TIEQIAO (TIM) ZHANG, Individually, and as administrator of the estate of Albert Liang (a/k/a Albert Zhang and f.k.a. Liangsheng Zhang), deceased, JING (LINDA) LIANG v. EMORY UNIVERSITY
No. 23-12365
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
May 23, 2025
Non-Argument Calendar; D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00868-AT
PER CURIAM:
This case involves tragic facts. Tieqiao Zhang and Jing Liang (“appellants“) appeal the dismissal of their negligence claims against Emory University arising out of the suicide of their son, Albert, an Emory student. On appeal, they argue that the district court procedurally and substantively erred in granting Emory‘s motion to dismiss. After careful review, we find no reversible error in the district court‘s well-reasoned orders, so we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal is from the district court‘s dismissal of appellants’ amended complaint. We summarize—and take as true—the factual allegations in that complaint. See Plowright v. Miami Dade Cnty., 102 F.4th 1358, 1363 (11th Cir. 2024).
Albert, after excelling in high school, enrolled at Emory in 2018, having received a scholarship that covered his tuition, fees, and room and board. When he enrolled, he was only 16 years old, so Emory required the appellants to submit their contact information. Albert was the only minor in the Emory Scholar program—which had between 200 and 250 students—during the 2018-19 academic year. Emory represented to Albert‘s parents that he would participate in the mandatory Emory Scholar advising program, and they believed that he would matriculate under “close supervision, care and protection.”
The amended complaint detailed Emory‘s suicide prevention programming and training efforts. According to Albert‘s parents, Emory was aware of various warning signs and “risk factors for suicide“—particularly among college students—including: “feelings of hopelessness and helplessness, impulsive tendencies, trauma or abuse, loss of a relationship, and limited support from family,” as well as “indications that the student [i]s in an abusive relationship.” Emory also was aware of medical literature that showed that suicide rates for young people were, in 2018-19, the highest they had been in the previous 17 years and that male and Asian-American students were especially at risk. Statistics also
Emory developed programming to reach out to students when suicide risk factors and warning signs were observed, “so that fewer students would consider, attempt and die by suicide.” One program, called “EMORY Cares 4 U,” was developed to address and help at-risk students. EMORY Cares 4 U concluded that male students, Asian American students, and students identifying as LGBTQ were groups especially “at risk” for suicide, and it recommended “selective efforts” to help students in those demographics. Another program, called “Question, Persuade and Refer” (“QPR“), trained participants to identify when someone was suicidal, persuade them to get help, and refer them to the support they needed. The QPR program was developed to help students in distress, including those facing crises such as homelessness. QPR training was mandatory for Emory staff before 2018-19 but was offered on a voluntary basis after that point. Emory also had a suicide prevention mobile app. The amended complaint further alleged that Dr. Goode was unaware of many crucial facts about suicide, Emory‘s suicide prevention efforts, and Emory‘s policies concerning parental consent for counseling services. The complaint also alleged that Dr. Goode had “received absolutely no suicide prevention training” and that he did not recognize warning signs of suicide in Albert‘s behavior while Albert was at Emory.
During the Spring of 2019, Albert told Dr. Goode that he was in a relationship with a female Emory student who was over
Over the summer, Dr. Goode witnessed “friction” between Albert and other students. In June 2019, Albert went to Emory‘s Counseling & Psychological Services office, but, because he was a minor, Emory would not provide Albert counseling services without his parents’ permission. Albert declined to authorize Emory to contact his parents and obtain their consent. Dr. Goode was aware of Albert‘s attempt to receive counseling and of his “frequent[] stay[s] overnight in an off-campus apartment” with his then-partner. According to the appellants, Dr. Goode also learned that Albert had, “at the insistence of” his partner, “begun cross-dressing,
The SAS program ended in July 2019 and Albert‘s Fall 2019 residence hall was not available for him to move into until August 24. On August 9, Dr. Goode ran into Albert on campus and Albert “exhibited unusual behavior” and acted startled. On August 15, Albert stopped by Dr. Goode‘s office and told him that his relationship “had abruptly ended that morning” and that he was asked to immediately leave the apartment where he had been staying. He was now homeless, and he explained that the end of his relationship had been “precipitated by a physical altercation” during which he was assaulted. Albert had a visible red mark on the left side of his neck, as well as a bruise on his chest, which Dr. Goode observed. Albert expressed sadness and concern, noting that his former partner blamed him for the physical altercation. Dr. Goode informed Albert that the incident could have
