JACK SUCIC, Claimant-Appellant v. ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee
2018-1486
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Decided: April 23, 2019
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in No. 13-158, Judge Mary J. Schoelen, Judge Coral Wong Pietsch, Judge William S. Greenberg.
KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Law Offices of Carpenter Chartered, Topeka, KS, argued for claimant-appellant.
JOSHUA E. KURLAND, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented by ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR., LOREN MISHA PREHEIM, JOSEPH H. HUNT; AMANDA BLACKMON, BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, DEREK SCADDEN, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
Before PROST, Chief Judge, REYNA and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
The adult children of deceased veteran Jack Sucic appeal the final decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court“) denying their motion for substitution. Sucic v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 121 (2017). Because the Veterans Court did not err in determining that Mr. Sucic‘s non-dependent, adult children do not qualify as accrued benefits beneficiaries under
Mr. Sucic served on active duty from July 1973 to August 1979 and from December 1982 to October 1984. J.A. 17. In June 2007, he was granted service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD“), effective January 24, 2003. Id. In June 2008, Mr. Sucic filed a notice of disagreement, requesting an earlier effective date of June 30, 1992. J.A. 23–26. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board“) denied Mr. Sucic‘s claim for an earlier effective date. J.A. 30, 39–40. The Veterans Court affirmed the Board‘s decision. Sucic v. Gibson, No. 13-0158, 2014 WL 2926475, at *4 (Vet. App. June 30, 2014), rev‘d and remanded, Sucic v. McDonald, 640 F. App‘x 901 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Mr. Sucic appealed to the Federal Circuit, and in February 2016, we reversed the Veterans Court‘s denial of an earlier effective date and remanded for further development and determination of the effective date. Sucic v. McDonald, 640 F. App‘x 901, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2016). On April 8, 2016, our mandate issued.
The Veterans Court effectuated our ruling by vacating the Board‘s decision and remanding Mr. Sucic‘s case to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA“) for further development and determination of the effective date. Sucic v. McDonald, No. 13-0158, 2016 WL 3035459, at *2 (Vet. App. May 27, 2016), withdrawn, Sucic v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 121 (2017). The Veterans Court entered judgment on June 20, 2016 and issued its mandate on August 22, 2016.
On April 13, 2016, Mr. Sucic died. J.A. 43–46. His death occurred five days after our mandate issued but before the Veterans Court vacated the Board‘s decision and remanded the case to the VA. Mr. Sucic‘s counsel did not notify the Veterans Court of Mr. Sucic‘s death until several months later, on August 31, 2016, shortly after the Veterans Court issued its mandate. See id. On the same day, Mr. Sucic‘s counsel filed an unopposed motion to recall the Veterans Court‘s judgment and remand decision, J.A. 47–49, and a motion to substitute Mr. Sucic‘s three adult children as claimants, J.A. 50–53.
The Veterans Court considered whether Mr. Sucic‘s three adult children were eligible accrued benefits beneficiaries under
Mr. Sucic‘s three adult children appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
II
We first provide an overview of the statutory provisions at issue in this appeal.
Substitution in VA proceedings is governed by
If a claimant dies while a claim for any benefit under a law administered by the Secretary, or an appeal of a decision with respect to such a claim, is pending, a living person who would be eligible to receive accrued benefits due to the claimant under section 5121(a) of this title may, not later than one year after the date of the death of such claimant, file a request to be substituted as the
claimant for the purposes of processing the claim to completion.
The statute governing accrued benefits is
(2) Upon the death of a veteran, to the living person first listed below:
(A) The veteran‘s spouse.
(B) The veteran‘s children (in equal shares).
(C) The veteran‘s dependent parents (in equal shares).
Congress also enacted a definitions section for Title 38.
(4)(A) The term “child” means (except for purposes of chapter 19 of this title (other than with respect to a child who is an insurable dependent under subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 1965(10) of such chapter) and section 8502(b) of this title) a person who is unmarried and—
(i) who is under the age of eighteen years;
(ii) who, before attaining the age of eighteen years, became permanently incapable of self-support; or
(iii) who, after attaining the age of eighteen years and until completion of education or training (but not after attaining the age of twenty-three years), is pursuing a course of instruction at an approved educational institution;
. . . .
III
We have exclusive jurisdiction to “review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof” by the Veterans Court “and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and necessary to a decision.”
“In statutory construction, we begin ‘with the language of the statute.‘” Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)). Our “first step is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). “It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.‘” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep‘t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). Our inquiry ceases “if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.‘” Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340)).
IV
The issue before us is whether the Veterans Court erred in denying Mr. Sucic‘s
Mr. Sucic‘s adult children argue that “[t]he veteran‘s children” includes non-dependent, adult children, while the Secretary of Veterans’ Affairs (“Secretary“) argues that “[t]he veteran‘s children” excludes non-dependent, adult children. While the parties argue for opposing interpretations of “[t]he veteran‘s children,” they both contend that the statute is clear and unambiguous in favor of their interpretation. See Appellant‘s Br. 8; Appellee‘s Br. 14.
We agree with the Secretary that the term “[t]he veteran‘s children” used in
Congress specifically defined “child” as “a person who is unmarried” and, among other things, who is “under the age of eighteen years,” or who “became permanently incapable of self-support” before turning eighteen, or who is “pursuing a course of instruction at an approved educational institution” and is eighteen to twenty-three years old.
Mr. Sucic‘s adult children do not argue that they satisfy the definition of “child” under
First, Mr. Sucic‘s adult children argue that the plain and ordinary meaning of “[t]he veteran‘s children” in
Mr. Sucic‘s adult children also argue that Congress specifically limited the third group of eligible accrued benefits beneficiaries—“[t]he veteran‘s dependent parents”
(5) The term “parent” means (except for purposes of chapter 19 of this title) a father, a mother, a father through adoption, a mother through adoption, or an individual who for a period of not less than one year stood in the relationship of a parent to a veteran at any time before the veteran‘s entry into active military, naval, or air service or if two persons stood in the relationship of a father or a mother for one year or more, the person who last stood in the relationship of father or mother before the veteran‘s last entry into active military, naval, or air service.
Mr. Sucic‘s adult children also argue that interpreting “[t]he veteran‘s children” to exclude non-dependent, adult children would lead to “an absurd result” when read in conjunction with the statutory directive for “[t]he veteran‘s children” to receive the accrued benefits “in equal shares.” See Appellant‘s Br. 13;
Finally, Mr. Sucic‘s adult children argue that the Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 2008, codified at
We have considered Mr. Sucic‘s adult children‘s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive.
We hold that the term “[t]he veteran‘s children” in
Because we find the statute unambiguous, we do not reach the issue of deference due to the VA‘s interpretation of “[t]he veteran‘s children.” See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). And because the statute is unambiguous, we also do not consider whether the canon of construction urged by Mr. Sucic‘s children that ambiguities in provisions for veterans’ benefits “are to be construed in the beneficiaries’ favor” applies here. See King v. St. Vincent‘s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991); Appellant‘s Br. 27–28; Reply Br. 17–20.
V
We affirm the decision of the Veterans Court denying Mr. Sucic‘s adult children‘s motion for substitution because they are not eligible accrued benefits beneficiaries under
AFFIRMED