Thе People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Terrell Allen, Appellant.
Court of Appeals of the State of New York
Argued October 23, 2014; decided November 25, 2014
24 NE3d 586, 999 NYS2d 350, 24 NY3d 441
Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, Criminal Appeals Bureau, New York City (Angie Louie of counsel), for appellant. I. The count of attempted murder was rendered duplicitous where the indictment charged attempted murder when appellant fired at Kevin Macklin and missed seconds before firing again and killing him, but evidence at trial showed that there was an earlier incident when appellant pointed a gun at Macklin but no shot was fired, and this mode of proceedings error does not need to be preserved for appeal. (People v Keindl, 68 NY2d 410; People v Alonzo, 16 NY3d 267; People v Bauman, 12 NY3d 152; People v Hanley, 20 NY3d 601; People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643; People v Parilla, 8 NY3d 654; People v Sinha, 84 AD3d 35; People v Nash, 77 AD3d 687; People v Hayes, 104 AD3d 1050; People v Jones, 165 AD2d 103.) II. The introduction of the lineup in violation of appellant‘s right to counsel was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the identification was made by the People‘s lead witness, and where the other witnesses had strong motives to lie. (People v Coates, 74 NY2d 244; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230; People v Smith, 22 AD3d 510; People v Polhill, 102 AD3d 988; Chapman v California, 386 US 18; Fahy v Connecticut, 375 US 85; People v Carracedo, 89 NY2d 1059; People v Carpenito, 80 NY2d 65; Wray v Johnson, 202 F3d 515; People v Burts, 78 NY2d 20.) III. The defense was improperly limited in establishing that the People‘s main witness, Judith Macklin, told police that there was one shooter and that the perpetrator fit the description of codefendant Waquan Welds,
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Nancy Fitzpatrick Talcott and John M. Castellano of counsel), for respondent. I. The count of attempted murder was not duplicitous and the Appellate Division properly rejected defendant‘s unpreserved claim to the contrary. (People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662; People v Michael, 48 NY2d 1; People v Jackson, 196 NY 357; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10; People v Kelly, 5 NY3d 116; People v Voliton, 83 NY2d 192; People v Middleton, 54 NY2d 42; People v Patterson, 39 NY2d 288; Brown v Greiner, 409 F3d 523; People v Ahmed, 66 NY2d 307.) II. Defendant wаs not denied his right to counsel at the lineup. In any event, error, if any, in the admission of such evidence was harmless. (People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470; People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192; People v Ingram, 18 NY3d 948; People v Wheeler, 2 NY3d 370; People v Pacquette, 17 NY3d 87; People v Sparber, 10 NY3d 457; People v Carracedo, 89 NY2d 1059; People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759; Kirby v Illinois, 406 US 682; People v Wilson, 89 NY2d 754.) III. The Appellate Division correctly affirmed the trial court‘s exclusion of impeachment evidence which could not be attributed to the witness sought to be impeached and which did not statе what defendant alleged. (Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400; Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284; Rock v Arkansas, 483 US 44; People v Aska, 91 NY2d 979; People v Miller, 39 NY2d 543; People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40; People v Petty, 7 NY3d 277; People v Corby, 6 NY3d 231; People v Davis, 43 NY2d 17; Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673.)
OPINION OF THE COURT
Chief Judge Lippman.
The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether a duplicity argument based on trial evidence must be preserved for appeal where the count is not duplicitous on the face of the indictment. We hold that such error must be preserved, and find that none of the other issues raised by defendant warrant reversal.
On June 22, 2008, shortly before 1:30 a.m., defendant attempted to shoot the victim while he was in the street, but the
The victim‘s wife witnessed some оf the events leading up to the shooting, and on the night of the murder, spoke to police officers about what she saw. She mentioned to Detective Mark Lobel the name of the codefendant in this case (Welds), who told police that defendant had fired the gun. Three days later, defendant was arrested by police, including Detective Lobel, in New Jersey, after he attempted to avoid arrest by hiding in an attic. Police brought defendant to the 113th precinct in Queens. Detective Lobel conducted a lineup at the station, and the victim‘s wife identified defendant as the shooter. Ballistics evidence showed that the bullet recovered at the scene and the bullet recovered from the victim‘s body were fired from the same gun. Defendant and Welds were charged in a single indictment. Welds’ case was ultimately severed from defendant‘s. Welds stood trial first and was convicted by a jury of murder in the second degreе. Facing a sentence of up to 15 years to life, Welds agreed to testify against defendant in exchange for a promise of leniency. Welds was sentenced to 7 1/2 years to life.
