State v. YoungState v. Young
Rendered on March 29, 2013
Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Sheryl L. Prichard, for appellee.
Dustin M. Blake, for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Edward L. Young (“appellant“), appeals from his conviction in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas of criminal offenses charged against him based on his actions in a dispute with his girlfriend. The trial court sat as the finder of fact and found appellant guilty of felonious assault, abduction, and domestic violence. The court merged the felonious assault charge with the domestic violence charge and sentenced appellant to three years of community control. Appellant contends that the findings of guilt were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We reject this contention and affirm appellant‘s conviction and sentence.
{¶ 2} The state called two witnesses in prosecuting its case. The first witness to testify was Arianna Howard (“Howard“). She testified that on the date of the dispute, December 26, 2010, she and appellant had been boyfriend and girlfriend off and on for six
{¶ 3} The police and paramedics arrived at the apartment. The police advised Howard to seek a protection order. Howard testified that the paramedics told her that they did not believe her jaw was broken and advised her to ice it and take ibuprofen.
{¶ 4} The following day, Howard reported the incident to the city prosecutor‘s office in order to seek a protection order. Members of the prosecutor‘s staff took photographs of Howard‘s face. Howard testified that the photos correctly reflected bruises, swelling, and other discoloration of her face on the day following the dispute. The court accepted the photos into evidence.
{¶ 5} Several days after the incident, Howard went to the emergency room because the pain in her jaw remained intense and was worsening. X-rays disclosed a fracture of her jaw. Howard underwent surgery to set the jaw, which was wired shut for seven weeks. During that period, appellant could not eat or drink except through a straw. For the first several days after surgery, she was unable to talk. She missed approximately eight weeks of work as a schoolteacher and was not offered a teacher‘s contract for the following school year.
{¶ 7} On cross-examination, Dr. Bernacki acknowledged that a fracture of the jaw could occur as the result of a fall or other causes.
{¶ 8} Based on the evidence presented by the state, the trial court found appellant guilty of felonious assault, in violation of
{¶ 9} Appellant assigns three errors for this court‘s review:
[1.] THE TRIAL COURT‘S JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF FELONIOUS ASSAULT AGAINST APPELLANT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
[2.] THE TRIAL COURT‘S JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF ABDUCTION AGAINST APPELLANT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
[3.] THE TRIAL COURT‘S JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST APPELLANT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
Felonious Assault
{¶ 11} The trial court found appellant guilty of felonious assault in violation of
{¶ 12} We first address appellant‘s manifest-weight argument that he did not “knowingly“cause serious physical harm to Howard. “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.”
{¶ 13} Appellant did not testify at trial and, therefore, there is no direct evidence as to appellant‘s mental state at the time he struck Howard. Intent to cause serious physical harm in a felonious assault case may, however, be determined from the surrounding facts and circumstances. State v. McClelland, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-205, 2008-Ohio-6305, ¶ 18, citing State v. Robinson, 161 Ohio St.2d 213 (1954). Moreover, “a person is presumed to intend the natural, reasonable and probable consequences of his voluntary acts.” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 39 (1978). Further, ” ‘it is not necessary that the accused be in a position to foresee the precise consequence of his conduct; only that the consequence be foreseeable in the sense that what actually transpired was natural and logical in that it was within the scope of the risk created by his conduct.’ ” McClelland, quoting State v. Losey, 23 Ohio App.3d 93, 96 (1985). Accordingly, in a felonious assault case, the state need not prove that a defendant knew that his conduct would produce a specific injury, here a broken jaw, but only that the actual injury was a natural and logical consequence and within the scope of the risk created by his conduct. Id.
{¶ 14} We acknowledge that Howard‘s testimony concerning appellant‘s act of striking her was limited. She could not remember whether appellant struck her with an open fist or with an open hand. But there is no dispute that Howard suffered a broken jaw, nor was there evidence contradicting her testimony that she immediately suffered intense pain in her lower jaw when struck by appellant and that her “face wasn‘t stinging as if [she] had been slapped.” (Tr. 22.) Moreover, photographs taken the day following the incident reinforced her testimony that she was struck hard enough to produce swelling and red marks on the left side of her face.
{¶ 15} In light of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court judge, who observed both the appellant and his victim, did not clearly lose his way or create a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding that appellant knowingly caused Howard severe physical harm. Appellant hit her hard enough to break her jaw. That fact supports the trial court‘s conclusion that appellant was aware that his act would cause Howard serious physical harm. Accord State v. Horton, 10th Dist. No. 95APA04-455 (Dec. 19, 1995) (nature of victim‘s injuries, including prolonged blurred vision, a swollen eye, and a
{¶ 16} We further reject appellant‘s argument that the trial court judge lost his way in determining that Howard‘s broken jaw was, in fact, caused by appellant‘s hitting her in the face, as opposed to some other cause. No evidence was produced of any other cause, and the argument is, at root, a challenge to Howard‘s credibility. We will not question the trial court‘s acceptance of Howard‘s testimony that her jaw was broken as a result of appellant striking her.
{¶ 17} We therefore find that appellant‘s first assignment of error is without merit, and we overrule it.
Abduction
{¶ 18} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that a finding of guilt of the crime of abduction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20}
{¶ 21} Appellant contends that the state failed to provide evidence sufficient to show that appellant used “force or threat” to restrain her liberty. He notes that Howard did not testify that appellant did not put his hands on her to prevent her from leaving the
{¶ 22} Appellant‘s argument ignores the fact that appellant had shortly before hit Howard enough to break her jaw. Certainly that act, combined with his conduct immediately thereafter in blocking her retreat through both a door and window, justified a finding that his conduct was threatening. Accord State v. Banks, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1286, 2004-Ohio-6522, ¶ 27 (“clearly, holding someone at gunpoint could be perceived to be a ‘force or threat’ “). Moreover, Howard specifically testified that she was in fear of Howard, undoubtedly prompting her wish to leave the apartment to avoid the threat of additional physical abuse. In finding appellant guilty of abduction, the trial court determined that appellant had knowingly restrained Howard‘s liberty by force or threat under circumstances that put Howard in fear. That finding was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The fact that appellant eventually abandoned his restraint of Howard‘s liberty and left the apartment does not change the conclusion that he had earlier committed the crime of abduction.
{¶ 23} Accordingly, appellant‘s second assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.
Domestic violence
{¶ 24} In his third assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court‘s finding that he was guilty of the crime of domestic violence was against the manifest weight of the evidence. That crime is established by
{¶ 25} But, again, appellant‘s argument merely challenges the truth of Howard‘s testimony. She testified that she and appellant were living together on the date of the crimes and that her broken jaw was the result of appellant‘s violent conduct towards her.
{¶ 26} Accordingly, appellant‘s third assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.
{¶ 27} For the foregoing reasons, appellant‘s three assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
BROWN and SADLER, JJ., concur.