STEVEN KAMPMEYER ET AL. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
No. M2019-01196-SC-R11-CV
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
January 13, 2022
April 28, 2021 Session
Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals Tennessee Claims Commission, Middle Division No. T20190265-1 Robert N. Hibbett, Commissioner
This case involves claims against the State of Tennessee asserted by a husband and wife. The claimant husband suffered injuries when his car collided with a Tennessee state vehicle parked in the roadway. He gave written notice of his claim to the Tennessee Division of Claims and Risk Management. The Division did not resolve it, so the Division transferred the claim to the Tennessee Claims Commission. The
Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed
HOLLY KIRBY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROGER A. PAGE, C.J., and SHARON G. LEE and JEFFREY S. BIVINS, JJ., joined. CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., not participating.2
Sidney W. Gilreath and Cary L. Bauer, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Steven Kampmeyer and Melissa Kampmeyer.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andree Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General; and Meghan Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3
On December 11, 2017, Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT“) employees parked two TDOT trucks on an overpass in the center lane of State Highway 111 in Sequatchie County, Tennessee, not far from the exit to Dunlap, Tennessee. After exiting the trucks, two TDOT employees applied a de-icing agent to the overpass. The TDOT employees placed no signs or other devices to warn oncoming drivers of the presence of the trucks in the middle of the highway. As the employees worked on the overpass, neither TDOT vehicle displayed hazard signals.
Meanwhile, Plaintiff/Appellant Steven Kampmeyer, a Florida resident, was driving his vehicle north on State Highway 111 toward that same overpass and the TDOT vehicles parked in the middle of the road. Mr. Kampmeyer‘s vehicle plowed into the rear of one of the TDOT vehicles. Mr. Kampmeyer suffered extensive injuries in the collision, including a broken leg, broken facial bones, and traumatic brain injury.
On August 9, 2018, Mr. Kampmeyer filed written notice of a claim for damages with Tennessee‘s Division of Claims and Risk Management. Pursuant to
On December 5, 2018, Mr. Kampmeyer and his wife, Plaintiff/Appellant Melissa Kampmeyer, jointly filed a complaint with the Claims Commission based on the same factual allegations in the written notice Mr. Kampmeyer filed with the Division of Claims and Risk Management. The complaint alleged that TDOT violated Tennessee law and its own safety standards. It also contained a claim for loss of consortium by Mrs. Kampmeyer that had not been included in the written notice of claim
In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss. In pertinent part, the State argued that Mrs. Kampmeyer did not give written notice of her claim against the State to the Division of Claims and Risk Management as required by
In reply, the Plaintiffs acknowledged that Mr. Kampmeyer‘s notice of claim with the Division of Claims and Risk Management did not include Mrs. Kampmeyer‘s claim for loss of consortium. They noted, however, that the Kampmeyers’ joint complaint was filed with the Claims Commission within the one-year statute of limitations. Consequently, as to Mrs. Kampmeyer, the Claims Commission should have treated the complaint as a written notice of claim mistakenly filed with the Claims Commission instead of the Division of Claims and Risk Management and transferred it to the Division. For those reasons, they contended, the Claims Commission should deem Mrs. Kampmeyer‘s consortium claim timely.
The Claims Commission granted the State‘s motion to dismiss Mrs. Kampmeyer‘s consortium claim. It held Mrs. Kampmeyer was a separate claimant and had to give written notice of her claim to the Division of Claims and Risk Management within the statute of limitations. Because she had not, the Claims Commission dismissed her claim.
At Mrs. Kampmeyer‘s request, the Claims Commission made its dismissal order final and appealable pursuant to
On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Claims Commission that
The Kampmeyers then sought permission to appeal to this Court, which was granted.
ANALYSIS
The only issue in this appeal is whether the Claims Commission erred by dismissing Mrs. Kampmeyer‘s claim for loss of consortium.6 Resolving this issue requires us to interpret statutes governing the Tennessee Claims Commission and the Division of Claims and Risk Management. Issues of statutory interpretation present a question of law, which we review de novo on appeal, giving no deference to the lower court decision. In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 552 (Tenn. 2015).
