Sun Bldg. Ltd. Partnership v. Value Learning & Teaching Academy, Inc.Sun Bldg. Ltd. Partnership v. Value Learning & Teaching Academy, Inc.
OPINION.
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 16, 2021
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Todd R. Marti, Assistant Attorney General, for Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Bruns, Connell, Vollmar & Armstrong, LLC, Thomas B. Bruns and Lucinda C. Shirooni, for Defendants-Appellants.
{1} In this debacle concerning the collapse of a community school (also known as a charter school), the superintendent ran the school into the ground, but managed to enrich herself and her family along the way. Not only were public funds squandered in this fiasco, but the scandal detrimentally impacted the lives of countless children, often from disadvantaged backgrounds. Ohio law imposes stiff penalties on its public officials for having a personal financial interest in the transactions of their public offices, and in the wake of the school‘s insolvency, this action involves the Ohio attorney general‘s efforts to hold the superintendent and her family accountable.
{2} After a trial on a stipulated record, the trial court found the superintendent strictly liable for the amounts of the conflicted transactions, and also determined that all the family members should relinquish their wages. Relatedly, the court held that the contracts between the school and the superintendent‘s husband‘s company constituted a pattern of corrupt activity, imposing treble damages. Ultimately, we affirm the strict liability claim against the superintendent and the reclamation of the family‘s wages. However, we disagree with the trial court‘s holding that the contracts with the husband‘s company constituted a pattern of corrupt activity, and we reverse the liability determination and damages under Ohio‘s racketeering statute.
I.
{3} In 2005, defendant-appellant Valerie Lee launched a community school (a publicly funded charter school) in the Cincinnati area—Value Learning & Teaching Academy (VLT). Located in the Over the Rhine neighborhood in the urban core of Cincinnati, VLT aimed to provide underprivileged children with a premier education. The public funding of the school also brought oversight by the Ohio Department of Education and the state auditor.
{4} VLT eventually sputtered into insolvency, closing its doors in 2014, which prompted its landlords to sue for unpaid rent. As part of that suit, the landlords brought claims against VLT, its sponsor, and various school personnel in their personal capacities. The landlords alleged, among other things, that these individuals bore personal liability for VLT‘s obligations because they participated in conflicted transactions, in derogation of public finance laws.
{5} This suit soon attracted the state‘s attention, as the Ohio Department of Education and the attorney general intervened on VLT‘s behalf, arguing that the state‘s involvement was necessary to protect the public‘s interest in recovering public assets. The state also took the position that VLT personnel were immune (as public officials) from the landlords’ suit and that VLT‘s assets (as a publicly-funded school) should be distributed according to relevant statutes instead of divvied up by the landlords. Ultimately, the trial court agreed, holding that the landlords lacked standing to recover public funds for their private use or to bring claims against VLT staff. As a result, despite affirming VLT‘s obligations to its landlords, the court allocated asset distribution preference to former teachers and administrators for unpaid wages and retirement contributions. The landlords appealed that judgment, and we affirmed. See Sun Bldg. Ltd. Partnership v. Value Learning & Teaching Academy, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-160789 and C-160793, 2017-Ohio-8727.
{6} Following our decision, the attorney general pursued many of the claims against VLT personnel. As relevant for this appeal, the attorney general specifically sought to recover from Ms. Lee and her husband and daughter (the “Lees“), because of their involvement with VLT. As already noted, Ms. Lee served as the superintendent. However, her husband, Clyde Lee, also worked for VLT as its project manager—a position he held from 2008 until 2014, when it closed. And Ms. Lee‘s daughter, Echole Harris, worked for VLT in various capacities from 2006 until its closure. As employees of a publicly funded institution, the Lees constituted public officials under the relevant statutes, and the attorney general alleged that they violated Ohio law by possessing a personal interest in two sets of VLT‘s transactions.
