Ted STAUFFER, Appellant v. Jane T. NICHOLSON, Appellee
No. 05-13-01009-CV
Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas
July 30, 2014
437 S.W.3d 205
The summary judgment evidence conclusively proves that on September 19, 2008, New Co. was indebted to MG for $164,024.82 and the Hospital was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting New Co.‘s motion and in denying the Hospital‘s motion. The Hospital‘s issues are sustained.
We reverse the trial court‘s judgment and render judgment that Tenet Health Systems Hospitals Dallas, Inc. recover $164,024.82 from North Texas Hospital Physicians Group, P.A.
T. Chase Garrett, Jeffrey A. Yates, William Todd Albin, Plano, for Appellee.
Before Justices O‘NEILL, LANGMIERS, and EVANS.
OPINION
Opinion by Justice EVANS.
This interlocutory appeal arises out of a lawsuit Jane T. Nicholson filed in probate court against her brother Ted Stauffer a nonresident. Nicholson sued Stauffer individually and as “Successor Trustee of the Anne Bodulus Stauffer Revocable Trust.” Stauffer filed a special appearance to the action asserting the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. After a hearing, the court denied the special appearance in part, refusing to dismiss those claims related or “ancillary” to a certain investment account created and governed by the court‘s order in a previous lawsuit. On appeal, Stauffer contends the trial court erred in not dismissing all of the claims asserted against him because Nicholson‘s causes of action do not arise from or relate to any contacts he had with Texas. For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part the trial court‘s order denying in part Stauffer‘s special appearance, and render judgment of dismissal of this case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Stauffer as successor trustee and lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted against Stauffer individually.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In April 2008, Anne Stauffer sued Nicholson, her daughter, in Collin County Probate Court seeking to recover funds allegedly belonging to Anne.1 Appellant, Anne‘s son, assisted his mother in the lawsuit by participating telephonically from out of state in a recorded hearing and by making an agreement on the record with Anne and Nicholson that became embodied in the final agreed order (2008 order) resolving the 2008 lawsuit.
Among other things, the 2008 order required Nicholson to transfer the balance of certain funds to an investment account established by Anne. The 2008 order further provided that Stauffer and Nicholson would be payable on death beneficiaries of the investment account. Moreover, aside from certain amounts specifically identified in the order, funds could not be withdrawn or transferred out of the investment account “without the express written approval of each of” Anne, Nicholson, and Stauffer. In a separate paragraph, the 2008 order provided “this Court will retain continuing jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Order.” Stauffer and Nicholson each signed the 2008 order over lines beneath which only each of their typed names appeared. Anne died in 2011.
In September 2012, Nicholson filed the present action against Stauffer individually and as successor trustee.2 In her petition, Nicholson asserted the probate court had personal jurisdiction over Stauffer because he engages or has engaged in business in Texas and the lawsuit “arises out of the business done in this state and to which said Stauffer is a party.” Among other things, Nicholson factually alleged Stauffer had removed funds from the investment account created pursuant to the 2008 order
Stauffer filed a special appearance denying he was ever a resident of, engaged in business in, or maintained a place of business in, Texas. He further asserted he had no substantial connection or contacts with Texas and that Nicholson‘s claims did not arise from or relate to any activity conducted by Stauffer in Texas. Nicholson responded that the probate court had personal jurisdiction because Stauffer signed the 2008 order in which the court specifically retained jurisdiction to address issues related to the investment account.3 After a hearing, the probate court granted in part Stauffer‘s special appearance dismissing all claims against him except for those that related to, or were ancillary to, the investment account. In its findings of facts and conclusions of law, the probate court concluded it had specific jurisdiction over Stauffer “to enforce the terms of the May 2008 order for the limited purpose of determining whether there has been a breach of the Agreed Order as well as any ancillary issues pertaining to the investment account.” Stauffer timely perfected this interlocutory appeal.
II. ANALYSIS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Standard of Review
In a special appearance, the defendant bears the burden of negating all bases of personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. See Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010). If a lower court enters an order denying a special appearance, and the lower court issues findings of fact and conclusions of law, the appellant may challenge the fact findings on legal and factual sufficiency grounds. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). Whether a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a question of law, and thus we review de novo the lower court‘s determination of a special appearance. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007).
B. Consent Jurisdiction
Under her argument regarding specific jurisdiction, Nicholson argues Stauffer consented to jurisdiction of the probate court by agreeing to the clause in the 2008 order that provides that the probate court will “retain continuing jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Order.”
We have previously held a consent-to-jurisdiction clause that encompasses claims against a nonresident defendant obviates the need to rely solely on traditional analysis of minimum contacts. This is because in such instances where a defendant has consented to jurisdiction, there is another legitimate and stronger means to establish a court‘s jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. See RSR Corp. v. Siegmund, 309 S.W.3d 686, 704 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.) (citing Monesson v. Nat‘l Equip. Rental, Ltd., 594 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref‘d n.r.e.)); Barnette v. United Research Co., 823 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied); Dunne v. Libbra, 330 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2003). In such cases, we have rested our decisions on precedent recognizing personal jurisdiction as a “waivable right” and the “variety of legal arrangements” that allow a litigant to give “express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n. 14, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985)); see also Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 72 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1982). Furthermore, “[t]o the extent a party has consented to jurisdiction in a particular forum, the trial court‘s exercise of personal jurisdiction over it does not violate due process even in the absence of contacts with Texas.” Id.; see also CNOOC Se. Asia Ltd. v. Paladin Res. (SUNDA) Ltd., 222 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (op. on rehearing) (“A forum-selection clause obtained through freely negotiated agreements does not offend due process, provided it is not unreasonable and unjust.“). Limitations on consent to jurisdiction clauses based on concerns a clause is unreasonable or unjust have not been raised in this interlocutory appeal.4
In analyzing claims that allegedly fall within the scope of negotiated consent-to-jurisdiction clauses, we conduct a “common-sense” examination of an agreement‘s relevant jurisdictional clauses and their relationship to the claims of the lawsuit. RSR Corp., 309 S.W.3d at 700. Recognizing forum-selection clauses as creatures of contract, we apply principles of contract interpretation. Id. In interpreting the jurisdictional clause, our goal is thus to ascertain the true intent of the parties as written in the agreement. Id. Consequently, we give terms their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meanings, and contracts are to be construed as a whole in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all provisions of the contract. See id.; Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (2005). Upon determining that claims fall within the scope of the clause, application of the
Enforcement of a court order involves a motion or pleading in which a party seeks as relief from the court the exercise of the court‘s power to compel compliance with the order or punish noncompliance typically using the threat of the court‘s power to impose sanctions or hold a party in contempt. See, e.g., Response Time, Inc. v. Sterling Commerce (N. Am.), Inc., 95 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.) (discovery sanctions to secure compliance, deter other litigants from violating the discovery rules, and punish parties who violate the discovery rules); Ex parte Pryor, 800 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. 1990) (a contempt order involves a court‘s enforcement of its own orders); see generally
Nicholson‘s petition contains a recitation in the factual section regarding the 2008 order and the court‘s retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the order. She alleges the 2008 order prohibited Stauffer from withdrawing or transferring funds out of the investment account without her permission. Nicholson‘s causes of action regarding the investment account are predicated on this theory. Nowhere in her petition did Nicholson request Stauffer‘s compliance with the 2008 order or punishment of Stauffer for non-compliance with it. Because a common sense examination of the 2008 order and Nicholson‘s petition demonstrates that none of Nicholson‘s claims seek enforcement of the 2008 order by compulsion or punishment, the continuing jurisdiction clause does not pertain to Nicholson‘s claims in this lawsuit. Accordingly, by signing the 2008 order, Stauffer did not consent to jurisdiction in Texas to be sued for the claims Nicholson now asserts against him.
We next examine both parties’ arguments about specific jurisdiction.5 Nicholson sued Stauffer individually and as successor trustee of the Trust. Neither party makes a distinction in their arguments between these two capacities and the record is devoid of any mention of Stauffer as a successor trustee beyond the style of the case—no pleaded allegation nor fact in the record. The probate court‘s order does not distinguish between these capacities, so the order does not dismiss the claims against Stauffer in his alleged capacity of a successor trustee.
The capacity in which a nonresident has contact with a forum state must be considered in the jurisdictional analysis. Tabacinic v. Frazier, 372 S.W.3d 658, 666 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.) (non-resident‘s execution of documents without indication of representative capacity for business entity subjecting signer to individual liability were contacts to be considered pertaining to non-resident‘s individual, specific, personal jurisdiction); see generally Stull v. LaPlant, 411 S.W.3d 129, 134 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) (personal jurisdiction over nonresident in capacity in which nonresident sued may be challenged in special appearance). In order to properly analyze Stauffer‘s amenability to jurisdiction, we will consider first the parties’ specific jurisdiction arguments as they pertain to the claims against Stauffer as successor trustee of the Trust.
Employing the standards of review we announced above, we analyze specific jurisdiction on a claim-by-claim basis, unless we are shown that all claims arise from the same contacts with Texas. See Moncrief Oil Int‘l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013). Specific jurisdiction exists when the nonresident defendant‘s alleged liability arises out of or is related to his activity connected to the forum. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 576. The contacts with the forum which we are to analyze for jurisdictional purposes are those “where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial connection with the forum State.” Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d at 151 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985)). A substantial connection can result from even a single act. Id. (citing McGee v. Int‘l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1957)). But “there must be a substantial connection between those contacts and the operative facts of the litigation.” Id. at 156 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585). The operative facts are those on which the trial will focus to prove the liability of the defendant who is challenging jurisdiction.
Here the only contacts with Texas the parties argue about are Stauffer‘s participation in the 2008 lawsuit and agreement to the 2008 order. The parties argue those contacts as to all of Nicholson‘s claims in the aggregate. Accordingly, we will analyze Stauffer‘s contacts as related to all of Nicholson‘s claims in the aggregate.
