KIMBERLY A. STRINGER v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH-OHIO, ET AL.
No. 102166
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
June 11, 2015
[Cite as Stringer v. Dept. of Health-Ohio, 2015-Ohio-2277.]
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., McCormack, P.J., and Stewart, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 11, 2015
Administrative Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-13-819004
Glen S. Richardson
Bentoff & Duber Co., L.P.A.
55 Public Square, Suite 1200
Cleveland, OH 44113-1901
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
For Department of Health-Ohio
Thomas M. Saxer
Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A.
159 South Main Street
Suite 1100
Akron, OH 44308
For Stephen Buehrer
Mike DeWine
Ohio Attorney General
By: Thomas M. McCarty
Assistant Attorney General
State Office Building, 11th Floor
615 West Superior Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44113-1899
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Kimberly A. Stringer appeals the decision of the trial court that vacated a dismissal with prejudice and granted the motion to enforce settlement filed by defendant-appellee Department of Health-Ohio (“the DOH”). Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} Stringer refiled a complaint on December 18, 2013, appealing from an administrative decision that denied an additional allowance for certain conditions requested under her workers’ compensation claim. Stringer had previously voluntarily dismissed the action pursuant to
{¶3} The trial court referred the case to workers’ compensation mediation. On April 25, 2014, the trial court issued an order indicating that the case settled in mediation and that the parties were to submit a more definitive dismissal entry addressing court costs. On May 13, 2014, Stringer filed a notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice. That same day, the DOH filed a motion to enforce settlement with a request for attorney fees, indicating that defense counsel had been informed by plaintiff’s counsel that Stringer had a change of heart, no longer wished to settle her claim, and refused to sign a settlement agreement. The next day, the trial court entered an order of dismissal with prejudice.
{¶4} Thereafter, the trial court set a hearing on the motion to enforce settlement. The DOH filed a motion for relief from judgment on May 30, 2014, indicating that the parties had reached a settlement during mediation, the DOH was advised Stringer had a
{¶5} At the hearing held on June 2, 2014, the mediator testified that he prepared a report following the mediation conference that indicated the case was “considered settled” for $50,000. The report further indicated that both the plaintiff and the defendant and their respective counsel were present. Following the hearing, the trial court vacated the dismissal with prejudice and granted the motion to enforce settlement. The trial court’s ruling stated:
Pretrial had. Parties represented by counsel. Evidentiary hearing had. Defendant’s motion for relief from judgment is granted. In the alternative, the court vacates the prior dismissal for good cause. The court finds, as will be set forth below, that the court has inherent power to do so. By way of background, the instant matter was set for jury trial to commence on 7/31/2014. In the meantime, the case was sent to workers compensation mediation by agreement of the parties. The court was subsequently advised by the mediator that the matter had settled in mediation for the sum of $50,000.00. The court in due course signed an entry submitted by plaintiff’s counsel dismissing the matter with prejudice. The court did so on the belief that the dismissal was in furtherance of the settlement reached in mediation. In reality, plaintiff had second thoughts about the agreement to settle the case and refused to accept the amount of the settlement. Plaintiff did not advise the court that there was a dispute as to the settlement. Instead, plaintiff’s counsel filed a dismissal entry with prejudice. Surprisingly, plaintiff took the position at hearing that the court could no longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter because a dismissal with prejudice had been submitted by plaintiff’s counsel and signed by the court. The court rejects plaintiff’s arguments and finds that relief from judgment is appropriate. In the alternative, the court finds that it has inherent power to vacate the dismissal prompted by plaintiff’s submitted entry under the circumstances of this case. The court further finds that the only aspect of the case that changed after a settlement was reached was plaintiff’s change of heart. Accordingly, the court finds that the matter is
hereby settled and dismissed with prejudice for the sum of $50,000.00 at defendant’s costs. Final. Court cost assessed to the defendant(s). Notice issued.
{¶6} An initial appeal filed by appellant was dismissed for a lack of a final appealable order because the trial court had not addressed the DOH’s request for attorney fees. On October 29, 2014, the trial court issued an order denying the request for attorney fees. This appeal timely followed.
{¶7} Stringer raises three assignments of error for our review. Her first assignment of error claims the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on appellee’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement because the court had unconditionally dismissed the action. We find no merit to this argument.
{¶8} Initially, we recognize that the Ohio Supreme Court recently held “that a trial court may, when it dismisses a civil action upon notification that the parties have settled, expressly retain jurisdiction for the specific purpose of enforcing the settlement agreement.” Infinite Sec. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Props. I, Ltd., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1101, ¶ 2. In order to expressly retain jurisdiction, the court’s entry must reflect the trial court’s action in clear and succinct terms. Id. at ¶ 29. “Absent a clear indication that the trial court intends to retain jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement, parties must be entitled to rely on the finality of the court’s action[.]” Id. at ¶ 30.
{¶9} In this case, the trial court did not expressly retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement in its entry dismissing the action with prejudice. However, our
{¶10} Next, we must determine whether the dismissal in this action was a final judicial determination from which
{¶11} We review a decision on a
{¶12}
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party * * * from a final judgment, order or proceedings for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; * * * (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; * * * or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
In order to prevail on a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
{¶13} In this case, the trial court had the authority to vacate the dismissal and did not abuse its discretion in so doing. The record reflects that the motion for relief from
{¶14} Although counsel for Stringer indicated at oral argument that the second and third assignments of error were no longer being pursued, we nonetheless shall address them as they were raised in the appellant’s brief and presented for review. Under her second assignment of error, Stringer claims the parties never reached an enforceable settlement. She asserts that she never received or signed a written agreement with specific terms and conditions, that she was under the impression the settlement was tentative, and that new and changed circumstances relative to her future medical needs had arisen.
{¶15} A settlement agreement is an enforceable contract designed to terminate a claim by preventing or ending litigation. Continental W. Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc., 74 Ohio St.3d 501, 502, 1996-Ohio-158, 660 N.E.2d 431. “[S]ettlement agreements are highly favored in the law.” Id. Where parties dispute the existence of a settlement agreement or there is uncertainty as to the terms of a settlement agreement, a trial court should conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether an enforceable agreement exists. See Infinite Sec. Solutions, L.L.C., at ¶ 31; Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d 58, ¶ 17; Rulli v. Fan Co., 79 Ohio St.3d 374, 376-377, 1997-Ohio-380, 683 N.E.2d 337.
{¶17} Under her third assignment of error, Stringer claims the enforcement of the settlement agreement is against public policy because self-insured employees are provided a 30-day period in which they can withdraw from a settlement offer pursuant to
“When an appeal involves a state-funded employer, the Administrator of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation is a direct party. However, when an appeal involves a self-insured employer, the Administrator is not a direct party. If appellant’s position is adopted, the Administrator could potentially enter into a settlement agreement and then be required to submit such an agreement to itself for approval. * * * Therefore,
R.C. 4123.65 does not apply to judicial settlements arising from an appeal underR.C. 4123.512 .”
(Emphasis sic.) Myers v. Admr., Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 01 CA 131, 2002-Ohio-7439, *9, quoting Macek v. Admr. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 99-CO-6, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6162, *7-8 (Dec. 21, 1999).
{¶18} Because the parties entered into a settlement during court litigation initiated under
{¶19} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
TIM McCORMACK, P.J., CONCURS;
MELODY J. STEWART, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
KIMBERLY A. STRINGER v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH-OHIO, ET AL.
No. 102166
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
June 11, 2015
{¶20} By considering and subsequently granting the DOH’s
{¶21}
{¶22} As the majority notes, there are, however, circumstances where the court has the authority to consider a motion for relief from an erroneously entered notice of dismissal. See, e.g., Logsdon v. Nichols, 72 Ohio St.3d 124, 647 N.E.2d 1361 (1995) (noting that “the trial court had jurisdiction to consider a
{¶23} In this case, the court vacated the notice of dismissal on motion by the defendant. There is no authority for the proposition that a court has the ability to grant relief to a defendant by vacating a plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal when the plaintiff has not moved the court to do so and, furthermore, does not want the dismissal vacated.
{¶24} The court believed that the parties had reached a settlement, and the court clearly believed that it had entered the dismissal of the case — and had done so in error. It did not. Regardless of whether the parties had reached an agreement, Stringer filed a notice of voluntary dismissal before the commencement of trial in the case. She was within her right to do so. We have held that “[t]he voluntary dismissal of claims by a plaintiff, prior to the actual commencement of trial is ‘an absolute right, regardless of motives and can be accomplished without order of the court and without giving notice to opposing counsel.’” In re Carothers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96369, 2011-Ohio-6754, at ¶ 12, quoting Witt v. Lamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87349, 2006-Ohio-3963, ¶ 8. So even if Stringer was seeking to avoid finalizing a settlement, she nonetheless had the absolute right to dismiss her case against the DOH.