{7} The first set of transactions involved multiple contracts between VLT and an entity called CEED, Inc., for janitorial and maintenance services. These arrangements attracted scrutiny because Mr. Lee was the sole owner of CEED. As a result of owning CEED, the attorney general alleged that his interest in those contracts violated Ohio law based on his status as an employee of VLT. Further, the attorney general highlighted Ms. Lee‘s personal interest in the CEED contracts because she was an authorized user on its bank account. She transferred funds from CEED‘s account into her personal account and sometimes routed CEED payments straight to herself. Having determined that this scenario created a conflict of interest with respect to the CEED contracts, the trial court imposed two types of civil penalties against Mr. and Ms. Lee.
{8} As to the second set of transactions, the attorney general characterized the daughter‘s employment contracts as illegal. Here, though, only Ms. Lee possessed the potentially illegal interest because she co-owned the bank account where VLT deposited her daughter‘s wages. The trial court therefore held that Ms. Lee‘s illegal interest rendered the daughter‘s contracts void and unenforceable, and as a result, concluded that Ms. Harris should forfeit those wages.
{9} Finally, pertaining to both sets of transactions, the trial court held Ms. Lee strictly liable by virtue of her position as superintendent. Ms. Lee‘s name appeared on VLT‘s bank account that received public funds, and she also shared responsibility for managing those funds. Thus, the court concluded that Ms. Lee assumed responsibility for the entire amounts of VLT‘s contracts with CEED and her daughter.
{10} In sum, the trial court determined that Ms. Lee‘s liability amounted to $6,132,071.241: $887,441.46 for her forfeited wages (faithless servant doctrine); $328,188.38 for her daughter‘s wages (strict liability); and $5,096,441.40 for the CEED contracts ($1,694,973.84 under strict liability, overlapping with treble damages under the OCPA). The court held Mr. Lee liable for $5,448,520.23:
$352,078.83 for his forfeited wages (faithless servant doctrine); and $5,096,441.40, jointly and severally with Ms. Lee for triple the CEED contracts under the OCPA. Finally, the court held Ms. Harris liable for $328,188.38, jointly and severally with Ms. Lee, for the value of her employment contracts that the court deemed void and unenforceable.
{11} The Lees now appeal, presenting seven assignment of error, challenging the judgments against them and the attorney general‘s authority to sue in the first place. We note, however, that the trial court‘s factual determinations are not at issue because the parties presented joint stipulations instead of convening an in-person trial. Therefore, we review the trial court‘s conclusions de novo. See Brown v. Gallagher, 2013-Ohio-2323, 993 N.E.2d 415, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.) (“Review of a trial court‘s application of the law to stipulated facts is de novo.“).
II.
{12} The Lees first challenge the case against them—in its entirety—by maintaining that the attorney general lacked the authority to prosecute these claims in the first place. In their first two assignments of error, the Lees posit that the attorney general had neither statutory standing nor common law standing because the state auditor failed to issue a “finding for recovery.” Ultimately, we conclude that the attorney general enjoys statutory standing, rendering it unnecessary to address the parameters of his common law authority.
{13} To fully understand the Lees’ challenge to the attorney general‘s authority, we provide a little background on community
{14} To provide flexibility, community schools are exempt from some Ohio laws and regulations, but they must nonetheless meet state academic standards and comply with extensive guidelines set forth in
{15}
{16} Furthermore,
{17} Returning to the case at hand, the Lees attempt to fashion
Upon request of the auditor of state, the attorney general may file and prosecute to judgment or decree appropriate actions to prevent the unlawful expenditures of public funds, cancel contracts not made in compliance with law, enforce liabilities arising from false certifications or failure to furnish financial reports, secure compliance with this chapter, secure compliance with fiscal, accounting, or budgeting requirements, opinions, or adjustments made in an audit report, secure compliance with the laws, ordinances, rules, and orders pertaining to any public office, and enforce generally the laws relating to the expenditure of public funds.
{18} As they traverse the statutory sections here, the Lees broadly argue that
A.
{19} To show why the attorney general cannot obtain standing under
{20} Of course,
{21} Nevertheless, to justify limiting
{22} “When construing the language of a statute, we begin with a familiar objective: a determination of the intent of the General Assembly.” State ex rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga Cty. Med. Examiner‘s Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 163, 2017-Ohio-8714, 94 N.E.3d 498, ¶ 14. And the Ohio Supreme Court has instructed that we ” ‘give effect to the legislature‘s intention’ by looking at the language of the statute.” (Internal citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Cline v. Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 573 N.E.2d 77 (1991). Thus, if the language of the statute is unambiguous, we have “no cause to apply the rules of statutory construction.” Id.; see Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8434, 75 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 8 (“We ‘do not have the authority’ to dig deeper than the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute ‘under the guise of either statutory interpretation or liberal construction.’ “), quoting Morgan v. Adult Parole Auth., 68 Ohio St.3d 344, 347, 626 N.E.2d 939 (1994); see also
{23} This principle extends, of course, to the in pari materia rule of statutory construction. “[I]t is applied only ‘where some doubt or ambiguity exists in the wording of a statute.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Clay at ¶ 17, quoting State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Allen Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 32 Ohio St.3d 24, 27–28, 512 N.E.2d 332 (1987); see Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc., 142 Ohio St.3d 236, 2014-Ohio-5511, 29 N.E.3d 903, ¶ 22 (” ‘The in pari materia rule of construction may be used in interpreting statutes where some doubt or ambiguity exists.’ “), quoting Stateex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch, 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 585, 651 N.E.2d 995 (1995). And “ambiguity in a statute exists only if its language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.” Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 16.
{24} Here, the Lees do not even attempt to portray
{25} The Lees also confuse the significance of
{26} Further illustrating this point, we note that in at least two other instances, the General Assembly explicitly utilized
B.
{27} Anticipating our refusal to confine
{28} The Lees’ fallback suffers from the same fate as their lead—the language of
{29} The Lees’ argument also runs afoul of the maxim that ” ‘[p]ublic authorities have their option as to which sections they will utilize in protecting public money and public property.’ ” State v. Johnson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-81-151, 1981 WL 5432, *3 (Oct. 30, 1981), quoting State ex rel. Smith v. Maharry, 97 Ohio St. 272, 279, 119 N.E. 822 (1918). In Johnson, the Sixth District rejected a nearly identical exclusivity argument in the wake of a finding of deficiency for a former registrar for the Bureau of Motor Vehicles. Id. at *1. The registrar contended that the attorney general lacked standing to sue because he had not invoked his authority under
{30} The Lees nonetheless attempt to narrow their argument by responding that the statutory scheme for community schools implicitly limits the attorney general to recovery under
{31} Finally, citing D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio St.3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, the Lees offer up a rejoinder that not viewing
{32} In D.A.B.E., the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether a local health board could prohibit smoking in all public places in the county. Id. at ¶ 14. The health board looked to the language of
{33} But we fail to see how D.A.B.E. aids the Lees here. The statutory scheme
{34} Furthermore, the Lees’ fear of superfluity for
{35} In sum, we hold that the attorney general has standing under
III.
{36} In their fourth, sixth, and seventh assignments of error, Mr. and Ms. Lee contest both the trial court‘s finding of illegality of the CEED contracts and the interplay between those transactions and their liability. Based on their personal interests in the CEED contracts, the court held them liable under the faithless servant doctrine for the value of their wages during the relevant time period, and imposed treble damages for the contracts’ value under the OCPA. We first address the trial court‘s illegality determination before addressing Mr. and Ms. Lee‘s liability under the faithless servant doctrine and the OCPA.
A.
{37}
{38} The Lees do not contest whether the elements of
{39} Instead of disputing these elements, the Lees focus their attention on subsection (C) of
(1) The subject of the public contract is necessary supplies or services ***;
(2) The supplies or services are unobtainable elsewhere for the same or lower cost * * * ;
(3) The treatment accorded the political subdivision or governmental agency or instrumentality is either preferential to or the same as that accorded other customers or clients in similar transactions; [and]
(4) The entire transaction is conducted at arm‘s length * * * .
{¶40} Here, the trial court issued alternative holdings on the subsection (C) exception. The court first concluded that the exception represents an affirmative defense and that the Lees did not satisfy their burden. In the alternative, the court held that the undisputed facts precluded them from satisfying the third element of the exception. Mr. and Ms. Lee challenge both findings on appeal.