Stauffer was not a party to the 2008 lawsuit in any capacity. He participated in the 2008 lawsuit because Anne was his mother and “was a quadriplegic from her neck down, she required full care” which Stauffer provided to her so she “relied heavily” on Stauffer. There is no evidence in this record when, if ever, Stauffer was a successor trustee of the Trust, so there is no evidence that he was a trustee in 2008 at the time of his alleged participation in the 2008 lawsuit. He signed the 2008 order without indicating it was in any capacity other than his personal capacity by signing the order over his typed name thereby subjecting himself to personal liability. See Tabacinic, 372 S.W.3d at 666. There are, therefore, no facts in this record demonstrating that Stauffer as successor trustee had any contacts with Texas. Accordingly, the probate court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Stauffer as successor trustee of the Trust in light of Stauffer‘s objection. The probate court abused its discretion by not granting Stauffer‘s special appearance and dismissing all claims and causes of action against Stauffer as successor trustee.
III. Analysis of Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Remaining Claims
Nicholson‘s remaining claims seek damages from Stauffer individually to Nicholson personally or other remedies for Nicholson. What remain are simply tort claims between a sister and brother. However, we first must consider the probate court‘s subject matter jurisdiction over Nicholson‘s tort claims against Stauffer before we determine whether Stauffer is subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas for those claims because a court cannot enter a valid judgment if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 74-75 (Tex. 2000).
Probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. In re United Servs. Auto. Ass‘n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 302-03 (Tex. 2010) (contrasting
A. Standard of Review
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007); Tex. Dep‘t of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of conferring jurisdiction. Tex. Dep‘t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002); Dallas Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied) (“When reviewing subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, we must construe the petition in favor of the pleader, and if necessary, review the entire record to determine if any evidence supports jurisdiction.“).
[R]ecourse must be had first to the Constitution, second to the general statutes establishing jurisdiction for that level of court, third to the specific statute authorizing the establishment of the particular court in question, fourth to statutes creating other courts in the same county (whose jurisdictional provisions may affect the court in question), and fifth to statutes dealing with specific subject matters (such as the Family Code, which requires, for example, that judges who are lawyers hear appeals from actions by non-lawyer judges in juvenile cases).
In re United Servs. Auto. Ass‘n, 307 S.W.3d at 303-04 (quoting Office of Court Administration, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Courts at 1). Accordingly, we will examine the jurisdiction of the probate court in Collin County considering the sources for its jurisdiction in the order prescribed by the supreme court.
The Texas Constitution does not specifically provide for probate courts, but generally grants the Legislature authority to create courts and prescribe their jurisdiction. See
Texas courts employ principles of statutory construction to discern the boundaries of statutory probate court jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Gibbs, 253 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism‘d). A court‘s goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by looking to the language of the statute itself. See Nat‘l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). In construing statutes, courts may not enlarge the meaning of any word in a statute beyond its ordinary meaning. See Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.1994);
By applying these principles to the language of the probate code, Texas courts have held that the legislative intent behind the probate court jurisdictional statutes was to confer a narrow grant of jurisdiction to statutory probate courts. See Shell Cortez Pipeline Co. v. Shores, 127 S.W.3d 286, 294 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (class claims against two oil companies that are the same as an inter vivos trust‘s claims does not bring a class action lawsuit within the subject matter jurisdiction of a statutory probate court); Borden, Inc. v. Sharp, 888 S.W.2d 614, 618 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied). By not enlarging the meanings of relevant jurisdictional terms, Texas courts have concluded actions that merely implicate trusts or the operations of the trusts are not within the jurisdiction of probate courts. See Gibbs, 253 S.W.3d at 872 (dismissing claims of restitution and breach of fiduciary duty brought in statutory probate court by one sibling beneficiary against other sibling beneficiaries of mother‘s trust because of court‘s lack of jurisdiction); Schuchmann v. Schuchmann, 193 S.W.3d 598, 603 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied) (sustaining appellant‘s plea to jurisdiction where a post-divorce action involving litigants only in their individual capacities and only implicating inter vivos trust was brought into probate court); see also In re Stark, 126 S.W.3d 635, 642 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding) (holding that tort claims do not fall within district court‘s jurisdiction for claims involving trusts and that enumerating types of trust proceedings in a jurisdictional statute indicates legislative intent to set forth the general nature of proceedings to be included in a probate court‘s jurisdiction). The court in Gibbs observed that broad construction of the jurisdictional statutes would lead courts to the absurd result that “every lawsuit touching on [probate matters properly within the court‘s jurisdiction], however slightly or tangentially, would come within the subject matter jurisdiction of the statutory probate courts, regardless of the subject matter.” Gibbs, 253 S.W.3d at 872.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the record before us, we conclude that Stauffer as successor trustee of the Trust is not amenable to personal jurisdiction in Texas for Nicholson‘s claims in this lawsuit and the probate court erred in not making that determination. Without deciding whether or not Stauffer in his individual capacity is amenable to jurisdiction in Texas for Nicholson‘s remaining claims, we conclude the probate court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Nicholson‘s remaining claims against Stauffer individually. We, therefore, reverse in part the trial court‘s order denying in part Stauffer‘s special appearance, and render judgment of dismissal of this case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Stauffer as successor trustee and lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted against Stauffer individually.