CITY OF STRONGSVILLE v. DAVID KANE
No. 97765
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
July 26, 2012
2012-Ohio-3372
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Cooney, P.J., and Rocco, J.
Criminal Appeal from the Berea Municipal Court, Case No. 10 CRB 01289
James P. Celebrezze
Nicholas J. Celebrezze
Jeffrey A. Crossman
The Celebrezze Group, LLC
5546 Pearl Road
Parma, OH 44129
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
George F. Lonjak
City of Strongsville Prosecutor
614 Superior Avenue
Suite 1310
Cleveland, OH 44113
Also listed:
For Berea Municipal Court Probation Department
Gregory Sponseller
Director of Law
City of Berea - City Hall
11 Berea Commons
Berea, OH 44017
{¶1} Appellant David Kane appeals the order of restitution imposed after his no contest plea and finding of guilt to the misdemeanor offense of criminal mischief. For the following reasons, we overrule the two assigned errors and affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶2} Strongsville charged Kane with a single count of criminal mischief in violation of
{¶3} Kane timely appealed, raising two assignments of error. Kane‘s first assigned error provides as follows: “The trial court committed reversible error by admitting hearsay evidence on the issue of damages.” Kane‘s argument lacks merit.
{¶4} The victim in this case, Jennifer Coulter, appeared at the restitution hearing and offered an estimate from Great Home Improvement for the repair of 133 boards on Coulter‘s side of the property and 36 boards on Kane‘s side of the property. A representative from the fence company did not appear or offer any additional evidence. Rather, Coulter in an exhaustive restitution hearing that stretched to 49 pages of transcript, outlined the specific details in the estimate. Further, her testimony revealed she selected the company that offered an estimate based on damage repair rather than complete fence replacement, which was, she indicated, from other companies she contacted, often the industry standard.
{¶5} Ohio courts have long recognized that
When determining restitution, a court‘s calculation must be supported by competent, credible evidence from which it can discern the amount of the restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty. The court may base the amount of restitution it orders on an amount recommended by the victim, the offender, a presentence investigation report, estimates or receipts indicating the cost of repairing or replacing property, and other information.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.28(A)(1) . The court may also rely upon hearsay.Ohio R. Evid. 101(C) excepts application of theRules of Evidence, including the hearsay rule, from certain proceedings, such as miscellaneous criminal proceedings. Among those listed as specifically excepted from the Rules of Evidence are proceedings for sentencing. A hearing to determine restitution is part of sentencing. Consequently, an ordering court is not restricted by the Rules of Evidence, including the prohibition on hearsay, in determining the amount of a restitution order.
State v. Tuemler, 12th Dist. No. CA 2004-06-068, 2005-Ohio-1240, ¶ 16-17.
{¶6} We find that Coulter‘s testimony was both competent and credible. The use of admissible hearsay testimony, coupled with Coulter‘s detailed description of the fencing and the damage, did not render the trial court incapable of making an informed decision. Thus we reject this assigned error.
{¶7} Kane‘s second assignment of error provides as follows: “The trial court committed reversible error by ordering restitution that was not reasonably related to the offense charged.” This argument also lacks merit.
{¶8} “[W]e review a lower court‘s order of restitution for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Lalain, 8th Dist. No. 95857, 2011-Ohio-4813, citing State v. Marbury, 104 Ohio App.3d 179, 661 N.E.2d 271 (8th Dist.1995). “[T]he term ‘abuse of discretion’ implies that the court‘s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶9} Pursuant to
{¶10} We first note that
{¶11} Kane objected to the amount of restitution before it was imposed, and there is no indication in the record that restitution was included in the plea deal. Absent a transcript of the plea hearing, we must presume regularity in the proceedings. Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 161 Ohio St.2d 197, 199, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980). The trial court overruled Kane‘s objection under the guise of settling all issues regarding the fence in one proceeding.
{¶12} Kane was charged with one count of criminal mischief, in violation of
{¶13} Kane pleaded no contest to the charges as alleged in the complaint. It is uncontested that a videotape showing Kane damaging one board on the fence on April 20, 2010, was submitted by Coulter to police and formed the basis for this charge. While we have no record before us outlining the factual basis for the plea, we note that Coulter testified at the restitution hearing that the damage to her fence, demonstrated by the repair estimate, occurred over a period of several months and was not limited to the single day that Kane was found to have damaged the fence. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the prosecutor failed to charge the offense as a range of dates or move the court to conform the complaint to the facts presumably outlined at the time of the no contest plea to a range of dates rather than April 20, 2010, we cannot find that the court ordered restitution that exceeded the economic loss resulting from Kane‘s criminal conduct. While Strongsville should have ideally included allegations of conduct that occurred over the five-month period preceding the April 20, 2010 date of offense, the inference of ongoing damage based on the uncontroverted testimony of Coulter at the restitution hearing does not make the trial court‘s order of restitution contrary to law.
{¶14} Kane‘s second assignment of error is therefore overruled, and the trial court‘s imposition of restitution is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, P.J., and
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR
