SVF Grosvenor Del Rey Corp. v. SchwarzSVF Grosvenor Del Rey Corp. v. Schwarz
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, George F. Bird, Judge. Affirmed.
Ashley N. Rossetto, Kimball, Tirey & St. John LLP, for Plaintiff and Appellant SVF Grosvenor Del Rey Corporation.
Eric M. Post, BASTA, Inc. for Defendant and Respondent Lisa Schwarz.
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Plaintiff SVF Grosvenor Del Rey Corporation appeals the unlawful detainer judgment entered against it in favor of defendant Lisa Schwarz, following the court‘s granting of defendant‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. As discussed below, we affirm. The court did not err in granting the motion, because the eviction notice failed to comply with the requirement in 1161(2) that, if mailing the rent to comply with the notice is provided as a listed option, the name of the person to whom rent is to be paid by mail, along with the person‘s telephone number and address, must be provided in the notice.
BACKGROUND
The complaint was filed on June 21, 2024, alleging plaintiff owned the property located at 5550 Grosvenor Boulevard #152 in Los Angeles, and defendant occupied the premises under a lease requiring she pay $3,912 per month. Plaintiff maintained defendant on June 13, 2024 was served with a three-day pay rent or quit eviction notice, the period expired without defendant complying, and she remained in possession of the unit. Plaintiff requested it be awarded possession of the apartment, forfeiture of the lease, past due rent and the reasonable rental value of the property, and attorney fees under the lease.
The attached eviction notice stated, “WITHIN THREE (3) DAYS, excluding Saturdays and Sundays and other judicial holidays, after the service on you of this notice, you are hereby required to pay the delinquent rent of the premises herein after described, of which you now hold possession, as follows” (capitalization in original), and proceeded to specify the dates rent became due and the amounts which were not paid. The total rent due, for six months when it was not paid, was listed as $23,472. The notice stated that, in the alternative to paying the amount, defendant was to give up possession of the property.
Defendant filed an answer. She denied specified portions of the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses.
On August 29, 2024, defense counsel filed a brief in support of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Counsel argued the cause of action for unlawful detainer failed, because the eviction notice, incorporated by reference in the complaint, failed to include “the ‘name, telephone number, and address of the person’ to whom the rent should be mailed” as required by 1161(2), instead listing only an address with regard to the paying by mail option. Plaintiff‘s attorney filed an opposition, arguing that, given the “name, telephone number, and address of the person to whom the rent should be made” was listed in the personal payment option, this was sufficient to comply with the statute. In reply, defense counsel filed a brief arguing 1161(2) should be construed to require the listing of a name, telephone number and address of a person when mailing is noted as an option, and that if this information is not provided, “The question may be appropriate [sic] framed as follows: if the tenant were to send the money in the mail, whose name should be on the envelope? And who should the tenant call with questions about mailing the rent?”
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. However, because a judgment had not been entered, this court noted the appeal was taken from a non-appealable judgment (see Caldera Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Regents of University of California (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 338, 350, fn. 8 (Caldera)), and proceeded to dismiss the appeal. Upon remand, the court entered judgment in favor of defendant, and plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review and Unlawful Detainer Law
Although an order granting judgment on the pleadings is not appealable, the ruling may be reviewed in an appeal from an ensuing judgment. (See Caldera, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 350, fn. 8; Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1212-1213.) “‘“A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of review. . . .” “All properly pleaded, material facts are deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law . . . .”’” (Sepanossian v. National Ready Mixed Concrete Co. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 192, 199.) “Because the complaint incorporated the . . . notice to pay or quit, it is part of our review. [Citation.]” (Hsieh, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. Supp. 5.)
The law pertaining to unlawful detainer cases is settled. “A valid three-day pay rent or quit notice is a prerequisite to an unlawful detainer action. [Citations.] Because of the summary nature of an unlawful detainer action, a notice is valid only if the lessor strictly complies with the statutorily mandated notice requirements. [Citation.]” (Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, 697.) A cause of action for unlawful detainer is not viable if the eviction notice fails to state what is required by 1161(2), and judgment must be entered in a tenant‘s favor in such an instance. (Foster, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. Supp. 14; Jayasinghe v. Lee (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th Supp. 33, 37.)
As we noted in Foster, as with other cases involving statutory construction, “[i]n interpreting [1161(2)‘s] notice requirements, ‘[w]e begin with the statutory language because it is generally the most reliable indication of legislative intent. [Citation.] If the statutory language is unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] To the extent the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, we may ‘employ various extrinsic aids, including a consideration of the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Foster, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. Supp. 14.)
The terms of 1161(2), in relevant part, state a tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer, as follows.
“When the tenant continues in possession . . . after default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement under which the property is held, and three days’ notice, excluding Saturdays and Sundays and other judicial holidays, in writing, requiring its payment, stating the amount that is due, the name, telephone number, and address of the person to whom the rent payment shall be made, and, if payment may be made personally, the usual days and hours that person will be available to receive the payment (provided that, if the address does not allow for personal delivery, then it shall be conclusively presumed that upon the mailing of any rent or notice to the owner by the tenant to the name and address provided, the notice or rent is deemed received by the owner on the date posted, if the tenant can show proof of mailing to the name and address provided by the owner), or the number of an account in a financial institution into which the rental payment may be made, and the name and street address of the institution (provided that the institution is located within five miles of the rental property), or if an electronic funds transfer procedure has been previously established, that payment may be made pursuant to that procedure, or possession of the property, shall have been served upon the tenant and if there is a subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, also upon the subtenant.”
Defendant argues the requirement to state “the name, telephone number, and address of the person to whom the rent payment shall be made” in an eviction notice applies to both when payment may be made personally and when the notice states payment is allowed to be made by mail. We find defendant‘s interpretation is supported by the text of the statute and its legislative intent.
In the text of 1161(2), there is no modifying or limiting language following the portion requiring a notice to “stat[e] the amount that is due, the name, telephone number, and address of the person to whom the rent payment shall be made.” Immediately after this portion is a comma, with the word “and,” followed by another comma, followed by a requirement with respect to when payment may be made personally (“if payment may be made personally, the usual days and hours that person will be available to receive the payment”). Following this portion is a specified consequence when personal delivery is not allowed (“provided that, if the address does not allow for personal delivery, then it shall be conclusively presumed that upon the mailing of any rent or notice to the owner by the tenant to the name and address provided, the notice or rent is deemed received by the owner on the date posted, if the tenant can show proof of mailing to the name and address provided by the owner”). Two further options follow for paying the delinquent rent—payment at a financial institution and through electronic funds transfer—separated from the prior provisions by use of the word “or” twice. (See Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 319, 327) [“‘The plain and ordinary meaning of the
Moreover, 1161(2) appears to recognize that, at a minimum, the name and address of the person to whom rent is to be mailed must be listed when mailing is designated as an option, because it specifically indicates that, “if the address does not allow for personal delivery, then it shall be conclusively presumed that upon the mailing of any rent or notice to the owner by the tenant to the name and address provided, the notice or rent is deemed received by the owner on the date posted . . . .” (Ibid., italics added.)
We determine the plain terms of the statute exhibit no intent that “the name, telephone number, and address of the person to whom the rent payment shall be made” need only be listed when payment may be made personally. To the extent the text is ambiguous, the legislative intent supports an interpretation requiring “the name, telephone number, and address of the person to whom the rent payment shall be made” to be listed if the notice states payment can be made by mail.
As we previously noted, “Prior to 2001, [1161(2)] required the three-day notice to state the amount of rent that was due, without listing any information regarding how payment was to be made. [Citation.] The information regarding how payment had to be made was added to the statute because of concerns that, without the information in the notice, ‘the tenant is unsure of whom to pay, and this confusion could lead to an unlawful detainer action.’ [Citation.] (Foster, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. Supp. 16, citing Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 985 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 17, 2001, pp. 3 & 6.) The Court of Appeal elaborated on the amendment‘s intent, pointing out, “The Legislature added these informational
In Foster we held, “A notice with a URL address does not inform the tenant where [the tenant] can physically go to pay the rent or where to mail the rent. Lack of an address to a physical place could lead to confusion, cause the tenant to delay paying rent, and result in the expiration of the three-day notice and subsequent court-ordered eviction.” (Foster, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. Supp. 16.) The same can be said for a notice which states payment can be made by mail and does not list the name, telephone number and address of the person to whom rent can be mailed. A notice allowing payment by mail without a name and address of a person to whom payment can be mailed is useless to a tenant. Even if an address is specified, a tenant must know to whom to address the mailing, otherwise the tenant could rightfully fear the payment may not be timely received by the right person at the address provided. Also, without a telephone number and the name of a person to consult concerning mailing inquiries, the tenant risks incurring delay and being the target of ensuing legal action, disserving the purposes of the Legislature in amending the statute.
Application to Plaintiff‘s Eviction Notice
Our interpretation of the statute, as applied to plaintiff‘s eviction notice, leads us to conclude the notice failed to comply with 1161(2). The notice told defendant, “Payment must be made payable to SVF Grosvenor Del Rey,” presumably requiring that a check or money order be made out to this entity. However, the first and only option at the end of the first page listed as a payment delivery option, “By mail to Leasing Office 5550 Grosvenor Blvd Los Angeles, CA. 90066.” The notice complied with 1161(2)‘s requirement of stating an address, but not with the mandate to list the “name” and “telephone number” and address of a “person” to whom rent could be mailed. Under no reading of the notice could “Leasing Office” be considered the name of a person, and no telephone number was provided. The notice‘s
Plaintiff contends the notice was sufficient, because it listed a person‘s name, address and telephone number in the option for personal delivery of payment. We are unpersuaded. A tenant reading a notice like the present one, which explicitly states in separate provisions on separate pages how to go about making payment by mail and personally, would be required to speculate whether the same person listed in the personal payment option, with the same telephone number, is the person to pay by mail. If a tenant reading the notice stopped at the first listed option, the person would not know to whom rent could be paid, because the payee‘s name was not listed. Under plaintiff‘s interpretation of 1161(2), the tenant would have to search the notice for other options looking for a person‘s name, telephone number and address, potentially leading to the rent being sent to a different person or a different address than intended by the landlord and/or rent not being provided in a timely manner, and eviction proceedings commencing. This would be inimical to the purposes of the statute: to ensure the tenant is provided clear information to avoid unnecessary evictions. (Sheehan, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 75; Foster, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. Supp. 16-Supp. 17.)
We also find unpersuasive plaintiff‘s argument that, if the payment by mail option was deficient, the notice was nonetheless valid because the personal payment option satisfied 1161(2). Assuming, without deciding, the personal payment option complied with the statute, the invalid mailing option rendered plaintiff‘s entire notice inoperative. The notice explicitly indicated payment could be made either by personal delivery or by mail. If a tenant, in reliance on the notice, exercised the right to pay by mail, the fact that complete information was provided for the personal payment option would be of no assistance. Again, delay and confusion, rather than an unwillingness to pay rent, could result in failure to comply with the notice under plaintiff‘s interpretation, leading to eviction, a result contrary to the purposes of the statute.
Finally, we agree with plaintiff‘s point that “STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF [1161(2)] MUST BE REASONABLE” (capitalization and bold highlighting omitted). When interpreting a statute and
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendant is to recover costs on appeal.
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Ricciardulli, J.
We concur:
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P. McKay, P. J. Hobbs, J.