Strauss v. StraussStrauss v. Strauss
The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his postjudgment motion to vacate a series of orders finding him in contempt for his failure to comply with the parties’ separation agreement, which had been incorporated into the judgment of dissolution. The plaintiff filed two motions for contempt in 2014, alleging that the defendant failed to comply with the court‘s orders that had been issued in response to her fifteen prior motions for contempt. The defendant failed to аppear for a hearing on the 2014 motions, and the court found him in contempt for his failure to provide to the plaintiff his life insurance information, to pay child support, to contribute to certain required expenses and to pay her attorney‘s fees. At a subsequent hearing, the court incarcerated the defendant for one week for his failure to purge the contempt. After a third hearing in 2014, the court found that the defendant was still in contempt and issued additional orders, from which the defendant neither appealed nor filed a motion to reargue. In 2019, the plaintiff filed another motion for contempt. In 2020, the defendant filed a motion to vacate the 2014 contempt orders, arguing that the orders were issued, and he was incarceratеd, in violation of his constitutional rights because he was absent from the initial 2014 hearing due to a serious heart condition. The court denied the motion to vacate, concluding that it lacked the authority to overturn a judgment of contempt rendered five years previously when the defendant alleged the court committed error in its judgment. Thereafter, the court denied the defendant‘s motion to stay the trial court proceedings during the pendency of this appeal. Held:
1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that it did not have the authority to vacate the 2014 contempt orders, which was based on his claim that a court retains inherent equitable authority to vacate a contempt order beyond the four month deadline imposed by the applicable statute (
2. This court declined to review the defendant‘s claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion to stay the proceedings during the pendency of this appeal; the defendant‘s claim was not properly before this court because the defendant failed to file a motion for review of the trial court‘s decision pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (
ELGO, J. The defendant, Mark E. Strauss, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his postjudgment motion to vacate a series of orders finding him in contempt for his failure to comply with a separation agreement that he entered into with the plaintiff, Tami G. Strauss, in connection with the underlying judgment dissolving their marriage. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that it lacked authority to vacate its prior contempt orders, and (2) denied his motion to stay the trial court proceedings during the pendency of this appeal. We affirm the judgmеnt of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In September, 2006, the court dissolved the marriage of the parties. The court incorporated into the judgment of dissolution the parties’ comprehensive separation agreement (agreement). With respect to the parties’ daughter, who was born in 2000, the agreement required that the defendant pay to the plaintiff weekly child support and to contribute a percentage of expenses, including day care, summer camp, insurance, and unreimbursed medical expenses. The agreement also required the defendant to maintain life insurance, naming the plaintiff as trustee and their daughter as the benеficiary, and to furnish proof of this insurance to the plaintiff at her request, no more than twice annually.
Between 2007 and 2011, the parties engaged in a protracted contest regarding their obligations pursuant to the agreement, which resulted in more than 100 docket entries. During that time period, the plaintiff filed at least fifteen motions for contempt requesting that the defendant comply with his obligations pursuant to the agreement. The court granted relief with respect to at least five of the plaintiff‘s motions for contempt and ordered, inter alia, that the defendant provide to the plaintiff (1) past due child support, day care expenses, camp expenses, health insurance premiums, unreimbursed medical expenses, (2) proof of life insurance, and (3) attorney‘s fees incurred in the prosecution of the motions. The case then was dormant for three years.
On April 9, 2014, the plaintiff filed another motion for contempt in which she outlined the extensive procedural history of the case and contended that the defendant had failed to comply with the court‘s prior orders issued in response to her fifteen prior motions for contempt. As for relief, the plaintiff requested that the court order the defendant to pay her $112,573.53, which amount represented past due child support, day care expenses, camp expenses, health insurance premiums, unreimbursed medical expenses, and attorney‘s fees. The plaintiff also requested that the defendant be ordered tо provide her with proof of life insurance, and
On June 30, 2014, the court held a hearing on the plaintiff‘s motion for contempt. At the hearing, the defendant requested a brief continuance so that he could retain counsel,1 and so that he could produce an updated financial affidavit because his financial situation was, in his view, ‘‘particularly complex . . . .‘’ The court orally granted the defendant‘s request and continued the hearing on the motion for contempt to August 4, 2014. Also on June 30, 2014, the court issued an order requiring the defendant to pay child support by immediate wage withholding, produce certain financial documents to the plaintiff, and provide an updated financial affidavit by July 14, 2014. On July 25, 2014, the plaintiff filed another motion for contempt on the ground that the defendant failed to provide anything to the plaintiff in violation of the court‘s June 30, 2014 order. After several continuances at the request of the defendant, the court scheduled the hearing on the plaintiff‘s April 9 and July 25, 2014 motions for contempt for September 2, 2014, at 9:30 a.m.
Only the plaintiff and her counsel appeared at the September 2, 2014 hearing.2 At the hearing, the plaintiff testified that the defendant had failed to comply with the terms of the agreement and the court‘s previous contempt orders. The plaintiff also testified that the defendant did not provide any documents in response to the court‘s June 30, 2014 order. On the same date, the court issued a written order finding the dеfendant in contempt for his failure to provide to the plaintiff his life insurance information, to pay child support, to contribute the required childcare expenses, and to pay her attorney‘s fees. The court ordered the defendant to be incarcerated, but it stayed the order for three weeks, until September 22, 2014, to provide the defendant an opportunity to purge the full amount that he owed to the plaintiff, $145,578.36.
On September 22, 2014, both parties appeared for a hearing to determine whether the defendant had purged the contempt. The defendant explained that he was unable to attend the September 2, 2014 hearing and offered to present medical documents supporting his absence. The court said it would ‘‘make a note of it,‘’ incarcerated the defendant because he failed to satisfy the purge amount, set his bond at $10,000, and continued the matter for one week.
On September 29, 2014, after the defendant had been incarcerated for one week, the parties appeared for another hearing. The defendant requested that the court lift the bond so that he could be released from incarceration and have time to speak to an attorney and to negotiate a payment schedule to settle his outstanding arrearage. The court did not modify its finding of contempt, but it lifted the bond and continued the matter for fifteen
On October 14, 2014, the parties again appeared before the court. At the hearing, the defendant provided to the plaintiff $1000 as a contribution toward the arrearage and presented satisfactory proof that he maintained life insurance. The defendant explained that, despite his poor financial circumstances, he actively was seeking employment and offered to prospectively pay the plaintiff $1000 per month to satisfy the arrearage. The defendant also entered into evidence a letter authоred by his physician, which explained his cardiovascular condition. See footnote 2 of this opinion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the defendant was still in contempt due to his inadequate efforts to contribute toward the substantial arrearage that he owed to the plaintiff. The court additionally ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $1248.20 per month. The defendant did not file an appeal from or a motion to reargue the court‘s September 2, 22, and 29, and October 14, 2014 contempt orders (collectively, 2014 contempt orders).
Approximately five years later, on September 13, 2019, the plaintiff filed another motion for contempt contending that the defendant had failed and refused to remit the $1248.20 monthly paymеnts to her. The plaintiff represented that the outstanding amount totaled $222,205.71, which accounted for sporadic payments made by the defendant. On January 22, 2020, the defendant filed an opposition contending that the plaintiff could not prove that he wilfully violated any of the court‘s orders.
On January 22, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to vacate the court‘s 2014 contempt orders. The defendant argued that the 2014 contempt orders were issued, and he was incarcerated for one week, in violation of his constitutional rights because he was absent from the September 2, 2014 hearing due to a serious heart condition.
On January 22, 2020, the court heard arguments on the defendant‘s motion to vacate.4 The plaintiff‘s counsel argued that the court should deny the mоtion to vacate because the court lacked the authority to vacate the 2014 contempt orders on the basis that those orders were entered more than five years ago, well beyond the four month time limitation for opening or setting aside a judgment pursuant to General Statutes
On February 11, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to reargue the court‘s decision denying his motion to vacate. The defendant argued that the court has inherent authority to vacate the 2014 contempt orders as part of its power to vindicate prior judgments. The plaintiff filed an objection, arguing that the court should deny the motion to reargue because there was no basis to vacate the 2014 contempt orders five years after they were entered. After a hearing, on September 28, 2020, the court granted the defendant‘s motion to reargue and vacated its January 22, 2020 order denying the defendant‘s motion to vacate. The cоurt stated that, ‘‘[u]pon reconsideration, the court agrees with the defendant that the court does have jurisdiction and continuing inherent authority to modify or vacate prior findings and rulings entered to enforce the court‘s judgments.‘’ Accordingly, the court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the defendant‘s motion to vacate for October 27, 2020, which was continued to May 26, 2021.
Prior to that scheduled hearing, the court issued a memorandum of decision, dated April 28, 2021, in which it denied the defendant‘s motion to vacate.6 The court concluded that it lacked the ‘‘authority to overturn and rehear a judgment of contempt rendered five years previously when the contemnor alleges the court committed error in the judgment.‘’ The court reasoned that the remedy fоr the defendant to challenge the 2014 contempt orders was to file an appeal, a motion to reargue, or a timely motion to open those orders in 2014. The court further held that, although there are statutes that permit the opening and modification of judgments in the ‘‘family law arena‘‘—General Statutes
During the pendency of this appeal, on February 24, 2022, the defendant filed with the trial court a motion to stay, pursuant to Practice Book
On May 17, 2022, the trial court, after hearing arguments from both parties, orally denied the defendant‘s motion to stay. The court reasoned that an automatic stay did not apply because Practice Book
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked authority to vacate the 2014 contempt orders. Specifically, the defendant argues that, although
We begin with the standard of review and relevant legal principles. Whether the trial court had the authority to vacate a judgment is a question of law over which we exercise plenary review. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Treglia, 156 Conn. App. 1, 9, 111 A.3d 524 (2015); East Haven Builders Supply, Inc. v. Fanton, 80 Conn. App. 734, 737, 837 A.2d 866 (2004).
‘‘Generally, courts recognize a compelling interest in the finality of judgments which should not lightly be disregarded. Finality of litigation is essential so that parties may rely on judgments in ordering their private affairs and so that the moral force of court judgments will not be undermined. The law favors finality of judgments . . . . This court has emphasized that due consideration of the finality of judgments is important and that judgments should only be set aside or opened for a strong and compelling reason. . . . It is in the interest of the public as well as that of the parties [that] there must be fixed a time after the expiration of which the controversy is to be regarded as settled and the parties freed of obligation to act further in the matter by virtue of having been summoned into or having appeared in the case. . . . Without such a rule, no judgment could be relied on.‘’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 180 Conn. App. 818, 828, 184 A.3d 1254 (2018).
‘‘Although it is undisputed that courts of general jurisdiction have the inherent power to open, correct, or modify their own judgments, the duration of this power is restricted by statute and rule of practice.‘’ (Emphasis
In the present case, the defendant filed his motion to vacate in January, 2020, more than five years after the 2014 contempt orders he sought to vacate. Recognizing that his motion to vacate was filed far beyond the four month limitation, the defendant argues that a trial court retains authority to vacate a judgment beyond the four month limitation on two different grounds.9 First, he contends that a trial court retains authority to vacate a contempt order at any point in time. Second, he argues that a trial court has inherent equitable authority to vacate a contempt order so as to vindicate an underlying dissolution decree.
With respect to his first argument, the defendant relies exclusively on a quotation from Eric S. v. Tiffany S., 143 Conn. App. 1, 9, 68 A.3d 139 (2013), in which this court stated: ‘‘After a finding of civil contempt, the court retains jurisdiction to vacate the finding or to give the contemnor the opportunity to purge the contempt by later compliance with a court order.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., quoting Monsam v. Dearington, 82 Conn. App. 451, 456–57, 844 A.2d 927 (2004). We do not read this quotation, in isolation, as extending a court‘s continuing authority to vacate a contempt order, in perpetuity, on the basis that the contemnor contends they improperly were found in contempt. Instead, reading Eric S. and Monsam together, this quotation properly is understood as affording a trial court limited continuing authority to vacate an order of civil contempt on the specific ground that the contemnor has purged the contempt.
It is logical that a trial court would retain limited continuing authority to vacate a contempt order to permit the contemnor the opportunity to purge the contempt because a purge of contempt does not automatically vacate a contempt order. ‘‘[A] finding of contempt is not necessarily vacated because the violator has purged himself. On the contrary, a contempt finding has cоllateral consequences, even when no longer active, unless or until it is vacated or rendered invalid.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Clark, 113 Conn. App. 611, 619, 967 A.2d 1222 (2009); see also Kendall v. Pilkington, 253 Conn. 264, 278 n.7, 750 A.2d 1090 (2000). ‘‘Although it could do so, a court is not required, however, to vacate its judgment after a contemnor has purged himself or herself of the contemptuous acts.‘’ Hall v. Hall, 182 Conn. App. 736, 755 n.11, 191 A.3d 182 (2018), aff‘d, 335 Conn. 377, 238 A.3d 687 (2020).
Here, the defendant, in his motion to vacate, did not seek to vacate the 2014 contempt orders because he had purged his contempt but, rather, because the court improperly found him in contempt. Therefore, the defendant‘s motion did not fall within the court‘s continuing authority to vacate a contempt order pursuant to Eric S. and Monsam. The defendant has provided us with no authority, and we have found none, extending a court‘s continuing authority to vacаte a contempt order in perpetuity on the basis that the contemnor contends that he improperly was found in contempt. This court, in fact, has previously held to the contrary. See, e.g., CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 38 Conn. App. 745, 749, 662 A.2d 1340 (1995) (trial court lacked authority to vacate sanctions order stemming from motion for contempt three years after finding of contempt because parties did not waive provisions of
With respect to his second argument, the defendant is correct that a trial court has continuing authority to effectuate its prior judgments. ‘‘[T]he trial court‘s continuing jurisdiction to effectuate its prior judgments, either by summarily ordering compliance with a clear judgment or by interpreting an ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate the judgment as interpreted, is grounded in its inherent powers, and is not limited to cases wherein the noncompliant party is in contempt, family cases, cases involving injunctions, or cases wherein the parties have agreed to continuing jurisdiction.‘’ AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 260 Conn. 232, 246, 796 A.2d 1164 (2002). ‘‘Although ordinarily our trial courts lack jurisdiction to act in a case after the passage of four months . . . there are exceptions. One exception arises when the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to effectuate prior judgments or otherwise enforceable ordеrs.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Veneziano v. Veneziano, 205 Conn. App. 718, 728, 259 A.3d 28 (2021); see also Tracey v. Miami Beach Assn., 216 Conn. App. 379, 397, 288 A.3d 629 (2022) (trial court has equitable powers to fashion whatever orders are required to protect integrity of earlier judgment), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 919, 291 A.3d 1040 (2023).
Conversely, a trial court‘s continuing authority to effectuate its judgments beyond the four month period does not permit it to substantively modify or correct its prior judgments. See, e.g., Almeida v. Almeida, 190 Conn. App. 760, 765, 213 A.3d 28 (2019). ‘‘This court has explained the difference between postjudgment orders that modify a judgment rather than effectuate it. A modification is [a] change; an alteration or amendment which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter intact. . . . In contrast, an order effectuating an existing judgment allows the court tо protect the integrity of its original ruling by ensuring the parties’ timely compliance therewith.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Walzer v. Walzer, 209 Conn. App. 604, 615, 268 A.3d 1187, cert. denied, 342 Conn. 907, 270 A.3d 693 (2022); see also Cunningham v. Cunningham, 204 Conn. App. 366, 374, 254 A.3d 330 (2021).
In sum, if the defendant wanted to challengе the court‘s 2014 contempt orders, his remedy was to file a timely appeal, a timely motion to reargue, or a motion to open or vacate within the four months following the 2014 contempt orders. The defendant having forgone those options, the trial court lacked the authority to vacate those orders on the ground that it had five years earlier improperly found the defendant in contempt. We therefore conclude that the court properly denied the defendant‘s motion to vacate.
II
The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to stay the trial court proceedings during the pendency of this appeal. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court improperly concluded that there was no automatic appellate stay in effect pursuant to Practice Book
‘‘Pursuant to Practice Book
As outlined previously, on February 24, 2022, the defendant filed with the trial court a motion to stay pursuant to Practice Book
Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that the defendant improperly presented this issue for resolution on direct appeal because he failed to file a motion for review of the trial court‘s decision denying his motion to stay. See, e.g., U.S. Bank, National Assn. v. Bennett, 195 Conn. App. 96, 110 n.4, 223 A.3d 381 (2019); Lawrence v. Cords, 165 Conn. App. 473, 479–80, 139 A.3d 778, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 907, 140 A.3d 221 (2016); Clark v. Clark, 150 Conn. App. 551, 576, 91 A.3d 944 (2014). In his appellate reply brief, the defendant characterizes his motion to stay not as a request for an appellate stay but, instead, as a request that the court continue a hearing on the plaintiff‘s September 13, 2019 motion for contempt until after this appeal concluded. This characterization is belied by the relief sought in his motion to stay and the appellate claims in his principal appellate brief challenging the court‘s actions regarding the appellate stay. We therefore decline to review his claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
According to a memorandum to the trial court file authored by a temporary assistant clerk, the defendant called to inform the caseflow coordinator on the morning of the September 2, 2014 hearing that he would not be in attendance because he suffered a cardiovascular event that required emergency medical treatment. At 9:32 a.m., the caseflow coordinator conveyed the defendant‘s message to the clerk via email, however, the clerk did not read the email until noon during a recess. The clerk then informed the court of the defendant‘s message, but the matter already had been heard and the orders already had been issued.
At a hearing on October 14, 2014, the defendant entered into evidence a letter authored by the defendant‘s physician, Robert Labarre, of Cardiology Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC, addressing the defendant‘s cardiovascular condition. The letter explained that, on August 5, 2014, the defendant was sent from his oral surgeon‘s office to Stamford Hospital because he had very low blood pressure, and was near syncope, sweaty, and feeling dizzy. On the morning of September 2, 2014, the defendant called his physician before admitting himself to Stamford Hospital because he was suffering from similar conditions to those he experienced on August 5, 2014. The defendant then proceeded to the Cardiology Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC, where an echocardiogram revealed a severe left ventricular outflow obstruction, and that his blood pressure was significantly elevated. The defendant was discharged with instructions to take prescribed medication, go home, rest, and not to drive.