In The Matter of the Driver‘s License Suspension of Steven Leslie Williams. Steven Leslie WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Department of Transportation, Respondent.
No. 39122
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
July 30, 2012
283 P.3d 127
discuss or weigh the Barker factors in reaching its decision.
Our Supreme Court‘s non-application of the Barker factors, other than the reason for the delay, in Clark and Young is significant. We take this to mean that where the reason for the delay is well defined, and that reason on its face clearly does, or clearly does not, constitute good cause, there is no occasion to consider the other Barker factors in assessing a claimed violation of
We also conclude that good cause clearly was not demonstrated in this case. The reason for the delay was the magistrate court‘s error in determining the deadline for a trial date within the statutory period.2 If, as our Supreme Court held in Clark, a trial court‘s overcrowded trial calendar does not constitute good cause, then the mistake that occurred here, which might properly be characterized as negligence, cannot amount to good cause justifying the delay of a defendant‘s trial beyond the
Therefore, the district court‘s appellate decision reversing the magistrate‘s order of dismissal is reversed, and the magistrate‘s order of dismissal is reinstated.
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON concur.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise; Susan K. Servick, Special Deputy Attorney General, Coeur d‘Alene, for respondent.
GRATTON, Chief Judge.
Steven Leslie Williams appeals from the district court‘s decision upon judicial review affirming the Idaho Transportation Department‘s (ITD) order disqualifying Williams from holding a commercial driver‘s license (CDL) following his conviction for driving under the influence (DUI). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 12, 2010, Williams was arrested for his second DUI. Both offenses occurred while Williams was driving a noncommercial vehicle. Due to the offenses, ITD notified Williams of a lifetime disqualification of his CDL. Williams timely requested an administrative hearing.
The hearing officer upheld the lifetime disqualification. Williams filed a petition for judicial review with the district court and the district court affirmed ITD‘s final order. Williams timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Williams argues that the administrative disqualification of his CDL, pursuant to
The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA) governs the review of ITD decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person‘s driver‘s license. See
This Court may overturn an agency‘s decision where its findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency‘s statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
A. Double Jeopardy
Williams argues that he was subjected, in consecutive prosecutions, to multiple convictions and punishments for the same offense. Whether a defendant‘s prosecution complies with the constitutional protection against being placed twice in jeopardy is a question of law over whiсh we exercise free review. State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct.App.2000). We initially note that Williams does not claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho Constitution provides any broader protection than that of the United States Constitution. Therefore, we will analyze this claim under the double jeopardy provisions of the United States Constitution. See State v. Talavera, 127 Idaho 700, 703, 905 P.2d 633, 636 (1995); State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 624, 38 P.3d 1275, 1280 (Ct.App.2001). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The clause affords
Williams argues that he was subjected to multiple convictions and punishments for the same offense because, although civil in nature, the lifetime CDL disqualification is so punitive in form and effect as to be transformed into a criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes. In 1995, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a defendant who was convicted of DUI and whose driver‘s license was subsequently suspended for ninety days pursuant to
In Buell v. Idaho Dep‘t of Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (Ct.App.2011), this Court analyzed a one-year CDL disqualification in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court establishing a new framework for double jeopardy claims. This Court stated:
Subsequent case law has, however, called the analytical method utilized in Talavera into question. In conducting its analysis, the Talavera Court relied almost exclusively on United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997). Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, “a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.” Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 501-02.