{¶41} We first consider the affirmative defense point. The General Assembly determines the burdens of production and persuasion that rest on each party. See
{¶42} The attorney general primarily relies on State ex rel. Mallory v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Bd., 82 Ohio St.3d 235, 694 N.E.2d 1356 (1998), in which the Ohio Supreme Court appeared to place the burden of proving the subsection (C) exception on the public official invoking it. See id. at 243 (“The * * * Public Defender has fallen substantially short of satisfying the stringent four-part test set forth by
{¶43} To avoid this conclusion, the public defender also invited the application of the subsection (C) exception. Id. at 242-43. And in response, the court concluded that he had “fallen substantially short” of proving that exception because he had “made no showing, beyond mere assertions.” Id. at 243. While we recognize that the issue whether
{¶44} For their part, the Lees counter with State v. Nucklos, 121 Ohio St.3d 332, 2009-Ohio-792, 904 N.E.2d 512, as militating in favor of a conclusion that subsection (C) is an element of the offense that the attorney general must prove. The Nucklos court considered whether the state bore the burden to prove a health-professional exception to a drug trafficking statute. Id. at ¶ 1. This drug statute provided that it does not apply to licensed health professionals who comply with applicable regulatory standards. Id.; see
{¶45} Contrary to the Lees’ assertion, we conclude that Nucklos‘s reasoning weighs in favor of finding that subsection (C) is an affirmative defense. To be sure, subsection (C), like the provision in Nucklos, begins with “this section does not apply”
{¶46} Furthermore, other Ohio authorities have generally concluded that the party invoking subsection (C) carries the burden of proving it. We first note that the Seventh District assumed as much. See State v. Mieczkowski, 2018-Ohio-2775, 115 N.E.3d 758, ¶ 79 (7th Dist.) (stating that the “[defendant] had * * * to prove the [
{¶47} While none of the authorities in the prior paragraph binds us, we find them instructive in light of the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Mallory and Nucklos. Based on the structure of the statute and the weight of Ohio legal authority, we therefore hold that
{¶48} We now turn to consider whether Mr. and Ms. Lee satisfied their burden here. That inquiry need not detain us long because, as the trial court noted, the Lees “failed to come forward with any briefing or authority on [subsection (C)‘s] applicability.” In short, just as in Mallory, Mr. and Ms. Lee “made no showing, beyond mere assertions.” See Mallory, 82 Ohio St.3d at 243. In light of the failure to attempt to carry their burden, we conclude that Mr. and Ms. Lee could not avail themselves of the exception embodied in
{¶49} Even if the state bore the burden under (C), we also agree with the trial court‘s alternative holding that the undisputed facts precluded the Lees from satisfying the third element, which provides: “The treatment accorded the political subdivision or governmental agency or instrumentality is either preferential to or the
{¶50} The trial court reasoned that Mr. and Ms. Lee could not satisfy this element because CEED had no other customers. In other words, Mr. Lee created this entity to do business with only VLT and benefit from his inside relationship with Ms. Lee. For their part, the Lees attempt to turn the trial court‘s reasoning on its head by insisting that the third element was met precisely because CEED had no other customers. In other words, they maintain that it was legally impossible for CEED to give less-preferential treatment to VLT. But this reasoning runs roughshod over the purpose underlying the exception. The thrust of subsection (C) is to ensure that in the event conflicted transactions are necessary, they are nonetheless transparently fair to the public‘s interest. And the General Assembly provided the preferential-treatment standard as a key benchmark to evaluate that fairness. Here, because CEED had no other customers, it could not satisfy
{¶51} For all of these reasons, we conclude that Mr. and Ms. Lee violated
B.