Dr. Goode did not file a
Dr. Goode saw Albert again on August 24 and learned that Albert‘s housing for the Fall was in the same residence as Albert‘s former partner. Two days later, Albert met with Dr. Goode and explained that his former partner was planning to file a
Finally, the amended complaint detailed the facts and circumstances surrounding Albert‘s death by suicide. Neither Emory nor Dr. Goode informed Albert‘s parents about the
Based on these factual allegations, the amended complaint asserted a “special relationship” between Emory and Albert under Georgia law, and alleged claims against Emory for: (1) negligence; (2) gross negligence; (3) wrongful death; and (4) damages on behalf of Albert‘s estate. The claims were each premised on Emory breaching its duty of care to Albert, thus causing Albert‘s suicide. As to the breach of care, the amended complaint alleged numerous failures on Emory‘s part, including the university‘s failure to inform Albert‘s parents about his romantic relationship, his homelessness situation, and the
Emory moved to dismiss the amended complaint. It primarily argued that “no one, including Dr. Goode . . . expected Albert‘s suicide.” It urged the court to review the documents referenced in the amended complaint because, it contended, the references were “cherry-picked” and the documents, as a whole, supported its position that it did not reasonably foresee Albert‘s suicide. Emory also argued that, even taking all the allegations as true and setting aside the external documents, there was no plausible allegations that it
Bad News? Unfortunately, I don‘t think I‘ll be able to make it to tomorrow‘s meeting. I‘m very sorry for the late notice. A recent unfortunate series of events has caused me to become temporarily homeless myself (ironic, I know). I will be fine and I do have a place to stay, but I just don‘t think I‘ll be able to make the meeting tomorrow. Could I get back to you later in the week to find another time?
Dr. Druss responded: “No problem, I hope everything is OK . . . . Keep us posted and let us know if anything would be helpful.”
Second, Emory attached a Police Report from the day of Albert‘s suicide. Mirroring the allegations in the complaint, the Report indicated that Dr. Goode called the police after: (i) receiving an email from Albert—with the address of the vacant home in the subject line—stating: “Hi Ed, Please find me at this address;” (ii) getting no response from Albert after emailing him in response; and (iii) going to the address and not receiving an answer when he knocked on the door. The Report also documented Dr. Goode‘s comments as to why he called the police, that a medical examiner had ruled Albert‘s loss as death by suicide—estimating the time of death as being the previous evening—and that the email Albert sent Dr. Goode was automated. The appellants opposed the
The district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. First, ruling on the dispute about evidence outside the complaint, the court concluded that it would consider the full email exchange between Albert and Dr. Druss, because that exchange was quoted directly in the amended complaint. It also considered the Emory Police Report, as it was referenced in the amended complaint, was central to the appellants’ claims, and was of undisputed authenticity. It declined to consider any other evidence outside the amended complaint.
Turning to the merits of the motion to dismiss, the district court explained that it had dismissed the original complaint because the allegations were “not sufficient, without more, to support a factual inference that Emory was in a position to reasonably foresee that Albert might attempt to take his own life.” It noted that courts ruling on similar cases “ha[d] generally required some allegations or evidence that university faculty or staff were more directly alerted to the danger of a potential suicide” than the allegations the appellants initially presented. The court then explained that the amended complaint suffered from the same deficiencies and, accordingly, failed to state a claim. It concluded that there were no facts that supported an inference that Dr. Goode or any
It also reasoned that the statement that Dr. Goode or “Emory knew that Albert was suicidal prior to the date of Albert‘s death” was conclusory and unsupported by the factual allegations. The district court focused on the Police Report and allegations in the complaint pertaining to the timing of Dr. Goode‘s alleged knowledge. The court constructed a timeline based on the allegations in the complaint and Police Report and concluded that it was not until Dr. Goode received Albert‘s pre-scheduled email following his death that Dr. Goode suspected that Albert might be suicidal.
The district court also rejected the appellants’ failure-to-train claim on the ground that a university does not have a duty to provide suicide prevention training to its staff. The court reasoned that, even though Georgia law recognizes a version of the “good Samaritan” doctrine set forth in the Restatements of Torts, see, e.g., Huggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 264 S.E.2d 191, 192 (Ga. 1980), the doctrine was ill-suited to a claim regarding college suicide prevention training.
