Sudler & Trotter v. StateSudler & Trotter v. State
Friedman,
Wright, Alexander, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by Graeff, J.
Filed: July 30, 2026
On appeal, appellants present the following question for this Court‘s review, which we have revised slightly, as follows:
Did the circuit court err in denying appellants’ motions to exclude evidence discovered in violation of
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. (“CP“) § 1-211 (2025 Repl. Vol.) , which prohibits a search of a vehicle based solely on the odor of cannabis?
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Jaylen Ahnarie Sudler
On July 21, 2023, at approximately 2:58 a.m., two police officers from the Ocean City Police Department were on patrol in Ocean City, Maryland. They observed a grаy Nissan Altima that appeared to have an inoperable tag light. Upon closer observation, the officers were unable to read the unilluminated half of the license plate from a distance of 50 feet, which constituted a violation of
The vehicle was occupied by four individuals, including a driver, a front seat passenger, and two rear seаt passengers. Mr. Sudler was the left rear passenger. One officer contacted the driver through the front passenger side window and detected the odor of cannabis coming from the vehicle. After making this observation, the police asked each occupant their age; all four advised that they were under the age of 21. Because possession of cannabis is illegal for individuals under the age of 21, the officers searched the vehicle. They discovered contraband, including a firearm.
On November 2, 2023, Mr. Sudler appeared for a hearing. The State proffered that Mr. Sudler was challenging the legality of the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle in which Mr. Sudler was a passenger. The court questioned whether the issue should be considered as a motion to suppress or as a motion in limine. It requested that the parties file memoranda addressing that issue, and it reset the date for the hearing.
A.
Motion to Suppress Hearing
On December 4, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing. Mr. Sudler‘s counsel argued that he was challenging the legality of the search as a motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment, but he should also have the opportunity to challenge the admissibility of the evidence separately as a motion in limine. The court agreed, and the parties proceeded to argue the motion to suppress.
Counsel for Mr. Sudler argued that
The circuit court found that the search of the vehicle was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment based on the odor of cannabis and the knowledge that the occupants of the vehicle were all under 21. It stated, however, that
The court stated that it would not address thаt issue that day. It adopted the motion to suppress as a motion in limine to exclude the items seized from the vehicle, and it set a date for another hearing. It stated that it “want[ed] answers from the appellate court” on this issue.
B.
Motion in Limine Hearing
On January 16, 2024, the circuit court held a hearing on appellant‘s motion in limine. Neither party made any additional arguments.
As I went through my findings of fact in the previous ruling, there was a stop for - - I think it was a tag light or some sort of equipment repair issue, that the odor of cannabis was observed by the stopping officer, and an inquiry was made prior to a search of the vehicle which identified that all of the occupants were under the age of 21.
An individual - - while there are certain amounts of cannabis that are legal for individuals to possess in the State of Maryland effective January 1 of 2023 I believe, that does not apply to minors, minor being anyone who has not attained the age of 21.
So in that respect, anyone who is not yet 21 years of age who is in possession of any quantity of cannabis or marijuana would be subject to some law enforcement action, whether it be the issuance of a citation, at the juvenile level some sort of juvenile interaction, but the behavior under those circumstances violates our statutes - - our criminal statutes that are in place.
And I find that to be an additional circumstance on which the search was based, and therefore, the search was not based solely on the odor of marijuana.
* * *
What I am satisfied with as far as my ruling today goes is that the presence of an odor of burnt or unburnt cannabis coupled with the age of all of the occupants of the . . . vehicle, means that the search was based on something other than solely the odor, that i[s] . . . the age of the occupants, and therefore, the motion in limine is denied.
Not Guilty Plea
On March 7, 2024, Mr. Sudlеr pleaded not guilty pursuant to an agreed statement of facts.2 The court found Mr. Sudler guilty, and as indicated, it sentenced him to two years, all but 60 days suspended, and 18 months of probation. The State entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining charges.3
II.