Defendant was charged with one count of second-degree murder and one count of attempted second-degree murder among other charges. The indictment charged defendant and codefendant with:
“murder in the second degree, committed as follows: The defendants, on or about June 22, 2008, in the County of Queens, acting in concert with each other and with the intent to cause the death of Kevin Macklin, caused thе death of Kevin Macklin, by luring him off the front steps of his home and shooting him with a loaded firearm.”
Defendant, alone, was charged with:
“attempted murder in the second degree, committed as follows: The defendant, on or about June 22, 2008, in the County of Queens[,] and with the intent to cause the death of Kevin Macklin, attempted to cause the death of Kеvin Macklin by discharging a loaded firearm at and in his direction.”
Defendant filed a request for a bill of particulars, seeking specification of the substance of each aspect of defendant‘s conduct encompassed by each charge, the distinctions in conduct
“[I]t appears the Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment charging [m]urder in the [s]econd [d]egree (intentional) and [a]ttempted [m]urder in the [s]econd [d]egree are multiplicitous counts as . . . the defendant is charged [with] attempting to cause the death of Kevin Macklin by discharging a loaded firearm at and in his direction, and . . . the defendant is charged with luring him off the front steps of his home and shooting him with a loaded firearm, causing his death. It appears that these counts encompass either the same conduct or a single continuing offense and should not be separate counts in this indictment.”
In response, the People stated that the substance of defendant‘s conduct was that
“on June 22, 2008, at approximately 01:35 a.m., in the vicinity of 112-02 148[th] Street, the defendant[,] acting in concert with co-defendant . . . pointed a pistol at Kevin Macklin[,] and attempted to shoot Kevin Macklin[,] and thereafter did fire at Kevin Macklin, striking him in the head, thereby causing his death.”
After a Wade hearing, Supreme Court denied defendant‘s motion to suppress identification testimony, which had claimed, inter aliа, that the identification was made in a lineup that was conducted in violation of defendant‘s right to counsel. There was conflicting testimony from defendant and the police officers as to whether or not defendant had requested the presence of his attorney at the lineup. The court concluded that “even if defendant Allen in fact had told detectives prior to the lineup that he wanted his lawyer, they were under no obligation to contact or provide counsel at the lineup.”
During opening arguments, the People raised both incidents of defendant attempting to shoot the victim (both thе gun not firing, and the missed shot in front of the house 10 minutes later), applying the term “attempted murder” only to the earlier one. Defendant made no objection. During the testimony of the
In the closing argument, the prosecutor did not clarify which incident formed the basis of the attempted murder count. The court also did not specify which conduct the attempted murder сharge was based upon, stating:
“[U]nder the second count the People are required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt two elements: One, on or about June 22, 2008 in the County of Queens this defendant acting in concert intended to commit the crime of murder in the second degree. I have given you those elements. And, two, the defendant engaged in conduct which tended to effect the commission of that crime.”
Defendant did not object to the charge.
Defendant was convicted on all counts, and sentenced to 25 years to life for murder, 25 years for attempted murder, 15 years for each of two criminal possession of a weapon counts, and one year for menacing. The attempted murder sentence was imposed consecutively to the other counts.
The Appellate Division unanimously modified the judgment of conviction, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by directing that all the terms of imprisonment run conсurrently with each other, and as so modified, affirmed, holding that: (1) although the trial court erred in denying defendant‘s motion to suppress the lineup identification, the error was harmless; (2) the trial court properly refused to allow defendant to introduce extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter to impeach
“An indictment is duplicitous when a single count charges more than one offense” (People v Alonzo, 16 NY3d 267, 269 [2011]). Defendant argues that the count of the indictment charging him with attempted murder was rendered duplicitous due to events that unfolded during the course of the trial.
The indictment in this case appears to cite the incident that occurred in front of the victim‘s house (the two shots fired within seconds of each other) as the basis for the attempted murder count against defendant. The bill of particulars, which says that “defendant. . . pointed a pistol. . . and attempted to shoot . . . and thereafter . . . fire[d],” may be read as tying the attempted murder charge to the earlier incident (the misfire), but it does not eliminate the ambiguity. At trial, beginning with the opening statement, the People presented to the jury two separate incidents in which a gun was pointed at the victim, and defendant рulled the trigger. Neither the People, in their closing argument, nor the court, in its instructions to the jury, clarified the basis of the attempted murder count. Thus defendant contends that the jury verdict on the attempted murder count could have represented either a finding as to the first incident, the second incident, or a combination of the two.
Defendant argues that preservation is unnecessary where a count is not duplicitous on its face, but where it is the evidence adduced at trial that renders a count duplicitous, contending that the defect constitutes a mode of proceedings error.
In People v Becoats (17 NY3d 643 [2011]), defendant cоntended that the indictment was facially duplicitous. This Court held that such issues must be preserved at trial. We reasoned:
“To allow an unpreserved claim of duplicitousness to be raised on appeal would open the door to abuse. Defendants accused of multiple offenses may not much care how many counts they face, or may prefer to face one count (and thus one conviction) rather than several. Under the rule defendants here seek, it would be possible for them to make that choice at trial by letting a duplicitous indictment stand without objection, and make the opposite choice on
appeal; they might thus obtain a new trial on the basis of an error they consciously decided not to challenge because they thought it insignificant, or welcomed it. To expand the definition of ‘mode of proceedings’ error too freely would create many suсh anomalous results” (Becoats, 17 NY3d at 651).
Here, defendant asserts that the charge for attempted murder did not become arguably duplicitous until the trial evidence suggested that there had been another incident involving defendant and the victim.
The First and Second Departments have held that where it is claimed that the trial evidence has rendered a count duplicitous, the issue must be preserved for review (see People v Sinha, 84 AD3d 35, 43-44 [1st Dept 2011], affd 19 NY3d 932 [2012]; People v Nash, 77 AD3d 687, 688 [2d Dept 2010]). The Fourth Department, however, has held that duplicity created by trial evidence violates a defendant‘s right to be tried and convicted only of the crimes and theories charged in the indictment, which is a fundamental and non-waivable right, and that such error also violates a defendant‘s right under
As we held in People v Alvarez (20 NY3d 75, 81 [2012], cert denied 569 US 947, 133 S Ct 1736 [2013], and 569 US 981, 133 S Ct 2004 [2013]), in relation to the constitutional right to a public trial, “preservation of public trial claims is still required. Bringing a public trial violation to a judge‘s attention in the first instanсe will ensure the timely opportunity to correct such errors” (see also People v Garcia, 95 NY2d 946, 947 [2000]; People v Nieves, 90 NY2d 426, 431 [1997]). Therefore, defendant‘s argument that he need not preserve an issue that has constitutional significance is unconvincing.2
Any uncertainty could have easily been remedied with an objection during opening statements or the witnеss testimony, or to the jury charge. Requiring preservation will prevent unnecessary surprise after the conduct of a complete trial. Accordingly, we hold that issues of non-facial duplicity, like those
As to the lineup identification, any error in its admission “must be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when considered in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant‘s guilt” (People v Owens, 74 NY2d 677, 678 [1989]; accord People v Harris, 80 NY2d 796 [1992]). Here, there were three eyewitnesses, two of whom knew the defendant personally, ballistics evidence, a confession to one of the witnesses an hour after the shooting, and defendant‘s strenuous efforts to avoid arrest.
Finally, we reject defendant‘s claim that he was improperly limited in establishing through police reports that the People‘s main witness, the victim‘s wife, described the shooter to the police and that the description matched that of the alleged accomplice in this case. As to limitations on cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, it is well settled that “[a]n accused‘s right to cross-examine witnesses . . . is not absolute” (People v Corby, 6 NY3d 231, 234-235 [2005]). Because prior statements are
“often collateral to the ultimate issue before the jury and bear[ ] only upon the credibility of the witness, [their] admissibility is entrusted to the sound discretion of the Trial Judge whose rulings are not subject to review unless there has been an abuse of discretion as a matter of law” (People v Duncan, 46 NY2d 74, 80 [1978], cert denied 442 US 910 [1979]).
The trial court, acting in accordance with these principles, did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the police reports were inadmissible extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter. Defendant failed to demonstrate that the source of the information in the reports was actually the victim‘s wife herself. The officers/authors of the reports wrote that they were based on secondhand information, and neither of them had ever spoken to the victim‘s wife personally.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott, Rivera and Abdus-Salaam concur.
Order affirmed.