RAKIIM STRICKLAND, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Appellee.
No. 321, 2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
October 2, 2024
Submitted: July 24, 2024; ID No. 2206015863 (K);
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. AFFIRMED.
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant Rakiim Strickland.
John Williams, Esquire, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Dover, Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware.
TRAYNOR, Justice:
The Dover Housing Authority operates a surveillance-video recording system in the vicinity of housing units it manages in the Senate View section of the Dover neighborhood known as Capitol Green. Two of the system‘s cameras captured an individual—later identified as Rakiim Strickland—in possession of an assault weapon, and one recorded the weapon being discharged in the direction of another person. Strickland was a convicted felon and, as such, was prohibited from possessing
At Strickland‘s trial, which resulted in his conviction and a 35-year prison sentence, the State played, and the jury watched, the two video clips. Strickland neither objected to the admission of the video clips nor requested a jury instruction concerning the purposes for which the jury could consider them. But Strickland now claims that the trial judge should have sua sponte—that is, of her own accord without prompting or suggestion—instructed the jury that it could only consider what Strickland calls the “shooting evidence” for the limited purposes of identifying the person in possession of the firearm. According to Strickland, that the jury might, in the absence of the instruction Strickland did not request, consider it for other, improper purposes, was so clearly prejudicial to Strickland‘s rights as to require the reversal of his convictions.
Strickland points to a second reason why his convictions should not stand. He claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of two firearm-related convictions of a defense witness. Strickland readily concedes that another firearm-related conviction on the witness‘s record—theft of a firearm—was admissible because it was a crime involving dishonesty. But because the two other convictions, in Strickland‘s telling, did not involve crimes of dishonesty, the trial court was required to, but did not properly, balance the probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence of those convictiоns.
As we will develop more fully below, neither of Strickland‘s claims of reversible error has merit. In short, the video evidence was admissible without reference to the evidentiary rule governing other, uncharged bad acts, because the evidence directly proved the charged possessory offense. And in the face of Strickland‘s failure to request a limiting instruction to ensure that the jury did not improperly consider the evidence, the trial court‘s failure to so instruct the jury was not plainly erroneous. In addition, Strickland‘s argument concerning the witness‘s prior convictions is grounded in a questionable, even if not implausible, characterization of the trial judge‘s ruling. And even if we were to accept that characterization, any error associated with the admission of the convictions was harmless. We therefore affirm Strickland‘s convictions.
I
A
At 6:18 p.m. on June 22, 2022, an evening with heavy rainfall, a 911 call came in to the Dover Police Department (“DPD“), reporting shots fired near 409 Kent Avenue, a single-story residence in Dover‘s Capitol Green neighborhood. According to the caller, someone with “dreads in his hair” driving a white Nissan Altima with temporary tags was shooting a gun near a residence.1 DPD broadcast the incident, alerting officers that “a white passenger vehicle . . . fired shots outside the vehicle”2
At 6:20 p.m., DPD Corporal Cliff Figueroa was on duty in a patrol vehicle heading eastbound on Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard, which forms Capitol Green‘s northern border. Corporal Figueroa saw a
Corporal Figuerоa checked the vehicle for other occupants and then with other officers “started setting up a perimeter on River Road. . . .”5 Another DPD officer, Maria Ragona, reported to the scene. Ragona checked the Altima for firearms and located a black bookbag in the rear passenger seat, and in that she found Strickland‘s driver‘s license and health insurance card. Ragona advised all DPD units of the address on Strickland‘s license: 634 River Road. Sergeant Michael Wilson was also on duty that evening. He was familiar with Strickland, and he reported to the River Road residence to help set a perimeter around Strickland‘s residence. Strickland‘s grandmother emerged from the residence and told Wilson and the other responding officers that Strickland was in the shower. Strickland came outside five to ten minutes later. Officers obtained a search warrant for the residence and located a wet white tank top and muddy black Nike sneakers from a bedroom.
