. The court found that when Timothy was working on Jackie’s cases he “demanded sex” from Jackie for his work and “to continue doing a good job” and that she “allowed the sex to occur, even though she didn’t always want it” so he would not carry through on his threats to stop working on her cases. The court explained that Timothy’s conduct was coercion under subsection (a)(6) “because by saying to [Jackie] have sex with me or I won’t work on your case or I won’t work it well, [Timothy] threatened to withhold information from the [c]ourt to support [Jackie’s] legal claims in her defense in her custody cases. That’s coercion.”
Other than the presumed claims of error dismissed above, Timothy does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that his conduct satisfied the elements of
Under the trial court’s unchallenged application of Timothy’s conduct to the elements of the coercion statute,66 to establish the requisite intent the court also had to find that Timothy knowingly compelled Jackie to engage in unwanted sex “by means of instilling in [her] a fear that, if the demand [were] not complied with,”67 he might sabotage her cases.68 The court found that Timothy communicated to Jackie: “have sex with me or I won’t work on your case or I won’t work it well.” Jackie did not testify that Timothy had explicitly threatened to stop serving as her attorney; she testified he would demand sex for work he had done on her cases, evidently implying she should be grateful for that work and reciprocate by granting sexual favors. Although the court did not enter an explicit intent finding, there is only one plausible basis upon which it could have concluded Timothy coerced Jackie: it interpreted Jackie’s testimony to indicate that Timothy was knowingly making an implicit threat to stop serving as her attorney if she did not comply with his demands. If there is only one plausible basis for a court’s holding, we generally will not remand for failure to enter an explicit finding.69
Although the trial court did not enter an explicit intent finding, the evidence upon which it relied is more than sufficient to support an inference that Timothy knowingly
2. The trial court did not clearly err by finding that Timothy and Jackie were “domestic living partners,” but further findings are necessary to determine whether their partnership was in effect when the acts of domestic violence occurred.
The presumption against unsupervised visitation contained in
Timothy raises three arguments relevant to this question: (1) the crimes alleged were not committed against his family or his children and should have no bearing on his visitation rights; (2) the court impermissibly defined “domestic living partner” under
a. Criminal trespass and coercion are qualifying offenses under AS 25.24.150(g) .
Timothy’s first argument, that the crimes alleged “were completely irrelevant and not applicable to his family, especially his children,” has no merit. He asserts that the coercion finding “did not constitute domestic violence in the sense that it did not have any relevance to his family or any pattern of behavior.” He also notes that “[t]here was no evidence of any type of abuse by [Timothy] to his children or any person ever within his family circle.”
When considering acts of domestic violence under
b. The trial court did not impermissibly conflate “domestic living partner” with “household member.”
Timothy’s second claim against the application of
c. The trial court made insufficient findings to demonstrate Jackie was a domestic living partner at the time the acts of domestic violence were committed.
Timothy’s final claim is that the trial court erred by misinterpreting precedent and applying an overly broad definition of “domestic living partner.” We have not yet ruled whether “domestic living partner” under
i. The trial court did not clearly err by finding that Timothy and Jackie were “domestic living partners” for some unknown period.
A helpful discussion of the presumptions against custody and visitation created by
In support of the argument that “domestic living partner” might plausibly have the same meaning as “household member” under
But despite any legislative history to the contrary, the language of the statute and the context in which it is employed leave little room for such an interpretation.87 If the legislature intended that all acts of domestic violence be considered when applying the
Because “domestic living partner” must be a narrower term than “household member,” the questions then become how narrow that definition should be and whether Jackie should qualify. Bolotin notes that prior to 2008 “all appellate cases that applied [AS] 25.24.150(g) . . . concerned violence between parents of the child whose custody was in dispute,” but that our 2008 Michele M. case “clarifies that a spouse who is not the parent of the child also qualifies as a ‘domestic living partner.’ ”94 In Michele M., however, it was
An accurate assessment of the state of the law after Michele M. and at the publication of Bolotin’s note in 2008, therefore, would conclude there was no indication that “domestic living partner” must have the same meaning as “household member” under
In Harris v. Governale97 we considered whether domestic violence between a father and an ex-girlfriend should be factored in to a custody determination — involving the father and the mother of another child — under either the general best interests analysis98 or when applying the presumption against custody in
In this case the trial court interpreted Michele M. to mean that “a domestic living partner includes a former girlfriend,” but made no reference to Harris. Timothy correctly points out that the court’s interpretation of Michele M. is overbroad, as the victim in that case was an ex-wife, not merely an ex-girlfriend.102 But Timothy does not address Harris either, nor explicitly argue that “domestic living partner” should include only spouses and ex-spouses; he does suggest that the definition should require that the victim and perpetrator be “partners in the sense of family with children” and “reside together.”
We are therefore presented with three questions in determining how “domestic living partner” should be interpreted and applied in this case: (1) should the term include only spouses and ex-spouses? (2) should the term require that the perpetrator and victim have a child together? and (3) should the term require that the perpetrator and victim reside together?
The answer to the first question is no. The plain meaning of the term “domestic living partner” supports this conclusion.103 Had the legislature wished courts to consider only spouses and ex-spouses then it easily could have employed that more familiar language, rather than the term of art “domestic living partner.”104 Additionally, as noted above, our precedent does not foreclose an interpretation extending beyond ex-spouses, and the dictum in Harris suggests that we have been
The answer to the second question is likewise no — there is no requirement that the perpetrator and the victim have a child together as Timothy seems to suggest. Nothing either in the statute or in our precedent indicates that such a condition is necessary.106
The answer to the third question is yes; there is a requirement that the perpetrator and victim lived in the same household, but “lived together” must be given a fairly relaxed meaning. This requirement is suggested by a plain reading of the term “domestic living partner,” relying on common public definitions in place at the time
An argument against such an interpretation is that although a plain reading of the term “household member” suggests that the perpetrator and victim reside together, the definition provided in
Although the plain meaning of “domestic living partner” suggests some requirement that the perpetrator and victim did in fact live together, we do not believe that requirement can be construed too strictly. As Bolotin highlights, legislatures enacting presumptions against custody and unsupervised visitation for perpetrators of domestic violence were generally motivated by social science findings indicating that “[c]hildren who witness domestic abuse” are more likely to experience a variety of mental and physical health problems.114 Within the context of serious and committed relationships, if courts were to interpret the term “domestic living partners” as exclusively requiring a traditional household where the partners share one home on a more or less permanent basis, then cases of domestic violence where the partners have unorthodox housing arrangements — for example, retaining their own homes and taking turns staying at each or living in different cities and regularly visiting each other — might slip through the
It was not clearly erroneous to find Timothy and Jackie’s relationship fell within this definition. Jackie testified that although Timothy “had his own place[ h]e would stay over quite often, so it’s basically like he was living” at her home for the better part of a year. Timothy “talk[ed] about marriage,” “spent time with [Jackie’s] children, and when he had visitation with his own children . . . those children also spent time at [Jackie’s] home and with [Jackie’s] children.” Jackie responded affirmatively when asked whether Timothy had “been essentially living with” her from the time they began dating, and she testified that one of her children “referred to [Timothy] as Daddy.” Jackie’s and Timothy’s children spent a significant amount of time together during the period the adults were dating. In short, although Timothy and Jackie maintained separate residences, their lives were clearly very intertwined during some part of their relationship, when they generally lived and slept in the same home and incorporated their children into their shared lives. Jackie and Timothy spent a significant amount of their time in a shared, marriage-like, domestic environment; we thus affirm as not clearly erroneous the trial court’s general finding that Jackie was Timothy’s “domestic living partner” for purposes of
ii. Additional findings are necessary to determine whether Timothy and Jackie were “domestic living partners” when the crimes of domestic violence occurred.
Our inquiry, however, does not end there. The trial court did not enter findings on when Jackie’s status as a “domestic living partner” with Timothy began and ended. As discussed earlier, given the extremely broad definition of “household member” provided in
The context of this case raises at least two scenarios where this tension presents itself. The trial court’s first trespass finding involved Timothy, with his children present, using a credit card to enter Jackie’s home without her permission. Although Jackie testified that it was “basically like [Timothy] was living” at her home during that period, she also testified that she considered his entry unauthorized because “he wasn’t staying at my house at that point in time.” The court made no explicit findings on when their status as “domestic living partners” began or ended; it is therefore not clear whether the court felt they were active “domestic living partners” when the trespass occurred, or whether they had achieved “domestic living partner” status and it had not terminated simply because Timothy was no longer authorized to enter Jackie’s home (assuming he ever had been granted that privilege). But more importantly the court’s lack of findings leaves unexplained how Timothy and Jackie could be domestic living partners at a time Timothy was not privileged to enter Jackie’s home.
The trial court’s findings concerning the second trespass likewise fail to resolve this tension. In that instance Timothy was at Jackie’s residence when she became infuriated and ordered him to leave; Timothy “declined to do so . . . until [Jackie] threatened [him] with pepper spray and by calling the police.” Certainly there may be factual scenarios where courts will find both that two people are “domestic living partners” and that one of them committed trespass by refusing to leave the other’s premises after being directed to do so. But the trial court’s limited findings do not demonstrate whether those circumstances apply here.
Because it is unclear whether Timothy and Jackie were “domestic living partners” when the trespasses occurred, we must also question whether they were “domestic living partners” when the other act of domestic violence occurred. We conclude it is necessary to remand so the court can determine: (1) the specific timing of Timothy and Jackie’s domestic living partnership; (2) the specific arrangements they had during that domestic living partnership regarding movement between houses — including any express, implied, or apparent authority each had to enter the other’s house during the domestic living partnership; and (3) how the timing and nature of these arrangements relate to the criminal trespass and coercion findings.
In remanding we decline to establish any precise delineations on when a domestic living partnership must be found to begin and end. We have established that the status of “domestic living partner” is achieved whenever partners spend a significant amount of their time with each other — and when applicable, with their children — in a shared, marriage-like, domestic living environment. There will be cases when domestic living partnerships — like marriages — disintegrate, although cohabitive living arrangements may stay the same for some period of time. Trial courts need to be attentive to the facts of each case to determine when couples no longer are domestic living partners but rather are merely household members. We defer any decisions on the temporal limitations of domestic living partnerships to future cases where the issue is more squarely presented.
V. CONCLUSION
We VACATE the trial court’s decision applying