MICHAEL TENNANT, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 108993
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
August 13, 2020
2020-Ohio-4063
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION. JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. Civil Appeal from the Garfield Heights Municipal Court, Small Claims Division, Case No. CVI 1901160.
Milton A. Kramer Law Clinic and Andrew S. Pollis, for appellants.
Giffen & Kaminski, L.L.C., Melissa A. Laubenthal, and In Son J. Loving, for appellee.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants Michael Tennant and Jeannette Tennant (appellants) appeal the decision of the Garfield Heights Municipal Court, Small Claims Division, to dismiss their complaint upon finding the action is time-barred
Background
{¶ 2} On April 4, 2019, appellants, acting pro se, filed a small-claims complaint against defendant-appellee the Huntington National Bank (Huntington), in which they made the following allegations:
During the date of the incident [occurring from December 5, 2017, to December 20, 2017], $7,991.24 was stolen from our Bank Acct * * *. Bank via cell, msg 16 days later, as date we called and cancelled card. We contend they had a duty to freeze/stop the debit card transactions, the first time they stopped the first suspicious unauthorized activity in the amount of $1,870.03 @ the USPS on 06 Dec., 17. They had obligation on calling the telephone. Hard time. Suspicious unauthorized were $6,200.00 transfer funds. Did not provide provisional credit. Demanding refund under FDIC.
Appellants set forth an amount claimed of $6,000.00 in the complaint.
{¶ 3} The case was scheduled for bench trial on May 7, 2019, but Huntington filed a motion for continuance that was granted. Appellants filed a motion requesting default judgment and other related motions that were denied. The case proceeded to trial on June 19, 2019.
{¶ 4} Before trial began, Huntington made an oral motion to dismiss pursuant to
{¶ 5} On July 25, 2019, the magistrate issued a decision granting Huntington‘s motion to dismiss pursuant to
The Electronic Funds Transfer Act governs disputes involving unauthorized debit card transactions. Said Act has a clear one-year statute of limitations. See
15 U.S.C. Section 1693m(g) . Plaintiffs’ Complaint was sworn to, signed, and filed with this Court on 4/4/2019. Said Complaint states: 1) the unauthorized transactions occurred from 12/5/2017 through 12/20/2017; 2) the Plaintiffs were made aware of the alleged violations by text 16 days later; and 3) on that date the Plaintiffs called and cancelled the card. Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ Complaint on its face conclusively shows that said Complaint is time-barred as it was filed more than one year after the alleged violations occurred and the Plaintiffs were aware of the same.
Additionally, the magistrate declined to apply the federal doctrine of equitable tolling and found the state tolling statute,
{¶ 6} Appellants filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision. On September 11, 2019, the trial court overruled the objections, adopted the magistrate‘s decision, entered judgment in favor of Huntington, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Appellants timely appealed.
{¶ 7} Under their sole assignment of error, appellants claim the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint based on the one-year statute of limitations under the EFTA.
{¶ 8} Initially, we recognize that Huntington made its oral motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
pleadings is similar to the standard in ruling on a
{¶ 9} A trial court‘s decision to grant a dismissal under
{¶ 10} Appellants make several arguments in support of their claim that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. First, appellants, who were pro se litigants in the trial court proceedings, acknowledge they filed their action too late to invoke the EFTA; however, they argue the allegations in their complaint also support claims under state contract and tort theories, including breach of contract, negligence, and conversion, which they claim are not time-barred. Second,
{¶ 11} In response, Huntington asserts that the trial court properly applied the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the EFTA and that appellants are barred from offering alternative theories of recovery. Huntington states that in response to the oral motion to dismiss, appellants did not dispute application of the EFTA and argued the statute of limitations was tolled. Huntington argues that appellants proceeded as if the EFTA governed their claims, that the one-year statute of limitations under the EFTA applied, and that at no time did appellants claim they were asserting any state-law claims or assert the EFTA did not preempt any state-law claims. Huntington argues
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13}
{¶ 14} It is undisputed that appellants did not raise a specific objection relating to state-law claims. Appellants concede that they objected to the
{¶ 15} Appellants argue that pleadings are kept to a minimum in small-claims court and their complaint does not conclusively show that the action is time-barred because the allegations support state-law contract and tort claims that are not preempted by the EFTA. Pursuant to
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} In this matter, the magistrate‘s decision was limited to determining that the action was time-barred based upon the one-year statute of limitations under the EFTA. A complaint may be dismissed as untimely only when, after accepting the factual allegations as true and making all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the complaint shows conclusively on its face that the action is time-barred. Schmitz v. NCAA, 155 Ohio St.3d 389, 2018-Ohio-4391, 122 N.E.3d 80, ¶ 11, citing Maitland v. Ford Motor Co., 103 Ohio St.3d 463, 2004-Ohio-5717, 816 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 11, and Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 376, 379, 433 N.E.2d 147 (1982). We find that the complaint contains allegations of fact that, if proven, support actionable claims under state law. Moreover, construing all
{¶ 18} We recognize Huntington‘s oral motion to dismiss focused on the statute of limitations set forth in the EFTA and appellants did not present objections pertaining to state-law claims to the trial court. Consequently, it is understandable why the trial court never examined the small-claims complaint to determine whether the allegations supported any state-law claims. The trial court adopted the magistrate‘s decision, granted judgment in favor of Huntington, and dismissed the action.
{¶ 19} Nonetheless, we are compelled to find Huntington‘s motion to dismiss should have been denied. Accepting the factual allegations as true and making all reasonable inferences in favor of appellants, the complaint can be read to have pled actionable state-law claims, which are not subject to the statute of limitations set forth under the EFTA. Thus, even though the trial court properly determined that a claim under the EFTA is time-barred, the trial court committed plain error in granting Huntington‘s motion and dismissing the complaint. See Straka v. Fisler, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88005, 2007-Ohio-981, ¶ 10 (finding the trial court‘s application of the wrong limitations period constituted plain error).
{¶ 20} We find this case presents exceptional circumstances that require application of the plain-error doctrine. We decline to address the contract argument raised by Huntington that had not been addressed in the trial court. Appellants’ assignment of error is sustained.
It is ordered that appellants recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the municipal court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., and
RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J., CONCUR