JOSEPH TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:23-cv-00475
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA CHARLESTON DIVISION
June 13, 2024
IRENE C. BERGER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The Court has reviewed Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 182), the Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 183), the exhibits submitted at Document 194, the Plaintiff‘s Response in Opposition to Defendant Wexford‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 206), and the Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 209).
The Court has further reviewed West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 186), West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation‘s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 187), the exhibits submitted at Document 195, the Plaintiff‘s Response in Opposition to Defendant West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 205), West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation‘s Reply in Support of Motion for
The Court has also reviewed the Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment Against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Document 188), Plaintiff‘s Memorandum in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment Against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Document 189), West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation‘s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 202), and the Plaintiff‘s Reply in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment Against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Document 211).
In addition, the Court has reviewed the Motion to Seal Various Exhibits to Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 180) (sealed), the Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Seal Various Exhibits to Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 181) (public), the Motion to Seal Various Exhibits to Defendant West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 184) (sealed), the Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Seal Various Exhibits to Defendant West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 185) (public), the Plаintiff‘s Motion to File Exhibits Under Seal and Temporary Seal (Document 191) (sealed), the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff‘s Motion to File Exhibits 5 and 14 to His Motion for Summary Judgment Under Seal and Exhibits 15, 16, and 18 Under Temporary Seal (Document 192) (public), Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.‘s Response to Plaintiff‘s Motion to File Exhibits Under Seal and Temporary
MOTIONS TO SEAL
“The right of public access to documents or materials filed in a district court derives from two independent sources: the common law and the First Amendment.” Virginia Dep‘t of State Police v. Washington Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004). Under the common law, “[t]he trial court has supervisory power over its own records and may, in its discretion, seal documents if the public‘s right of access is outweighed by competing interests.” In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting factors may include “whether the records are sought for improper purposes, such as promoting public scandals or unfairly gaining a business advantage; whether release would enhance the public‘s understanding of an important historical event; and whether the public has already had access to the information contained in the records“). District courts have discretion to determine “whether to grant or restrict access to judicial records or documents” based on the facts and circumstances of the case. Virginia Dep‘t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 575.
In contrast, the First Amendment protects a narrower range of documents, but “[w]hen the First Amendment provides a right of access, a district court may restrict access only on the basis of a compelling governmental interest, and only if the denial is narrowly tailored to serve thаt interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The burden to overcome a First Amendment right of access rests on the party seeking to restrict access, and that party must present specific reasons in support of its position.” Id.
After determining whether the common law or First Amendment provides the right of access, a district court “must give the public notice of the request to seal and a reasonable opportunity to challenge the request; it must consider less drastic alternatives to sealing; and if it decides to seal it must state the reasons (and specific supporting findings) for its decision and the reasons for rejecting alternatives to sealing.” Id. at 476. “Notifying the persons present in the courtroom of the request to seal or docketing it reasonably in advance of deciding the issue is appropriate” to provide public notice. In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984).1
Documents attached to a motion for summary judgment are subject to the First Amendment standard, even if the documents were “the subject of a pretrial discovery protective order.” Virginia Dep‘t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 576; Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining that discovеry is “ordinarily conducted in private,” while dispositive motions can “serve[] as a substitute for trial“). Thus, the First Amendment standard applies here, and access can be restricted only if there is a compelling countervailing interest. Any such restriction must be narrowly tailored.
Wexford seeks to preserve the seal on two Guidelines documents, one for Medication Assisted Treatment/Medications for Opioid Use Disorder (Documents 180-23, Wexford Exhibit 26; 184-23, DCR Exhibit 26; and 199-1, DCR Resp. Exhibit 1), and one for Endocrine/Metabolic Disorders – Pharmacological Management of Type I and Type II Diabetes Mellitus (Document 191-6, Plaintiff‘s Exhibit 21). These documents contain detailed guidelines designed to assist medical professionals employed by Wexford in correctional facilities in providing treatment to patients with Opioid Use Disorder (OUD) and diabetes, respectively. Wexford argues that these
The Court finds that Wexford has not demonstrated that it has a compelling interest in maintaining the secrecy of the Guidelines documents sufficient to outweigh the public‘s First Amendment right to access court records. While the Court does not doubt that Wexford invested time and money into developing the Guidelines, the nature of the information contained in the Guidelines is not particularly sensitive. Medical standards of care and research surrounding OUD and diabetes are publicly available. Wexford‘s care protocols and guidance for providers designed specifically for an inmate patient population appear to be drawn primarily from public medical sources. Wexford provides care to inmates in taxpayer-funded facilities after contracting with governmental agencies. The Guidelines documents touch on the central issues of the Plaintiff‘s claims, as well as matters of general public interest.2 Thus, the Court finds that the motions to seal as to Documents 180-23, 184-23, and 191-6 should be denied.
The Plaintiff further sought to file certain exhibits under temporary seal because the Defendants did not consent to removing the confidential designation. Neither Defendant set forth
Finally, DCR seeks to seal MAC Meeting Minutes, filed at Document 199-23. This document contains minutes for meetings between Wexford and DCR reviewing the provision of healthcare and any incidents that occurred during relevant time periods. It contends that these records are confidential pursuant to
FACTS3
The Plaintiff, Joseph Taylor, was incarcerated at Central Regional Jail (CRJ) from January 1, 2023, to March 9, 2023. Defendant West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) operates jails and correctional facilities in West Virginia, including CRJ. Defendant Wexford Health Sources provides medical care at DCR facilities, including CRJ.
Mr. Taylor was prescribed Suboxone, a version of buprenorphine, by Cabin Creek Hеalth System in Clendenin, West Virginia, in April 2022. He filled Suboxone prescriptions from another provider on December 13, 2022, and from Cabin Creek on December 20, 2022. He stated that he lacked transportation to return to the clinic for another 7-day prescription on December 27, 2022. His prescribing physician, Dr. Barbara Michael, testified that she would have provided him another 7-day prescription if he had returned to the clinic.
Mr. Taylor was arrested on January 1, 2023, and detained at CRJ. He reported to intake staff that he was prescribed Suboxone by Cabin Creek Health and was in withdrawal from suboxone. Intake staff did a urine drug screen, and he tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and Fentanyl. He did not test positive for buprenorphine, and the test did not screen for norbuprenorphine, a buprenorphine metabolite that remains in the body for a longer
Because Mr. Taylor tested positive for opiates and indicated that he was going through withdrawal at intake, staff placed him on a withdrawal protocol with over-the-counter medications designed to reduce withdrawal symptoms. Staff also placed him on the Clinical Opiate Withdrawal Scale Protocol (COWS), which involves twice-daily assessments of withdrawal symptoms. His COWS assessments resulted in scores of 0 or 1 on January 2 and the morning of January 3. At 10:42 p.m. on January 3, 2023, he had a COWS score of 13. The next morning, his score was 1. At 12:31 a.m. on January 5, 2023, his COWS score was 14. He declined assessments on January 6 and 7. He testified that he was too ill to get out of bed and did not know where he was at times during his withdrawal. On January 8, 9, and 10, he had COWS scores of 0 or 1. He described symptoms including insomnia, migraines, muscle spasms, heart palpitations, vomiting, anxiety, and opioid cravings. Mr. Taylor noted that there were days friends brought him meal trays because he could not get up. Though the other symptoms largely dissipated after about ten days, the opioid cravings remained. After he was released in March, 2023, he overdosed and reports that he nearly died.
Mr. Taylor testified that he repeatedly requested that he be provided with Suboxone to continue the treatment he was receiving prior to his incarceration, but was told that MOUD was only offered to those with a current prescription upon intake. He recalled one nurse telling him she was “not giving you Suboxone in my jail,” regardless of the treatment provided by outside doctors. (Taylor Dep. at 42:15-16) (Document 195-6.) Mr. Taylor also submitted inquiries about MOUD. On January 21, 2023, he requested “a copy of the suboxone rules and regulations,” and Lara Lynn, the Wexford Health Services Administrator, responded “[y]ou did not have a current order upon intake therefore you did not qualify for us to give you suboxone.” (Taylor Inquiries/Grievances, Pl.‘s Ex. 10) (Document 188-11.) On January 31, 2023, he asked whether he was on the list for the Sublocade injection, and Ms. Lynn responded that the “program is on hold until further notice.” (Id.) Another inmate who filed a grievance seeking MOUD was similarly informed that they were ineligible because they “did not have a current prescription on intake” and had not tested positive for buprenorphine. (Inmate Grievance Logs, Pl.‘s Ex. 19) (Document 188-20.)
