*1 735 рrejudice from den to show that resulted allegation
an error.7 A mere that addi- might
tional evidence have been beneficial
gathered error not is had the occurred meet But
insufficient burden.8 only
Jones asserts that “the records and Young bal- findings might tip favor,” plaintiffs
ance in has not so she any
met her burden show that error
was harmful.9 judgment AFFIRMED. FORK
NORTH COAL
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
v. AND
FEDERAL MINE SAFETY COMMISSION;
HEALTH REVIEW Labor; Gray, Re- Mark
spondents. 11-3398,
Nos. 11-3684.
United Court of Appeals, States Circuit.
Sixth 19, July
Argued: 2012. 14,
Decided Filed: Aug. 2012. (5th Barnhart, (5th Carey Apfel, 7. 230 v. F.3d Cir. v. Castillo 2000); Sanders, Cir.2003) (“[The Shinseki v. points see also claimant] no evi- 173 L.Ed.2d dence that would have been adduced and that (2009) (“[T]he showing changed burden had could have the result been [she] normally party upon represented by error is harmful attorney, falls and therefore has determination.”). attacking agency’s prejudiced not demonstrated that she was due hearing.” to the absence of counsel at (“This Carey, at 142 will not F.3d Court (internal quotations omitted)). and citatiоn reverse the of an decision ALJ for failure to fully fairly develop Hyde, U.S.App. the record unless the 9.See LEXIS prejudiced (“Something speculative claimant that he or she shows was *11 more then a as- preju- might .... To ALJ’s failure establish sertion that medical records exist and dice, might clarify must he necessary, claimant demonstrate that earlier records perhaps she could and would have adduced evidence such as a statement from the doctor (internal might have altered the do result.” that such records exist and confirm an omitted)); quotations diagnosis.”). and citations also see earlier *3 Penn, M. Stephen Hodges,
ARGUED: Eskridge, Abingdon, Stuart & Virginia, fоr Rosenbluth, Petitioner. Robin United Labor, States Department Arlington, Virginia, Respondents. ON BRIEF: Stephen Hodges, Timothy M. W. Gres- ham, Penn, Eskridge, Stuart & Abingdon, Virginia, for Petitioner. Robin Rosen- bluth, Labor, United States Department Arlington, Tony Virginia, Oppegard, Lex- ington, Kentucky, Addington, Appala- Wes Center, Inc., chian Citizens Law Whites- burg, Kentucky, Respondents. GRIFFIN, Before: SUTTON and HOOD, Judges; Circuit District Judge.* GRIFFIN, J., opinion delivered court, SUTTON, in which J. and HOOD, D.J., SUTTON, joined. (pp. J. 744-47), concurring delivered a separate opinion.
OPINION GRIFFIN, Judge. Circuit This case involves a of em- filed ployment discrimination Mark * Hood, Kentucky, by designation. Joseph sitting M. Senior trict of Honorable Unit- Judge ed States District for the Eastern Dis- (“Secre- request Federal brought,” must Secretary of Labor she
Gray with Federal Mine Safe- to the and Health Review Commis- tary”) pursuant Safety (the “Mine Act” “Commission”) Act of 1977 ty (the and Health to order sion amended, “Act”), §§ 801- miner’s “pend- a determination Following complaint.” ing final order on “frivolously Gray’s complaint was Thereafter, an in- conducts Gray temporary re- brought,” granted was vestigation whether she will to determine U.S.C. instatement. on discrimination Thereafter, following miner. Id. If the behalf of the *4 Secretary deter- Gray’s allegations, the occurred, Act finds that no Mine violation a the Mine Act had mined that violation of may bring the an action on his or miner Secretary Accordingly, the not occurred. § her own behalf. Id. Under Gray’s concluding that a complaint, denied circumstance, the the either merits of Gray’s action on behalf was discrimination is re- complaint miner’s discrimination instant case presents not warranted. The judge law solved an administrative impression the issue of first whether (“ALJ”), discretionary re- with further that an employee’s Mine Act mandates provided by view the Commission. after temporary reinstatement continue 2700.69, ag- §§ Parties C.F.R. 2700.70. that determines his com- grieved by the Commission’s final order lacks merit. hold the Mine plaint We may review in the federal seek additional Act not such continued tem- require does § appeals. courts 30 U.S.C. 816. porary reinstatement. II. I. May On North Fork Coal Cor- Act was to the Mine enacted Fork”) (“North Gray, provide poration need to more fired Mark “urgent
