MICHAEL STRUCKMAN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TEAYS VALLEY LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL.
Case No. 18CA3
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PICKAWAY COUNTY
RELEASED 01/09/2019
2019-Ohio-115
Hoover, J.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Richard T. Ricketts and Andrew C. Clark, Ricketts Co., LPA, Pickerington, Ohio, for appellant.
Victoria Flinn McCurdy, Sue W. Yount, and James P. Schuck, Bricker & Eckler LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for appellees.
Hoover, J.
{¶1} This Court previously affirmed the judgment of the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas which dismissed the complaint of plaintiff-appellant Michael Struckman (“Struckman“) against defendants-appellees, the Board of Education of Teays Valley Local School District, the members of the school board in their representative capacity, and the superintendent of the school district in his individual and representative capacities (collectively “Teays Valley“), for breach of a real estate purchase contract. Struckman has since filed a
{¶2} On appeal Struckman contests the trial court‘s denial of his motion for relief from judgment. For his Sunshine Law claim, we acknowledge that laches is inapplicable to a
{¶3} Struckman next contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for relief from judgment because new documents established his claim that the parties intended that the property be used as the site for a new school. In our previous decision, however, we explicitly held that the real estate purchase contract was unambiguous, thus rejecting Struckman‘s claim that extrinsic evidence was admissible to establish the meaning of the contractual phrase at issue. Therefore, consistent with the doctrine of law of the case, the trial court correctly denied Struckman‘s
{¶4} Therefore, we overrule Struckman‘s appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts and Procedural Background1
{¶5} In May 2004, Struckman and Teays Valley executed a written purchase contract, wherein Teays Valley purchased approximately 70 acres of real estate from Struckman for $10,400. The parties agreed that Struckman would retain his right to farm the property. Paragraph 23 of the contract, in part, states:
“* * * Furthermore, Seller shall be entitled to without charge from Buyer continue its Farming Activities on any part of the Real Estate purchased by Buyer until Buyer commences construction on any such portion of the Real Estate or otherwise must occupy said portion of the Real Estate in connection with its intended use thereof.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶6} On July 21, 2015, Robin Halley, the superintendent of the Teays Valley Local School District, wrote a letter to Struckman to confirm the school district‘s intent to begin occupying the property and that Struckman‘s farming rights would terminate at the conclusion of the 2015 farming season. Halley also stated, “The District‘s plans include the construction of a small facility on the site in conjunction with its occupancy and use of the property for the District‘s student FFA organization and other potential school-related or extracurricular functions.”
{¶7} In March 2016, Struckman commenced this action by filing a complaint against the Board of Education of Teays Valley Local School District, the members of the school board in their representative capacity, and the superintendent of the school, individually and in his representative capacity. In his complaint, Struckman asserted the following counts against Teays Valley: breach of contract (Count One), specific performance (Count Two), declaratory relief
- It was specifically and affirmatively represented to Mr. Struckman that the Real Estate was being purchased for use as a future school site (“School Site“).
- Mr. Struckman would not have sold the Real Estate or entered into a contract for its sale for a purpose other than the use of the Real Estate by [Teays Valley] for a School Site.
- Mr. Struckman agreed to sell the Real Estate to [Teays Valley] at an amount less than its fair market value, based on two material considerations and representations by [Teays Valley]:
- The Real Estate would be used for a School Site; and
- Struckman would have the right to continue to farm the Real Estate, at no additional charge, until such time as a school was developed on the Real Estate (collectively, “Express Considerations and Representations“).
- Plaintiff, as seller, and [Teays Valley], as buyer, entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract for the sale and purchase of the Real Estate as a School Site. * * *
- The Contract specifically provides at paragraph 23 as follows: “The Plaintiff shall be entitled to farm the Real Estate after the closing and so long thereafter until Defendant commences construction on or otherwise occupies the Real Estate in connection with its intended use“. [sic] (Emphasis added.)
- [Teays Valley] represented and warranted that the intended use of the Real Estate was for a School Site.
{¶8} Struckman attached a copy of the purchase contract and the superintendent‘s July 21, 2015 letter to his complaint. Struckman also attached newspaper articles and letters published by Teays Valley that aim to demonstrate Teays Valley‘s intention to use the property for a school site. In his complaint, Struckman asserted that Teays Valley‘s intention to use the property for
{¶9} On March 25, 2016, Teays Valley filed a motion to dismiss Struckman‘s complaint pursuant to
{¶10} Struckman filed a memorandum in opposition to Teays Valley‘s motion to dismiss, and Teays Valley filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss.
{¶11} On May 5, 2016, the trial court granted Teays Valley‘s motion to dismiss. In its decision, the trial court only addressed Teays Valley‘s second argument, i.e. that the purchase contract did not require Teays Valley to build a school on the property. The trial court concluded that the second argument was dispositive; thus, the other issues were rendered moot. In its decision, the trial court stated:
Attached to Plaintiffs complaint as Exhibit A is the Real Estate Purchase Contract. A perusal of this contract shows that there is no reference whatsoever to the land being limited to use as a future school site. Plaintiff points to Paragraph 23 of the contract * * *[.]
Plaintiff hangs his hat on the phrase “intended use.” This phrase is not defined in the contract. Plaintiff also provides parol evidence in the form of newspaper articles about the land sale and letters between Plaintiff and Defendant. See Complaint Exhibits B-G.
* * *
Plaintiff claims that the term “intended use” is ambiguous, thus allowing the introduction of parol evidence. This Court does not find this term to be ambiguous
Plaintiff could have insisted, at the time of contracting, that the intended use be specified. He did not. The intention of building a school is simply never mentioned.