Tizonn Roemello James Trotter
On March 24, 2024, at approximately 12:45 a.m., Ocean City Police Officer Cara-Marie Chiocca conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle after observing that its right headlight was out. There was a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle, which was occupied by three individuals; Mr. Trotter was the front seat passenger. The agreed statement of facts presented at the suppression hearing provided:
Upon contact with the occupants of the vehicle, it was determined that all three individuals in the vehicle were under the age of 21. Based upon the possession of marijuana being illegal for individuals under the age of 21, a
search of the vehicle was conducted and contraband to include a firearm and a small bag of marijuana was recovered from that vehicle.4
The prosecutor stated that the gun and cannabis were found under the front passenger seat. The prosecutor was not sure about the amount of cannabis recovered, but it was a small baggie, likely within the personаl use amount allowed for a person over the age of 21.
On August 13, 2024, the circuit court held a suppression hearing based on stipulated facts. The State argued that
Mr. Trotter argued that
On September 10, 2024, Mr. Trotter pleaded not guilty pursuant to an agreed statement of facts. The court found Mr. Trotter guilty, and as indicated, it sentenced him to three years, all but one day suspended, and three years of probation. The State entered a nolle prosequi with respect to the other charges.
DISCUSSION
Appellants contend that the circuit court erred in denying their motions to exclude the firearms found in their vehicles in violation of
The State contends that the circuit court properly determined that
I.
Standard of Review
With respect to the applicable standard of review, in both cases the court reviewed the issue as a motion to suppress. In Mr. Sudler‘s case, the court addressed the issue as a motion to suppress as well as a motion in limine.
In reviewing a circuit court‘s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, “we accept ‘the hearing court‘s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous’ but ‘review the hearing judge‘s legal conclusions de novo.‘” Rodriguez v. State, 258 Md. App. 104, 114-15 (2023) (quoting Thornton v. State, 465 Md. 122, 139 (2019)). With respect to a trial court‘s ruling on a motion in limine, “‘we are generally loath to reverse a trial court’ unless the evidence was plainly improperly admitted or excluded under law, ‘or there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.‘” CR-RSC Tower I, LLC v. RSC Tower I, LLC, 202 Md. App. 307, 337 (2011) (quoting Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404-05 (1997)), aff‘d, 429 Md. 387 (2012).
Here, there are no facts in dispute, and the issue involves the interpretation of
A.
History Leading to Enactment of CP § 1-211
There has been a dramatic shift in Maryland law regarding cannabis in the last dozen years. We briefly discuss that change to provide perspective on the statute that we construe in this appeal.
Prior to 2014, the law was cleаr that the odor of cannabis provided probable cause to believe that criminal activity was occurring, justifying a search of a car or an arrest of a person. See State v. Harding, 166 Md. App. 230, 240 (2005) (“[T]he odor of marijuana alone can provide a police officer probable cause to search a vehicle.“), cert. denied, 393 Md. 161 (2006); Ford v. State, 37 Md. App. 373, 379-80 (arrest of driver based on smell of cannabis emanating from his person and the car was supported by probable cause), cert. denied, 281 Md. 737 (1977).
In 2014, however, the Maryland General Assembly decriminalized possession of less than 10 grams of cannabis. Lewis v. State, 470 Md. 1, 9 (2020). As the Supreme Court of Maryland explained, “[t]he legislature made such possession a ‘civil offense,‘” subject to a citation. Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311, 320 (2019) (quoting Robinson v. State, 451 Md. 94, 97 (2017)).