address improv- measures for effective means and 4 mine. employed a roof its No. bolter ing practices working conditions Gray com- thereafter filed discrimination the Nation’s other in or- [and] coal mines Secretary, plaint alleging he was with prevent physical der to death and serious com- making safety-related terminated for 801(c). § impor- One harm[.]” U.S.C. plaints. Finding Gray’s complaint prohibits provision employ- tant of the “frivolously brought,” the Secre- reprisal ment discrimination as a for mak- tary application temporary for his filed safety-related complaints. ing reinstatement, granted and an ALJ § was prohibition This intended request. parties jointly requested encourage play to miners to an “active economic, Gray’s reinstatement be part in the of the Act” and enforcement return to the mine. foregoing his any possible them protect “against dis- Gray’s into Following her they might crimination which suffer as termination, informed the their participation.” S.Rep. result оf No. pursuing ALJ that she would not be 95-181, reprinted in 1977 thereafter, complaint. discrimination Soon U.S.C.C.A.N. dissolving Gray’s an order ALJ issued Act, a miner believing Under temporary reinstatement. On December subjected prohibited that he was em- 30, 2009, Gray filed a discrimination action may ployment discrimination file a com- on his own behalf. Secretary. plaint with the 815(e)(2). January On If the “frivolously granted discretionary review of the ALJ’s (1984). However, Gray’s temporary reinstate- L.Ed.2d 694 “if the dissolution of stat- decision, Thereafter, split in a ment. is silent or ambiguous respect ute with reversed the ALJ’s Commission issue, specific question holding temporary reinstatement was agеncy’s court is whether the answer is Gray’s until required to continue individual permissible based on a construction of the by final order. Two action was resolved 843,104 statute.” Id. at S.Ct. 2778. holding on the commissioners rv. 815(c), language of while a concur-
plain 815(c) ring third found commissioner part: Section states in relevant ambiguous, requiring deference to the be ... Any miner who that he believes has Secretary. The two with, discharged, been interfered or oth- dissenting commissioners asserted that the against by any erwise discriminated 815(c) plain language required person violation of this subsection dissolution of may, days within 60 after such violation when the deсided not to occurs, file a with the Secre- complaint. the miner’s North Fork there- *5 tary alleging such Upon discrimination. petition after filed for review before this receipt of such complaint, the court. shall forward a copy of the III. the respondent and shall cause such in- vestigation “The to be made as he ap- standard under which deems [we gov propriate. the Commission’s order is review] Such shall general erned the Mine Act and admin commence within days 15 of the Secre- principles[.]” Pendley istrative law v. Fed. tary’s receipt of the complaint, and if Comm’n, Safety & Health Review finds that such (6th Cir.2010). 601 F.3d 422 “[We frivоlously brought, the Com- review] Commission’s decision and not mission, expedited on an upon ap- basis underlying decision of ALJ[.]” plication Secretary, of the shall order Questions of law are reviewed de novo. the immediate reinstatement of the min- conflict, Id. at 423. When the Secre pending er order on the com- final tary’s super- reasonable If plaint. upon investigation, such cedes that of the Commission. Id. at 423 provi- determines that (citing Sec’y n. 2 Labor ex rel. Bushnell of sions of this subsection have been vio- Indus., v. Cannelton 1435 lated, immediately he shall file a com- (D.C.Cir.1989)). Commission, plaint with the with service upon alleged miner, violator and the reviewing agency’s