* * *
{¶12} On appeal, in March 2017, we affirmed the trial court‘s
First, it is clear that the purchase contract does not state both of the two “material considerations” that Struckman alleges the parties’ agreed to. Nowhere in the purchase contract does Teays Valley promise to build a school on the property or agree that they may only terminate Struckman‘s farming rights in order to begin construction for a new school. While it is true that we must accept Struckman‘s factual allegations contained in his complaint, under the
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard, Struckman‘s claims arise from the parties’ purchase contract. As such, we must determine whether the purchase contract bars Struckman‘s claims from relief.
Examining paragraph 23, the parties agreed that Struckman had the right to farm the property until one of the following occurred: (1) Teays Valley began construction on any portion of the property or (2) Teays Valley otherwise must occupy said portion of the property in connection with “its intended use thereof.” We agree with the trial court‘s conclusion that the paragraph‘s intention is to establish Struckman‘s ability to farm the property for free until a certain time when Teays Valley sought to use the property they purchased. This is evidenced by the title of the paragraph, i.e. “Farming Rights“. Our interpretation of the phrase “its intended use” is that Teays Valley could not arbitrarily occupy the property just to terminate Struckman‘s farming rights. Instead, Teays Valley must have occupied the property with the intent to use it for some envisioned purpose. We find this to be the only reasonable interpretation of paragraph 23. As such, we find that the language in paragraph 23 is unambiguous.
With the superintendent‘s letter to Struckman in July 2015, Teays Valley gave notice that they intended to beginning occupying and using a portion of the property. Struckman‘s entire complaint is based upon the assertion that Teays Valley‘s notice breached the terms of the purchase contract because they did not intend to use it as a site for a new school. Because we have found that the purchase contract did not contain a provision that Teays Valley must build a school on the property and the unambiguous nature of paragraph 23 allows for only the enforcement of the purchase contract‘s express terms, Struckman has failed to set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. The parties’ purchase contract presents an insuperable bar to relief on Struckman‘s breach of contract claims.
{¶13} In December 2017, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to accept Struckman‘s appeal of our judgment for review. Struckman v. Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 151 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2017-Ohio-9111, 87 N.E.3d 1271.
{¶14} On May 4, 2017, just a few months after our decision in Struckman, but before his Supreme Court appeal was resolved, Struckman filed a
{¶15} Teays Valley filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion, in which it argued, among other reasons: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion because Struckman‘s appeal to the Supreme Court remained pending; (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant Struckman‘s
{¶16} In February 2018, after the Supreme Court of Ohio did not accept Struckman‘s appeal from our earlier judgment, the trial court denied Struckman‘s
II. Assignments of Error
{¶17} Struckman assigns the following errors for our review:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD KNOWN AS THE GTE TEST.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE
III. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES TO PRECLUDE CONSIDERATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE TERMINATION NOTICE.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT APPLIED THE LAW-OF-THE-CASE DOCTRINE TO PLAINTIFF‘S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 60(B).
III. Standard of Review and General Principles
{¶18} Struckman‘s assignments of error contest the trial court‘s denial of his
{¶19} A trial court possesses discretion when determining whether to hold a hearing regarding a
{¶20} A party moving for relief from judgment under
“If the movant files a motion for relief from judgment and it contains allegations of operative facts which would warrant relief under Civil Rule 60(B), the trial court should grant a hearing to take evidence and verify these facts before it rules on the motion.”
Coulson v. Coulson, 5 Ohio St.3d 12, 16, 448 N.E.2d 809 (1983), quoting Adomeit v. Baltimore, 39 Ohio App.2d 97, 105, 316 N.E.2d 469 (1974); accord Kay v. Marc Glassman, Inc., supra. “Thus, the trial court abuses its discretion in denying a hearing where grounds for relief from judgment are sufficiently alleged and are supported with evidence which would warrant relief from judgment.” Id. at 19.
{¶21} To be entitled to a hearing, a movant must present operative facts to show all three of the following circumstances:
(1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in
Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through(5) ; and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief areCiv.R. 60(B)(1) ,(2) or(3) , not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus.
IV. Law and Analysis
{¶22} In his third assignment of error and in part of his first and second assignments of error, Struckman asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
{¶23} As an initial matter, we agree that laches is inapplicable to a
{¶24} Nonetheless, in construing the trial court‘s laches ruling as a ruling that the motion was not timely filed, as instructed by the above-cited case law, we conclude that Struckman did not timely file the motion. To prevail on a motion for relief from judgment, the movant must establish that the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds for relief are
{¶25} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Struckman failed to timely file the motion; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Struckman‘s
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Holding That the Law-of-the-Case Doctrine Prevented Struckman from Raising the Same Breach-of-Contract Claim He Previously Raised
{¶27} Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels. State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall, 123 Ohio St.3d 229, 2009-Ohio-4986, 915 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 28; Hopkins v. Dyer, 104 Ohio St.3d 461, 2004-Ohio-6769, 820 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 15; Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984). Consequently, “[w]here an appellate court has already ruled on an issue in a direct appeal, a trial court‘s ‘reconsideration’ of that same issue is inconsistent with the appellate court‘s exercise of jurisdiction and the doctrine of the law of the case.” State ex rel. Rogers v. Marshall, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 05CA3004, 2008-Ohio-6341, ¶ 33 (applying this holding to the trial court‘s ruling on a
{¶28} In Struckman, 2017-Ohio-1177, ¶¶ 4, 23-28, we expressly rejected Struckman‘s claim that he could use extrinsic evidence to interpret the parties’ purchase contract phrase “its intended use” because the phrase is ambiguous. We explicitly held that the contested phrase was unambiguous, thus rejecting his claim that extrinsic evidence was admissible to establish the meaning of the contractual phrase.
V. Conclusion
{¶30} Having overruled all of Struckman‘s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying his
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
For the Court,
By:
Marie Hoover, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.