Lead Opinion
Following the suicide death other 14-year-old daughter, Appellee Laura Lane Maia filed an action against the mayor and city council of the City of Richmond Hill (collectively “the City”) and Douglas Sahlberg, individually and in his capacity as an officer with the Richmond Hill Police Department (collectively “Appellants”), alleging wrongful death and assoсiated claims.
In her subsequent complaint, Appellee averred, inter alia, that Sahlberg had a duty to keep the injury photographs confidential, that he had breached that duty, that Sahlberg should have known that the publication of the photographs created a reasonable apprehension that Sаnders would further harm herself, and that Sanders’s death was caused by Sahlberg’s negligent conduct. Appellants subsequently moved for summary judgment, asserting that Appellee could not demonstrate causation because, under Georgia law, suicide is generally an independent act which breaks the chain of causation from the events preceding the dеath; Appellants also averred that the exceptions to the general rule regarding suicide are inapplicable in this case. In response, Appellee argued that the question of proximate cause, even in suicide cases, turns on the question of the foreseeability of harm and that such an issue is a jury question. The trial court denied the motion with a one-page order and granted a certificate of immediate review. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that, because “Sanders’s suicide was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Sahlberg’s negligent conduct, [Sanders’s] act of suicide was not an intervening act that would preclude Sahlberg’s breach of duty from constituting the proximate cause of that injury.” Maia,
1. “It is well established that to recover for injuries caused by another’s negligence, a plaintiff must show four elements: a duty, a breach of that duty, сausation and damages.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. American Nat. Red Cross,
there can be no proximate cause where there has intervened between the act ofthe defendant and the injury to the plaintiff, an independent act or omission of someone other than the defendant, which was not foreseeable by defendant, was not triggered by defendant’s act, and which was sufficient of itself to cause the injury.
(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) McQuaig v. McLaughlin,
As the Court of Appeals correctly recognized below, it has long been the rule in Georgia that, generally speaking, suicide is deemed an unforeseeable intervening cause of death which absolves the tortfeasor of liability Maia,
Regarding the first exception, “[w]here the tortfeasor’s wrongful act causes the injured party to kill himself during a ragе or frenzy, or in response to an uncontrollable impulse, the wrongful act is considered to be the proximate cause of the suicide.” (Footnote omitted.) Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo,
Georgia сourts have also deviated from the general rule that suicide absolves an alleged tortfeasor of liability in cases involving a special relationship between the tortfeasor and decedent, such as where a tortfeasor owes the unusual duty to prevent the decedent from harm. As Judge Dillard recognized in his dissent below, this special duty may аrise in cases involving a doctor-patient or hospital-patient relationship. See, e.g., Purcell v. Breese,
We note that the Court of Appeals has failed to consistently recognize the special-relationship exception as a general matter, see, e.g., Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo,
2. Though questions of proximate cause are generally left to a jury, the law in this area is clear and the facts of this case are plain; as such, this Court may resolve the question of proximate cause as a matter of law. See, e.g., McAuley v. Wills,
As applied in this case, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that “Sahlberg was not a medical professional, nor was Sanders in his custody or care.” Maia,
We agree with Judge Dillard that “Sahlberg’s flagrant violation of RHPD’s policy regarding cоnfidentiality was undoubtedly wrongful and it may indeed have been a factor in Sanders’s tragic decision to take her own life.” Maia,
Accоrdingly, Appellants were entitled to summary judgment in their favor, and the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court’s denial of that motion.
Judgment reversed.
Notes
Following the Court of Appeals’s decision below, the only remaining claims are a wrongful death claim against the City and Sahlberg in his official capacity, and a survival claim and a claim for punitive damages against Sahlberg in his individual capacity.
The record suggests that the photos depict Sanders in her underclothes.
We do not mean to imply that foreseeability plays no role in cases that fall within two of the narrow exceptions discussed herein, but only that foreseeability does not, alone, overcome the principle that suicide is deemed an unforeseeable intervening act that severs liability of a negligent tortfeasor.
This Court in Stevens v. Steadman suggested that liability for suicide might arise where a party encourages, counsels, or aids and abets another in committing suicide.
As discussed below, we disapprove Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo to the extent that it fails to fully address the exceptions to the general rule regarding proximate cause in cases involving suicide; nevertheless, it remains good law with respect to its discussion regarding the rage-or-frenzy exception.
We note that prior cases applying the rage-or-frenzy exception have involved a physical injury that has caused the decedent’s rage, frenzy, or uncontrollable impulse. See, e.g., Appling,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially
While I agree with the end result reached by the majority, I write separately to express my concern that the majority may be making too much of the idea that a “special relationship” did not exist between Sahlberg and Sanders simply because Sahlberg had no ability to supervise her or exercise custody or control over her. In my view, the range of possibilities for creating a special relationshiр may be broader than that which is implied by the majority. Indeed, Sahlberg did have some duty to Sanders based on police policies that prohibited him from revealing injury photos from Sanders’ attempted suicide to others. While the existence of the photos and Sahlberg’s violation of policies to keep such photos private may not have created a special relationship between Sahlberg and Sanders, it does beg the question of what circumstances outside of direct supervision or exercising custody or control over an individual might give rise to such a relationship.
To me, the key to this case is foreseeability — specifically the fact that Sanders’ suicide was an unforeseeable event in light of the manner in which Sahlberg revealed the injury photos to his daughter in a private setting.
Of course, this case might be entirely different if Sahlberg released the photos, for example, at a school assembly where Sanders was in attendance.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Recognizing that it has long been the rule in Georgia that, generally speaking, “ ‘suicide is an unforeseeable intervening cause оf death which absolves the tortfeasor of liability,’ ”
The specific facts of this case should not be limited by the two exceptions set by prior precedent where a defendant knеw of the previous attempted suicide, and committed flagrant acts of negligence against a known policy of confidentiality within close proximity to the prior attempted suicide.
I would uphold the trial court’s decision denying the motion for summary judgment
Mayor and City Council of City of Richmond Hill v. Maia,
Tucker v. Pearce,