Management8 in order to facilitate informal settlement of claims against the State.9 Currently, both are housed within the Department of Treasury.
This Court has summarized the process of giving initial written notice of a claim to the Division of Claims and Risk Management and filing a complaint with the Claims Commission:
The Claims Commission Act sets forth a structure designed to afford the State ample opportunity to resolve a claim administratively, without the need for a lawsuit. Thus, it requires a written notice with basic information about the claim, and provides that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled by the filing of the notice.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402 . The Act then gives the Division of Claims a “ninety-day settlement period” in which it is to investigate the claim and “make every effort” to either honor or deny it.Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(c) . If the Division decides to honor the claim, the statute addresses its efforts to settle with the claimant. Id. If the claim is either honored or denied within the 90-day “settlement period,” the claimant is informed of his right to file a claim with the Claims Commission. However, if it is neither honored nor denied during the settlement period, the claim is automatically transferred to the administrative clerk of the Claims Commission for adjudication. Id.. . . [I]f the matter is not settled during the 90-day settlement period and is transferred to the Claims Commission‘s administrative clerk, the Claims Commission regulations provide that the claimant “shall file a complaint....”
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0310-01-01-.01(2)(d)(3) . Thus, under the Claims Commission Act and the accompanying regulations, the written notice and the complaint serve different functions. The written notice triggers a protected 90-day “settlement period” designed to facilitate the resolution of claims without litigation. The State is neither expected nor required to file an answer to the notice of the claim, and the claimant is not entitled to discovery during the protected settlement period. To adjudicate the claim, the notice alone will not suffice; the claimant must also file a
complaint that complies with Rules 8 and 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795, 804–05 (Tenn. 2015) (footnote and some citations omitted).
As referenced in Moreno,
In this case, Mr. Kampmeyer complied with section 9-8-402(a)(1) by filing written notice of his claim with the Division of Claims and Risk Management. As the Kampmeyers concede, however, the written notice Mr. Kampmeyer filed with the Division did not include Mrs. Kampmeyer‘s consortium claim.
On appeal, the Kampmeyers contend that they gave the requisite notice of Mrs. Kampmeyer‘s consortium claim by including it in the complaint with the Claims Commission, which was filed within the one-year statute of limitations.10 They argue that the relationship between the Claims Commission and the Division is such that the Claims Commission complaint provided notice to the Division. Relying on Hunter v. State, No. 01-A-01-9210-BC00425, 1993 WL 133240 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1993), the Kampmeyers contend that the Claims Commission should have simply forwarded the complaint containing Mrs. Kampmeyer‘s claim to the Division.
In Hunter, claimant Anthony Hunter did not file written notice of his wrongful death claim with the Division of Claims and Risk Management. Instead, he sent a complaint by Federal Express to the Claims Commission; it arrived one day before the statute of limitations ran. Id. at *1. The Claims Commission transferred the complaint to the Division, which Hunter described as in keeping with the Claims Commission‘s “practice” when “claims [were] mistakenly filed there.” Id. The complaint, however, did not arrive at the Division until after the limitations period had lapsed. Id.
After it received Mr. Hunter‘s complaint, the Division determined it could not act on it within the statutory ninety-day period, so it transferred the complaint back to the Claims Commission. Id. The Commission then dismissed the complaint as time-barred. Id. The claimant appealed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in Hunter reversed. Interpreting the statutes that govern the Claims Commission and the Division of Claims and Risk Management, the intermediate appellate court first noted that
Hunter perceived these statutes as “potentially inconsistent,” in that the Claims Commission purportedly had exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the State but the Division of Claims and Risk Management was given limited authority over them as well. Id. at *2. The potential inconsistency put a duty on the court, it said, to avoid construing the statutes in a manner that would place them “in conflict” with one another. Id. (citing Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Woods, 561 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn. 1978)). The court then held:
In order for us to construe these two provisions without conflict, we are compelled to find that the Division [of Claims and Risk Management], although from a different department of the state, is but an extension or adjunct of the Claims Commission. Otherwise, the Claims Commission could not be said to have exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, under our interpretation a claim filed with the Division [of Claims and Risk Management] or with the Claims Commission is valid if filed within the applicable statute of limitations.
