THOMAS E. PEREZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. POSTAL POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 12-4390
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Decided and Filed: November 27, 2013
13a0334p.06
Before: MERRITT and CLAY, Circuit Judges; STAFFORD, District Judge.*
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b). Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland. No. 1:12-cv-00897—James S. Gwin, District Judge. Argued: October 11, 2013.
COUNSEL
OPINION
CLAY, Circuit Judge. Sections 401 and 402 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA“),
This case turns on how we determine when a member has “exhausted” his internal union remedies. Plaintiff, the Secretary of Labor,1 contends that a member exhausts the union‘s remedies when he receives the union‘s final decision. Defendant, the union representing police officers working for the United States Postal Inspection Service, asserts that the member‘s one-month limitations period runs from the date the union sends out its final decision. The district court agreed with Defendant and dismissed this case on the grounds that the complaining member had not filed his administrative complaint within the prescribed time period. We disagree, and hold that a member has not “exhausted” his internal union remedies until he receives the union‘s final decision. We therefore REVERSE the district court and REMAND this action for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Procedural History
In the summer of 2011, Defendant held an election to choose six officers, including its President. Scott Murray was the incumbent President, but when the election was held on July 29, 2011, he was ousted in favor of Christopher Vitolo, then the First Vice President. Murray was convinced that the election was tainted, and he raised his protests with Eric Freeman, Defendant‘s Election Chair, in a letter dated September 12, 2011. Among other things, Murray claimed that Vitolo had gained an unfair advantage by getting access to union members’ personal e-mail addresses. Freeman denied Murray‘s protests in a letter dated October 12, 2011. Murray appealed to Defendant‘s Executive Board. The Board, in turn, issued a final decision affirming Freeman‘s rulings on December 9, 2011. The Board sent this decision on to Murray by certified mail on December 9, 2011, and Murray received the decision on December 14, 2011. Murray filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Labor on January 13, 2012.
Section 402(b) of the LMRDA,
B. The Statutory Scheme
Congress enacted the LMRDA, also widely known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, to stem what it saw as “‘shocking abuses’ in the process by which labor unions govern[ed] themselves and [to] ensure ‘internal union democracy.‘” Shelley v. Brock, 793 F.2d 1368, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) (quoting S. Rep. No. 86-187, at 5, 6 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2322). The LMRDA was thus intended “to restore to members of labor unions the right to participate freely in the government of their union.” Sertic v. Cuyahoga, Lake, Geauga & Ashtabula Counties Carpenters Dist. Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 423 F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 1970). “Congress saw the principle of union democracy as one of the most important safeguards against such abuse, and accordingly included in the LMRDA a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of union elections.” Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 531 (1972). This regulatory scheme is set out in Title IV of the LMRDA,
Title IV reflects Congress’ “weigh[ing] how best to legislate against revealed abuses in union elections without departing needlessly from its long-standing policy against unnecessary governmental intrusion into internal union affairs.” Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass‘n, 389 U.S. 463, 471 (1968). Section 401,
Sections 402(a)(1) and (a)(2) provide two ways that a union member may satisfy the exhaustion requirement: respectively, either by “exhaust[ing] the remedies available under the constitution and bylaws of” his union,
DISCUSSION
This appeal presents a single issue—whether a member exhausts his internal union remedies under LMRDA § 402(a)(1) when the union sends its final decision, or when the member receives it. We review the district court‘s interpretation of this statute de novo. See S.E.C. v. Mohn, 465 F.3d 647, 650 (6th Cir. 2006). Our analysis begins with the plain meaning and, if the language is unambiguous, ends there as well. See Nat‘l Air Traffic Controllers Ass‘n v. Sec‘y of Dep‘t of Transp., 654 F.3d 654, 657 (6th Cir. 2011). If the text alone does not admit a single conclusive answer, we can draw on a broader range of interpretive tools. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333–36 (2011). Those tools include the Secretary of Labor‘s construction of the statute. See id. at 1335. The regulation interpreting § 402(a) is not binding on this Court or entitled to Chevron deference. See Martin v. Local 480, Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 946 F.2d 457, 462 n.1 (6th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). In fact, the Secretary does not claim that Chevron deference applies. But the rule, along with the Secretary‘s less formal pronouncements on the statute‘s meaning, may still have the “power to persuade” us. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also N. Fork Coal Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm‘n, 691 F.3d 735, 742 (6th Cir. 2012).
A. “Exhaust” Means “Obtain a Final Decision”
Section 402 establishes two ways that a member can exhaust his internal union remedies and thus begin the one-month limitations period. He can “exhaust[] the remedies available under the
The LMRDA does not explicitly define “exhausted” and dictionary definitions simply confirm that a member exhausts his remedies when he reaches the end of the union‘s procedures. See Black‘s Law Dictionary 654–55 (9th ed. 2009); Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989), available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/66155?; Webster‘s Third New Int‘l Dictionary 796 (1993). These broad definitions do not illuminate the narrow question before us. However, our plain meaning analysis does not end there. We discover a statute‘s plain meaning “by looking at the language and design of the statute as a whole.” Metro. Hosp. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.3d 248, 259 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, we read § 402(a)(1) and (a)(2) together. When a member begins the exhaustion process, the timeliness of any future administrative complaint is governed by § 402(a)(2) alone. But section 402(a)(2) becomes irrelevant if the member “obtain[s] a final decision” within three months.
Interpretive sources beyond the bare text confirm this interpretation. The Department of Labor‘s interpretive rule construing § 401(a)(1) reads sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) together, so that “[i]f the member obtains an unfavorable final decision within three calendar months after invoking his available remedies, he must file his complaint within one calendar month after obtaining the decision.”
B. Members “Obtain a Final Decision” When They Receive That Decision
Now that we have identified the key statutory phrase, we can determine what it means. Once again, we start with the plain meaning. When the verb “obtain” is used in its transitive form, it means “to gain or attain possession or disposal of,” Webster‘s Third New Int‘l Dictionary 1559 (1993), “[t]o come into the possession of; to procure; to get, acquire, or secure,” Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2004), available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/130002?, or “[t]o succeed in gaining possession of as the result of planning or endeavor; acquire.” Am. Heritage Dictionary 1214 (4th ed. 2000). In other words, someone “obtains” a thing when
Other interpretive sources reinforce our conclusion. Congress intended the LMRDA to check the power of union leaders and ensure that rank-and-file members have a meaningful opportunity to participate in union operations.3 The election provisions contained in Title IV of the LMRDA are a key part of this larger statutory scheme. Title IV also recognizes and respects the preference that unions have the first opportunity to resolve election disputes internally. See Hodgson, 403 U.S. at 339. The one-month limitations period of § 402(a) reflects Congress’ balancing act. But where time is of the essence and union members have so little of it, the overarching goals of the LMRDA strongly favor giving the member the full benefit of this one-month period. See Martin, 946 F.2d at 463–64. The date-of-receipt rule also incentivizes unions to “provide responsible and responsive procedures for investigating and redressing members’ election grievances.” Wirtz v. Local Union No. 125, Laborers’ Int‘l Union of N. Am., 389 U.S. 477, 484 (1968). If a member has one month from receiving the union‘s final decision, it is more likely that the union will take care that the member is quickly and fully apprised of the resolution of his complaint.
Further, the Secretary has consistently advanced the date-of-receipt rule in prior litigation. See Herman v. Local 305, Nat‘l Postal Mail Handlers Union, 44 F. Supp. 2d 771, 780 (E.D. Va. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 214 F.3d 475 (4th Cir. 2000); Reich v. Local 134, Int‘l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, No. 95 C 6688, 1996 WL 84207, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1996). Congress has charged the Secretary with enforcing the provisions
of § 401 of the LMRDA and recognizes the Secretary‘s special knowledge and expertise in this area. See Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 140. Although the Secretary‘s litigation positions are not entitled to Chevron deference, we acknowledge the persuasive power of the Secretary‘s interpretation of the statute, especially in light of the text and the clear legislative intent.
Defendant cannot weave together a convincing argument in response to the Secretary‘s position. Defendant claims that we already adopted the date-of-sending rule in Dole v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 970 F.2d 1562 (6th Cir. 1992), but this is incorrect. The question before us in Dole was whether union members had exhausted
Our decision in Brock v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 369, 790 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1986), is even more off base. As we acknowledged in Brock, “[t]he exhaustion requirement has two aspects: procedure and scope.” Id. at 509. Brock dealt with the permissible scope of the Secretary‘s complaint in district court in comparison to the member‘s internal grievances. See id. at 512. The case now before us concerns only the procedural aspect of the exhaustion requirement. Furthermore, the date-of-receipt rule does not import a subjective notice requirement into § 402(a). The limitations period runs from the objectively ascertainable date of receipt, not the date the union member opened the envelope or read the decision. Defendant in this case sent its final decision to Murray via certified mail—an excellent example of how a union might act to ensure that the date of its member‘s receipt is clear and unambiguous.
CONCLUSION
Based on the language of the LMRDA, Congress’ clear intent in enacting the statute, and the Secretary‘s persuasive interpretation, we hold that a union member‘s one-month period to file an administrative complaint under LMRDA § 402(a)(1),