Ms. Kessel likewise testified that “when Wexford started with DCR in the jails, [buprenorphine] was for those people who have an active script for buprenorphine,” and that continued until “sometime spring or summer of 2023.” (Kessel Dep. at 64:24 – 65:8.) An active script meant one that was in effect upon entry, and if someone had missed the 7-day refill, it would not be considered active. In addition to those with active scripts, “[t]here may have been situations that, if clinically indicated, we could try to get approval, talk to our addiction specialist, and see if there was a way to go ahead and start somebody prior to that,” but Ms. Kessel did not recall ever doing so, though she did recall contacting Dr. Mitcheff related to patients’ withdrawal symptoms. (Kessel Dep. at 69:5-8.) She again explained that “[i]n January [2023] ... if they
Even before the Medication Assisted Treatment (MAT) program was initiated beginning with patients who entered DCR custody with active prescriptions,4 Wexford (and its predecessor) provided MOUD to pregnant patients. During the January-March 2023 time period, pregnant patients who entered CRJ with opioids in their system were started on Subutex to ensure they did not go through withdrawal, which can present a risk of pregnancy complications. They were not required to have an active prescription or have received previous treatment. For non-pregnant patients, the experts differ on the ideal timing for starting buprenorphine. The Defendants’ experts and medical staff contend that patients must begin withdrawal and reach a COWS score of about 12, before initiating buprenorphine, while the Plaintiff‘s expert, Dr. Fingerhood, indicated that forcing patients into withdrawal is unnecessary and dangerous.
In addition to failing to continue patients whose outside prescriptions for MOUD had lapsed or to initiate patients with OUD onto MOUD, the Defendants often discontinued patients from MOUD. In 2022, only 314 of 881 non-pregnant patients who were receiving MOUD before incarceration were continued on MOUD. (Pl.‘s Ex. 16) (Document 191-4.) In 2023, 2118 of 3106 non-pregnant patients were continued on their MOUD, including 144 of 185 patients at CRJ who were receiving MOUD prior to incarceration. (Id.) The Plaintiffs note that the raw data for the spreadsheets include Mr. Taylor as a patient continued on his MOUD, even though he was denied MOUD during his January – March 2023 incarceration, suggesting potential underreporting
Wexford created guidelines for providers, with the caveat that programs may differ based on the client correctional system, jail, or prison‘s preferences, and that providers retain flexibility to base decisions on their own medical judgment. The Guidelines for Addiction Medicine and MOUD at the time recognized that MOUD is the “appropriate, first-line treatment for most patients, especially those with moderate to severe OUD,” and that outcomes are better when patients receive MOUD. (MOUD Guidelines at 5, Document 180-23.) The Guidelines emphasize that ”individuals with OUD not on MOUD have a much higher risk of death from drug overdose in the first two weeks after release from prison compared to the general population,” and note that MOUD “works to reduce recidivism, reduce criminal behavior, decrease domestic violence, decrease infectious disease from intravenous drug use..., increases employment as well as increasing retention in recovery programming.” (Id. at 4, emphasis in original.) The Guidelines recommend consideration of naltrexone, buprenorphine, buprenorphine/naloxone, or methadone for patients with moderate to severe OUD and current opioid use. For those who are post withdrawal, the Guidelinеs suggest long-acting injectable naltrexone, “in shared decision making with the patient,” or buprenorphine or methadone, particularly for “patients with a history of success on prior medications for OUD.” (Id. at 22.) Dr. Mitcheff, Wexford‘s corporate Medical Director of Addiction Medicine, Utilization Management, and Clinician Services, testified that, in general, under Wexford‘s Guidelines, a
Dr. Mitcheff testified that in his view, “over the past five years, [buprenorphine has] really become the community standard” of care, though it has been in use much longer. (Mitcheff Dep. at 28:16-17) (Document 195-3.) He does regular trainings, both for medical staff and for non-medical administration staff, outlining how MOUD works, in part to reduce stigma. Dr. Mitcheff distinguished between MOUD and other mеdications because buprenorphine is a controlled substance, requiring extra care to ensure responsible prescribing, particularly related to potential for diversion. He indicated that Wexford‘s guidelines promote universal screening and treatment, but the client‘s policies override Wexford‘s, as when a state or jail restricts access to patients meeting certain criteria. In addition, they “have to work within the parameters that are given and within the budget, and that‘s how we come up with a priority list” for MOUD treatment. (Id. at 145:6-8.) Dr. Mitcheff does not recall any provider contacting him related to Mr. Taylor‘s treatment while he was at CRJ from January to March of 2023.
