TIMOTHY E. VUYANICH; CAROL L. VUYANICH, Appellants v. SMITHTON BOROUGH; CHIEF MICHAEL R. NATALE, in his individual capacity; PATROLMAN RALPH R. MARSICO, JR., in his individual capacity; DALE H. COOPER; MARSH AUTO SAVAGE INC.; HARRY F. THOMPSONS GARAGE, INC.; JARVIS AUTO & TRUCK SALVAGE; R&R AUTO RECYCLING; SOUTH HUNTINGDON TOWNSHIP; SUPERVISOR EDDIE TROUPE, in his individual capacity; SUPERVISOR MATTHEW JENNEWINE, in his individual capacity; SUPERVISOR RICHARD GATES, in his individual capacity
No. 20-1813
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
July 27, 2021
PRECEDENTIAL
(D.C. Civil Action No.
District Judge: Honorable William S. Stickman, IV
Argued on December 15, 2020
(Opinion filed: July 27, 2021)
Alexander W. Brown [Argued]
Bernard P. Matthews, Jr.
Meyer Darragh Buckler Bebenek & Eck
40 North Pennsylvania Avenue, Suite 410
Greensburg, PA 15601
Counsel for Appellants
Suzanne B. Merrick [Argued]
Thomas Thomas & Hafer
U.S. Steel Tower
600 Grant Street, Suite 2600
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellees Borough of Smithton, Chief Michael R. Natale, and Patrolman Ralph Marsico, Jr.
Adam R. Gorzelsky
101 North Main Street, Suite 106
Greensburg, PA 15601
Counsel for Appellee Harry F. Thompson‘s Garage Inc.
John P. Morgenstern
Penelope B. O‘Connell
O‘Hagan Meyer
1500 Market Street
East Tower, 12th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Dennis J. Mulvihill [Argued]
William C. Robinson, III
Amy V. Sims
Robb Leonard & Mulvihill
500 Grant Street
BNY Mellon Center, Suite 2300
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellees Township of South Huntingdon, Supervisor Eddie Troupe, Supervisor Matthew Jennewine, Supervisor Richard Gates
OPINION OF THE COURT
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Two homeowners allegedly treated their property as a junkyard. This resulted in misdеmeanor criminal charges against one of the homeowners for creating a public nuisance. The surrounding borough sought to clean up the property while the charges were pending, and a Pennsylvania state court judge authorized the borough to do so after giving the homeowner a brief window to collect any belongings he wished to keep. The homeowners failed to retrieve their possessions during this window, and thereafter the borough and other affiliated entities hauled away the vehicles and оther items that were strewn throughout the yard. In an effort to obtain damages
The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction over appeals from unfavorable state court judgments—typically a task reserved for the United States Supreme Court. But that Court has repeatedly emphasized that the doctrine is a narrow one that defeats federal subject-matter jurisdiction only under limited circumstances. And we have a precise four-pronged inquiry for when Rooker-Feldman should be invoked. When even one of the four prongs is not satisfied, it is not proper to dismiss on Rooker-Feldman grounds. Because this case does not satisfy all four prongs, we reverse.
In so holding, we do not suggest that federal cases implicating matters previously litigated in state court should automatically survive a motion to dismiss. Far from it: there are many other principles, including claim and issue preclusion, that may doom such federal claims. But many of those principles are non-jurisdictional, and courts should be wary of finding a Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional issue where none exists.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Timothy E. Vuyanich and his mother, Carol L. Vuyanich, reside at a property in Smithton, Pennsylvania they
In July 2018, the Borough brought misdemeanor criminal charges against Timothy for abandoning inoperable vehicles, old appliances, and other trash on and around his property, in violation of local ordinances and state statutes. This was not Timothy‘s first run-in with local authorities; he had received multiple prior citations for keeping his motor vehicles in a nuisance condition but had allegedly refused to dispose of them. Borough officials claim the property had been in an “offensive condition” since at least 2014, and that neighbors had complained the “junk” smelled bad, attracted snakes and rats, presented dangers to small children, and was an eyesore that might lower the value of their homes. App. at 92.