Id. On that basis, Hunter reversed the Claims Commission‘s dismissal of the complaint.
In a footnote, the court commented that “allowing claims to be filed with the Claims Commission” did not prejudice the Division, and added: “Moreover, as the record indicates, claims mistakenly filed with the Claims Commission are usually forwarded to the Division... on the same day.” Id. at *2 n.1.
In reliance on Hunter, the Kampmeyers maintain that they timely gave written notice of Mrs. Kampmeyer‘s consortium claim by including her claim in the complaint with the Claims Commission, which was filed within the statute of limitations. Under Hunter, a complaint filed with the Claims Commission within the statute of limitations serves as notice to the Division of Claims and Risk Management, so they satisfied the requirements of
Though not explicitly stated in Hunter, the court in that case implicitly interpreted
Is Hunter‘s interpretation warranted? We think not. In statutory interpretation, “[t]he text of the statute is of primary importance.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 552 (quoting Mills v. Fulmarque, 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012)). A statute should be read naturally and reasonably, with the presumption that the legislature says what it means and means what it says. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth. v. UnitedHealthcare Plan of the River Valley, Inc., 475 S.W.3d 746, 758 (Tenn. 2015). Here, the General Assembly could have added language to section 9-8-402(a)(1) stating that claimants can give written notice of claims to either the Division of Claims and Risk Management or to the Claims Commission. It chose not to do so.
Nor is there a conflict between sections 9-8-307(a) and 9-8-402(c) that would necessitate
assigned to the Division of Claims and Risk Management does not infringe on the Claims Commission‘s ability to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over claims that are litigated. Thus, there is no conflict between sections 9-8-307(a) and 9-8-402(c) that would require us to hold, as Hunter did, that written notice of a claim against the State can be filed with either the Claims Commission or the Division of Claims and Risk Management.
We see little in the statutes to support Hunter‘s assertion that the Division of Claims and Risk Management “is but an extension or adjunct of the Claims Commission.” 1993 WL 133240, at *2. From the beginning, they were separate entities. See 1984 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 972, §§ 1, 9. Indeed, at the time Hunter was decided, the two entities were housed administratively in different parts of state government. See 1993 WL 133240, at *2. At that time, the Division of Claims and Risk Management was in the Department of Treasury and the Claims Commission was in the Department of Commerce and Insurance.11
The Court of Appeals’ opinion in Hunter included comments that “claims mistakenly filed with the Claims Commission are usually forwarded to the Division of Claims [and Risk Management],” describing this as the Commission‘s normal “practice.” Id. at *1 & n.1. Whatever the record in Hunter may have shown, nothing in the record before us indicates the Commission has such a “practice” today. Moreover, nothing in the governing statutes requires the Claims Commission to forward complaints to the Division of Claims and Risk Management.
The Kampmeyers point out hopefully that another provision of section 9-8-402 requires the Claims Commission to transfer some claims to yet another separate entity, the Board of Claims. See
Both parties argue that this case is governed by our decision in Moreno, and indeed the Court of Appeals below held as much. See Kampmeyer, 2020 WL 5110303, at *4 (“Notwithstanding Hunter, we are bound by the binding precedent of the Tennessee Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Moreno . . . .“). We respectfully disagree. Certainly, Moreno discusses in general terms the statutes governing the Claims Commission and the Division of Claims and Risk Management, as noted above. However, the issue decided in Moreno was whether a written notice of claim filed in the Division of Claims and Risk Management within the statute of limitations is “an original complaint” within the meaning of our comparative fault statute,
Ultimately, our decision must rest on the text of
CONCLUSION
We hold that
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to appellants Steven and Melissa Kampmeyer, for which execution may issue if necessary.
HOLLY KIRBY, JUSTICE