Dr. Anye Amjad, DCR‘s Medical Director of Correctional Healthcare, testified that since she began in her position in December 2022, DCR and Wexford had worked together to increase access to MOUD. Her understanding was that, at the time she started, OUD care “included anyone who has a prescription for an MOUD, I will say Suboxone. And then, of course, if someone wanted to get screened or be treated, they have to put in requests.” (Amjad Dep. at 30:6-9) (Document 195-2.) She testified that a patient who enters with a verified prescription
The DCR Request for Proposals (RFP) and Wexford‘s Response to RFP at the time Wexford won the contract to provide medical care in DCR facilities includes discussion of MOUD. The RFP notes that DCR had a goal of expanding the MOUD programs. It states that a medical services vendor would be required to “continue any inmate coming into the facility with a verified MAT [medically assisted treatment] prescription on such medication so long as the same is medically necessary” and ensure appropriate MOUD treatment for pregnant patients. (Response to RFP at 203) (Document 188-14.) Wexford proposed implementing a program with “three phases: detoxification, recovery, and maintenance.” (Id. at 207.) It indicates that it “does not detox pregnant patients,” but instead provides MAT, in accordance with the applicable standards of care. (Id. at 211.) For non-pregnant patients, after detoxing, Wexford indicates that patients referred to the MAT program will receive a mental health evaluation and be screened to determine whether they are medically eligible to participate in MAT — except that patients already on buprenorphine on intake would be continued.
The Plaintiff‘s expert, Dr. Fingerhood, testified that Mr. Taylor, and all inmates with OUD, should have been offered MOUD upon intake at CRJ. “Staff at the jail should have continued his
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The well-established standard in consideration of a motion for summary judgment is that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, nor will it make determinations of credibility. N. Am. Precast, Inc. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 2008 WL 906334, *3 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 2008) (Copenhaver, J.) (citing Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1986)). If disputes over a material fact exist that “can be resolved оnly by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party,” summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. If, however, the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
When presented with motions for summary judgment from both parties, courts apply the same standard of review. Tastee Treats, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 2008 WL 2836701 (S.D. W. Va. July 21, 2008) (Johnston, J.) aff‘d, 474 F. App‘x 101 (4th Cir. 2012). Courts “must review each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law,” resolving factual disputes and drawing inferences for the non-moving party as to each motion. Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Monumental Paving & Excavating, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Ass‘n Ins. Co., 176 F.3d 794, 797 (4th Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION
A. Wexford – 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Defendant Wexford argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the evidence establishes that Mr. Taylor was provided appropriate medical treatment. Wexford contends that it did not have a pоlicy of providing MOUD only to people with active prescriptions on intake, but instead permitted providers to determine whether a patient needed MOUD based on their medical judgment. Based on the asserted lack of evidence of such a policy, Wexford argues that the Plaintiff cannot establish an official policy or custom, as required to hold a corporation accountable for a deliberate indifference claim. It further contends that Mr. Taylor was appropriately evaluated, he did not have a current prescription for buprenorphine and did not have buprenorphine in his urine screen, and his medical records and COWS assessments showed only mild or