Apparently impatient to have the property cleaned without waiting “months and months for the criminal charges to work their way through court,” the Borough and the District Attorney‘s office agreed to seek the state criminal court‘s assistance in the meantime to get the job done. App. at 99–100. The Vuyaniches’ cоmplaint references minutes from a January 2019 meeting at which the Borough council apparently “talked about not telling Vuyanich what is happening beforehand, so that he doesn‘t remove items.” App. at 34, 84.
After the hearing, the state court judge issued an order (the “June 18, 2019 order“) continuing the criminal case for 60 days. It explained that this additional time was needed for a Borough “contractor to finish clean-up of [the] property [and] to determine [the] total cost” Timothy owed for the clean-up effort. App. at 127. It also provided that Timothy had “20 days to remove his personal items from [the] property.” Id. It was silent, however, as to which items the Borough was authorized to seize and whether those items could be seized permanently or just temporarily.
On July 9, 2019, 21 days after the state court hearing, the Borough began cleaning the property without the Vuyaniches’ permission or a warrant. The cleanup effort continued until early October 2019. Natale and Ralph Marsico, Jr. of the Borough Police Department, along with Township
The Vuyaniches take issue not only with this “intrusion[],” App. at 65, but also with the manner in which the cleanup was conducted. They claim some of the Defendants entered the “curtilage”3 area of their yard, coming close to their dwelling, “physically contacting” their private shed, and ignoring the many “no trespassing” signs posted throughout the property. App. at 46. Thе Vuyaniches further allege Natale told some of the Defendants they could keep, sell, use, scrap, or destroy the items seized from the property without creating an inventory showing which items had resale value or had been destroyed. At least one of the Defendants was apparently able to obtain a small sum ($110) for scrap metal removed from the property.
Believing some of the removed items to be valuable, the Vuyaniches sent a cease-and-desist letter to a subset of the Defеndants in July 2019, threatening to file a federal suit unless the Borough compensated them. An attorney for the Borough responded that they would not get even “one cent.” App. at 152. In response, the Vuyaniches made good on their threat, filing a federal suit in October 2019 under
Defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint, which the District Court granted in April 2020, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Vuyaniches moved to alter the judgment under
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over the Vuyaniches’ § 1983 claims under
“In certain circumstances, where a federal suit follows a state suit, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine prohibits the district court from exercising jurisdiction.” Id. at 163–64. The doctrine stems from
In the years following Rooker and Feldman, federal courts sometimes blurred the lines between that doctrinе and the principles of issue and claim preclusion. The latter two principles prevent a plaintiff from relitigating issues that were (and claims that were or could have been) litigated and resolved in a prior state court judgment. See, e.g., Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 152 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that Rooker-Feldman prevents “relitigating in federal court the issues decided in a state court“).
Congress has directed federal courts to look principally to stаte law in deciding what effect to give state-court judgments. Incorporation of preclusion principles into Rooker–Feldman risks turning that limited doctrine into a uniform federal rule governing the preclusive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Act.
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (emphasis in original). And Rooker-Feldman, unlike claim and issue preclusion, implicates a federal court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning it cannot be forfeited or waived, see United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002), and courts must evaluate its applicability sua sponte if it is a concern, see Bracken v. Matgouranis, 296 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2002).
We have translated the Supreme Court‘s approach to Rooker-Feldman into a four-pronged inquiry. To trigger the doctrine, the following requirements must be met: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments‘; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (alterations omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284). We have described Prongs 2 and 4 as the “key requirements,”
IV. Discussion
A. Prong 2
To repeat, Prong 2 requires a plaintiff to “complain[] of injuries caused by the state-court judgments.” Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166. This requirement “may also be thought of as an inquiry into the source of the plaintiff‘s injury.” Id. To deprive the court of jurisdiction, the plaintiff‘s injury must actually be “produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it.” id. at 167 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Any injury Timothy and Carol suffered was not “caused by” a state court judgment.6 As an initial matter, Natale, the Borough police chief, represented to the state court judge that the Borough had preexisting authority under a Borough
But even if the Borough lacked independent authority to seize the Vuyaniches’ property, the state court is best viewed as having “acquiesced in” or “ratified” the Borough‘s seizure of the property rather than having “produced” it. Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 167. The court did not order the Borough to take the Vuyaniches’ property or give any specific instructions on how the Defendants could go about the cleanup project. Indeed, to the extent the state court played any role in shaping the ultimate cleanup effort, it was to the Vuyaniches’ benefit: Natale suggested the Borough would like to begin cleaning up the property immediately, but the court granted the request of Timothy‘s counsel for an additional 20 days to remove any valued items from the yard. App. at 118 (Public Defender: “I‘ve been urging [Timothy] to cooperate, and he said that he will do that. We‘re just looking . . . for more time to see if we can solve this problem“); App at 122 (Judge: “So I‘m telling [the Borough], you‘re not authorized to go in there until at least day 21.“). And the actions with which the Vuyaniches principally take issue—springing the cleanup
At bottom, any injuries the Vuyaniches may have suffered were caused by the Defendants, not the state court. Accordingly, Prong 2 of Rooker-Feldman does not apply.7
Even if Prong 2 were satisfied, Rooker-Feldman would still not bar jurisdiction because this case does not meet the requirements of Prong 4. To refresh, that prong requires a plaintiff to “invit[e] the district court to review and reject [a] state judgment[].”8 Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166. The Vuyaniches did not invite the District Court to do so.
“When the plaintiff attempts to litigate previously litigated matters, the federal court has jurisdiction as long as the federal plaintiff presents some independent claim, even if that claim denies a legal conclusion reached by the state court.” In re Philadelphia Ent. & Dev. Partners, 879 F.3d 492, 500 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 169) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, if the federal court‘s review does not concern ‘the bоna fides of the prior judgment,’ the federal court ‘is not conducting [prohibited] appellate review‘” even if “the claim for relief if granted would as a practical matter undermine a valid state
Here, the Vuyaniches have presented the requisite “independent claim[s]“: they have challenged the Defendants’ actions as unconstitutional and tortious. The District Court could have ruled on these claims without conducting appellate review of the June 18, 2019 order. For example, without reviewing or rejеcting the state court order, that Court could have held unconstitutional the ordinance of the Borough ostensibly authorizing it to seize the Vuyaniches’ property. See Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 168 (noting that declaring a statute unconstitutional would not “amount to appellate reversal or modification of a valid state court decree” relying on that statute). Similarly, without touching the underlying state court order, the District Court could have concluded the Borough carried out the cleanup in an unconstitutional or tortious way. It is of no consequence that these conclusions might, “as a practical matter[,] undermine” the efficacy of the state court order. In re Philadelphia Ent., 879 F.3d at 503.
To be sure, the Vuyaniches’ federal complaint asserts that the state court‘s order was “invalid.” See, e.g., App. at 39, 40, 57. But doing so remains insufficient, on its own, to trigger Rooker-Feldman. Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 171. The Vuyaniches are “not merely contending that the state-court decision[] w[as] incorrect or that [it was] in violation of the Constitution. Instead, [they] claim[] that people involved in the decision violated some independent right.” Id. at 172 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And importantly, the Vuyaniches did not ask the District Court to overturn the June 18, 2019 state-court order, but rather sought damages for the actions Defendants took under the guise of
In this respect, this case stands in stark contrast to the Rooker and Feldman decisions. In the former, the plaintiff asked the district court to declare a state court‘s judgment “null and void.” 263 U.S. at 414. And in Feldman, parties who had unsuccessfully petitioned the District of Columbia‘s highest court to waive certain bar requirements “commenced a federal court action against the very court that had rejected their applications.” Exxon-Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283.9 Unlike in those cases, the relief requested in our case—money damages for the Defendants’ allegedly overzealous cleanup efforts—does not
C. Prong 1
Although the failure to satisfy either Prong 2 or Prong 4 dooms Defendants’ Rooker-Feldman argument, we also takе the opportunity to recognize an abrogation of the law the District Court relied on to hold that Prong 1 bars Carol‘s claim.10 Carol did not lose in state court; she was not even a party to the criminal proceeding against Timothy or to the state court‘s June 18, 2019 order. The District Court concluded this fact was irrelevant, relying on our decision in Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2004), which held that ”Rooker-Feldman bars actions brought by parties in privity with the parties in the state action.” Id. (citation omitted). Because Timothy and Carol own their property as joint tenants and had an aрparently equal claim to the personal effects removed during the cleanup effort, the District Court concluded they were in privity and that Rooker-Feldman barred Carol‘s claims as well.
We disagree with that conclusion. Although the Court correctly characterized our decision in Marran, the Supreme Court partially abrogated that holding in Lance v. Dennis by concluding that “[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be
Lance governs here. To be sure, it left open the possibility that Rooker-Feldman might sometimes prevent federal claims from a party not named in an earlier state proceeding, like when an “estate takes a de facto appeal in a district court of an earlier state decision involving [a] decedent.” Id. n.2. But Rooker-Feldman does not bar Carol‘s claim “simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, [she] could be considered in privity with” Timothy. Id.
D. Alternative Bases for Dismissal
Defendants argue that even if Rooker-Feldman poses no bar to federal subject-matter jurisdiction, we should affirm dismissal of the case on an alternative ground: because the Vuyaniches’ claims are barred by issue preclusion and under the doctrine articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994), which provides that a plaintiff may not recover damages under § 1983 if doing so would imply the invalidity of a prior conviction that has not otherwise been overturned. The District Court did not reach this alternative, and indeed Timothy was not convicted until after the District Court dismissed the case.
“We ordinarily decline to consider issues not decided by a district court, choosing instead to allow that court to consider them in the first instance.” Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int‘l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 401 (3d Cir. 2010). There is no reason to depart from that principle here. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533 n.11 (2011) (“[Q]uestions of preclusion unresolved below are ‘bеst left for full airing and decision on
Although “all courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists,‘” Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 163 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)), we need not address Defendants’ alternative preclusion arguments in the first instance because preclusion “is not a jurisdictional matter,” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293. And as panels of our Court have stated in not precedential opinions, Heck does not present jurisdictional issues either. See, e.g., Ortiz v. New Jersey State Police, 747 F. App‘x 73, 77 (3d Cir. 2018); Bolick v. Sacavage, 617 F. App‘x 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Reaves v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 580 F. App‘x 49, 54 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
Importantly, the Heck decision contains no jurisdictional language. Instead, it holds that a “§ 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sеntence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 489–90; see also Teagan v. City of McDonough, 949 F.3d 670, 678 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting, in a dictum, that “the Supreme Court‘s own language suggests that Heck deprives the plaintiff of a cause of action—not that it deprives a court of jurisdiction“). Consistent with this approach, at least one of our sister circuits has treated Heck as an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional rule. See Carr v. O‘Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1126 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The failure to plead the Heck defense in a timely fashion was a waiver[.]“); but see O‘Brien v. Town of Bellingham, 943 F.3d 514, 529 (1st Cir. 2019) (stating, without analysis, that “[w]hether Heck bars § 1983 claims is a
* * * * *
The Supreme Court has made clear that Rooker-Feldman is a limited doctrine that must not be applied outside of a precise, narrow set of circumstances. Those circumstances are not present here, and we therefore reverse the District Court‘s dismissal of the case and remand for further proceedings.