When an in applicant employment, represen- for or of terpretation language, we are tative of miners alleging such discrimi- “First, with presented questions. two al nation or interference and propose an ways, question is the Congress whether granting appropriate order relief. The directly spoken precise question has to the opportunity Commission shall afford an clear, If Congress at issue. the intent of (in hearing for a accordance with sec- matter; is the end of the for the regard tion 554 Title 5 but without court, agency, give as well as the must (a)(3) section) subsеction of such in unambiguously expressed effect to the order, Chevron, U.S.A., thereafter shall issue Congress.” tent of Inc. Council, Inc., upon findings affirming, modify- v. Natural Res. 467 Def. 837, 842-43, ing, vacating pro- U.S. or 2006, the of Federal From 1978 to Code directing appro- or other posed “If, following an or- priate Regulations provided: relief. reinstatement, the Secre- der of added). § (emphasis 30 U.S.C. tary provisions that the sec- 815(c)(3), petition relevant to Also 815(c)(1), 105(c)(1), have tion provides: which violated, Judge shall be so not been days receipt of a com- Within dissolving enter an order the Sec- notified and shall paragraph filed under plaint miner, notify, writing, retary shall reinstatement.” 29 C.F.R. the order of represen- employment, (1999). applicant any serious 2700.45(g) Without tative of miners of his determination controversy, practice was followed If has occurred. whether a violation 2006, however, years. In the Commis- Secretary, upon investigation, deter- regulation. portion sion deleted this that the of this subsec- mines explaining change, In violated, not been the com- tion have believed noted within 30 plainant right, shall have the interpreted should be to re- days of notice of the deter- temporary reinstatement “even when quire mination, to file an aсtion his own Secretary determines that there was Commission, charging behalf before the 105(c) no violation of section of the Mine or interference viola- discrimination 44,198 44,190, Reg. (Aug. Act.” Fed. (1). paragraph The Commission tion of 2006). response, de- Commission hearing for a opportunity shall afford regulatory to delete the reference to cided (in with section 554 of Title 5 accordance *6 reinstatement, temporary leaving the mat- (a)(3) regard but to subsection without litigation.” ter to “be resolved in Id. at section), of such and thereafter shall is- then, 44,199. appeals no court of Since upon findings of sue an has аddressed this issue. sustaining the com- dismissing and, charges charges if the plainant’s sustained, relief it V. granting
are
such
as
appropriate....
Proceedings
deems
un-
First,
phrase
we conclude
the
expedited by
section shall be
der this
complaint”
final
“pending
order on the
Secretary
the
and the Commission.
plain meaning
not have a
because it is
does
Any
by
order
issued
Commission
subject to more than one reasonable inter
paragraph
subject
shall be
to
under
Indeed,
fact is
pretation.
demonstrat
judicial review in accordance with sec-
by
split
ed
decision of the Commission
tion 816 of this title.
competing interpreta
and the reasonable
815(c)(3).
§
on the
Id.
This case turns
by
Pugliese
parties.
tions offered
See
proper interpretation
phrase “pend-
of the'
Dev., Inc.,
v. Pukka
final
contained
ing
complaint”
order on the
(11th Cir.2008) (“Although
parties
both
ar
815(c)(2).
§
Secretary
in
The
reads the
gue
plain
is
un-
“complaint”
term
to mean the miner’s
that the
unambiguous,
argue
and
both also
complaint,
derlying discrimination
whether
plain meaning supports
interpreta
their
by
Secretary
it
litigated
under
ambiguity.
tion. This indicates
Further
815(c)(2)
§
or the miner under
more,
divergent
court
the existence
North Fork asserts that the term “com-
ambiguity.” (citing
opinions
suggests
also
plaint”
by
Secretary
refers to that filed
(South Dakota), N.A.,
Smiley v. Citibank
Commission,
and not to the
before
U.S.
separate
“action” filed
the miner under
n
(1996))).
L.Ed.2d 25
phrase
temporary
reference
reinstatement.
at
operative
The
words of
(“[WJhere
“complaint.”
and
Congress
issue are “order”
This
example,
dispute
North Fork does not
As North Fork
problems.
without its
em-
expedited-proceedings
requirement,
that the
phasizes,
the event
815(c)(3),
only
§in
applies
mentioned
that no Mine Act violation has
(3).
actions pursued under
occurred, and the miner decides not to
applies
right
The same
for the
to obtain
pursue
individual
action
under
from
appeals.
review
the federal courts of
815(c)(3),
nothing
in the
there is
sum,
phrase “pending
In
final order
providing
Act
for a “final order.” While
complaint”
plain,
on the
does not have a
operator
asserts that a mine
unambiguous meaning under the circum-
final
request
could
order from the Com-
presented
stances
in this case. According-
mission,
no such
provides
proce-
ly,
analysis necessary.
further
dure.
subject
“complaint”
The word
is also
VI.
interрretations
two reasonable
this con-
plain meaning,
the absence of a
hand,
ability
On the one
text.
must determine the most reasonable inter-
miner to
a civil action on his or her
*7
pretation
statutory
of
language
at is-
815(c)(3).
§in
In
own behalf is set forth
sue, giving
interpretation
deference to the
subsection,
this
the miner is referred to as
presented by
Secretary.
Pendley, 601
“action,”
filing
“complaint.”
not a
See
case,
In
parties
F.3d at 423.
States,
16, 23,
Russello v. United
464 U.S.
dispute
required,
the level of deference
(1983) (“We
743 815(c)(3), however, Co., does not refer a & Swift (1944)). 161, Rather, § “complaint.” miner’s 89 L.Ed. “charges” allows a miner to his case, Similarly, present in the because presume “action.” individual We interpretation has been of- Congress’s language pur- choice of was it no more litigation, is afforded fered Russello, poseful. See 464 U.S. at deference. Chao than Skidmore While S.Ct. Occupa- in the context of the was decided Act Safety and Health tional The miner’s individual “action” is (“OSH Act”), Act is we note that OSH set forth in a different subsection than the Mine Act with “nearly identical” to describing “complaint” the one investi judicial and re- regard to administrative pursued by gated Secretary. Sturm, Ruger & procedures.
view
See
Moreover, §
does not address
Chao,
Co.,
867, 872-73
Inc. v.
300 F.3d
temporary
again,
reinstatement. Once
we
(D.C.Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks
presume
statutory
this choice in
omitted).
intentional, indicating
structure was
temporary
appropri
reinstatement
is not
VII.
pursues
ate when miner
an individual
Skidmore,
the Secre
Under
id.;
“action” under
See
see
tary’s position is afforded deference to the
Graham,
also
v.
United States
608 F.3d
“power
persuade.”
it
extent
has
(4th Cir.2010) (“[W]e
164, 176
cannot con
Skidmore,
H.R.Rep. No.
52
1977
rel-
(Conf.
(em-
3485,
Rep.)
3500
provision
U.S.C.C.A.N.
which conflicts
evant
with the
added).
language
This
phases
indicates
agency’s
earlier
is entitled
appropri-
temporary
reinstatement
considerаbly
to
less deference than a con-
only during
Secretary’s investiga-
ate
(internal
sistently
agency
quo-
held
view.”
§in
tion as set forth
While the
omitted)). From
tation marks
the enact-
Report
temporary
indicates that
Senate
1977,
2006,
ment of the Mine Act in
until
“pend-
reinstatement
remain
effect
Secretary accepted
the Commission’s
ing
final outcome of the
practice
challenge
require-
and did not
95-181,
complaint,” S.Rep. No.
at 37
temporary
ment that
reinstatement cease
(em-
3401,
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
upon her determination of no Mine Act
added),
phasis
this
does not
Energy
Mining
violation.
W.
Co. v.
Cf.
upon
touch
the miner’s individual “action”
Safety
Fed. Mine
& Health Review
as set forth in
Comm’n,
(D.C.Cir.1994)
457,
support
holding.
Other factors also
our
(finding
Secretary’s “consistently
that the
First,
Congress
we assume that
was aware
interpretation”
maintained
of a Mine Act
27-year accepted
of the Commission’s
deference).
regulation
was entitled
practice
dissolving temporary
reinstate-
reasons,
For these
we conclude that the
Secretary’s
ment following the
determina-
Secretary’s interpretation
tempo-
of the
tion of no Mine Act violation. Neverthe-
rary
provision
reinstatement
does not have
less, during
27-year
this
period, we note
Rather,
“рower
persuade.”
nothing
was done to extend reinstate-
structure,
statutory language
legisla-
past
stage.
ment
v.