The Plaintiff argues that there is plenty of evidence in the record that would permit a finding in his favor. He notes that there is no dispute that he has OUD and that the Defendants were aware of his OUD when he entered their custody. There is also no dispute that, as reflected in his medical records, he informed Wexford staff that he was prescribed Suboxone by Cabin Creek Health Center. He points to Ms. Kessel‘s testimony that, for a patient without an active prescription, MOUD could be provided only if she sought approval to depart from the policy limiting MOUD to those entering with an active prescription, which she did not recall doing during the time period Mr. Taylor was incarcerated at CRJ. He argues that there is evidence, including his COWS scores of 13 and 14 and his own testimony describing his symptoms, that he was suffering severe withdrawal symptoms. He argues that grievances from other inmates provide further evidence of a policy and practice of denying MOUD and forcing patients with MOUD into withdrawal. He cites Wexford‘s responses to inquiries from Mr. Taylor and others seeking MOUD, infоrming them that they were ineligible because they did not have a current or active prescription upon intake. Mr. Taylor also points to data showing the percentages of non-pregnant patients who were discontinued from MOUD at CRJ in 2022 and 2023. The Plaintiff argues that Wexford‘s Guidelines, Dr. Mitcheff, and Ms. Kessel all recognized the dangers of failing to provide MOUD to patients with OUD, including the risk of relapse and overdose, and Wexford‘s
The Fourth Circuit recently held that the test for deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment is objective, in contrast to the subjective test applied for such claims under the Eighth Amendment. Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 608–09 (4th Cir. 2023) (relying on Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015)). The court set forth the standard as follows:
To state a сlaim for deliberate indifference to a medical need, the specific type of deliberate indifference claim at issue in this case, a pretrial detainee must plead that (1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known (a) that the detainee had that condition and (b) that the defendant‘s action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed.
There is evidence in the record that Mr. Taylor had OUD, and that OUD presents a substantial risk of serious harm. He requested treatment with MOUD upon intake and on occasion thereafter, and Wexford‘s own Guidelines and staff members agree that treatment with MOUD is the standard of care for OUD. Nonetheless, Wexford placed him on a medically supervised withdrawal protocol and did not prescribe MOUD. There is no dispute that Wexford knew that Mr. Taylor had OUD and was going through withdrawal, though there is dispute as to the extent of his withdrawal symptoms. There is factual dispute as to Wexford‘s knowledge of the
Because Wexford is a private corporation rather than an individual, the Plaintiff must also show that the deprivation of rights resulted from application of an official policy or custom. Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727–28 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying the “principles of § 1983 municipal liability articulated in Monell and its progeny” to private corporations).
A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a рerson with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that manifests deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens; or (4) through a practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal punctuation and quotation marks omitted).
Much of the dispute in this case, both as to the Wexford claims and the DCR claims discussed below, centers on exactly what Wexford‘s policy was with regard to provision of
Wexford, meanwhile, has presented evidence that it produced Guidelines thаt recommended broader use of MOUD to patients entering custody with drugs in their system and/or patients diagnosed with OUD, regardless of past treatment. It also points to testimony from Ms. Lynn and Ms. Kessel, indicating that if a provider believed a patient needed MOUD based on withdrawal symptoms or other factors, they could have consulted with Dr. Mitcheff for approval
B. WV Division of Corrections – ADA and RA
The Plaintiff and DCR filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to the Plaintiff‘s claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA).