In Lewis v. State, 470 Md. at 23, however, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that, “[a]lthough marijuana in any quantity is considered contraband, . . . the search incident to arrest exception can be invoked only upon the occurrence of a felony or attempt of a felony or misdemeanor; a civil infraction is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor,” and therefore, standing alone, it does not justify a search of a person. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the odor of cannabis satisfied the reasonable suspicion standard for an officer to conduct a brief investigatory stop. In re D.D., 479 Md. 206, 231 (2022). It explained that decriminalization did not render “the odor of marijuana free of all criminal
In 2022, Maryland voters approved a constitutional amendment that legalized the use and possession of cannabis by individuals who are 21 years of age or older. See Cutchember v. State, 493 Md. at 194; Kelly v. State, 262 Md. App. 295, 305 (2024). That same year, the General Assembly enacted legislation legalizing the possession of a “personal use amount” of cannabis. Hicks v. State, ___ Md. App. ___, ___, 2026 WL 1601794, at *9 n.13 (2026);
The General Assembly then enacted
(a) A law enforcement officer may not initiate a stop or a search of … a motor vehicle, … based solely on one or more of the following:
(1) the odor of burnt or unburnt cannabis;
(2) the possession or suspicion of possession of cannabis that does not exceed the personal use amount, as defined under
§ 5-601 of the Criminal Law Article ; or(3) the presence of cash or currency in proximity to cannabis without other indicia of an intent to distribute.
(b) If a law enforcement officer is investigating a person solely for driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle or vessel while impaired by or under the influence of cannabis in violation of
§ 21-902 of the Transportation Article or§ 8-738 of the Natural Resources Article , the law enforcement officer may not conduct a search of an area of a motor vehicle or vessel that is not:(1) readily accessible to the driver or operator of the motor vehicle or vessel; or
(2) reasonably likely to contain evidence relevant to the condition of the driver or operatоr of the motor vehicle or vessel.
(c) Evidence discovered or obtained in violation of this section, including evidence discovered or obtained with consent, is not admissible in a trial, a hearing, or any other proceeding.
B.
Analysis
In interpreting
When undertaking an exercise in statutory interpretation, we start with the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation—to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly‘s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute. 75-80 Properties, L.L.C. v. RALE, Inc., 470 Md. 598, 623 (2020). “A court‘s primary goal in interpreting statutory language is to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision under scrutiny.” Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274 (2010) (citations omitted).
To ascertain the intent of the General Assembly, our analysis begins with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute. Id. at 275. In doing so, we read the plain meaning of the language of the statute “as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 25-26 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, “[w]e neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute ‘with forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its application.” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275 (citations
omitted). “If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute‘s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resorting to other rules of construction.” Id.
Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 376-77 (2021). Accord Cutchember, 493 Md. at 201-02. We give the statute a “reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” Wheeling, 473 Md. at 377 (quoting Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276).
We begin with the words of the statute, which provide that law enforcement may not search a vehicle based solely on the odor of cannabis.
In seeking to determine the meaning of terms in a statute, “we often look to dictionary definitions, as a starting point, to identify the meaning of terms before considering the ‘statutory scheme as a whole.‘” Adelakun v. Adelakun, 263 Md. App. 356, 374 (2024) (quoting Westminster Mgmt., LLC v. Smith, 486 Md. 616, 644 (2024)), aff‘d, 491 Md. 1 (2025). Webster‘s Dictionary defines “solely” as “to the exclusion of all else” and “without another.” Merriam Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary 1187 (11th ed. 2009). Giving this word meaning, see Hollabaugh v. MRO Corp., 491 Md. 165, 176-77 (2025) (we give each word in a statute meaning when construing the legislative intent), it is clear that the search of a vehicle is not prohibited when it is based on something more than the odor of cannabis (or the other factors listed in the statute).
We looked to other states to see if there were other decisions addressing statutes similar to
Appellants argue, however, that analysis of the legislative history of
With respect to the argument that the legislative histоry shows an intent to address racial disparities in enforcement of drug laws, there is no dispute that this was a significant factor raised in the process of enacting the statute. See, e.g., Bill File for H.B. 1071 (“Bill File“), Written Testimony from Delegate Charlotte A. Crutchfield, Leg. Dis. 19, to House Jud. Comm. (Mar. 30, 2023); H.B. 1071, Racial Equity Impact Note, Dep‘t of Leg. Servs. (Mar. 3, 2023); Bill File, Letter from Legis. Black Caucus to Chairman Luke Clippinger, House Jud. Comm. (Mar. 7, 2023); Bill File, Written Testimony from Lower Shore
Nevertheless,
Appellants’ second point in support of their argument that the General Assembly intended for
The State contends that appellants place too much weight on the rejected amendment. We agree.
As the Supreme Court has long held and recently reaffirmed, “legislative rejection is not an infallible indicator of legislative intent.” Westminster Mgmt., LLC v. Smith, 486 Md. 616, 651 (2024) (quoting City of Balt. Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299, 329 (2006)). Accordingly, rejected amendments are “a rather weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining legislative intent” because “the General Assembly may well have concluded that the rejected amendment warranted further investigation before acting on it, or decided not to enact the amendment for a myriad of other reasons.” Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. at 329 (cleaned up).
Trimble v. State, 262 Md. App. 462, 467 (2024), aff‘d, 491 Md. 378 (2025).
Here, the State notes several reasons why the General Assembly could have rejected the amendment. Initially, the amendment was proposed at 9:00 p.m. on the final day of the 2023 legislative session. Senate Floor Actions: H.B. 1071, 445th Sess. (Md. 2023), https://perma.cc/9P6L-HRSQ (last visited July 14, 2026) (amendment proposed by Sen. Justin Ready) (advance video to 1:56:00). Legislators could have concluded that adopting an amendment at that late time would cause the bill to fail. Moreover, the amеndment could have been rejected because legislators concluded that it was unnecessary. See, e.g., Kerns v. Kerns, 59 Md. App. 87, 94 (1984) (observing that legislature‘s failure to pass bills that would have expressly authorized awards of joint child custody could have stemmed from legislators’ conclusion “that courts already had the authority to make such awards and that the bills would have been unnecessary additions to the code“). Legislators could have concluded, as this Court holds here, that the plain language of the statute, as written, already permitted the police to search a vehicle based on the odor of cannаbis if there is the
Based the plain language of
Here, there was odor plus knowledge that the occupants were under the age of 21, and it is unlawful for a person under 21 to possess cannabis. The court properly denied the motions to exclude the evidence discovered in appellants’ vehicles.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WORCESTER COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.
Notes
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, a person may nоt:
(1) possess or administer to another a controlled dangerous substance, unless:
(i) obtained directly or by prescription or order from an authorized provider acting in the course of professional practice; or
(ii) the controlled dangerous substance is cannabis, the individual is at least 21 years old, and the amount possessed is the personal use amount.
A violation of the statute involving the use or possession of the personal amount of cannabis by a person under the age of 21 is a civil offense, punishable by a fine not exceeding $100.
As this Court explained in Hicks v. State, ___ Md. App. ___, ___, 2026 WL 1601794, at *9 n.13 (2026):
The legislature‘s decision to prohibit by statute stops [and searches] based solely on the odor of marijuana may have “effectively overruled” or “superseded” the decision in D.D., see State v. Stone, 493 Md. 78, 133 (2026); Cutchember v. State, 493 Md. 187, 195 (2026). As the dissent in Stone noted, however, the General Assembly does not have the authority to overrule the “Court‘s decisions on constitutional matters,” and the legislature‘s policy decision to prohibit by statute investigatory stops bаsed solely on the odor of marijuana does not have any effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. at 152 (Gould, J., dissenting). Accord York v. City of Burlington, 225 F. Supp. 3d 341, 347 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (rejecting argument that arrest in violation of state law necessarily implicated violation of Fourth Amendment rights).
(a) Subject to . . . but notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful under state and local law, and shall not be a violation of state or local law, for persons 21 years of age or older to:
(1) Possess, process, transport, purchase, obtain, or give away to persons 21 years of age or older without any compensation whatsoever, not more than 28.5 grams of cannabis not in the form of concentrated cannabis;
* * *
(c) Cannabis and cannabis products involved in any way with conduct deemed lawful by this section are not contraband nor subject to seizure, and no conduct deemed lawful by this section shall constitute the basis for detention, search, or arrest.