After expressing deep sympathy to Albert‘s family, the court concluded that “the governing legal authority in Georgia simply does not provide an avenue for relief given the facts and circumstances alleged” in the amended complaint. Thus, it granted the motion to dismiss, and Albert‘s parents brought this appeal.
We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim de novo, “accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Plowright, 102 F.4th at 1363 (alterations adopted) (quoting Quality Auto Painting Ctr. of Roselle, Inc. v. State Farm Indem. Co., 917 F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc)). “Plaintiffs must plead all facts establishing an entitlement to relief with more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ramirez v. Paradies Shops, LLC, 69 F.4th 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012)). A “complaint must contain enough facts to make a claim for relief plausible on its face; a party must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Resnick, 693 F.3d at 1324-25). We need not, however, accept legal conclusions as true, “even when they are ‘couched as factual allegations.‘” Wainberg v. Mellichamp, 93 F.4th 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2024) (alterations adopted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). We also review legal issues, such as the proper application of Georgia law, applicable here, de novo. Ramirez, 69 F.4th at 1217; see also Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-80 (1938).
III. DISCUSSION
The appellants raise procedural and substantive challenges to the district court‘s order. Procedurally, they challenge the district court‘s consideration of documents outside the amended
A. The district court did not err in considering documents outside the complaint at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
The appellants argue that the district court either should have excluded from consideration the documents Emory attached to its motion to dismiss or should have given them notice that it was going to consider such purported evidence and allowed them to engage in additional discovery to further support their claims. “In general, district courts must limit their consideration to the pleadings and any exhibits attached to the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179, 186–87 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000)). “If a party presents, and the court considers, evidence outside of the pleadings, the general rule requires the district court to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 187. There are two exceptions, however: (1) the incorporation-by-reference doctrine; and (2) judicial notice. See id. (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)). Under the former exception—relevant here—a court may consider an extrinsic document when it “is (1) central to the plaintiff‘s claims; and (2) undisputed, meaning that its authenticity is not challenged.” Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2024).
The district court also did not err in considering the Police Report under the “incorporation by reference” doctrine. Johnson, 107 F.4th at 1300. The appellants do not contest the Report‘s authenticity or that it was central to their claims. See id. The appellants relied upon the Police Report to substantiate their position
B. The District Court did not err in granting Emory‘s motion to dismiss
Substantively, the appellants make several arguments. First, they argue that, if the court had drawn reasonable inferences from the amended complaint in their favor, their claims would have moved forward. They rely on Wyke v. Polk County School Board, 129 F.3d 560 (11th Cir. 1997), which they assert is “analogous” to the facts here. They argue that Dr. Goode possessed the necessary knowledge to create a duty to disclose “information concerning [Albert‘s] health and safety” to them, as his parents, given the fact that he was a minor. They also contend that the issue of foreseeability was a jury question and that a reasonable jury could find that Albert, Emory, and the appellants had a special relationship, that Emory breached a duty of care, and that Albert‘s death was foreseeable. They argue that “no direct knowledge that [Albert] would commit suicide was or is required” for their claims to succeed and they discuss cases from other circuits which, they assert, show error in this respect. Even if direct knowledge were required, they also contend that a reasonable jury could find that Emory—through Dr. Goode—should have foreseen that the failure to report or investigate Albert‘s allegations of physical and sexual abuse
Emory maintains that, based on the allegations and evidence properly before the district court, there is no plausible allegation that Dr. Goode considered Albert to be suicidal until after he received the email from Albert. It also argues that the appellants’ two new theories on appeal—“health emergency of a minor child” and negligence per se—are unavailing.
Under Georgia law, a plaintiff alleging negligence must show “the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant, a breach of that duty, causation of the alleged injury, and damages resulting from the alleged breach of the duty.” Rasnick v. Krishna Hosp., Inc., 713 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2011); see also City of Richmond Hill v. Maia, 800 S.E.2d 573, 576 (Ga. 2017).
there can be no proximate cause where there has intervened between the act of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff, an independent act or omission of someone other than the defendant, which was not foreseeable by defendant, was not triggered by defendant‘s act, and which was sufficient of itself to cause the injury.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting McQuaig v. McLaughlin, 440 S.E.2d 499, 502–03 (Ga. 1994)).