DCR asserts a factual narrative similar to that put forth by Wexford regarding the Plaintiff‘s treatment. DCR contends that it played no role in the provision of medical care to the Plaintiff, and any decisions regarding the Plaintiff‘s treatment and whether to provide MOUD were made solely by Wexford. It further argues that there is no evidence of discrimination against patients with OUD, noting that hundreds of patients in DCR custody during the relevant time period were being treated with MOUD. It contends that “proper MOUD guidelines were in place and followed by Wexford, and that Plaintiff was not placed on MOUD due to legitimate and reasonable medical reasons per the decisions of Wexford medical providers and Wexford guidelines.” (DCR Mem. at 15) (Document 187.) DCR further asserts that the “Plaintiff is not еntitled to the protections
The Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as to his ADA claim because his Opioid Use Disorder constitutes a disability for purposes of the ADA, he was entitled to the benefit of medical services while in DCR custody, and he has presented evidence that discrimination was a motivating factor in DCR‘s denial of access to medical treatment for his OUD. In response to DCR‘s argument that it had no direct role in provision of medical care, he argues that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to ADA and RA claims, and Wexford acted as DCR‘s agent. He further argues that DCR‘s documentation and statistics regarding MOUD made DCR aware that OUD patients were not receiving treatment. In addition, he contends that the practice of refusing to induce patients with OUD onto MOUD unless they were pregnant or entered with an active prescription “originated with the WVDCR-Wexford contract—one expressly approved by WVDCR.” (Pl.‘s Resp. at 10) (Document 205.) He argues that the drug-use provision of the ADA is not applicable because the ADA prohibits denial of “health services, or services provided in connection with drug rehabilitation, on the basis of the current illegal use of drugs.” (Id. at 12) (quoting
DCR first asserts that it has no potential liability because Wexford was responsible for the provision of medical care and the decisions made with respect to Mr. Taylor‘s OUD treatment. The Fourth Circuit has rejected the “argument that there is no respondeat superior liability under the ADA.... Under the ADA and similar statutes, liability may be imposed on a principal for the statutory violations of its agent.” Rosen v. Montgomery Cnty. Maryland, 121 F.3d 154, 157 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases, including cases addressing the Rehabilitation Act). DCR does not appear to contest that Wexford is its agent. Thus, the Court finds that DCR may be liable for violations committed by Wexford.
DCR further argues that Mr. Taylor was not protected by the ADA because he was an active user of illegal drugs.
The Fourth Circuit has addressed application of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, indicating that both “prohibit discrimination against an individual because of his or her disability.” Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739, 750 (4th Cir. 2018). The analysis of the claims is “substantially the same.” Id.
To establish a violation of either statute, plaintiffs must prove (1) they have a disability; (2) they are otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public sеrvice, program, or activity; and (3) they were denied the benefits of such service, program or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis of their disability.
Id. (quoting Nat‘l Fed‘n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 503 (4th Cir. 2016)). “The two statutes differ only with respect to the third element, causation.” Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012). The ADA requires proof that “the disability was a motivating cause of the exclusion,” while the Rehabilitation Act requires that the plaintiff prove “he was excluded solely by reason of his disability.” Id. at 461-62 (internal punctuation omitted) (citing Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 468-69 (4th Cir. 1999)). A person is “qualified” to receive the benefits or services of a program if she “meets the essential eligibility requirements for participation in a program or activity,” “with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices.” Halpern, 669 F.3d at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted).
There is no dispute that Mr. Taylor suffers from OUD or that OUD constitutes a disability. As a person detained at CRJ, he was qualified to receive medical care, although there is dispute as
DCR has prеsented evidence that the failure to provide MOUD was due to the individual provider‘s decisions based on Mr. Taylor‘s history and symptoms, rather than any policy. A jury could interpret the COWS assessments and medical records from the jail as showing relatively minor withdrawal symptoms on most days the assessments were given, and choose not to credit Mr. Taylor‘s description of his symptoms. DCR also produced testimony and evidence regarding the security considerations implicated in MOUD programs that provide controlled substances to patients in a correctional setting. Absent a policy to deny MOUD to eligible patients, a jury could conclude that there is insufficient evidence that OUD was treated differently than other medical
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, after thorough review and careful consideration, the Court ORDERS that Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 182), West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 186), and the Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment Against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Document 188) be DENIED.
The Court ORDERS that the Motion to Seal Various Exhibits to Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 180) (sealed), the Motion to Seal Various Exhibits to Defendant West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 184) (sealed), the Plaintiff‘s Motion to File Exhibits Under Seal and Temporary Seal (Document 191) (sealed), Defendant WVDCR‘s Motion to File Exhibits Under Seal (Document 199) (sealed), and the Plaintiff‘s Motion for Leave to File Exhibit Under Seal (Document 203) (sealed) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court further ORDERS that the following docket entries be MAINTAINED UNDER SEAL: Documents 180-1 through 180-22 (Wexford‘s Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24); Documents 184-1 through 184-22 (DCR‘s Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24); Documents 191-1 and 191-2
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and to any unrepresented party.
ENTER: June 13, 2024
IRENE C. BERGER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
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