See Barnhart
history,
tive
and other relevant
factors
Walton,
1265,
Congress’s
demonstrate
judgment
(2002) (noting
long-standing practice
dissolving tempo
petition for review and reverse the order
rary
reinstatement when the
of the Commission.
decides not to
the miner’s discrimi
nation complaint,
current
SUTTON,
Judge, concurring.
Circuit
position is entitled to less deference. See
Cardoza-Fonseca,
join
v.
I
Judge
thorough opinion
INS
Griffin’s
U.S.
446 n.
107 S.Ct.
First, per- subsection that distinct Third, these differences make sense action with mits the miner to file his own against background when measured says nothing about rein- principles granting for interim relief. The during proceeding. Ample statement a filing complaint norm is the mere silence, a reason exists for that failure employer, against government or carry over the immediate-reinstatement anyone else does not itself revert requirement proceeding from to the one parties’ legal relationship. Unless why other. It is difficult to understand plaintiff preliminary injunction seeks а Congress would favor reinstatement after something require- similar—and meets the com- has found miner’s so, doing including showing ments for plaint thing to lack merit. It is one probability of norm is to success—the require a company coal to continue to em- things they during leave as are the resolu- ploy a miner after the deter- tion of complaint. Congress altered complaint mines the discrimination by permitting custom here a reversion frivolously It quite was not filed. anoth- merely frivolously if the er to after do so brought. That makes sense the context has no merit. It of this whistle-blower statute. does What indeed, quite possible, that the nоt make Congress’s sense is to construe just will uncover not that the type silence the second of action as complaint is meritless but that it is frivo- altering background norm and as do- boot, making exceedingly lous to it odd to ing so even after the finds no preserve the reinstatement even after the complaint. merit to the I could see con- body authority given over this threshold 815(c)(3) struing pre- this silence in longer determination finds that it no ex- serving background norm—that ists. employee could seek continued reinstate- Second, types proceedings the two grounds ment based on the traditional only appear in distinct subsections (likelihood success, doing irreparable so they statute but language. also use distinct on). harm But I and so cannot see it as proceeding The initial —the carrying unique pro- over reinstatement permits one that if not “friv- to a unique vision action. olously brought” “complaint” to a —refers If accept ap- new Secretary.” filed “with the The second statute, moreover, proach to the what proceeding one that —the miner says nothing about would not file action with the reinstatement —refers to an lawyer “action” filed “before the Commis- Commission? And what would not *12 thing? The mere very recommend BALSLEY, Cаtherine Catherine action, non- a/k/a matter how no
filing of Brown, Bosley; Plaintiffs- Richard point at that even frivolous meritorious Appellees, reinstate time, ensure continued would proceeding. through the end of ment v. proceedings no small matter That LFP, INC., Defendant-Appellant. this one has— long last as as that can No. 11-3445. counting since the months and thirty-five say, counting,” I not “And reinstatement. Appeals, Court of United States because, if the flourish but for rhetorical Sixth Circuit. con right, 17, Argued: July 2012. appeals all Sec through tinues —from decision, decision, retary’s the ALJ’s Aug. and Filed: Decided decision, Ap the Court Commission’s decision, way to a certiorari all the peals’ Supreme States to the United
petition provide any does the statute Nor
Court. if any of these costs recovering
basis for ultimately rejects im system only would
claim. Such concerns, might it but process due
plicate settings. See them some
well violate 319, 333, Eldridge, v.
Mathews
(1976);
Cleve
96 S.Ct. Loudermill, 470 U.S. Bd. Educ. v.
land 84 L.Ed.2d Bd.,
(1985); v. R.R. Ret. Kelly Cir.1980). (3d better, Far it me, peril by treat to avoid this
seems as dis types proceedings
ing the two
tinct, in the the distinct just as just subsections indicates
two for the the statute
Secretary construed years of its existence. twenty-seven
first