Under Georgia law, in these circumstances, “the usual foreseeability principle does not apply” because “generally speaking, suicide is deemed an unforeseeable intervening cause of death which absolves the tortfeasor of liability.” Id. (emphasis in original) (collecting cases). However, Georgia courts have recognized two exceptions, or “deviations” from this rule: “the so called rage-or-frenzy exception and the special-relationship exception.” Id. at
Our application of Georgia‘s heightened liability standard in negligence cases involving suicide requires us to conclude that the amended complaint fails to plausibly allege that Emory‘s staff, specifically Dr. Goode, should have foreseen that Albert would attempt suicide. Although Georgia law first requires that there was a “special relationship” between Emory and Albert, see Maia, 800 S.E.2d at 577-78, 593 & n.3; see also id. at 262-63 (Melton, J., concurring) (discussing the special relationship exception), we do not
The amended complaint states that (1) “Emory knew that Albert was suicidal prior to the date of Albert‘s death” and that (2) “[Dr.] Goode specifically informed law enforcement officers that Albert was suicidal before it was discovered that Albert had indeed died by suicide.” The first of these statements about Emory and Dr. Goode‘s knowledge is a legal conclusion styled as a fact, which does not factor into our analysis. Wainberg, 93 F.4th at 1224 (“[W]e need not accept legal conclusions, even when they are ‘couched as . . . factual allegation[s].‘” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). To the extent the amended complaint simply asserts that foreseeability was present, it was not enough standing alone to state a plausible claim. Ramirez, 69 F.4th at 1217; Resnick, 693 F.3d at 1324-25.
The other documents before the court, such as the email between Albert and Dr. Druss, do not plausibly allege foreseeability either. In his email to Dr. Druss, Albert, after being kicked out of his ex-partner‘s apartment, told Emory that that he was “temporarily homeless” and would not be able to attend a meeting. However, he also expressed that he would “be fine” and that he did “have a place to stay.” He did not make any statement that can be read to suggest he was considering self-harm, and the tone of the email does not plausibly convey immediate danger. In short, Albert‘s email to Dr. Druss did not put Emory on notice that Albert
The Emory Police Report supports the same conclusion and describes how Albert timed his automated email to Dr. Goode so that it would not be sent until the next day, which also, unfortunately, was after he had already committed suicide. Dr. Goode‘s actions after Albert had already committed suicide also show that he did not immediately—or previously—know that Albert was suicidal. When Dr. Goode received the email from Albert, he responded to the email, tried to find Albert, and went to the address Albert had provided, arriving 28 minutes after he received Albert‘s email. When no one answered the house door, Dr. Goode called the police and expressed his concern at that time that Albert might be suicidal. Thus, the allegations show that Dr. Goode was generally concerned about Albert after receiving the email, went to check on him, became more concerned when Albert did not appear, and then called the police as he began to fear the worst. Thus, the Police Report does not support any allegation that Dr. Goode foresaw or should have foreseen Albert‘s suicide.
Furthermore, Emory‘s creation and maintenance of a suicide prevention program is not evidence that suggests it knew or should have known that Albert would commit suicide. Again, the
The appellants’ reliance on Wyke v. Polk County School Board, is also misplaced. In Wyke, a case involving Florida law,2 a student had recently attempted suicide twice while at school, “ma[king] it quite possible to conclude that [the student]‘s [later, successful] suicide was foreseeable” to school officials. Id. at 563-65. Unlike in Wyke, Emory had no notice regarding any prior suicide or other self-harm attempts by Albert, his email did not indicate he planned to harm himself, and the timing between when his email was received and when he committed suicide did not provide Emory or the policy any time to intervene. Wyke thus presented much stronger facts laying out the basis for a plausible
Finally, the appellants contend, arguably for the first time on appeal, that the defendants are liable under a “negligence per se” theory. See Finnegan v. Comm‘r, 926 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining that, generally, issues not raised in the district court cannot be raised on appeal). In any event, the argument is without merit. Under Georgia law, “even when negligence per se has been shown, proximate cause must still be proved.” Cent. Anesthesia Assocs., P.C. v. Worthy, 333 S.E.2d 829, 833 (Ga. 1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B, cmts. a & b (Am. L. Inst. 1965)); see also Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B., 797 S.E.2d 87, 91 (Ga. 2017); Principle Sols. Grp. v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., 944 F.3d 886, 892 (11th Cir. 2019). Thus, whether styled as a traditional negligence or negligence per se claim, appellants’ failure to plausibly allege foreseeability defeats both theories of liability. Worthy, 333 S.E.2d at 833; Goldstein, Garber & Salama, 797 S.E.2d at 91.