Detective Jordon Barrows later canvassed Kent Avenue for evidence. He located .300 blackout shell casings associated with an AR rifle or pistol, which were entered into evidence at trial. The detective also contacted the Dover Housing Authority and obtained surveillance-camera footage from the commons area in the Capitol Green.
B
Two aspects of Strickland‘s trial provide the grist for his appellate claims: the surveillance-camera footage and the cross-examination of the only witness called by the defense.
(i)
During the prosecution‘s case-in-chief, the surveillance-camera footage was entered into evidence and played for the jury. As the video was played and periodically paused, Detective Barrows explained the footage—without objection—from the witness stand. He testified that the footage showed “an individual who appears to be Mr. Strickland . . . exit a residence on New Castle Avenue carrying a black bookbag and enter[ing] the white Nissan Altima[.]”6 The video, timestamped 6:21 p.m., next showed “a white Nissan Altima with what appears to be a temporary white registration on the back heading eastbound through the alleyway from River Road.”7 At 6:22 p.m., according to Detective Barrows, the footage showed the driver exiting “the drivеr‘s side door of the Nissan Altima . . . brandishing, holding
(ii)
Taron Walker, who lived in the Capitol Green neighborhood at the time of the incident, testified for the defense. Walker testified that he and Strickland “grew up together”10 and had mutual friends. He told the jury that he was speaking to Strickland on June 22nd when “shots rang out,” which caused him to duck and run towards his home located at 411 Kent Avenue.11 Walker did not see Strickland leave, but “assume[d] [Strickland] sped off because [he] heard the engine of his car rev. . . .”12 Walker also testified that he did not see any bullets, a weapon, or anyone who looked like they had a weapon in the area.13
On direct examination, Strickland‘s counsel asked Walker if he had ever been convicted of a crime, incarcerated, or on probation, to which he answered yes.14 Before cross examination, the State made an application to the court under Rule 609 to permit the State to ask Walker about three felony convictions. Because it is critical to Strickland‘s appeal, the colloquy between the parties’ counsel and the Court regarding Rule 609 is set forth in full:
The State: So as alluded to somewhat indirectly during direct examination, Mr. Walker was convicted on September 12 of 2018, in the United States District Court for the District of Dеlaware with the following three offenses: Stealing firearms from a federally-licensed firearms dealer, conspiracy to steal firearms from a federally-licensed firearms dealer, and felon in possession of a firearm.
Now, the first of those offenses under Rule 609(a)(2) because it involves theft of firearms is not subject to a balancing test because it did involve a crime of dishonesty, mainly theft.
The other two offenses, to the extent that inchoate defenses of conspiracy would be separately not a crime of dishonesty, both of them are subject to the balancing test under Rule 609(a)(1).
The State‘s position is that the probative value does outweigh the prejudicial effect of admitting this testimony or information. The State proposes to ask the witness about it, and if he admits to those convictions, simply to leave it at that without the necessity of introducing the record.
However, the State does have a record I can provide to the Court. I would give the caveat that under normal circumstances the State would be presenting this as a certified record from the United States District Court. Under the circumstances this record
is from PACER, which is the U.S. court‘s online docketing system, and under the circumstances, the State would ask if it is necessary to admit that and to—that the Court accept that, taking judicial notice of its authenticity. But that is the State‘s application under Rule 609. Defense Counsel: Defense does not object to that application.
The Court: What about with regarding to . . . the criminal record?
Defense Counsel: As Mr. Smith has said, the first one because it is considered a crime of dishonesty is admissible. I would argue that the prejudicial effect of the admitting the other two . . . outweighs the probative value of the evidence, and I would ask that those two be excluded.
The Court: All right. And to the extent that the Court would allow Mr. Smith to ask Mr. Walker about these offenses, what is your position on the record that Mr. Smith is in possession of with regarding to the authenticity issue?
Defense Counsel: This is an authentic record. I would attest to its authenticity.
The Court: So you‘ll stipulate to the authenticity? Is that the defense‘s position?
Defense Counsel: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court: All right. The Court finds that based on at least what sounds like a partial concession by the defense that the probative value in light of the witness’ testimony does outweigh any prejudicial effect doing the balancing test, at least for two of the three
offenses, and the State would be permitted to ask Mr. Walker about those offenses from 2018.15
The defense did not object to or contest the court‘s statement that it had “made a partial concession[.]” But when the State cross-examined Walker and asked about his felony convictions, Strickland‘s counsel reiterated her earlier objections:
Defense Counsel: I object to bringing in all three of the offenses. As we discussed before, we could bring in the one that constituted a crime of dishonesty, but the other two were not crimes of dishonesty, and I would argue that those should not be brought in.
The State: Your Honor, I have no objection to Ms. Gray because they‘re in the record, but I understand the court‘s ruling that you engaged in the balancing test for thе other two felonies and found that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.
The Court: That is the Court‘s ruling, Ms. Gray and Mr. Smith can inquire about those three offenses.16
The State continued its cross examination and briefly asked Walker about the three offenses. The jury was only informed of what the convictions were and the relevant dates.
The jury found Strickland guilty of both PFBPP and PFABPP, and he was sentenced as a habitual offender to 60 years at Level V incarceration, suspended after 35 years, followed by two years of decreasing levels of supervision. Strickland appealed.
B
Strickland raises two issues in this appeal. He first contends that the Superior Court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that the only purpose for which
II
A
Because Strickland did not request a jury instruction limiting the purposes for which the jury could consider the video evidence, we review the Superior Court‘s failure to so instruct the jury sua sponte for plain error.17 An error is plain when it is “so clearly prejudicial to [a defendant‘s] substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial process.”18 Plain-error review is limited to material defects that are “aрparent on the face of the record; . . . basic, serious and
fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”19
The gravamen of Strickland‘s claim is that, because the video evidence depicted the driver of the white car discharging a weapon in proximity to another, unidentified individual, the jury would view it as evidence of uncharged crimes and hence “proof of [the shooter‘s] bad character, criminal personality, or dangerousness.”20 This, Strickland contends, implicates
Before the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence (“D.R.E.“) were adopted in 1980, our courts adhered to “the well-established rule that evidence of other crimes is not, in general, admissible to prove the commission of the offense charged.”21 This rule was codified in
particular occasion a person acted in accordance with the character,” but “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”22 Under
The adoption of D.R.E. Rule 404(b), modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), formalized the general rule forbidding introduction of character evidence solely to prove that the defendant acted in conformity therewith on the occasion in question. D.R.E. 404(b) [consists] of two sentences: the first proscribing admittance of evidence to prove propensity and the second enumerating illustrative purposes for which evidence of other acts, crimes, or wrongs may be used. Thus, D.R.E. 404(b) forbids the proponent, usually the prosecutor, from offering evidenсe of the defendant‘s uncharged misconduct to support a general inference of bad character. For purposes of D.R.E. 404(b), character evidence refers to the disposition or propensity of a defendant to commit certain crimes, wrongs or acts.
The second sentence of D.R.E. 404(b), however, permits introduction of such evidence for reasons other than proving propensity, “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” D.R.E. 404(b). Hence, evidence of prior misconduct is admissible when it has “independent logical relevance” and when its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.26
Thus, analysis under
Strickland concedes that
the “shooting evidence” may have had independent logical relevance as it was material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute in the case. The State used that evidence to prove identity and actual possession of the firearm and ammunition. If the State proved Strickland fired the weapon, it ipso facto proved he possessed a firearm and ammunition.27
Even so, Strickland relies on Weber v. State, in which this Court explained that “due process requires that whenever еvidence of other crimes is admitted [under
“was actually an element of the charges against [the defendant].”29 He reasons that a limiting instruction is nonetheless mandatory here, as in Weber, because the evidence at issue poses the “grave potential for misunderstanding
A careful reading of Weber, moreover, reveals that it is distinguishable from this case in important respects, the most obvious of which is that Weber, unlike this case, involves evidence of prior criminal activity and proceedings. The defendant in Weber was charged with intimidation and aggravated intimidation based on threats directed to a prosecution witness. Weber embellished his threats by warning the witness that “I killed once, [and] I‘ll kill again,”33 and bragging that he had previously bribed a judge. At trial, Weber objected to the admission of these statements because they would inform the jury of his past criminal experience. According to Weber, the statements “constituted evidence of prior bad acts as
described in
This Court agreed with the trial judge that Weber‘s statements were properly admissible under
This evidence of prior criminal acts cannot be submitted to the jury without guidance from the trial court. Therefore, when such evidence is admitted, it “must be accompanied by a cautionary instruction which fully and carefully explains to the jury the limited purpose for which that evidence has been admitted.” In this case, the admission of the evidence of Weber‘s statements concerning his prior activities was not accompanied by such a cautionary instruction. Since such an instruction wаs necessary for a proper understanding of the evidence by the jury and to assure a fair trial, the failure to give such an instruction was reversible error.37
The Court then addressed “a separate issue about the admissibility of a separate reference to [Weber‘s] prior conduct[,]”38 namely, witnesses’ references to Weber‘s prior trial. In this context, the Court emphasized that when the jury learns of “prior [criminal] activity and possibly the prior conviction . . ., in the context of the second unrelated trial, the trial judge‘s instruction that outlines the limited purpose for which the prior criminal activity or conviction is
We start with Strickland‘s failure to invoke
It bears repeating here that Strickland acknowledges that
These statements reflect the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Green.43 In Green, the Third Circuit reviewed the evolution of the “res gestae” exceрtion to the prohibition on the
admission of other uncharged crimes. Under the “res gestae” exception, uncharged crimes were admissible “not to demonstrate propensity, but to establish the ‘res gestae’ (‘thing done‘) of the charged crime.”44 The court noted that, after the enactment of
modern cases divide evidence of other crimes and bad acts into two categories: those “extrinsic” to the charged offense, and those “intrinsic” to it. Extrinsic evidence must be analyzed under Rule 404(b); intrinsic evidence need not be. Recalling the logic for allowing res gestae evidence, courts today exempt intrinsic evidence from application of Rule 404(b) on the theory that there is no “other” wrongful conduct at issuе; the
evidence is admissible as part and parcel of the charged offense.46
And, the court reasoned, “evidence is intrinsic if it ‘directly proves’ the charged offense . . . giv[ing] effect to
Here, it cannot be disputed that the video evidence depicting the discharge of the weapon from the car Strickland was driving was intrinsic to the crime charged. As Strickland himself concedes, it showed that the car‘s occupant possessed a firearm and ammunition. The evidence proved the very acts with which Strickland was charged and thus does not fall within the ambit of
In adhering to the Third Circuit‘s application of the “intrinsic evidence” label in Green, we are mindful that the label has been the object of criticism by some courts.50 Indeed, Green itself takes aim at the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, especially when it is employed to ascertain whether prior bad acts are “inextricably intertwined” with the crime charged.51 For that reason, the
court in Green sought to narrow the categories of evidence that should be considered intrinsic to the crime charged. Be that as it may, we find the distinction useful here to explain why evidence that directly proves the charged offense is not subject to
B
Strickland argues that the court‘s decision to admit two of Walker‘s three felony-firearms
impermissible character inference that Strickland was “guilty by association with a witness who ‘also uses’ guns.”54
The State responds that the Superior Court “performed the required balancing test under
The Superior Court‘s decision to admit evidence of prior felony convictions of a witness for impeachment purposes is subject to a review by this Court for an abuse of discretion.58 An abuse of discretion occurs “when a court has exceeded the
bounds of reason in light of the circumstances, or so ignored recognized rules of law or practice as to produce injustice.”59 An abuse of discretion also occurs if the court rests an evidentiary decision upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact.60
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime must be admitted but only if thе crime (1) constituted a felony under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.61
Thus, under
We first address Strickland‘s contention that the trial judge based her evidentiary ruling on the erroneous premise that defense counsel had made a partial concession that the probative value of the two сonvictions putatively not involving
dishonesty outweighed their prejudicial effect. This contention hinges on Strickland‘s crediting of the court reporter‘s punctuation of the trial judge‘s ruling. As transcribed, the ruling appears as follows
The Court finds then based on at least what sounds like a partial concession by the defense that the probative value in light of the witness’ testimony does outweigh any prejudicial effect doing the balancing test, at least for two of the three offenses, and the State would be permitted to ask Mr. Walker about those offenses from 2018.64
We agree that, under this rendition, Strickland‘s reading is reasonable. But if the relative clause modifying “concession” were bracketed by commas, the meaning of the relevant sentence reads differently, as can be sеen in the following version:
The Court finds then[,] based on at least what sounds like a partial concession by the defense[,] that the probative value in light of the witness’ testimony does outweigh any prejudicial effect doing the balancing test, at least for two of the three offenses, and the State would be permitted to ask Mr. Walker about those offenses from 2018.
In this version, the concession is decoupled from the balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect and, in our view, likely refers to the concessions defense counsel actually made—that the witness‘s theft-of-firearm conviction was a crime of dishonesty and not subject to a balancing test and that the defense would not object to the State‘s use of an uncertified record to provе the witness‘s criminal history. Considering that these concessions were made immediately before the court‘s ruling, it is far more likely in our view that they were the concessions to which the court
was referring. We therefore reject Strickland‘s contention that the trial court based its decision on an erroneous premise.
We must yet decide, however, whether the trial court‘s ruling adequately discharged the court‘s obligation under
it reversed Holden‘s convictions based on a determination that the frisk at issue was not supported by a reаsonable articulable suspicion.
We find Holden to be of limited utility here. As mentioned, no abuse of discretion was found there. And we see a fundamental distinction between a potentially case-dispositive decision on a motion to suppress following an evidentiary hearing and what happened here—a
Hines is more relevant. In Hines, this Court considered a challenge to the defendant‘s convictions based on a
So this is my ruling with respect to the 609 issues . . . [t]here is, of course, always some prejudicial effect in the jury hearing that a defendant was convicted of a felony offense, but there‘s nothing about these particular felonies that makes them unduly prejudiсial in my view, and there‘s certainly, particularly in a case such as this were we‘re talking about eyewitness accounts and that I assume, the defense case will have different accounts as to what transpired that day.
Where credibility is an issue I think it is, there is probative value to the jury hearing about the defendant‘s felony convictions, should he choose to testify, and that the probative value outweighs and prejudicial effects about the jury hearing about these convictions. Of course, all
the jury will hear is what the convictions were and the relevant dates, nothing relating to the underlying offense.70
This Court has found briefer analyses sufficient as well. For example, in Baldwin v. State,71 this Court found no abuse of discretion
I believe the probative value of knowing he is nоt pristine, if you will, goes to his credibility in a case where credibility is a significant factor. So I think the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect, or unfair prejudicial effect72
In this case, an explanation of the trial court‘s conclusion that the
But even if we were to conclude that the trial court‘s explanation of its balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect was inadequate or that its ruling was erroneous, any such error did not seriously prejudice the defense.73 Strickland was convicted of PFBPP and PFABPP. In its case in chief, the State relied on the
surveillance-video evidence, officer testimony, and Strickland‘s “abandonment of the white Nissan containing his driver‘s license, change of clothes, and the location of the wet white tank top and muddy shoes inside Strickland‘s nearby residence.”74 Strickland presented only one witness in his defense, Walker, who testified that Strickland was with him at the time of the incident and that he did not have or shoot a gun. Walker was a critical witness for Strickland, but the court properly admitted his 2018 firearms-related felony conviction; the other firearm-related convictions, which were part of the same 2018 prosecution, were unlikely to influence the jury‘s assessment of Walker‘s veracity. The jury, moreover, was alsо aware that Walker and Strickland were “lifelong friends.”75 Thus the admission of two other felony firearms convictions likely “added little to the impeachment mix.”76 Considering these factors, we conclude that the admission of the challenged convictions does not warrant reversal.
III
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Superior Court‘s judgments of conviction.