296 F.3d 160 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.(cid:13) This appeal presents an esoteric question of federal(cid:13) jurisdiction considered by the United States Supreme Court(cid:13) nearly a century ago in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.(cid:13) v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), and rarely reviewed since.(cid:13) The issue is whether the plaintiffs in a state-suit for(cid:13) defamation confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a federal(cid:13) court by raising a first amendment issue in response to an(cid:13) anticipatory defense.(cid:13) The plaintiffs, Cheryl Ann Bracken and her attorney, H.(cid:13) David Rothman, brought suit in the Allegheny County,(cid:13) Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas, alleging that(cid:13) Panorea Matgouranis’s attorney, defendant William J.(cid:13) Wyrick, defamed them during Bracken’s December 8, 2000,(cid:13) deposition. The plaintiffs also filed a second cause of action(cid:13) based on the alleged defamation, seeking an accounting(cid:13) and the imposition of a constructive trust on the assets of(cid:13) Panorea Matgouranis and her husband, Martin.(cid:13) The plaintiffs, in their Complaint, anticipated that the(cid:13) defendants would assert a defense of absolute privilege(cid:13) under Pennsylvania law. The plaintiffs, therefore, asserted(cid:13) 3(cid:13) that the exercise of such privilege would violate their first(cid:13) amendment rights under the United States Constitution.(cid:13) Based on this argument, as delineated in the plaintiffs’(cid:13) Complaint, the defendants successfully petitioned to have(cid:13) both cases removed to the United States District Court for(cid:13) the Western District of Pennsylvania.(cid:13) The plaintiffs, asserting lack of federal jurisdiction,(cid:13) moved to remand the cases to the state court pursuant to(cid:13) 28 U.S.C. S 1447. The District Court denied the motion,(cid:13) holding that the plaintiffs "have clearly raised federal(cid:13) constitutional issues in their complaint." The defendants(cid:13) moved to dismiss the cases, and, in due course, the District(cid:13) Court granted the motion. We hold that the District Court(cid:13) erred in assuming jurisdiction, and we will reverse.(cid:13) I.(cid:13) The plaintiffs allege that on November 6, 2000, Martin(cid:13) Matgouranis (Martin) gave Bracken, his employee and lover,(cid:13) a horrible beating that culminated in Martin shooting(cid:13) Bracken execution-style and leaving her for dead. Bracken(cid:13) survived and underwent facial surgery to reconstruct and(cid:13) repair her orbital area. Bracken was released from the(cid:13) hospital the same week she was admitted.(cid:13) Rothman, on Bracken’s behalf, wrote two letters to(cid:13) Martin’s attorneys. Rothman requested that Martin advance(cid:13) Bracken money because she was disabled and unable to(cid:13) support herself during her convalescence. Rothman(cid:13) indicated that if and when Martin appeared for sentencing(cid:13) in any criminal proceeding arising out of the alleged assault(cid:13) on Bracken, Bracken would inform the sentencing judge of(cid:13) any "belated compassion shown" by Martin. Rothman(cid:13) further stated that any ex post facto lack of compassion(cid:13) would also be revealed at any sentencing proceeding arising(cid:13) out of the alleged assault.(cid:13) On November 27, 2000, in the Court of Common Pleas of(cid:13) Allegheny County, Bracken filed an action to discover and(cid:13) freeze Martin’s assets. On December 8, 2000, the(cid:13) defendants deposed Bracken. During the course of the(cid:13) deposition, Wyrick, attorney to Panorea Matgouranis,(cid:13) established that Bracken had approved Rothman’s letters to(cid:13) 4(cid:13) Martin’s attorneys. Wyrick then accused Bracken and(cid:13) Rothman of attempting to extort money from Martin.(cid:13) Thereupon, the plaintiffs filed the action for defamation and(cid:13) intentional infliction of emotional distress.(cid:13) II.(cid:13) Title 28 U.S.C. S 1447(d) provides "[a]n order remanding(cid:13) a case to the State Court from which it was removed is not(cid:13) reviewable on appeal or otherwise." AlthoughS 1447(d)(cid:13) narrows the circumstances under which this Court can(cid:13) review a District Court’s order granting remand, appellate(cid:13) review of District Court orders denying remand is not(cid:13) prohibited. Spring Garden Assocs., L.P. v. Resolution Trust(cid:13) Corp., 26 F.3d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 1994). Irrespective of what(cid:13) S 1447 provides, this Court has a continuing obligation to(cid:13) sua sponte raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction if(cid:13) it is in question. Shaffer v. GTE North, Inc. , 284 F.3d 500,(cid:13) 502 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152.(cid:13) We exercise plenary review in determining whether the(cid:13) District Court had subject matter jurisdiction. Wujick v.(cid:13) Dale & Dale, Inc., 43 F.3d 790, 792 (3d Cir. 1994).(cid:13) Removing state-court cases to federal court is proper only(cid:13) when federal courts would have had original jurisdiction(cid:13) over the case. 28 U.S.C. S 1441(a);1 Caterpillar Inc. v.(cid:13) Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); V.I. Hous. Auth. v.(cid:13) Coastal Gen. Constr. Servs. Corp., 27 F.3d 911, 915 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1994).(cid:13) The Complaint, alleging defamation and intentional(cid:13) infliction of emotional distress, sounds entirely in(cid:13) Pennsylvania law. The parties are not diverse, and thus the(cid:13) District Court’s assumption of removal jurisdiction was(cid:13) predicated on original federal question jurisdiction(cid:13) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331.2 Because the Complaint(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. The statute provides, in pertinent part: "[A]ny civil action brought in(cid:13) a State court of which the district courts of the United States have(cid:13) original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district(cid:13) court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. S 1441(a) (emphasis added).(cid:13) 2. The statute provides: "The district courts shall have original(cid:13) jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or(cid:13) treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. S 1331.(cid:13) 5(cid:13) predicted that the defendants would assert a defense of(cid:13) absolute privilege under Pennsylvania law and in response(cid:13) asserted that such a defense would violate the United(cid:13) States Constitution, the District Court allowed the removal(cid:13) of the cases to federal court. The plaintiffs argued that the(cid:13) privilege defense was not an essential element of their state(cid:13) claims and moved to remand the cases to state court. The(cid:13) District Court denied the motion. Approximately a century(cid:13) of precedent compels us to reverse the District Court.(cid:13) This appeal raises fundamental questions regarding(cid:13) federal jurisdiction, and this Court may not ignore(cid:13) applicable law. The plaintiffs argue that there is no federal(cid:13) subject matter jurisdiction, because their complaints sound(cid:13) in defamation and intentional infliction of emotional(cid:13) distress, and any reference to their rights of free speech(cid:13) was surplusage and not essential to their claims. Although(cid:13) the plaintiffs have asserted the correct legal principle, they(cid:13) failed to cite precedential cases in support of this(cid:13) proposition to either the District Court or this Court.(cid:13) Mottley, not cited by any of the parties, is the appropriate(cid:13) starting point for our analysis.(cid:13) Mottley involved alleged injuries resulting from a collision(cid:13) of railroad trains that were owned by the defendant railroad(cid:13) company. 211 U.S. at 150. The plaintiffs and the defendant(cid:13) there reached a settlement in which the plaintiffs released(cid:13) the defendant from liability for damages in return for free(cid:13) railroad passes. The defendant allegedly performed its(cid:13) duties for several years and then it refused to renew the(cid:13) plaintiffs’ passes. The plaintiffs asserted that the(cid:13) defendant’s refusal to comply with the agreement was a(cid:13) consequence of a federal law forbidding free passes. Id. at(cid:13) 151. The plaintiffs argued that the federal law did not(cid:13) prohibit free passes under the circumstances of their case.(cid:13) Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that if the federal law(cid:13) prohibited their free passes, the law was unconstitutional.(cid:13) The District Court, based on the plaintiffs’ anticipation of(cid:13) the defendant’s defense, assumed jurisdiction. The United(cid:13) States Supreme Court reversed. Referring to the language(cid:13) of S 1331’s statutory predecessor, the Court stated:(cid:13) It is the settled interpretation of these words, as used(cid:13) in this statute, conferring jurisdiction, that a suit(cid:13) 6(cid:13) arises under the Constitution and laws of the United(cid:13) States only when the plaintiff ’s statement of his own(cid:13) cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws(cid:13) or that Constitution. It is not enough that the plaintiff(cid:13) alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action(cid:13) and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some(cid:13) provision of the Constitution of the United States.(cid:13) Although such allegations show that very likely, in the(cid:13) course of the litigation, a question under the(cid:13) Constitution would arise, they do not show that the(cid:13) suit, that is, the plaintiff ’s original cause of action,(cid:13) arises under the Constitution.(cid:13) Id. at 152; see also Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109,(cid:13) 113 (1936) (noting that a Complaint will not create federal(cid:13) jurisdiction by going beyond a cause of action statement(cid:13) and anticipating or replying to a likely defense); Krashna v.(cid:13) Oliver Realty, Inc., 895 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1990)(cid:13) (actions not removable based on federal defenses). Thus,(cid:13) the presence of federal question jurisdiction turns on the(cid:13) "well-pleaded complaint rule," which dictates that federal(cid:13) jurisdiction lies only when a federal question is presented(cid:13) on the face of the plaintiff ’s properly pleaded complaint.(cid:13) Williams, 482 U.S. at 392.(cid:13) The Supreme Court has labeled the "well-pleaded(cid:13) complaint rule" both reasonable and fair, Boston &(cid:13) Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Mining Co. v. Montana Ore(cid:13) Purchasing Co., 188 U.S. 632, 639 (1903), and has applied(cid:13) the rule consistently since its promulgation. E.g., Franchise(cid:13) Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-11(cid:13) (1983). The Court stated that speculation on possible(cid:13) defenses and responding to such defenses in an attempt to(cid:13) demonstrate that a federal question would likely arise is not(cid:13) a necessary element of a plaintiff ’s cause of action, and(cid:13) thus does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction.(cid:13) Montana Ore, 188 U.S. at 638-40.(cid:13) The plaintiffs’ Complaint sounds entirely in State law.(cid:13) Indeed, in terms of federal proximity, this case is one(cid:13) degree further removed than was Mottley. In Mottley, the(cid:13) plaintiffs anticipated a federal defense and offered their(cid:13) reply to it. Here, on the other hand, the plaintiffs have(cid:13) anticipated a state defense (i.e., absolute privilege), and(cid:13) 7(cid:13) have developed a first amendment response to the defense(cid:13) in their Complaint (i.e., absolute privilege violates the(cid:13) United States Constitution). Speculation on a state defense(cid:13) and a constitutional answer to it just cannot be the basis(cid:13) for federal question jurisdiction.(cid:13) Accordingly, the order of the District Court will be(cid:13) reversed and the proceedings remanded to the District(cid:13) Court with directions to vacate its order denying remand of(cid:13) the cases to the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.(cid:13) Upon remand, the District Court is instructed to enter an(cid:13) order granting plaintiffs’ motion for remand to the state(cid:13) court, with costs taxed against the defendants.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 8(cid:13)