{¶52} Having concluded that Mr. and Ms. Lee violated
{¶53} ” [T]he ‘faithless servant doctrine’ is a recognized rule of law in the state of Ohio which requires a disloyal and deceitful employee to forgo his compensation during such period of ‘faithlessness.‘” Fin. Dimensions, Inc. v. Zifer, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-980960 and C-980993, 1999 WL 1127292, *8 (Dec. 10, 1999), quoting Roberto v. Brown Cty. Gen. Hosp., 59 Ohio App.3d 84, 86, 571 N.E.2d 467 (12th Dist.1989). ” ’ “An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct which is disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of loyalty; if such conduct constitutes a willful and deliberate breach of his contract of service, he is not entitled to compensation even for properly performed services for which no compensation is apportioned.” ’ ” Id., quoting Roberto at 86, quoting 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Agency, Section 469 (1958). In other words, if an agent “acts adversely to his employer in any part of the transaction or omits to disclose any interest which would naturally influence his conduct * * *, it amounts to such a fraud upon the principal, as to forfeit any right to compensation for services.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Id.
{¶54} On appeal, Mr. and Ms. Lee do not seriously challenge the substance of the trial court‘s conclusion that they breached their respective duties of loyalty. Instead, they first repackage their standing argument—urging that the attorney general could not bring this claim because it did not flow from a finding for recovery. We already rejected that argument above, and similarly do so here.
C.
{¶56} We now turn to the trial court‘s determination that Mr. and Ms. Lee were jointly and severally liable for triple the value of the CEED contracts, under the OCPA. The OCPA provides, in pertinent part: “No person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity * * *.”
{¶57} Assuming the existence of an OCPA violation, the statutory scheme also provides for civil damages.
{¶58} On appeal, Mr. and Ms. Lee present three challenges to the trial court‘s judgment: (1) whether repeated violations of the same statute can constitute an OCPA violation; (2) whether the CEED contracts constituted a “pattern“; and (3) whether they participated in the affairs of an enterprise. Ultimately, we conclude that the Lees’ second argument—that the CEED contracts were not a pattern—has merit and reverse on that ground, obviating our need to address the other two.
{¶60} The General Assembly patterned OCPA after its federal counterpart, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Section 1961, Title 18, U.S. Code. Morrow at ¶ 26. And the declared purpose of RICO was ” ‘to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States.’ ” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 92. In contrast to RICO, “[t]here is little legislative history regarding the [OCPA].” State v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 333, 681 N.E.2d 911 (1997). Nevertheless, Ohio courts have concluded that its purpose is similar. See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 2d Dist. Miami No. 90-CA-54, 1992 WL 52473, *8 (Mar. 13, 1992) (quoting the purpose for RICO to interpret the OCPA). Furthermore, the Ohio Supreme Court has affirmed that RICO and the OCPA “were enacted to punish the enterprise and those controlling the enterprise, not the petty criminals.” State v. Stevens, 139 Ohio St.3d 247, 2014-Ohio-1932, 11 N.E.3d 252, ¶ 15. “[N]either statute intended to make a situation such as three robberies committed by the same person a RICO violation. Instead, while slightly different in definition, both statutes attempt to prohibit an enterprise.” (Emphasis in original.) Schlosser at 334.
{¶61} With this purpose in mind, we return to the issue of applying the meaning of “pattern.” And in resolving this, we find guidance from the Tenth District‘s decision in Morrow, 183 Ohio App.3d 40, 2009-Ohio-2665, 915 N.E.2d 696. The Morrow court considered whether repeated acts of perjury during a seven-year lawsuit constituted a pattern for purposes of the OCPA. Id. at ¶ 34. And to guide its analysis, the Morrow court adopted a multifactor test from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
“To state the inquiry simply, a pattern is the sum of various factors including: the length of time the racketeering activity existed; the number of different schemes (the more the better); the number of predicate acts within each scheme (the more the better); the variety of species of predicate acts (the more the better); the distinct types of injury (the more the better); the number of victims (the more
the better); and the number of perpetrators (the less the better).”
Morrow at ¶ 34, quoting Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1110 (6th Cir.1995).
{¶62} Applying this test, the Tenth District concluded that the acts of perjury did not constitute a pattern. Id. The subject matter of the statements was the same, it caused a single type of harm, and it involved the same perpetrators and victim. Id. Thus, the court concluded: ” ’ “Where there is only one purpose, one result, one set of participants, one victim, and one method of commission, there is no continuity and therefore no pattern.” ’ ” Id., quoting B.J. Skin & Nail Care, 641 F.Supp. 563, 566 (D.Conn.1986), quoting Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 628 F.Supp. 163, 166 (D.Colo.1986). We similarly find the Morrow test instructive and adopt it here.
{¶63} Applying Morrow to this case, we conclude that the CEED contracts do not constitute a pattern as a matter of law. The attorney general fixates on the fact that there were six separate illegal contracts. But a closer look shows that they might as well have been one contract on automatic renewal—they all sing the same song. The 2008 contract provided janitorial/repair services for two buildings, and the 2009 contract provided the same services, for the same two buildings, at the same price. The 2010 and 2011 contracts likewise mirror the first two, except that they include two additional buildings (recently acquired by VLT). And an additional 2011 contract simply adds one more building that VLT acquired, receiving the same services, with an identical contractual structure and substance. Finally, the last contract, in 2013, simplified matters by covering all the buildings at a flat rate instead of dividing the cost of each building. In other words, these six contracts covered the same subject matter (provision of janitorial/repair services), used nearly verbatim language, and had nearly identical pricing structures. The distinguishing feature is that, as it acquired more buildings, the contracts were modified to reflect VLT‘s growth. But even then, the per-building cost largely remained constant.
{¶64} Filtering these facts through the Morrow test, our conclusion is rather straightforward. There was only one scheme (to contract with VLT and receive public funds from it), one variety of predicate acts within the scheme (a self-interested contract), one type of injury (misappropriated public funds), one victim (VLT), and one set of perpetrators (Mr. and Ms. Lee). The contracts used virtually identical language and carried forward a similar pricing structure from year to year. We see no material difference between this arrangement and a single contract with an automatic renewal clause (perhaps with an evolving schedule of buildings). Nor do we find any distinguishing factor between this scheme and the series of perjurious statements in Morrow. As a result, for purposes of the OCPA, the CEED contracts represented a “single event” and did not constitute a pattern consistent with Morrow. We therefore sustain the Lees’ seventh assignment of error and reverse the trial court‘s judgment with respect to the OCPA.
IV.
{¶65} Having addressed the claims against both Mr. and Ms. Lee, we now turn to the claim brought solely against Ms. Lee—strict liability. The trial court determined that Ms. Lee‘s position as superintendent provided additional liability, namely strict liability under
{¶67} We have already determined that the CEED contracts violated
{¶68} Of course,
{¶69} The court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate for only the liabilities arising from the finding for recovery because, per the statute, such a finding is “prima facie evidence in determining the truth of the allegations.” Id. at 476, quoting
{¶70} Unlike in Scott, liability is not at issue here because we have already determined that liability exists for the CEED contracts. And Ms. Lee does not contest liability for her daughter‘s contracts. Thus, the trial court appropriately held Ms. Lee strictly liable under
{¶71} We finally turn to the Lees’ fifth assignment of error, which challenges the trial court‘s determination that Ms. Harris (Ms. Lee‘s daughter) is jointly and severally liable for the amount of her employment contracts. As already noted, the trial court held that Ms. Harris‘s contracts violated
{¶72} First, the trial court concluded that Ms. Harris was liable under subsection (H) of
{¶73} Regarding the trial court‘s second holding, we need not address this issue because Ms. Harris does not meaningfully challenge the trial court‘s first basis for permitting recovery: that parties receiving public funds pursuant to a void contract must return those payments. In their merit brief, the Lees argue only that the cases relied upon by the trial court were inapplicable because they “are all old cases from other states and involve municipalities.” They neglect to explain why the vintage of those cases or their context renders them inapplicable here. App.R. 16(A)(7) requires appellants to provide “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” Here, the Lees’ assertion that the trial court relied on inapplicable cases is one sentence long, engages in no analysis, and fails to cite a single authority. See State v. Hale, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 04 MO 14, 2005-Ohio-7080, ¶ 10 (disregarding an assignment of error because the appellant‘s argument was “only five sentences long and contain[ed] no citations to any authority“). We therefore overrule the Lees’ fifth assignment of error for failure to advance a legal argument.
* * *
Judgment accordingly.
ZAYAS, P. J., and BOCK, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion