¶ 1 Lindа Cannon appeals from a trial court-ordered forfeiture of her real property located at 633 East 640 North in Orem, Utah (the “defendant property”), following her conviction for several drug-related offenses. She contends that the forfeiture violated constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and excessive fines. She also assigns as error the trial court’s taking judicial notice on remand of the final disposition of criminal proceedings arising out of two later searches of the defendant property, alleging that the trial court thereby violated her constitutional due process rights.
¶ 2 This matter is before.us for the second time. On Cannon’s previous appeal, we remanded the case to the trial court for an entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding her constitutional claims.
See State v. 633 East 640 North,
¶3 Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the forfeiture of the defendant property, valued at between $71,272.30 and $80,-000.00. Cannon subsequently appealed the *1256 forfeiture order to this court. We affirmed the trial court’s rulings; however, we remanded the case for an entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law on the constitutional challenges so that we could address the trial court’s alleged violations of Cannon’s constitutional protections against excessive fines and double jeopardy.
¶ 4 On remand, both Cannon and thе State filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; Cannon also filed a request for oral argument. The trial court denied the request for oral argument and signed the State’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, taking judicial notice of the second and third searches of the defendant property and the resolution of resultant criminal charges against her. Cannon now appeals, claiming her state and federal constitutional due process protections 2 against excessive fines 3 and double jeopardy 4 have been violated.
ANALYSIS
I. FORFEITURE AS AN “EXCESSIVE FINE”
¶ 5 Cannon contends that the trial court-ordered forfeiture of her residence violated her state and federal constitutional protections against the imposition of excessive fines. However, because Cannon fails to support her state constitutional arguments with any substantive analysis, these arguments do not warrant separate analysis under the Utah Constitution. Accоrdingly, we decide this case on the basis of the United States Constitution alone.
See State v.
¶ 6 Because the law in Utah is unsettled, our holding today sets forth the analysis for use in future forfeiture cases under the Excessive Fines Clause. In doing so, we draw upon the following cases:
United States v. Bajakajian,
¶ 7 Before turning to Cannon’s specific arguments, it is first necessary to examine the history of excessive fines analysis. The United States Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exсessive fines imposed....” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The historical foundation and reasoning behind current excessive fines analysis has been well documented elsewhere; a brief history is sufficient for our purposes here. 5
¶ 8 In
Austin v. United States,
¶ 9 Since
Austin,
“there has been little uniformity both within and between the circuits as to the appropriate test to determine excessiveness. In order to promote uniformity, it is desirable to standardize thе analysis used to determine when specific forfeitures violate the Excessive Fines Clause.” Caione,
supra
note 5 at 1095;
see also United States v. 127 & 129 Hall St.,
¶ 10 We have addressed the issue of forfeitures as excessive fines on only a few occasions. In the most recent instance — pre-
Bajakajian
— we followed the suggestion in
Austin
that “the connection between the defendant property and the offense is the beginning point, rather than the sole criterion, in determining whether a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive.”
¶ 11 Now, the
Bajakajian
opinion provides us with the second prong to our excessive fines test merely hinted at in
¶ 12 We similarly hold that the threshold test in real property forfeitures 6 is whether the defendant property is an instrumentality of the offense. If instrumentality is proven, we must then examine whether the ordered forfeiture is “grossly disproportionate” to the offense. However, because in the instant case we rest our decision on gross disproportionality, we will assume for purposes of discussion, but not decide, that the instrumentality test has been satisfied.
¶ 13 We now examine whether the forfeiture is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. In 392
South 600 East,
we stated: “As future cases present situations in which the instrumentality analysis is not dis-positive, we can address other factors that may be comprehended by an excessive fines analysis.”
¶ 14 The Bajakajian court clarified the excеssiveness analysis, rejecting strict proportionality and adopting instead a “gross disproportionality” standard, declaring:
In applying this standard, the district courts in the first instance, and the courts of appeals, reviewing the proportionality determination de novo, must compare the amount of the forfeiture to the gravity of *1258 the defendant’s offense. If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense, it is unconstitutional.
1. The test in theory
¶ 15 The individual factors
Bajakajian
set forth to determine the gravity of a specific offense are those articulated in the United States Supreme Court’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause precedents.
See Bajakajian,
¶ 16 Instead of applying a strict Solem test, however, both parties have focused on a sample list of factors we cited in Nephi. Cannon asserts that these factors show the forfeiture here was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offеnse. The State uses the same factors to contend just the opposite. 8
¶ 17 The factors that we suggested in
Ne-phi
were factors the Eighth Circuit used in its excessiveness analysis. Those factors included “ ‘the monetary value of the property, the extent of criminal activity associated with the property, the fact that the property was a residence, the effect of forfeiture on innocent occupants of the residence, including children, or any othеr factors that an excessive fines analysis might require.’ ”
(1) whether the owner was negligent or reckless in allowing the illegal use of his property; or
(2) whether the owner was directly involved in the illegal activity, and to what extent; and
(3) the harm caused by the illegal activity, including (a) (in the drug traffiсking context) the amount of drugs and their value, (b) the duration of the illegal activity, and (c) the effect on the community.
Id. at 986.
¶ 18 We believe these factors complement the
Solem
test. We realize that the judicial determination of the gravity of a particular offense, as the
Bajakajian
court indicated, is inherently subjective and imprecise. However, use of these factors in conjunction with the
Solem
test will lessen the subjectivity of the analysis, acting as effective gauges for the gravity of an offense.
9
Therefore, we hold that the
Solem
test, using the factors set forth above from
¶ 19 One additional factor is necessary to complete an excessiveness analysis: the comparative punishment factor.
“In
considering an offense’s gravity, the other penalties that the Legislature has authorized are certainly relevant evidence.”
Bajakajian,
the maximum fine and Guideline sentence to which respondent was subject were but a fraction of the penalties authorized ... undercuts any argument based solely on the statute, because they show that respondent’s culpability relative to other potential violators of the ... provision — tax evaders, drug kingpins, or money launderers, for example — is small indeed. This disproportion is telling....
Id.
at 332 n. 14,
¶ 20 Including this factor in the final test makes sense. After all, two separate individuals, convicted of an “identical” crimе may receive vastly different sentences based on inherently individualized facts. During sentencing, the defendant’s culpability is evaluated, and punitive measures are meted out accordingly. The harsher the sentence, fines, and penalties a defendant receives, the less likely it is that a forfeiture may be grossly disproportionate. If a defendant receives only a small percentage of the “maximum” possible penalty, it is more likely— although still not dispositive — that the forfeiture may be constitutionally excessive.
¶ 21 In short, a court must look at four main factors:
(1) the gravity of the particular offense;
(2) the harshness of the forfeiture;
(3) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and
(4) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
In gauging the gravity of the offense (factor (1) above), a court should take into consideration:
(a) the harm caused by the illegal activity, including (i) (in the drug trafficking context) the amount of drugs and their value, (ii) the duration of the illegal activity, and (iii) the effect on the community; and
*1260 (b) the actual sentence the defendant received as a result of the offense compared to the maximum punishments authorized.
In judging the harshness of the forfeiture (factor (2) above), a court should look at:
(a) the fair market value of the property;
(b) the intangible, subjective value of the property, e.g., whether it is the family home; and
(c) the hardship to the defendant, including the effect of the forfeiture on defendant’s family or financial condition.
2. The test as applied to the instant case
¶ 22 Factual findings made by trial courts in conducting excessiveness inquiries must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.
See Bajakajian,
¶ 23 The police seized from the defеndant property less than two pounds of marijuana in three searches within eighteen months, with a street value of approximately $7,200.00. The trial court found that “[f|or-feiture of this real property has served a remedial purpose of removing this drug house from the stream of narcotic commerce, thereby serving the public by removing a drug safehouse from its ongoing criminal use, and by cleansing the site of significant and ongoing drug distribution activities.” The trial court concluded that the “forfeiture is the result of extensive, serious conduct by the claimant [Cannon] which presented significant threat of harm and cost to society.”
¶24 We do not condone any degree of drug trafficking; we recognize the great cost the State incurs in investigating, pursuing, and convicting offenders. We also understand the broad-scale effect of drug trafficking on society. As the trial court observed: “The use and salе of controlled substances is one of the single most serious factors affecting and utilizing the resources” of the courts and the criminal justice system, both on the state and federal level. However, these findings and conclusions are not sufficient to support this forfeiture in view of other factors.
¶ 25 Measured by any standard, Cannon’s drug operation was small, involving possession of less than two pounds of marijuana for sale in an eighteen month span. The trial court apparently agreed with this assessment at the time of trial when Cannon was placed on probation, although a jury had found her guilty of three felonies and a misdemeanor on charges stemming from the first search of her home. See supra note 1. The court allowed her to remain on probation after being convicted of an additional felony resulting from the second search. Cannon’s actual fines and surcharges impоsed on charges arising out of the first and second searches 11 totaled only $4,625.00. Cannon was also subject to $5,035.10 as a tax or penalty for possessing nonstamped illegal drugs. In sum, the actual fines, surcharges, and penalties imposed amounted to $9,660.10.
¶26 The State argues that Cannon faced “maximum possible penalties” of approximately $130,425.00 and “substantial” prison time. It repeatedly stresses these “maximum possible penalties,” contending that these amounts should be used for measurement, as opposed to the actual penalties. The trial court also used these theoretical figures extensively in addressing the gravity of Cannon’s offenses in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court on remand declared simply that the “value of the property forfeited does not grossly exceed the potential fines and fees in this case.”
¶ 27 The State argues that this fаct alone shows that the forfeiture is not grossly disproportionate. However, the State does not provide any legal support for its comparison of theoretical maximum penalties with the *1261 value of the forfeited property. 12 While reference to the maximum penalties is helpful in determining the gravity of the offenses, it has limited relevance in determining proportionality. Here, the trial court placed too much reliance on the maximum penaltiеs in its analysis of proportionality instead of focusing on the actual fines and penalties imposed.
¶ 28 When we compare the (1) gravity of Cannon’s conduct; (2) the actual fines, surcharges, and penalties of $9,660.10 imposed; and (3) her probation on the prison and jail sentences, with the value of the forfeited real property at approximately $80,000.00, we must conclude that there is a gross dispro-portionality here under the stаndards set forth in Bajakajian, and the forfeiture cannot be sustained.
II. JUDICIAL NOTICE AS DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
¶ 29 Cannon contends that the trial court violated her due process rights by taking judicial notice of the second and third searches of the defendant property as well as the resolution of criminal charges stemming from the second search. It is unnecessary to reach this question. In our above analysis of disproportionality, we have considered the controverted evidence regarding the second and third searches, but determined that the totality of all evidence does not raise Cannon’s offenses to a level sufficient to overcome the disproportionality.
¶ 30 We additionally do not need to reach Cannon’s contention regarding double jeopardy.
CONCLUSION
¶ 31 Based upon the foregoing analysis, we conclude that assuming the house was an instrumentality of the defendant’s drug offenses, the second prong of the “excessive fine” analysis is not met. The forfeiture of the defendant property is grossly disproportionate. Having decided the case on this basis, appellant’s other arguments on appeal are rendered moot.
¶ 32 Judgment reversed.
Notes
. Cannon was convicted of: (1) possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, for which she was sentenced to prison for zero to five yeаrs; (2) possession of cocaine, a second degree felony, for which she was sentenced to one to fifteen years; (3) illegal drug tax, a third degree felony, for which she was sentenced to zero to five years; and (4) possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, for which she was sentenced to not more than six months in jail. All terms were ordered to run concurrently. Additionally, Cannon was fined $2,000.00, and an additional $1,700.00 surcharge was imposed.
. See U.S. Const. amend. V.; Utah Const. art. I, § 7.
. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Utah Const. art. I, § 9.
. See U.S, Const. amend. V.; Utah Const. art. I, § 12.
.For a more extensive recitation of the analytical background to excessive fines protection and forfeiture, see generally,
. We note that an instrumentality inquiry is not relevant in cases dealing with the forfeiture of monies. Instead, such cases are examined using solely a proportionality dеtermination.
See Bajakajian,
. Harmelin overrules Solem insofar as proportionality relates to an analysis under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. However, Bajakajian, decided seven years after Harmelin, specifically references Solem in discussing the standard of gross dispro-portionality.
. The trial court, having adopted the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own, addressed some of these factors and some of the Solem factors, albeit cursorily. Concerning the excessiveness issue, the trial court concluded:
6. Forfeiture of the property described in this complaint is not excessive,
a.There is a close nexus of the property to the extensive and continued criminal conduct of the claimant in this case.
b. The value of the property forfeited does not grossly exceed the potential fines and fees in this case.
c. The forfeiture will not significantly impact other residents of the property since all but one have also been implicated in the criminal conduct giving risе to forfeiture.
d. The forfeiture is the result of extensive, serious conduct by the claimant which presented significant threat of harm and cost to society.
e. Forfeiture of this property does not impose hardship upon the claimant that is more extensive or severe than would have been imposed for other, equally serious conduct, under the laws of the State of Utah.
f. Forfeiture of property established to have beеn an instrumentality for the sale of drugs is authorized by virtually every state and federal government.
. We note that none of these factors, taken individually, is dispositive. These factors should be considered and weighed together.
. The first two factors used in 6380 Little Canyon Road to determine culpability are more concerned with establishing instrumentality. We therefore will not include these two factors in our proportionality test.
. Charges arising out of the third search were dismissed.
. In fact, at oral argument, upon being asked whether there was case law from which they derived this test, counsel for the State admitted that “I'm not sure that we relied on a case when we came up with our idea. I think that was just something we thought of.”
