THE FLORIDA BAR v. CHRISTOPHER W. CROWLEY
No. SC2020-0529
Supreme Court of Florida
July 9, 2026
GROSSHANS, J.
The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar restrict what lawyers may say about certain candidates running for elected office, including those in nonpartisan judicial races and those seeking partisan positions. See
I
In 2017, Crowley ran for the Office of State Attorney in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit. Also running for this post was then-Chief Assistant State Attorney Amira Fox. During the course of the campaign, Crowley made numerous remarks about Fox‘s qualifications and integrity that the Bar alleges are in violation of its rules.
For example, Crowley claimed that Fox had a low conviction rate and attributed to Fox the failure of the State Attorney‘s Office to obtain convictions in two cases. He also accused Fox of improperly interfering with a grand jury.
In another set of remarks, Crowley alleged that Fox was involved in the decision to arrest him for campaign-related
When these statements, and others, came to the Bar‘s attention, it filed a complaint against Crowley, alleging that he violated rules 4-8.2(a) (forbidding improper impugning of a candidate for election tо legal office), 4-8.4(a) (prohibiting conduct that violates the rules of professional conduct), and 4-8.4(d) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).4
The referee hеld an evidentiary hearing on the Bar‘s charges, at which the Bar called several witnesses and introduced documentary evidence. Upon consideration of the evidence and the parties’ arguments, the referee recommended that Crowley be adjudicated guilty for violating rules 4-8.2(a) and 3-4.3.5 Notably, the referee found proof that Crowley made the statements with the requisite mental state and that the subject of the statements was Fox‘s qualifications or integrity. However, the referee recommended that Crowley not be found guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(a) or 4-8.4(d). As a penalty for violating rules 4-8.2(a) and 3-4.3, the referee recommended a sixty-day suspension.
II
Crowley‘s chief argument is that the referee‘s recommendations related to rule 4-8.2(a) cannot be sustained, even if supported by competent, substantial evidence.6 This is so, Crowley tells us, because disciplining him for his challenged statements would abridge his First Amendment right to engage in political sрeech during an election campaign.7 We agree.
Before examining relevant background principles, we discuss the specific rule at issue, which reads as follows:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its
truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, mediator, arbitrator, adjudicatory officer, public legal officer, juror or member of the venire, or candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.
Several observations are readily apparent from the text of the rule. One, the rule applies to “statements“—something that, as conceded by the Bar, qualifies as speech under the First Amendment. Two, the rule‘s application depends on what the lawyer says, making it a content-based restrictiоn. For example, the rule does not apply if a lawyer comments on something other than the “qualifications or integrity” of certain officers or candidates. And three, in certain situations (as in this case), the rule restricts speech by lawyers about those holding or running for political, partisan offices. With these preliminary observations in mind, we now consider Crowley‘s as-applied constitutional challengе.
A
The First Amendment prohibits government action that “abridg[es] the freedom of speech.”
Because sovereignty resides with the people, the First Amendment safeguards against the government‘s exercise of “censorial power.” 4 Annals of Congress 934 (1794) (Statement of James Madison) (noting that in a republican form of government, “the censorial рower is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people“). Moreover, the First Amendment‘s free speech guarantee provides the people, as sovereigns, with an avenue to secure every other retained right. See James Madison, Virginia Resolutions of 1798 in 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions 529 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1863) (describing the “right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon,” as “the only effectual guardian of every other right“).
Consistent with these views, “speech about public issues and the qualifications of candidates for elected office commands the highest level of First Amendment protection.” Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 443 (2015) (citing Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“The First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttеred during a campaign for political office.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Eu, 489 U.S. at 223)); Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465-66 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Political speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection, and it is the lifeblood of a self-governing people.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (emphasizing that freedom of expression not only advances the truth but allоws people to share their sentiments on government and inspire change, “whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs” (quoting 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 108 (1774))). Indeed, James Madison acknowledged that the freedom of political speech in particular is “indispensable” to the exercise of voting rights. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions in 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions 574 (Jonathan Elliot
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the First Amendment does not guarantee an absolute right of expression. Cf. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The protections afforded by the First Amendment, however, are not absolute . . . .“); 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1874 (1833) (noting that the First Amendment does not secure “an absolute right to speak, or write, or print“). But for protected speech (as is the case here), the First Amendment demands that government restrictions satisfy a high level of judicial scrutiny. See Chiles v. Salazar, 146 S. Ct. 1010, 1021-23 (2026).
B
“Content-based laws merit this protection because they present, albeit sometimes in a subtler form, the same dangers as laws that regulate speech based on viewpoint.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 174 (Alito, J., concurring). That is, limits on speech “based on its
As noted above, the rule invoked by the Bar to punish Crowley‘s campaign speech is clearly content based.9 Rule 4-8.2(a) subjects attorneys to discipline if they comment on the qualifications or integrity of a candidate for election to a legal office with knowledge that the comment is false or with reckless disregard
C
We turn to whether the rule, on the specific facts presented here, may be constitutionally enforced against Crowley. The U.S. Supreme Court has established a framework for evaluating content-based speech restrictions under the First Amendment—namely, strict scrutiny. See TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U.S. 56, 70 (2025). Under this demanding standard, such laws are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government (here the Bar) proves “that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 171 (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club‘s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011)). That burden cannot be met here.
The Bar contends that it can sanction Crowley‘s speech
We agree that the Bar‘s interest in protecting the judicial system‘s integrity and maintaining public confidence in that system is, in some contexts, compelling. Indeed, because of this interest, an attorney‘s speech in ongoing litigation can be curtailed and punished. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) (“It is unquestionable that in thе courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed.“); Fla. Bar v. Martocci, 791 So. 2d 1074, 1075, 1078 (Fla. 2001) (punishing an attorney for making disparaging and profane remarks to humiliate the opposing party and her attorney in a divorce proceeding). And we accept the Bar‘s argument that this interest would be sufficiently compelling to justify certain restrictions on attorney speеch that recklessly impugns the qualifications or integrity of sitting judges. See Fla. Bar v. Girley, 417 So. 3d 230, 238-39 (Fla. 2025); In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686, 689-90 (Fla. 1973).
But here, the Bar has not carried its burden to show that the rule‘s application in this context serves a compelling interest. A generalized concern with preserving public confidence in the judicial system is insufficient to justify restricting vigorous, open debate about the integrity and qualifications of candidates for this public office. This is true even where, as here, the speech is inaccurate, offensive, and misleading. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“[I]n public debate [we] must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988))). And although the office of state attorney functions primarily within the judicial system, the aсtions of its candidates do not implicate the branch as a whole in the same manner as matters involving specific cases or judges.
Even assuming that the Bar correctly characterizes the office of state attorney as “quasi-judicial,” our conclusion is the same. State attorney candidates are not seeking judicial office. Florida‘s
Candidates for state attorney are permitted to affiliate with a political party, receive endorsements from a political party or partisan political organization, communicate their positions on a variety of politically charged issues, and solicit money directly from donors. The same cannot be said for candidates seeking judicial office, who are subject to very different regulations. See
Unlike judicial candidates, state attorney candidates are politicians campaigning in a partisan race. With that distinction in mind, the Bar has not identified a compelling interest sufficient to justify applicatiоn of rule 4-8.2(a) to races for this “legal office.”10 Accordingly, we find the rule unconstitutional as applied to Crowley‘s political speech during his campaign for state attorney.11
III
The Bar challenges the referee‘s no-guilt recommendations as to rules 4-8.4(a) and 4-8.4(d). We see no merit in these challenges.
Rule 4-8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in “conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prеjudicial to the administration of justice.” We agree with the referee that Crowley‘s campaign activities and statements were not connected with the practice of law. See State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962) (describing what constitutes the practice of law), vacated on other grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
As for rule 4-8.4(a), “that rule is necessarily violated whenever any other rule of professional conduct is violated.” Fla. Bar v. Letwin, 70 So. 3d 578, 582 (Fla. 2011). Since we do not accept the referee‘s guilt recommendation regarding rule 4-8.2(a), Crowley cannot be guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(a).
For these reasons, we reject the Bar‘s challenges to the
IV
Because application of rules 4-8.2(a) and 3-4.3 to Crowley‘s campaign statements unconstitutionally infringes his First Amendment right to freedom of speech, we reject the referee‘s recommendation that Crowley be found guilty of and punished for violating these rules. We, however, accept the balance of the referee‘s recommendations.
It is so ordered.
COURIEL, C.J., and LABARGA, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. MUÑIZ, J., concurs with an opinion, in which COURIEL, C.J., and LABARGA, J., concur. TANENBAUM, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
MUÑIZ, J., concurring.
Crowley does not argue that rule 4-8.2(a), as this Court has interpreted it, applies to at least some of the statements underlying the complaint in this case. Nor does he ask us to revisit our precedents on the elements and application of the rule. Had Crowley put those issues in plаy, it is possible we could have
COURIEL, C.J., and LABARGA, J., concur.
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, and Mark Lugo Mason, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Complainant
Christopher W. Crowley, Columbus, Georgia; and Scott K. Tozian of Smith, Tozian, Daniel & Davis, P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent