Keith STODDARD v. David WYNN, et al.
Civil Action No. 13-889 (RMC)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
September 19, 2014
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, United States District Judge
108 F. Supp. 3d 108
OPINION
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, United States District Judge
Keith Stoddard was on parole for a
Mr. Stoddard sues Commission staff members David Wynn and Jequan S. Jackson, in their individual capacities, alleging that they were notified that the warrant had been executed erroneously and they failed to take immediate action to obtain his release. He asserts that they are liable for false imprisonment and violating his Fifth Amendment rights. He brings his constitutional claims pursuant to
Keith Oliver Stoddard, Washington, DC, pro se.
I. FACTS
Because Mr. Stoddard is proceeding pro se, his Complaint is construed liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); United States v. Byfield, 391 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C.Cir.2004). The facts are taken from Mr. Stoddard‘s Complaint [Dkt. 1], Amendment to Complaint [Dkt. 9], and Appendix [Dkt. 10].
Mr. Stoddard was arrested and charged with DUI in Virginia on March 23, 2011. At that time, he was a
In May 2011, D.C. Public Defender Parisa Dehghani-Tafti contacted David Wynn at the U.S. Parole Commission and informed Mr. Wynn that Mr. Stoddard had been mistakenly scheduled for a preliminary interview, when a probable cause and revocation hearing was required. Ms. Dehghani-Tafti emailed the Commission:
I write because it has come to my attention that Mr. Stoddard was arrested on a USPC [U.S. Parole Commission] warrant in April, but, rather than being scheduled for a probable cause hearing, he appears to have mistakenly been scheduled for a preliminary interview at an undetermined time. It is my understanding that Mr. Stoddard is nоt on federal parole, but rather, is a DC Code offender. I would be grateful if the USPC would review the file to ensure that Mr. Stoddard receives the appropriate process in the appropriate time frame.
Pl. Supp. Mem. [Dkt. 23], Ex. 3 (Email May 24, 2011). Mr. Wynn forwarded the matter to Case Analyst Jackson for review. Id., Ex. 5 (Email May 26, 2011). Ms. Dehghani-Tafti wrote to Mr. Stoddard, indicating that she alerted the Commission to the fact that his case may be “on the wrong рrocedural track“; the case would be reviewed by a case analyst; and she hoped it would be placed on the “probable cause docket very soon.” Id., Ex. 3 (Letter May 27, 2011). Based on this correspondence, Mr. Stoddard alleges that Mr. Wynn “acknowledged the error.” Compl. at 4. No hearing was ever scheduled.
After more than ten weeks in jail, Mr. Stoddard was released on July 6, 2011. He asserts that “I was only release[d] through the motivation of the ‘show cause’ order issued through the Writ of Habeas Corpus filed June 6, 2011.” Pl. Supp.
Mr. Stoddard claims that the improper detention caused him severe emotional distress and cost him his job and school enrollment. He sues here, alleging false imprisonment and a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights, which he asserts pursuant to both
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Lack of Jurisdiction
Defendants move to dismiss, in part, based on sovereign immunity. Where claims are barred by sovereign immunity, they must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Watters v. WMATA, 295 F.3d 36, 39-40 (D.C.Cir.2002).
Pursuant to
B. Failure to State a Claim
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to
III. ANALYSIS
When a plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by an official who acted under color of State or D.C. law, he may sue the оfficial in his personal capacity for money damages under
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Thus, the threshold question is whether Defendants acted under color of federal law or D.C. law when they failed to take action to obtain Mr. Stoddard‘s release. While the U.S. Parole Commission is a federal entity, the Commission acts pursuant to D.C. law when it deals with D.C. prisoners who are on parole. The D.C. Board of Parole used to manage D.C. parolees, but in 1997 Congress transferred the D.C. Board of Parole‘s authority to the U.S. Parole Commission. See
Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate this suit because sovereign immunity applies. See Watters, 295 F.3d at 39-40. In making this argument, they rely heavily on Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 481 F.Supp.2d 156 (D.D.C.2007), vacated in part on reh‘g, 550 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C.2008), and Anderson v. Reilly, 691 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C.2010). The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that the Federal Government can be sued only insofar as it has agreed to be sued. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” Id. Sovereign immunity also bаrs suit for money damages against federal officials in their official capacities absent a specific waiver by the Federal Government. Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 102-04 (D.C.Cir.1984).
It is true that the Commission itself is an arm of the Federal Government and thus is entitled to sovereign immunity. See Fletcher, 481 F.Supp.2d at 162 (quoting Settles, 429 F.3d at 1106 (“Despite its role in administering parole for D.C.Code offenders, the Commission retains the immunity it is due as an arm of the federal sovereign.“)). Further, sovereign immunity bars a suit for money damages against Commissioners in their official capacities; in an official-capacity suit against Commissioners, remedies are limited to injunctive and declaratory relief. See Fletcher, 481 F.Supp.2d at 162-63 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)); Anderson v. Reilly, 691 F.Supp.2d at 92. However, Mr. Stoddard has not sued the Commission here and he has not sued the Commissioners in their official capacities. His suit lies against Defendants in their individual capacities.
Mr. Stoddard does not complain that Ms. Jackson issued an arrest warrant or that she issued the memorandum to hold the warrant in abeyance. And he does not blame Ms. Jackson or Mr. Wynn for the fact that the directive to hold the warrant in abeyance was not followed and he was taken into custody when he turned himself in on April 22, 2011. His claim is that Mr. Wynn and Ms. Jackson were notified expressly that he was being held erroneously in D.C. Jail, that they did nothing to obtain his release, and that he was not released until July 6, over ten weeks later.
Mr. Stoddard alleges that Defendants’ failure to act violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment was intended to secure the individual from arbitrary exercises of governmental power. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). It encompasses both substantive and procedural components. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must establish that he had a protected interest in life, libеrty, or property, see Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005), and that government officials knowingly, and not merely negligently, deprived him of that interest, see Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335-36, 106 S.Ct. 662, without notice and an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).3 An indi-
To state a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must assert that a government official was so “deliberately indifferent” to his сonstitutional rights that the official‘s conduct “shocks the conscience.” Estate of Phillips v. District of Columbia, 455 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C.Cir.2006); see also Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (government conduct must have been “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience“).
In sum, Mr. Stoddard alleges that Defendants violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights through inaction, under color of D.C. law. The Revitalization Act required the Commission to apply D.C. law to D.C.Code offenders, see Anderson v. Reilly, 691 F.Supp.2d at 91, and thus Commission employees may be sued, in their individual capacities, under
An official protected by qualified immunity enjoys “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” which is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original). Thus, questions of immunity are matters of law for a court to decide as early in thе proceedings as possible. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151. In this case however, the record lacks sufficient material facts regarding Defendants’ actions and/or omissions with regard to Mr. Stoddard‘s erroneous detention. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground of qualified immunity will be denied without prejudice.
Mr. Stoddard also asserts a tort claim for false imprisonment against Defendants in their individual capacities under D.C. law. See Amendment to Compl. at 1-2. The claim is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. See
If Mr. Stoddard‘s tort claim were construed as one against the Commission, the Commissioners in their official capacity, or the Commissioners in their individual capacities but within the scope of their employment,5 the claim is barred by sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
Mr. Stoddard‘s prior FTCA claims against the Commission and Chairman Fulwood were dismissed due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Stoddard v. U.S. Parole Comm‘n, Civ. No. 12-857(JEB) (D.D.C.) (Op. & Order Oct. 26, 2012) (citing GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 904–05 (D.C.Cir.1987) (administrative exhaustion is a mаndatory prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction)). Mr. Stoddard asserts that he has now exhausted remedies. See Amendment to Compl. at 1-2 (on December 13, 2012, Mr. Stoddard submitted a completed SF-95 administrative complaint to the Department of Justice).
Despite exhaustion, his claim is barred by sovereign immunity because FTCA‘s limited waiver of immunity does not cover claims against Commission employees for false imprisonment. The intentionаl tort exception to the FTCA bars “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.”
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Dkt. 17] will be granted in part and denied in part. The false imprisonment and Bivens claims will be dismissed. The
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
United States District Judge