In 1997, however, the United States Supreme Court disavowed the double jeopardy analysis used in Halper. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101-02, 118 S.Ct. at 494-95, 139 L.Ed.2d at 460-61. In Hudson, the United States Supreme Court held that Halper‘s deviation from traditional double jeopardy doctrine was ill-considered and that its test had proved unworkable. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101-02, 118 S.Ct. at 494-95, 139 L.Ed.2d at 460-61. The Hudson Court substituted a multi-part test for determining whether a civil sanction rises to the level of punishment for double jeopardy purposes. First, a court must ask whether the legislature indicated either expressly or impliedly that the statute should be considered criminal or civil in nature. Id. at 99, 118 S.Ct. at 493, 139 L.Ed.2d at 458-59. In cases where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, there must be further inquiry to determine whether the statutory scheme was so punitive as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminаl penalty. Id. In making this determination, the court should consider the following factors, including whether: (1) the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) the sanction has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) the sanction comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) the sanction‘s operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment, retribution, and deterrence;
(5) the behavior to which the sanction applies is already criminal; (6) an alternative purpose to which the sanction may rationally be connected is assignable to it; and (7) the sanction appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id. at 99-100, 118 S.Ct. at 493-94, 139 L.Ed.2d at 458-60. Buell argues that, rather than follow Halper and Talavera, we should employ the analysis used in Hudson. Because Talavera relied almost exclusively on Halper and because Halper has been abrogated by Hudson, we will apply the Hudson analysis in this case. Buell, at 261-62, 254 P.3d at 1257-58 (internal footnotes omitted). The Buell Court held that “[b]ased on the Hudson factors, . . . a оne-year CDL disqualification is civil in nature and does not rise to the level of a criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes.” Id. at 264, 254 P.3d at 1260.
However, the analysis in Buell does not end our inquiry because Williams argues that the lifetime disqualification, as opposed to a one-year disqualification, is a far more punitive sanction than a year-long disqualification. Therefore, we will apply the Hudson factors to the lifetime disqualification of
Under Hudson, we must first determine whether the Idaho legislature intended for the lifetime CDL disqualification under
Nevertheless, we must also inquire whether the statutory scheme governing the lifetime CDL disqualification imposed upon Williams was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. To make this determination, we must weigh the seven factors laid out in Hudson. It is important to note that these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face and that only the clearest proоf will suffice to transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100, 118 S.Ct. at 493-94, 139 L.Ed.2d at 459-60. First, we note that the disqualification of a CDL pursuant to
Second, we must consider whether driver‘s license suspensions have been regarded as punishment. Idaho appellate courts have not viewed driver‘s license suspensions as punishment, no matter the length of the suspension. See Talavera, 127 Idaho at 705, 905 P.2d at 638; Buell, 151 Idaho at 263, 254 P.3d at 1259; McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 623, 38 P.3d at 1279; State v. Gusman, 125 Idaho 810, 812-13, 874 P.2d 1117, 1119-20 (Ct.App.1993). See also United States v. Roberts, 845 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1988). Therefore, we hold that a CDL disqualification has not historically been regаrded as punishment.
Third, we must consider whether a lifetime CDL disqualification comes into play only on a finding of scienter. Under
Fourth, we must consider whether the behavior attached to the lifetime CDL disqualification is already a crime. We note that the conduct sanctioned in the instant case is also criminalized by
Fifth, we must consider whether a lifetime CDL disqualification promotes the traditional aims of punishment, retribution, and deterrence. The Court in State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 5, 704 P.2d 333, 337 (1985), held that while a driver does have a substantial right in his or her driver‘s license, the State‘s interest in preventing intoxicated persons from driving far outweighs the individual‘s interest, especially because the individual is entitled to a prompt post-seizure hearing. This holding suppоrts the conclusion that the State has a strong remedial and nonpunitive reason for suspending or disqualifying drivers’ licenses. We recognize that a lifetime CDL disqualification will have a deterrent effect, which is a traditional goal of criminal punishment. We also acknowledge that a lifetime ban will have a stronger deterrent effect than that of a one-year disqualification. However, deterrence may serve civil as well as criminal goals. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105, 118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462-63; McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 624, 38 P.3d at 1280. For example, the sanctions at issue here, while intended to deter future wrongdoing, also serve to provide for the safety of the public-at-large. To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose rеnders such sanctions criminal for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the State‘s ability to engage in effective regulation of driver‘s licenses. Therefore, we hold the mere presence of a deterrent effect is insufficient to render a lifetime CDL disqualification criminal.
Sixth, we must consider whether there is a purpose, other than punishment, that could be assigned to the lifetime CDL disqualification and whether the disqualification is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it. As noted above, the purpose of
Williams argues that the lifetime disqualification “is far more punitive in extent and impact than even the suspension of a class D driver‘s license.” According to Williams, a lifetime CDL disqualification is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it. Williams does not cite to any case for this contention. Understandably, the lifetime CDL disqualification is more significant than the one-year disqualification because lifetime disqualifications arise from two violations, whereas one-year disqualifications occur after one violation. Although the lifetime disqualification is significantly greater than that of the one-yeаr disqualification, we cannot say it is excessive in relation to the overall purpose of protecting public safety. A second offense is cause for significantly greater concern for public safety. Moreover,
B. Void for Vagueness
Williams claims that
Due process requires that all be informed as to whаt the State commands or forbids and that persons of ordinary intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the law. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247-48, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612-13 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998). The void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to statutes employing civil sanctions for violations, but greater tolerance is permitted when addressing a civil or non-criminal statute as opposed to a criminal statute. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193-94, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371-72 (1982); Cowan v. Board of Comm‘rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 513-14, 148 P.3d 1247, 1259-60 (2006).
Williams argues that he was not adequately notified of the consequences of submitting to the tests as required by
This issue was recently addressed, in part, by the Idaho Supreme Court in Wanner v. ITD [State, Dep‘t of Transp.], 150 Idaho 164, 244 P.3d 1250 (2011), wherein the Idaho Supreme Court held that a
§ 18-8002A suspension governs driving privileges in toto, while anI.C. § 49-335 suspension applies to a particular subset of driving privileges, i.e. the right to operate a commercial vehicle. Further the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed a similar argument in Buell, supra. There, Buell argued that his due process rights were violated becauseI.C. §§ 18-8002 ,18-8002A , and49-335 are ambiguous and did not adequately notify him of when his CDL disqualification would begin. The Idaho Court of Appeals held thatI.C. §§ 18-8002 and18-8002A are criminal statutes and address suspension of non-commercial licenses. Further,I.C. § 49-335 prescribes additional consequences that result from a motorist‘s refusal to take or the failure of an evidentiary test. The Buell court held that a disqualification underI.C. § 49-335 is in addition to a suspension underI.C. §§ 18-8002 and18-8002A .
A holder of a CDL is presumed to have knowledge of the laws governing CDLs. Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 1205, 1211 (Ct.App.2000). Williams argues that at no time was he informed that his CDL would be suspended for his lifetime if he failed the breath testing. The record shows that Williams was provided the required notifications as required by
Williams was presumed to know that the disqualification of his CDL was in addition to any suspensions he received under
This Court finds that
Whеn called upon to interpret a statute, we begin with an examination of its literal words. State, Dep‘t of Health Welfare ex rel. Lisby v. Lisby, 126 Idaho 776, 779, 890 P.2d 727, 730 (1995); McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 628, 38 P.3d at 1284; State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct.App.2001). The statutory language is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Lisby, 126 Idaho at 779, 890 P.2d at 730. A statute is to be construed as a whole without separating one provision from another. State v. Olson, 138 Idaho 438, 440, 64 P.3d 967, 969 (Ct.App.2003). In attempting to discern and implement the intent of the legislature, a court may seek edification from the statute‘s legislative history and contemporaneous context at enactment. Id. However, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory construction. Id.
In this case, we agree with the district court that the statute‘s language specifies
Additionally,
“A person is disqualified for the period of time specified in 49 CFR part 383 if found to have committed two (2) or more of any of the offenses specified in subsection (1) or (2) of this section, or any combination of those offenses, arising from two (2) or more separate incidents.”
A person with common and ordinary intelligence would know that
C. Substantive Due Process
Williams claims that applying
In Buell, 151 Idaho at 261, 254 P.3d at 1257, this Court stated “the remedial purpose of
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Williams claims that the lifetime disqualification of his CDL is tantamount to an excessive fine or cruel and unusual punishment, or both. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Though the Excessive Finеs Clause of this amendment has
The Excessivе Fines Clause limits the government‘s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for an offense. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 2033-34, 141 L.Ed.2d 314, 325-26 (1998); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2805-06, 125 L.Ed.2d 488, 497-98 (1993). Forfeitures are payments in kind and thus, are fines if they constitute punishment for an offense. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328, 118 S.Ct. at 2033-34, 141 L.Ed.2d at 325-26. A civil sanction that cannot fairly be said to solely serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610, 113 S.Ct. at 2805-06, 125 L.Ed.2d at 497-98. If the forfeiture is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, it is unconstitutional. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337, 118 S.Ct. at 2038, 141 L.Ed.2d at 331.
In Nez Perce Cnty. Prosecuting Attorney v. Reese, 142 Idaho 893, 136 P.3d 364 (Ct.App.2006) this Court stated:
In considering the gravity of the offense, factors for courts’ consideration include the nature and extent of the crime, whether the violation was related to other criminal activities, the other penalties that may be imposed for the violation, and the extent of harm caused. See [US v.] $100,348.00 [in U.S. Currency], 354 F.3d [1110] at 1122 [(9th Cir.2004)]; [U.S. v.] Ahmad, 213 F.3d [805] at 816 [(4th Cir.2000)]; In re: 319 E. Fairgrounds Dr., 205 Ariz. 403, 71 P.3d 930, 936 (App.2003). Judgments about appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336, 118 S.Ct. at 2037, 141 L.Ed.2d at 330. Thus, among the most important factors when determining the gravity of the offense are other penalties authorized by the legislature. See [U.S. v.] Wagoner County, 278 F.3d [1091] at 1100 [(10th Cir.2002)]. Additionally, the culpability of the offender should be examined specifically instead of examining the gravity of the crime in the abstract. [U.S. v. 3814 NW] Thurman Street, 164 F.3d [1191] at 1197 [(9th Cir.1999)]. Courts may take into account the extent of both the defendant‘s and the property‘s roles in the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal operation at issue, the personal benefit reaped by the defendant, and the value of the contraband involved in the offense. See Wagoner County, 278 F.3d at 1101.
To determine the proportionality of the forfeiture, relevant factors include, but are not limited to, the fair market value of the
property, the intangible or subjective value of the property, and the hardship to the defendant. See United States v. 25445 Via Dona Christa, 138 F.3d 403, 409 (9th Cir.1998); State v. 633 East 640 North, 994 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 2000). Courts have considered the property‘s character as a residence and the effect of forfeiture on innocent occupants or children when evaluating the subjective value of the property or the harshness of the forfeiture. See [U.S. v.] 45 Claremont St., 395 F.3d [1] at 6 [(1st Cir.2004)]; [U.S. v.] Dodge Caravan, 387 F.3d [758] at 763 [(8th Cir.2004)]; 633 East 640 North, 994 P.2d at 1258-59. Courts may also take into account any other sanctions imposed upon the defendant by the sovereign seeking forfeiture. See Wagoner County, 278 F.3d at 1101. Additionally, the effect of forfeiture on the defendant‘s family or financial circumstances is relevant. See 25445 Via Dona Christa, 138 F.3d at 409; County of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 770 N.Y.S.2d 277, 802 N.E.2d 616, 622 (2003); 633 East 640 North, 994 P.2d at 1260. Reese, 142 Idaho at 899-900, 136 P.3d at 370-71.
Williams argues that the lifetime disqualification, when viewed as a civil sanction, serves only retributive and deterrent purposes. Williams also contends that the lifetime disqualification is disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, at least partially, because of the lack of a nexus between the conduct, failing a breath test twice while driving on his Class D license, and the consequence—a lifetime CDL disqualification. The district court determined that a lifetime CDL disqualification for failing two evidentiary tests was not cruel and unusual punishment. First, the district court determined that the sanction serves a remedial purpose. The district court also held that Williams’ CDL loss “does not create such an extreme hardship that it rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.” The district court noted that Williams only lost certain employment, but retains the ability to seek employment that does not involve a CDL.
We agree that the sanction serves a remedial purpose and that Williams’ CDL disqualification is not grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. DUI is a serious offense and, as such, the Idaho legislature drafted
III.
CONCLUSION
A lifetime CDL disqualification under
Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON concur.
Notes
A person is disqualified for the period of time specified in 49 CFR part 383 if found to have committed two (2) or more of any of the offenses specified in subsection (1) or (2) of this section, or any combination of those offenses, arising from two (2) or more separate incidents.